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"Unknown to me the wounds of the famine of 1943, the barbarities of war, the 
horror of the communal riots of 1946 were impinging on my style and engraving 
themselves on it, till there came a time when whatever I did, whether it was 
chiseling a piece of wood, or burning metal with acid to create a gaping hole, or 
cutting and tearing with no premeditated design, it would throw up innumerable 
wounds, bodying forth a single theme - the figures of the deprived, the destitute 
and the abandoned converging on us from all directions.  The first chalk marks of 
famine that had passed from the fingers to engrave themselves on the heart persist 
indelibly." 
 
                Somnath Hore2
 
 
                                                 
1 Somnath Hore.  "The Holocaust."  Sculpture.  Indian Writing, October 3, 2006.  Web 
(http://indianwriting.blogsome.com/2006/10/03/somnath-hore/) accessed 04/19/2011. 
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Introduction: In Search of Famine 
 
 
In Search of Famine 
 In Mrinal Sen's 1980 film, Ākāler Sadhāney ("In Search of Famine"), a smart, 
middle-class film crew from Calcutta descends on a humble Bengali village to shoot a 
movie on the Bengal Famine of 1943.  Sen's film begins with a long shot of a typical 
country road, edged on either side by arching banyan trees, cutting through the vast Bengali 
plain. Rice fields fade into the distance, and on the far horizon a diesel engine puffs its 
single column of thin black smoke soundlessly into the pale blue sky - a mute signal of a 
distant modernity that punctuates the otherwise timeless landscape.  The camera pans to a 
caravan of vehicles that carry the film crew to their far-flung destination, and as the vans 
rumble past, a few stragglers who toil along the highway with loads of firewood perched 
precariously on their heads, or bales of hay piled high on bullock carts, stumble out of the 
way of the indifferent procession.  Accompanying the credits, as they begin to role, is a 
song by Salil Chaudury, Bengali poet and songwriter known for his gritty rustic themes and 
his long-lived solidarity with the people: 
 We know you well 
 We see you clear 
 Aren't you the dark-skinned mahout 
 who drives the white elephant? 
 
 We died in millions in fifty1
 When our mothers and sisters lost their honor 
 
 We'll not take our rice to somebody else's store 
 We'll not die of starvation again 
 We refuse to die2
 
 
The scene is thus set against a backdrop of nostalgic resistance.  The famine has come and 
gone; the spirit of Bengal has triumphed over death and depredation. But as the crew arrive 
                                                 
1 1350 is the Bengali year corresponding to 1943 
2 Translation taken from Samik Bandyopadhyay, p. 1 
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at their filming location, the camera moves in for a close shot of the ravaged face of a 
wizened peasant who stands by the wayside, wryly tracking the urbanites as they dismount. 
The old peasant strikes an ironic and ominous note: "The city folk have come to take 
pictures of the famine.  The famine is all over us."3
 The script from which the film crew works contains all of the well-worn tropes of 
the 1943 famine which are firmly lodged in the collective consciousness of Bengal. The 
setting: a small, nameless village in rural Bengal, riven by starvation and disease. Many of 
the desperate villagers have left for Calcutta in search of relief.  Many more have died.  
Those who remain, await a similar fate, balancing their options between death and an 
uncertain pilgrimage to the city.  Center stage is a small nuclear family consisting of a 
father, his son, his son's wife, and their small child.  The father is dying of starvation, but 
refuses to sell his chip of land to the moneylender who travels the countryside preying on 
the destitute.  The old man's son has gone off to work for military contractors, cutting 
bamboo which will be sent to the war front to build tents for Indian soldiers employed by 
the British army in their fight against the Japanese. On his return he complains of the 
insufficient wages he has received. The price of rice has gone out of reach, and the brightly 
printed rupee notes with which he has been compensated are all but worthless in the face of 
ever-escalating wartime inflation.  The old man dies shortly and the son stubbornly 
maintains his lost father's resistance to the moneylender in order to uphold the family's 
beleaguered honor.  When he himself is laid low by fever, however, the family situation 
becomes desperate and dignity cannot be maintained. With her husband bed-ridden and 
delirious, and their helpless infant crying in hunger, Savitri, the small holder's young wife, 
leaves one stormy night to strike a deal with Malati, a former housewife who has been 
driven to prostitution by the death of her own husband.  When Savitri returns home with a 
few cups of rice and cooking oil, her husband flies into a rage, suspecting her of 
defilement.  With the last of his energy the dying man smashes the pot in which the rice is 
boiling, and raises the infant over his head, poised to smash it as well, in order to end, once 
and for all, the family's descent into disgrace.  
   
 The shooting of this film inside the film runs into some insurmountable obstacles 
along the way.  When Devika, the prima donna actress caste in the role of Matali, arrives to 
                                                 
3 Ibid, p. 2 
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shoot the crucial scene of Savitri's humiliation with a fashionable bob and plucked 
eyebrows, the director is irate, "What's this?  What have you done?  Didn't I warn you not 
to pluck your eyebrows?  Why don't you realize that you have a responsibility?  You're not 
just any woman, you stand for a thousand women, an entire class."4
 The underlying theme behind the master narrative is that the famine that the crew 
has come "in search of" is everywhere to be found and leaps out at them at every turn, 
crowding into the frame from every angle.  As the old wizened peasant in the opening shot 
had foretold: the famine is "all over" the people of the village, and recurrently resists the 
narrative in which the director tries to contain it.  Having ventured to represent the 1943 
famine as a circumscribed "event," these well-meaning intellectuals from Calcutta only 
succeed in reproducing the famine in telling ways.  The search for an actress to play the 
role of a woman driven to prostitution by hunger is interpreted by the villagers as an effort 
to dishonor them, to prey on their poverty, and to "buy" a girl cheap to finish their quixotic 
project.  At one point in the film an anonymous villager complains to a member of the 
crew, "the price of everything; vegetables, fish, eggs, have gone up like anything, thanks to 
  Devika, tired to death 
with the hardships of working so far from Calcutta in any case, takes offence at the 
director's reprimand and packs off for the city in a huff.  Now the director is faced with the 
problem of finding an actress to play the prostitute Matali.  He approaches a respectable 
member of the village whose daughter, he has heard, is intelligent and was recently 
honored in school for her oratory skills.  The father, when he hears a description of the role 
that the director is asking his daughter to play, is furious and, calling the director and his 
agent "pimps," shows them the door.  The director is forced to look elsewhere to fill the 
role, but finds that everywhere he turns the citizens of the village have already heard of his 
search for a likely prostitute and have shut their doors against him. Finally, seeing the 
director's desperation, Haren, an unemployed local who has impressed himself upon the 
crew as a stagehand in the hopes of earning a few rupees, brings his own daughter to the 
director in the hopes that he might find her "suitable for the role."  By this time, however, 
the village has been mobilized against the crew and it has become dangerous to remain.  
And so, at the village headmaster's suggestion, they pack their generators, lights and 
cameras and head back to Calcutta to finish their work "in the studio."   
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 27 
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you.  Most of it goes to the city anyway.  The little that we used to get has gone beyond our 
reach.  It is all now for the film folk." In another scene, perhaps the most well known in the 
film, the director plays a "picture game" with his crew.  Having dug up pictures of famine 
from newspaper archives and private collections, the director challenges the crew to locate 
them temporally: 
Director (holding up the first picture of an emaciated body): Tell what period this 
     is from? 
Bubu: Should be 1943. 
Rathin: '43 
Montu: Famine, that's for sure. 
Nilkantha: 1943. 
Dipankar: May I?  (the director nods)  1959. 
Smita: How could you guess? 
Director: He knew.  I told him.  There was a famine in 1959.  A picture from then.   
One of the hunger marchers. 
 






Smita (holding up a third picture):  Identify this. 
Nilkantha: That's '43. 
Montu: '43 
Jochhan: Once again? 
Rathin: This is '43. 
Dipankar: Well - what is it? 
Smita: 1971. 
Director: Bangladesh.  Don't you remember?5
 
 
Another picture from the archives baffles one and all - it is a picture of the starving Buddha 
from a second century Kandahar sculpture.  
 Through such dialogic and cinematic means Sen is able to complicate both the 
temporal location and ontological meaning of famine in Ākāler Sadhāney.  The famine 
that the crew has gone in search of cannot be framed.  Rather it escapes boundaries, 
resists narration, reverberates in the present, and replicates itself in the contemporary 
social context.  The "story" that the director would like to tell, a story that incorporates all 
the tropes that are often assumed to encapsulate the Bengal Famine of 1943, is pulled 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 34-35 
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apart by the contingencies of social distance, historical presumption and structural 
continuity.  Famine obeys none of the rules of circumscribed representation.  The 
problems that the film crew experience are problems that will remain in any effort to 
frame an "event" as massive as the Bengal Famine.  In my own perhaps even more 
quixotic search for famine these problems of framing have been, likewise, acute.  The 
distances I have traveled, both geographically and socially, "in search of famine" have 
dwarfed those crossed by Sen's film crew in Ākāler Sadhāney.  In this light it would be 
impossible for me to presume to be able to capture famine in still life.  What I am capable 
of, however, is a further expansion and complication of the frames in which famine has 
been represented.  As such, my aim is to let the monster out of the box. 
 
Framing Famine 
 As creatively depicted in Mrinal Sen's film, the received association between the 
particular year 1943 and famine in Bengal is a trope that can be extremely misleading.  
The period under consideration in the pages to follow, September 1939 - September 
1946, is a period that represents an unparalleled epoch of turmoil, upheaval and 
misfortune in modern Bengal.  A central argument that I will be making throughout this 
work is that the most profound factor influencing the structural, political, social, 
economic, and communal fabric of Bengal - during this entire era - was famine. As such, 
a primary aim of this work is to de-link famine in Bengal from the year 1943, and to 
demonstrate the to extent to which hunger, scarcity, starvation and disease remained 
central to the torturous and volatile socio-political circumstances throughout this seven-
year period. Though 1943 was, perhaps, the most graphic and extreme stage of famine in 
Bengal -  particularly in the capital city of Calcutta - famine, as in the words of historian 
Mike Davis, "is part of a continuum with the silent violence of malnutrition that precedes 
and conditions it, and with the mortality shadow of debilitation and disease that follows 
it."6
                                                 
6 Davis, p. 21 
  Famine, in this sense, is inextricably woven into the fabric of famine societies, and 
as a "part of a continuum," as Mrinal Sen has portrayed, leaps out of every frame that is 
constructed to contain it. 
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 In the official reckoning of the time, the effort to de-limit famine to the year of 
1943 is most pronounced.  Denials, indifference, and administrative incompetence led to 
the highly consequential failure - by default or design - to recognize famine until as late 
as September of 1943 - once its eruption on the streets of Calcutta could no longer be 
ignored.  In its Report on Bengal, the imperially sanctioned Famine Enquiry Commission 
found, a bit less conservatively, that the Bengal Famine had, in fact, begun "in the early 
months" of the same year.7  This contention was later complicated by historian Paul 
Greenough, in his work Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal,  which represents the 
only existent full-length study of the Bengal Famine until now.  Writing in 1982, 
Greenough argues that the Bengal Famine could said to have begun in October of 1942, 
in the wake of a devastating cyclone which decimated the district of Midnapur, south-
west of Calcutta.8 However, as early as August 2nd of 1942, the Chief Minister of 
Bengal, Fazlul Huq, had informed the colonial administration, that "at the present 
moment we are faced with a rice famine in Bengal."9 As I will demonstrate in Chapters 
One and Two of the work to follow, even this early recognition by the Chief Minister was 
extremely tardy.  Reports of famine from the districts of Bengal had been wide-spread 
since at least two years earlier.  Moreover, the abject impoverishment of the Bengal 
country-side and "the silent violence of malnutrition," that define the long trajectory of 
famine, had been at least a decade in the making.  As early as 1934, Bengali social 
scientist Satish Chandra Mitter noted in his Recovery Plan for Bengal that the rural poor, 
even at that time, "[could not] but be hunger-stricken and starving."10
The "end" of famine in Bengal, is a similarly slippery slope.  With military aid to 
the famine devastated province having begun in November of 1943, by December 18th the 
Food Member of the Government of India could pronounce, "We are now faced with the 




                                                 
7 Report on Bengal, p. 1 
  As I will show in Chapter Six, however, starvation, and a myriad of 
diseases that preyed on the starving population, remained a nagging reality well into 1946.  
Writing in 1981, economist Amartya Sen came to a similar conclusion in his renowned 
8 Greenough, p. 96 
9 Letter from Fazlul Huq to Governor Jack Herbert, August 2, 1942, reprinted in: Shila Sen, p. 273 
10 Ibid, p. 13 
11 The Statesman, December 18th, 1943 
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work, Poverty and Famines. In conclusion to his case study of famine mortality in mid-
20th century Bengal, Sen notes, "very substantially more than half the deaths attributable to 
the famine of 1943 took place after 1943."12  In fact, though Sen's effort is essentially one 
of estimating the total fatalities of famine in Bengal, he writes, "What emerges most 
powerfully from our analysis is not so much the largeness of the size of total mortality, but 
its time pattern."13  He continues, "if the turmoil of the partition of Bengal in 1947 and the 
displacement resulting from it make us reluctant to read the impact of famine in the excess 
mortality figures beyond 1946, we can be conservative and count the excess figures only 
during 1943-46."14
My own effort to complicate the chronology of famine in Bengal is less 
quantitative.  In expanding the time frame of famine in Bengal, it is my aim to more 
accurately and explicitly illuminate the awesome magnitude of famine in Bengal - not in 
order to count bodies, but in order to demonstrate the extremely protracted entailments of 
famine on the socio-political landscape of Bengal.  In this context, it is also a primary goal 
in this work to investigate another of the most widespread and also widely accepted tropes 
related to the Bengal Famine - that it was "man-made."  Only a month after the English 
language newspaper, The Statesman, had depicted famine in Bengal to India and the 
international community in images too explicit to be further denied, the public was 
reminded: "this sickening catastrophe is man made."
 Thus, Sen punctuates his accounting of famine mortality with the 
Calcutta riots of 1946 - which is significant.  
15  The Bengal Famine of 1943, as it 
had already come to be known, had not resulted from any "calamity of Nature," but instead 
was the result of shameful and prolonged "Governmental bungling."16 The understanding 
that the Bengal Famine was "man-made" has, ever since, met with few detractors.17
                                                 
12 Sen (1981), p. 215 
 In the 
dozens of interviews that I have conducted with survivors from the 1940s, this explanation 
was very eagerly and extremely indignantly advanced by almost all.  Most scholars of the 
famine have followed suit.  In Poverty and Famines, Amartya Sen has famously identified 
13 Ibid, p. 202 
14 Ibid, p. 200-201 
15 The Statesman, "Reflections on Disaster," September 23, 1943 
16 Ibid 
17 Although the Famine Enquiry Commission's Report on Bengal supported the idea of deficit, and Sugata 
Bose, in his Agrarian Bengal, advances an explanation that comes closer to a theory Food Availability 
Decline (FAD)  
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a crisis of entitlements,18
In the present work, particularly in Chapters Two, Three and Four, I aim to detail, 
on a much more comprehensive scale, the intricacies, agencies, and ideologies that defined 
the making of the Bengal Famine.  It is a truly monumental affair to kill off at least three 
million people in the short span of (as few as) three years.
 rather than actual scarcity, as the determining factor leading to 
famine, lending persuasive theoretical weight to the popularly held contention that the 
Bengal Famine of 1943 was "man-made." In a much more recent work, Churchill's Secret 
War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II,  journalist 
Madhusree Mukerjee has made a compelling and poignant argument detailing the extent to 
which high colonial policy in London - particularly in relation to the refusal of imports to 
India during the height of famine - contributed to the manufacture of famine in Bengal.  
19
                                                 
18 essentially purchasing power 
 High colonial policy, of 
course, usually in the name of the war effort, played an important role, but responsibilities 
were widespread.  Seeking colonial favor, or entrenched in "opposition," the response to 
famine by Indian politicians in both Bengal and New Delhi, was also guided, often enough, 
by political interest rather than public welfare.  This disconnect between the misery of the 
masses and the expediency of the elite was even more pronounced in relation to the 
involvement of large capital interests.  In a time of record profits, industrial firms in and 
around Calcutta played a central role in the extraction of rice from the countryside that 
effectively left villagers to starve.  Partnering with Government, business interests - Indian 
and European alike - descended on the country-side in repeated and rapacious rice 
appropriation schemes in the name of feeding industrial Calcutta.  With each consecutive 
effort, prices escalated further, more stocks went into the black-market, and more 
inhabitants of the province sunk into starvation.  It was therefore at least as much profit that 
motivated the rapacity that ravaged Bengal, as it was the colonial creed of racial and 
cultural superiority.  In meticulously detailing the ways and means, as well as the 
ideologies and prejudices, with which policies leading to famine were enacted, I hope to 
capture some measure of the outrage and anguish with which so many have reminded me 
that the Bengal Famine was "man-made."   
19 I use "three million" and "three years" in reference to Amartya Sen's numbers, as I have already argued, 
famine in Bengal spanned more than three years, and the number of dead also is likely to exceed three 
million. 
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A third trope which has come to be almost universally accepted is that the victims 
of famine, as in the words of eminent historian Sugata Bose, "died without a murmur."20
By the summer of 1942, the nationalist leadership, and Mahatma Gandhi in 
particular, were also openly contesting the policies and practices that would lead to the 
further destitution of the Bengal countryside.  Policies that directly led to famine - and were 
understood as promising the same - were, in fact, central to the stand-off between the 
Indian National Congress and the Government of India, which led to the arrest of the 
national leadership in August of 1942, and the widespread violence of the "Quit India" 
movement that ensued.  As I will also detail in Chapter Three, central to Gandhi's fast of 
early 1943 was concern for the "privations of the poor millions." That these acts of protest 
failed to stem the progress of famine, does not negate the fact that resistance was, in fact, 
prevalent.  
 
This idea that famine victims died passively, without resistance, and without a fight, 
however, is a claim that cannot live up to historical scrutiny.  In fact, I would argue, it is 
not possible for millions to die "without a murmur." Rather it is only a replication of the 
same forces that served to marginalize these same masses to the point of extermination that 
renders them silent.  To attribute this sort of silence and surrender to the victims of cruel 
and calculated annihilation is only to degrade their lives still further. In fact, and as I will 
demonstrate in all the chapters included in this work, famine was very much contested at 
every stage.  Particularly when the chronology of famine is expanded, it can be seen that 
active resistance - from the highest echelons of the nationalist leadership to the farthest 
reaches of destitution - was widespread.  From the earliest governmental and corporate 
schemes to denude the countryside of rice, the boats, lorries, and bullock carts employed in 
the effort were attacked and looted by outraged villagers who well understood the 
implications of these efforts at extraction.  Government, recognizing the threat, could only 
move rice and paddy under armed military escort, which is also a clear indication of the 
resistance they faced. Paddy was also looted from small-scale capitalist who were hoarding 
stocks locally, even while poor villagers were beginning to die in large numbers.  
Because the Bengal Famine has all-too-often been de-limited to the year 1943, 
however, the contention that victims of famine died without protest is mostly founded on 
                                                 
20 Bose (1986), p. 96 
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the presumption that because victims at the height of famine, in the very last stages of bare 
life, riven with hunger and disease and de-vitalized to the point of collapse, failed to attack 
rice shops in Calcutta, they did not "resist."  The historiography of resistance, however, has 
undergone very productive development in the more recent past, particularly with 
methodologies pioneered by historians of the subaltern school, such as Ranajit Guha and 
Gautam Bhadra.21
 
 With a more subtle eye turned towards the agency of the most marginal 
citizens of Bengal, in Chapter Four, I will example how famine victims resisted state 
authority, literally, until their last breath.  Famine in Bengal, after all, had not snuck up on 
anyone surreptitiously.  The population of the province well understood the implications of 
its brutal enemy from long and bitter experience. 
War and Famine 
The first, and most spectacular, famine under British rule followed close on the 
heels of the British East India Company's victory at Plassey.  Between the years of 1769 
and 1771 at least one third of the population of Bengal - then estimated to be 30 million - 
was wiped out by famine.22
The Imperial Gazetteer of India
  William Wilson Hunter, British civil servant, and compiler 
of , was also author of one of the few colonial 
descriptions of the 1770 Bengal famine, in his Annals of Rural Bengal, written in 1868.  
The death from starvation and disease of 10 million or more of the Company's newly 
acquired subjects, places in new light, Hunter writes,  
those broad tracks of desolation which the British conquerors found everywhere 
throughout the Lower Valley; it enfolds the sufferings entailed on an ancient rural 
society by being suddenly placed in a position which its immemorial forms and 
usages could no longer apply; and then it explains how, out of disorganized and 
fragmentary elements, a new order of things was evolved.23
 
 
That depopulation through starvation had made of Bengal something of a "clean 
slate," however, was not entirely a surprise.  The Famine Commission investigating 
events leading up to the 1770 famine reported:  
                                                 
21 See Ranajit Guha's Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 1983, and Gautam Bhadra's "Four Rebels of 1857," in Ranajit Guha, ed. Subaltern Studies IV: 
Writings on South Asian History and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985) 
22 See W.W. Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, also: Brahma Nand, Famines in Colonial India, and: Kali 
Charan Ghosh, Famines in Bengal. 
23 Hunter, p. 19-20 
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In October 1769, very gloomy reports were received from Behar and North 
Bengal.  In November the Collector-General 'saw an alarming prospect of the 
province becoming desolate' and the Government wrote home to the Court of 
Directors in the most alarming terms.  They resolved to lay up six months' store of 




Hunter implies, however, that these efforts at martial appropriation of rice were not 
entirely effective.  Even as "day and night a torrent of famished and disease-stricken 
wretches poured into the great cities:"25
The troops were marched from one famine-stricken part to another, the movement 
being represented to the king as made for his benefit; and so far from the English 
administration having laid in a sufficient stock of grain for the army at the 
commencement of the famine, the peasantry complained that the military wrung 





  Hunter goes on to explain 18th century British priorities succinctly, "until 1772 
Bengal was regarded by the British public in the light of a vast warehouse, in which a 
number of adventurous Englishmen carried on business with great profit and on an 
enormous scale.  That a numerous native population existed, they were aware; but this 
they considered an accidental circumstance."27 The accident of the Bengali population's 
starvation, then, demanded little reflection.  "The utmost that could be expected from 
Government," wrote the Company's Council from Calcutta, "would be a lenient policy 
towards the husbandmen whom a bad harvest had disabled from paying the usual land-
tax."28  This "relief," as might be expected, proved insufficient, and in subsequent years 
the Company found that "the remnant of the population would not [even] suffice to till 
the land." In 1771 the President of the Council in Calcutta mourned to the Court of 
Directors in London that there had been "such a mortality and desertion among the ryots, 
as to deprive the (revenue) farmers of the possibility of receiving rents in arrear."29
                                                 
24 Quoted in Kali Charan Ghosh, Famines in Bengal, p. 4 
 Ten 
million were dead, the Council's attempted measures of "relief" had proven lasting, and 
revenues continued to be moribund. It was only toward this latter casualty of famine that 
25 Hunter, p. 26-27 
26 Ibid. p. 39 
27 Ibid, p. 34-35 
28 Ibid, p. 23 
29 Hunter, p. 33 
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the Council directed its imagination and began hammering out a "permanent settlement" 
of Bengal's land tenure in order to guarantee the Company's revenue.30
 
 
 It is a very sad - and telling - fact that British colonialism in India both began and 
ended with catastrophic famine in Bengal. The famine of 1770, understandably, remained 
etched in popular consciousness throughout the colonial period, and by late 1943, 
comparisons with 1770 were common.  That both famines were essentially "man-made" 
was not lost on commentators, and that at the root of famine, in both cases, lay predatory 
economic practices related to the colonial enterprise was well understood.  Perhaps most 
striking of all, however, is the extent to which militarization and martial priority 
determined the course of both famines.  In this context, Hunter's words above might just 
have easily been written to describe the Bengal Famine of 1943, as that in 1770.  
Throughout this later period, as well; "the troops were marched from one famine-stricken 
part to another... [even as] the peasantry complained that the military wrung from them 
their last chance of subsistence."31
 While famine itself remained the over-arching reality for the majority of Bengal's 
inhabitants throughout the period under consideration, it was - above all else - war that 
determined the practices, priorities and ideological orientation of the colonial state at the 
time.  As I will detail in Chapter One, from September of 1939 the exigencies of Britain's 
war against Axis powers were central to how the colony would be governed. Even before 
there was any material threat to India, the colony was co-opted into the war effort, 
politically, economically and ideologically.  When war was declared against Germany on 
India's behalf by Britain, this sharply exacerbated existing resentment over foreign rule.  
The Indian National Congress, India's primary nationalist party, withdrew from 
governmental participation, and political alignments became increasingly entangled in the 
rubric of national "defense."  Opposition to Britain, in this context, meant opposition to 
 The structural entanglements of war and famine in 
Bengal during the 1940s are central to all that follows.   
                                                 
30 In his Rule for Property on Bengal, Ranajit Guha traces the earliest impetus for a Permanent Settlement 
in Bengal to the 1770 famine.  "The first two advocates of Permanent Settlement both regarded the famine 
as the most conclusive evidence of the worthlessness of the existing economic policies and the best reason 
that could be there for seeking an alternative in terms of a more stable and comprehensive land settlement." 
p. 16 
31 Humter, p. 39 
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the war effort, which, in turn, meant complicity with the "enemy."  The colonial state, in 
this context, lent its support to the Muslim League, who they understood to be more loyal 
to the British cause, and did their best to caste the "rebellious" Congress as a Hindu-
centric organization, a policy which greatly contributed to mounting communal 
animosities in India.  
War also strengthened the tenor of colonial oppression, justifying the impunity 
with which the recalcitrant population could be dealt. In Bengal this entailed the 
mobilization of hundreds of thousands of native, "loyalist" forces who would be 
deputized to do the bidding of the colonial state - in the name of war-time "order." These 
same "troops," however, were used, not to "defend" the population against enemy attack, 
but - throughout the period - to police society according to colonial dictates.  War with a 
foreign enemy, in this sense, was used to justify martial law domestically.  It was also 
used as an excuse to circumvent the nascent democratic process.  The Government of 
India Act of 1935, which had established the principle of "Provincial Autonomy," 
allowed for the election of a Legislative Assembly in each province, at the head of which 
was a Chief Minister.  This set-up represented the first real concession to democratic rule 
in British India.  In Bengal, however, war and famine were used repeatedly to side-step 
the measures of self-determination that were laid out in the 1935 Act, and in Chief 
Minister Fazlul Huq's words,  Provincial Autonomy became only a "mockery" of self-
determination. Twice during the period the Ministry in Bengal was dismissed and 
"Emergency Rule" allowed the province to be governed by executive fiat from the 
Government of India in New Delhi and His Majesty's Government in London.  
Throughout the period, moreover, the supposed exigencies of war were repeatedly cited 
by the Government of India as necessary grounds to enact drastic policies, such as 
"denial," which contributed significantly to famine, without any consultation with 
elected, provincial authority  
With Japan's entry into the war in late 1941, and its quick succession of victories 
in Southeast Asia, India became increasingly central to the Allied effort, and the threat to 
India became less abstract.  When Burma fell to Japan in early 1942, Bengal became the 
Allied  front, and Calcutta was centralized as the industrial capital of war in Asia. 
Keeping Calcutta's industries running at full capacity, in this context, became central to 
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the rhetoric of "defense".  The fact that enormous profits were also being made in and 
around Calcutta at the same time, lent influence to arguments that the city needed to be 
maintained at any cost.  It was not in the name of profit, however, that the countryside of 
Bengal was pressed into the service of Calcutta, but in the name of "defense."  As 
commercial agents, backed by government authority and martial force, scoured the 
countryside for rice, prices skyrocketed, stocks disappeared from markets, and the 
existing trade infrastructure broke down.  Meanwhile, that Calcutta and its industrial 
workforce were deemed "essential" to the war-effort, justified all means - as well as all 
consequences.  Any resistance to governmental schemes was understood as a threat to the 
war effort, and, as such, could be met with overwhelming force.  "Defense" thus served 
as the ideological cover by which means the poor of the province were disadvantaged to 
the point of mass starvation. When starvation could no longer be contained in the 
countryside, and waves of famine-stricken villagers began collapsing on the streets of 
Calcutta, it could only, and again, be recognized in relation to the threat this spectacle 
entailed for the war effort.   
When the city was bombed by the Japanese in 1943, as I will detail in Chapter 
Five, however, the colonial state's rhetoric of "defense" was revealed to be extremely 
hollow. Calcutta was, in fact, almost entirely undefended, and Japan was able to mount a 
large-scale attack, in broad daylight, unopposed.  Meanwhile the industrial laborers of 
Calcutta, whose "priority" had been so central to the economic policies which had 
precipitated famine, were also revealed to be of less than vital importance to either the 
industrial firms that relied on their labor, or the colonial administration, which had long 
cited the welfare of Calcutta's labor force as central to their economic policies in Bengal.  
In the wake of the bombing, in fact, the bodies of dock workers were left unidentified and 
untended, and afforded little more concern than the hundreds of thousands who had died 
of hunger that year. In this sense, the skepticism with which Britain's war effort was 
received by much of the population of India,  proved well-founded.  In short, the colonial 
state, at the tail end of its long tenure, used World War II to justify - and indeed amplify - 
the brutality and rapacity with which it clung to power. 
Meanwhile, it was still famine that continued to shape the socio-political 
environment of the colonized.   In the wake of 1943, as I will show in Chapter Six, the 
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famine became only more deeply enmeshed in the structures and collective psyche of 
Bengal.  The countryside lay in ruins, with the social fabric of rural society torn to shreds 
by disease, dislocation and death.  Whole villages had been wiped out, and hardship 
continued to take a devastating toll.  With an "end" to famine declared in official circles, 
however, the relief efforts begun late in 1943 were rolled back and imports to ward off 
further catastrophe were withheld from London.  Provincial politics, meanwhile, became 
increasingly acrimonious, revolving around the highly charged issues of famine and the 
continuing hardships that citizens of Bengal faced.  With the Muslim League in control of 
the Ministry, moreover, the debate became increasingly more entrenched in communal 
rancor.  Accusations of bias in private relief, contentions about the communal make-up of 
rationing schemes, and dire predictions of a looming "second famine," became ever more 
dangerously entangled in opposing claims of "Hindu" versus "Muslim" interests.  These 
communalized contentions reverberated in national politics, and lent a dark and elemental 
tone to negotiations in Delhi as well. 
Also contributing to the entrenchment of communalist ideology during the period 
were the physical bodies of the dead. As the toll from famine mounted, so too did the 
corpses that government and society needed to process, materially, politically, 
psychologically and socially. The sheer enormity of the devastation wrought by famine 
inured society to death, amounting to a collective "brutalization of consciousness"32
                                                 
32 A tern used by Suranjan Das to describe the psychological effects of famine on the people of Bengal.  In 
Das (1991), p. 162 
 that 
was deep and abiding.  In the countryside, bodies lay were they had fallen and rotted in 
the sun, or were torn apart by wild animals. In Calcutta, which had its international image 
to maintain, however, corpses need to be removed from public view, categorized and 
disposed of in orderly fashion.  But because famine victims were the most marginal 
citizens of empire, the record kept of corpses collected by the authorities in Calcutta was 
extremely limited.  In fact, the sole criteria used to classify the dead, as in the case of the 
bombings, was religious affiliation.  In some definite sense, that the state only recognized 
these nameless corpses as "Hindu" or "Muslim," was merely an extension of the 
simplistic binary which they were want to categorize the population more generally.  That 
corpses were thus understood, however, lent a certain biological "proof" to the long 
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advanced discursive argument that this distinction, alone, was paramount in 
understanding the Indian population.  Together with the cheapening of life that famine 
and war entailed, the contention that communal affiliation adhered to the very bodies of 
the citizens of Bengal represented a dark foreshadow of the violence to come.   
Among the population of Calcutta there was still, however, a remarkable 
solidarity of purpose which was expressed in anti-colonial demonstrations that rocked the 
city in late 1945 and early 1946.  The citizenry understood that their fate was shared, and 
their case for equity and justice was a collective, rather than sectarian cause. The furor of 
these disturbances also demonstrated the tremendous anxiety that had built up after years 
of extreme adversity.  The main political parties, Congress and the Muslim League, 
however, were busy jockeying for position in a future independent India, and so 
distanced themselves from the political will of the people and continued to angle for a 
more narrowly "disciplined" constituency that would do their political bidding. But 
famine was, again, complicating the picture. The harvest of 1945 had been a bad one, and 
again newspapers were running headlines that millions were doomed to die of starvation 
in the coming year.  The political leadership, however, still had its own interests in mind.  
A high level Cabinet Mission had been sent from London to negotiate a final settlement 
for a transfer of power, but had broken down around the intractable issue of Pakistan.  
With Bengal again careening into starvation by the summer of 1946, violence erupted in 
Calcutta on an unprecedented scale - and this time it was directed, not at the colonial 
state, but at fellow inhabitants of the city, Hindu and Muslim.  Before saying more about 
the Calcutta riots, however, some background to my stake in this story is warranted. 
 
Background 
 Having grown up in Lansing, Michigan in the 1980s, the realities of Bengal in the 
1940s were distant and vague.  My father himself made little attempt to keep in contact 
with his own roots.  Having immigrated to the United States from Calcutta in 1956 - 
before the large wave of Indian immigrants who came after the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 - he had little opportunity to associate with other Indians, and, in 
fact, had little desire to do so.  As soon as he became an American citizen, he carried with 
him, at all times, his United States passport.  When asked what nationality he was, he 
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would often reply "American," and present his passport to demonstrate this fact.  That he 
had an accent was something that I didn't even recognize until after he had died and I saw 
a video-tape of a lecture he had given years earlier.  Because he married an American 
woman, of half Irish and half Hungarian decent, no Bengali was spoken at home, and 
very few cultural ties to Bengal were maintained.  There were occasional phone calls to 
Calcutta - agonizing affairs that generally accompanied some catastrophe across the 
ocean - such as my aunt's death in 1974 - but the phone lines were unreliable in those 
days, and after several hours waiting for a connection, the call itself would usually last 
only a few short minutes before breaking off.  On these occasions my father was always 
highly overwrought.  When the call had finally gone through, he would bark a few words, 
choked with tears, into the receiver in a language that I could not understand.  For this 
reason I imagined for a long time that Bengali was just a language that people wept in. 
 What I knew of Calcutta, or Bengal, was limited to the few stories that my father 
had told me about his own childhood.  Amongst these memories there were even a few 
that were pleasant.  These mostly involved life in the village of Bahadupur, in what is 
today Khulna, Bangladesh.  Several times during the turbulent times that comprised his 
youth, he, like so many other middle-class children of his generation, had been removed 
to the countryside to avoid the uncertainties of war-time Calcutta.  The village was a lush 
and adventurous escape from the precariousness of life in Calcutta.  The rivers and ponds 
were full of fish and the surrounding jungle full of mystery and natural danger that kept a 
child's imagination rapt.  In the village my father could be a child, and as such his 
memories of life in Bahadupur were rather uncomplicated and tranquil.  But the retreats 
to the ancestral village, although providing an idyllic refuge from city life, were rather ill-
timed and provided him no security from the tribulations of childhood in a war zone.  He 
was back in Calcutta when Japanese bombs fell on the city in both 1942 and 1943, and 
the memories that he had of these bombings were profound and persistent.  Yet they were 
not quite distinct.   
As my father was only eleven years old during the bombings, and at the height of 
the famine, his recollections of both were more a product of affect than precision.  The 
bombings had terrified him, and he had never forgotten the sound of the planes or the 
earth shaking impacts of the explosions, but few specifics remained. His memories of the 
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famine were, likewise, somewhat abstract.  Sound, again, took precedence.  He, like so 
many others I have spoken to who lived through the famine, remembered, above all else, 
the plaintive moans that rent the air night after night in Calcutta, "Phan Dao, Ma, phan 
dao. Amra ar bachbo na."33
My father's memories of the Calcutta riots, on the other hand, were vivid and 
distinct.
  He also remembered that the dead bodies piled up so fast on 
the sidewalks of the city that the authorities could not remove them before they began to 
rot.  Stacked corpses remained a persistent memory throughout his life as well:.  "Like 
that game we play - pick-up sticks, just skin and bone, stacked in heaps." But specifics 
were few. Scenes of famine, like the bombings, had left a deep and nagging impression 
on the child's mind, but the memories themselves were imprecise. 
34
                                                 
33 "Give us the water in which you've boiled your rice (phan), Mother, we are dieing." 
  On the night of August 17th, 1946 the family house at Mommenpur was 
attacked, several of its inhabitants were killed, and the rest were dislocated for many long 
years to come.  Tensions in Calcutta had been building for months and mass 
demonstrations and civil violence had become part and parcel of daily life in the city.  On 
the 16th of August, the day of the Muslim League's call for "Direct Action," 
unprecedented riots had broken out and the city had quickly descended into anarchy.  On 
the following night a Muslim mob attacked my father's sister's house two doors down.  
All the men in that house were killed and my father's sister was bludgeoned over the head 
with a steel rod.  Bleeding profusely, she ran to my grandfather's house for shelter.  The 
mob followed her, and subsequently laid attack to my grandfather's house in the late 
evening hours.  It was a crowd bent on slaughter, many thousand strong with blood of my 
father's sister already on its hands.  Chants of "Allahu Akbar!" filled the air, the house 
was quickly surrounded, and within a few minutes the crowd was pressing in, clambering 
up the walls, and breaking in the doors below.  They had already gotten hold of those too 
slow to make it up to the rooftop, which could be secured by means of a steel door.  On 
his way up the stairs my father turned to see the beheading of a wiry little man whom he 
had known well his whole short life; the family cook who would slip him sweets 
34 What follows is a narrative reconstruction of my father's memory of the riots.  This narrative is written 
partially in the present tense to lend emphasis to the immediacy that these events maintained, in his 
memory, throughout his life.  It is, as such, a necessarily subjective account of a Muslim attack on one 
Hindu family's house.  Attacks on Muslim houses by Hindu mobs were also frequent during the riots, and 
were likely indexed in similar binary terms.   
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whenever there is anything in the larder to spare. "His head," my father told me many 
times, "was cut clean from his body."  On the rooftop there was only the terror of grim 
expectation.   
The street below is now a solid sea of murderous faces.  They are hurling bricks 
and steel rods - they will not be satisfied until the entire family above is exterminated.  
The heat from the fire they have lit below is beginning to sere the flesh of those who have 
made it to the rooftop wherever that flesh touches the concrete floor - the same floor that 
bears the cracks that the bombs, dropped three years earlier, had rent.  The young boy 
(my father) is hiding beneath a table with his equally terrified younger brother.  Their 
elderly and unfit father is apoplectic.  The boy too knows that he will die - and all the 
rest, thirty-some in all, all his flesh and blood. His sister is still bleeding from her head. 
Her husband and his brothers have already been killed and she is shrieking.  She has 
likely been raped as well as bludgeoned - the tone of her lamentation is tinged with 
madness.  But the boy's older brother, twelve years his senior, has begun firing a gun, an 
old, rusty rifle that had been commissioned to him during the war.  He is firing into the 
street, reloading the gun in a blood-red rage, and firing again.  He will not let his family 
be slaughtered.  His body is scarred by the bricks and rods that have struck him, but the 
crowd below is quickly dispersing.   
The chants and calls for bloodshed are fading into the near distance.  The boy is 
still trembling, uncertain whether, in fact, he has even survived or not.  His sister's sobs 
have gotten more pronounced and sharper still - her long mourning has only just begun. 
His father sits in a puddle of hot urine, weeping into his upturned palms like a fever-
stricken child - everything is lost.  His older brother, still clutching the rifle firmly to his 
chest, paces the rooftop urgently searching for some means of escape from the fire below.  
Finally a rescue truck arrives from somewhere and the survivors climb down a thin and 
rickety ladder to the street below.  Once rescued from the rooftop, they are shepherded 
into a waiting van and shuttled to a crowded and grief-choked port of provisional refuge. 
And thus begins many long years of displacement, uncertainty, and desperation, and still 
more shadows without number, piling up in the darkness and compounding the mass-less 
weight (quite contrary to all the accepted laws of physics) that would forever threaten to 
extinguish him.  
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 From a very early age, I had a somewhat inordinate fascination with these events 
and with the Calcutta riots in general.  I was not a morbid child, and had no particular 
interest in violence.  What a "riot" even consisted of, in fact, I had scarcely a clue.  My 
life was otherwise preoccupied by sports and fitting in with a foreign sounding name at 
school.  Neither my sisters nor my mother took any particular interests in my father's 
stories of things that had happened a long time ago and far away.  Even my father, if the 
truth be told, had little inclination to recount these events unsolicited.  It was rather at my 
request, for the most part, that he would, again, tell the tale of the Calcutta riots.  It may 
have been the poignant intensity with which he told the riot story that moved me, or it 
may have been the shear drama of the events, but my fixation on the riots remained 
unique and abiding. 
I myself had a secret that over the years I began to believe explained my interest 
in the riots better than any more rational explanation.  Though an otherwise well-adjusted 
child, with little to complain about, I was subject to a peculiar inner tension that would 
arise without warning, last for a few minutes at the most, and then dissolve again into the 
mysterious depths from which it had emerged.  This tension seemed to have little relation 
to external events or circumstances.  It might arise while I was waiting for the school-bus, 
or it might arise while I was lying in bed at night drifting off to sleep.  It generally came 
upon me when I was alone, but this was not a rule.  I have no recollection of when it 
started, though I do know that it began from a very early age.  It was, by any means, a 
persistent phenomenon of my mental life throughout childhood that seemed to have no 
objective cause or connection.  The tension consisted of a recurrent kind of auditory 
hallucination that is extremely difficult to describe: a cacophony of indistinct human 
voices, a chaos of staccato exclamations and appeals, a quarrel, maybe, but riven with 
acute anxiety and desperation.  Nothing at all concrete could be deciphered: a tumultuous 
and rather tortured chorus of indistinct anxiety.  Surprisingly, it did not frighten me or 
seem like cause for concern.  I learned to live with it as if it were completely normal. 
It wasn't until I was in my 20s that I began to question what was at the root of this 
phenomenon.  It had not affected my life in any negative way and was not something that 
I imagined needed correction.  In fact, I had grown to appreciate the odd energy of this 
inner tension, and knew that it kept me centered in an inexplicable way.  As with all 
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secrets, it was something that was mine alone, and as such remained part and parcel of 
my own doggedly defended sense of individuality.  It was in this context - as an 
extraordinary object of Self - that I began to wonder more about what was at the root of 
this psychological anomaly.  There was no "Ah Ha!" moment, and I can't even say how 
the thought took hold, but over the course of time I came to conclude, and began to 
firmly believe, that the cacophony that occasionally visited me - as insufficiently 
described above - was an indistinct, and incomprehensible, geo-temporal echo of the 
Calcutta riots.   
At length, I became convinced that this auditory tension that I had long 
experienced was a "memory" of the Calcutta riots. The ways and means by which 
memories are conveyed - particular in close and intimate relations - are, after all, complex 
and mysterious.  Stories, of course, are the most well understood.  But there are also the 
mute suggestions of gesture, the silent implications of character, and even the hidden 
insinuations of voice.  In close contact with a person whose memories of a given incident 
are particularly intense and remain particularly entangled in that person's psyche, who is 
to say what portion of that experience can be transmitted?  Somehow, I began to believe, 
in this case, it had been substantial, and even imagined that it was something akin to 
genetic memory. I should say that since that time I have spent many years in Calcutta and 
have witnessed many things, including impassioned domestic disputes, riots in the streets, 
and abundant fractious demonstrations, and the tone, tenor and timber of the Bengali 
language used in heated conflict does have an uncanny resonance with the auditory 
tension that I have described above - but there is no one but me to judge.   
I include this personal (and somewhat embarrassing) anecdote to note the fact that 
when I went to Calcutta for the first time, in 1999, my primary goal was to investigate the 
1946 Calcutta riots - not famine. I had looked in vain for a better understanding of the 
riots from my far remove, but came up empty handed. Although the riots have been 
widely understood as seminal to the catastrophic violence of India's partition, in most 
historical works only passing reference is made to the actual event. I decided, at length, 
that I would go to Calcutta and investigate the riots myself, in conversation with those 
who had survived them.  In Calcutta, I was able to find traces everywhere, but at the 
frayed end of each and every lead that I followed, what I found was famine.  In as much 
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as the riots emerged from a specific socio-political context in Calcutta during the 1940s, 
the over-determining social fact - for the vast majority of the population of Bengal - of 
this same period was famine.  My search for an understanding of the Calcutta riots, then, 
has been unavoidably transformed into a "search for famine."  
In the final chapter of this work, I examine the Calcutta riots from this perspective 
- as the culmination of a period of cumulative violence that is punctuated by calamitous 
internecine fury.  All existing scholarship on the riots has focused on the "communal" 
nature of the outburst, giving primary consideration to the divisive political environment 
in which they erupted. This explanation, however, cannot account for the full extent of 
the violence that visited Calcutta in 1946. Participation in the riots was extremely 
widespread, motivations were highly diverse, and enactments multifaceted.  In first 
detailing the tortured socio-economic, ideological, as well as political context that 
preceded the riots, I demonstrate, in Chapter Seven, that the Calcutta riots emerged from 
an extremely complex confluence of anxieties, animosities and contentions that were 
dominated, above all else, by the entailments of war and famine. As such, the 
understanding of the Calcutta riots as merely a Hindu/Muslim battle for political place, is 
woefully incomplete.  
 
Perspective 
 Because I came to this research from the perspective of personal experience, it has 
been, also, the personal experience of these times that has long been my primary interest.  
Along with the many relatives with whom I have spoken at length about this period, I 
have interviewed dozens of survivors from these times in Calcutta. When I began this 
journey, it was their stories that I had intended to tell.  But, for many reasons, the effort to 
locate particular subject-positions within the complex nexus of destructive and violent 
structural forces that defined Bengal in the 1940s, is one that was doomed to failure. 
While the events that I will examine can be historically situated and structurally analyzed, 
the exact impact of these same events on any given, particular witness escapes 
meaningful reconstruction.  As such, the primary effort to reconstruct individual 
experience has devolved into the more academic exercise of detailing the anatomy of this 
historical period through access to archival, literary, and remembered narratives.  In 
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short: the secondary goal of trying to paint an adequate picture of the event - in which to 
later locate the individual - has become primary.  The compromised conclusion of such 
an endeavor is to admit the very indeterminate nature of the impact of structural violence 
on individual identity - while perhaps succeeding in theorizing something of its impact on 
collectivities.  These were nearly impossible times to live through.  To tell the story of 
any individual's passage, before the story of the context is told, would be to set an 
inconceivably despairing voice afloat in the world, without reference to the extraordinary 
circumstances that defined that passage.  And yet the story told is the necessary pretext to 
understanding the individuals who taught me the meaning of these events.  Above all it 
was a sense of injustice and disbelief that grounded their understandings. They 
themselves were endlessly interested in the facts.  As such, this remains their story and it 
is told for them. I begin here, however, with a short family history that will also bring the 
remaining narrative up to date. Ramakrishna Mukherjee is my grandfather.  Kalinath is 
my father.  The rest is self-explanatory. 
 
 In the wake of the devastating famine of 1866, the idea of partitioning the 
province of Bengal began making administrative rounds.35
                                                 
35 In his work The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, Sumit Sarkar traces the debate about partition to the 
1866 Orissa famine. 
  At the time Bengal was a vast 
and unwieldy province encompassing 189,000 square miles, with a population of 78.5 
million. Famine was most acute in modern day Orissa, which at that time was still part of 
Bengal.  Parts of modern-day Bihar and Assam were also included.  Famine brought 
home the difficulties of administering a province of this size, particularly with Calcutta, 
then the seat of British imperial power, the only industrial and commercial center in the 
region.  Debates about the administrative wisdom of partitioning Bengal circulated for 
the next several decades, receiving impetus from increasing political and governmental 
difficulties in Bengal around the turn of the century.  Discussions were finalized in 1905, 
spurred by the desire to reduce the influence of Bengal’s educated, largely Hindu, elite, 
but justified in the name of administrative efficiency.  East Bengal, with Assam, became 
a separate province of its own, with West Bengal encompassing the remainder. 
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 The 1905 partition was greeted with alarm by the educated, Hindu elite of 
Bengal, who quickly began organizing demonstrations against partition. The loss of 
eastern Bengal was both an economic and psychological affront. The east represented 
both the nostalgic homeland, as well as the agricultural heartland of Bengal.  A boycott of 
British goods and the re-vitalization of native industry comprised the central platform of 
the swadeshi movement that crystallized around discontent with partition. The swadeshi 
movement, it has been argued, was the first Nationalist mass mobilization in British 
India.  Though the movement has also been represented as the birth of non-violent 
resistance to British rule, however, "terrorist" elements became involved from early on.  
Far from achieving a representative "mass," moreover, the core of the movement 
remained mainly Hindu, middle-class, and urban throughout.  Meanwhile, in the newly 
created province of East Bengal, Muslim majority rule was greeted with enthusiasm by 
many.  In 1906 the Muslim League was founded at Dacca in order to consolidate and 
develop the political autonomy gained by Bengali Muslims after 1905.   
 Despite limitations, however, the swadeshi movement represented a significant 
and novel critique of the colonial system, and in 1911 partition was withdrawn and 
Bengal was reunited. Such an outcome might have been cause for celebration, but by this 
time the swadeshi movement had lost its legs, and had been overtaken by its radical 
elements that now engaged the colonial government in more open expressions of dissent; 
assassinating police officers, sabotaging transportation and communication lines, and 
amassing stockpiles of stolen weapons to mount armed attack on the colonial state. In 
1912 the British withdraw their administrative apparatus from Calcutta and settled in to 
Delhi.  At the inaugural ceremony there, a bomb exploded near the Viceroy's entourage, 
narrowly missing the Viceroy himself.  The bomber was, somewhat predictably, a 
Bengali - a fact which could only have further disenchanted the British to the city and 
province that they had left behind.   
 The advent of World War I brought more difficulties.  In Bengal terrorist 
activities were still rife and internal security was less than satisfactory.  War had been 
declared by Britain on India's behalf, without consultation or popular support.  India's 
"defense spending" increased by 300 percent.36  Revenue demands spiked.37
                                                 
36 Bose and Jalal, p. 127 
 Financing 
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the British war effort proved tricky.  The currency in circulation nearly tripled from Rs. 
660 million in 1914 to Rs. 1540 million in 1919.38 Inflation, war profiteering and 
curtailment of shipping, fueled shortages and scarcity that further embittered the 
population. But internal "disorder" could not be tolerated in the context of war.  As such, 
"the British met the war-time threat by a formidable battery of repressive measures - the 
most intensive since 1857 - and above all by the Defence of India Act of March 1915."39
 In Bengal, however, the British were finding it difficult to commandeer a native 
police force to maintain order.  In 1911 a Special Branch to obtain intelligence on 
"terrorist" activity was formed, but recruitment into the Calcutta police remained 
frustratingly lack-luster.
  
The Defence of India Act - which remained in force until the end of colonial rule in 1947 
- described a broad range of "emergency" powers, including an expansion of capital 
offences, provisions for extra-judicial detention, and guidelines for military action against 
the civilian population. 
40 The same year, because of a general lack of morale stemming 
from poor working conditions, 255 police recruits resigned from service and many others 
simply deserted.41  An inadequacy of training facilities, it was decided, was part of the 
problem. In 1914 a new training center was sanctioned at Dalanda, a former lunatic 
asylum on the outskirts of the city, and in 1916 the Police Training School at Dalanda 
was put into service to attempt a resuscitation of the force.  The training center occupied 
only one corner of the old asylum, with another wing designated to the Special Branch 
for its interrogations of "terrorists" rounded up under the Defence of India rules.  "All 
types of revolutionaries - those who confessed fully, those who partially confessed and 
those who survived the process without making confession - would all come to Dalanda 
house."42
 In 1916 Ramakrishna Mukherjee came to Calcutta from the village of 
Bahadupur in the Satkira sub-division of Khulna district to join the training cohort at 
 Though some died of "interrogation," and several more committed suicide, 
Dalanda continued to serve dual law-enforcement objectives until the 1920s. 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 Metcalf and Metcalf, p. 161 
38 Bose and Jalal, p. 127 
39 Sarkar, Sumit (1983),  p. 149 
40 Chattopadhyaya, Tapan,  p. 125 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid, p. 132 
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Dalanda.43  Bahadupur was a frontier region, carved out of dense jungle by enterprising 
Bengali landlords given unclaimed - or depopulated - plots to clear and cultivate by the 
British administration.44  Plots varied in size, but the labor involved in clearing the jungle 
in order to cultivate the land, limited the arable portion.  By 1938, 84% of land-holdings 
in the district consisted of less than five acres.45
 The Bengal middle-class had been subject to a long trajectory of 
impoverishment throughout the colonial period. The "permanent settlement" of land 
rights on a class of traditional rent-collectors in Bengal did little to advance the long-term 
economic welfare of the, mostly Hindu, "middle-class" (bhadralok.)  The rights that 
zamindars were granted by the British established them only as the "top rung of the 
revenue collecting ladder."
  The size of the land holding of 
Ramakrishna Mukherjee and family is difficult to discover, but is likely to have been less 
than ten acres.  Paddy fields, worked by Muslim tenant farmers, surrounded a central "U" 
shaped compound defining a protected courtyard, typical of Bengali rural architectural 
style.  The land was ideal for paddy cultivation, on the northern fringe of the Sundarban 
forest - a tropical, riverine band of mangrove jungle, in the vast deltaic expanse that spans 
the Bengal coastline from Midnapur to Chittagong.  But for the Hindu middle-class, by 
the early twentieth century, economic conditions were poor.   
46
                                                 
43 The story of Ramakrishna Mukherjee (my grandfather) and family is comprised of information gained 
from extensive interviews with Mukherjee's sons, Narendra Krishna, Kalinath (my father) and Somnath 
Mukherjee, as well as interviews with Dolly Mukherjee, Narendra Krishna's wife. 
  The actual occupation of land was the providence of the 
(primarily Muslim or lower-caste Hindu) chasi, or peasant, who cultivated it and paid 
rent, often in kind, to the, typically town-dwelling, bhadralok.  By the turn of the 
twentieth century, due to inflation and the fragmentation of estates through inheritance, 
the social prestige of the mostly Hindu "middle-class" throughout rural Bengal was based 
at least as much on their status as upper-caste Hindu landlords, as it was on their financial 
capacities.  Increasingly the bhadralok were economically dependent on white-collar 
employment in Calcutta - which continued to be in short supply. By 1915, according to 
one official report  "it [was] well known that the number of unemployed amongst the 
44 See Bose (1986),, p. 15 
45 Ibid, p. 23 
46 Bose (1986), p. 4 
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bhadralok is large and that the circumstances of many families are pitiful and their 
sufferings very great, in some cases falling little short of death by slow starvation."47
 Ramakrishna Mukherjee himself, though educated in an English medium 
college in Khulna, was a rustic figure: tall and severe, a devout Hindu whose practices 
tended towards the tantric.  A Brahman by birth, Ramakrishna performed sacrifices and 
fire rituals to the goddess Kali on the family premises, drawing enthusiastic crowds of 
minority Hindus from surrounding villages on festival days.  But his hardships were 
increasing.  The yield from the land was incidental, revenues were poor, and the status of 
landholder meant increasingly less in material terms towards the turn of the century. 
Frequent floods, a lack of connectivity to urban centers, and the unpredictability of 
frequently shifting deltaic rivers made the prospects of prosperity further complicated.  
The dream of moving into a proper, middle-class, urban position, however, remained 
illusory.
 
48 World War I only straitened circumstances further.49
 In Calcutta Ramakrishna found the success that had proven unattainable in the 
village.  Having finished his training at Dalanda, he was issued a Calcutta High 
Constable's uniform and a place of promise in the Detective Department of the Calcutta 
Police.  Work in the Detective Department proved lucrative, as well as interesting.  
Ramakrishna had a particular penchant for establishing contacts in Calcutta's infamous 
underworld.  These contacts helped the young officer crack important cases, as well as 
advance his own financial interests. His friends included figures like Ladoo, who had a 
neat, skin-grafted pouch sewn into the far-back of his throat, which was deep enough to 
secrete an object as big as a sun-ripe plum, not to mention a braided gold necklace, and 
Altu, who, like a perfect circus performer, could - absolutely noiselessly - walk through 
narrow alleyways on bamboo stilts two stories high and drop through open windows or 
 Sometime around the 
turn of the first decade of the twentieth century, Ramakrishna's older brother, Ponchanon, 
had left the village and found a place in the Calcutta police.  Ramakrishna, with three 
children of his own and moribund fortunes in the countryside, followed suit in 1916. 
                                                 
47 Chatterjee, Partha (1984) p. 22 
48 See, for instance, Indivar Kamtekar's War Dance, p. 208 on the lack of middle-class jobs in early 
twentieth century Bengal. 
49 Partha Chatterjee's Land Question, p. 120 "The end of the War...brought increasing difficulties for the 
predominantly Hindu middle-classes of Bengal - rising prices, shrinking real incomes from rent and the 
lack of employment opportunities." 
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air-vents as stealthily as any agile and city-bred tomcat; who stopped by the officer's 
house to discuss happenings in the city.  By the early twenties Ramakrishna had earned 
the title of Sergeant in the Detective Department, and by dint of his less official services 
to the citizens of Calcutta, had received generous "gifts" from grateful patrons in the form 
of brightly printed rupee notes that he kept in large bundles, stuffed into the drawers of 
the family almira. 
 The wealth of the family, however, did not stay liquid long.  In the late 
twenties, looking to parlay his fortunes, Ramakrishna entered into a number of 
speculative land deals in Calcutta which eventually became taxing on both his mental and 
financial health.  Through connections in the police and the underworld, the Sergeant 
bought up scattered properties in several different slum districts of Calcutta, most with 
rather complicated deeds that the Sergeant felt confident he could straighten out by resort 
to his carefully established connections.  One such property was the ill-fated residence at 
8A Mommenpur Road, which became the family's dwelling place in 1921.  The large, 
two-story house at Mommenpur Road was a short distance from the busy Kidderpore 
docks, and just a bit further from the Garden Reach industrial area.  The house was a 
solid, brick and mortar construction, situated in the heart of a sprawling, and mostly 
Muslim, slum. Though the location was anything but prestigious, the structure was an 
impressive and extravagant dwelling for a man of the Sergeant's means.  He had gotten it 
cheap and had no compunction spending the extra time and money that would be required 
to ensure that it was made officially his through a clean deed of ownership.   
 In 1936, when Ramakrishna Mukherjee retired from the Calcutta Police, his 
fortunes were already dwindling. Lathi in hand, the former policeman would patrol his 
slum properties in Kidderpore and Park Circus, trying to shake down recalcitrant Muslim 
tenants of the few rupees rent that they owed him.  More capital was lost in several 
business deals, such as a tobacco shop in central Calcutta, that went quickly sour.  The 
meager pension he was due from service in the police was also tied up in litigation, even 
as the cash maintained in the family almira continued to dwindle.  Still Ramakrishna 
stuck to his rustic ways, doing rituals to exorcise the spirits that stymied his endeavors 
and making sacrifices to Kali for assistance.  By 1940 the well was all but dry and the 
few bits of gold that his wife had brought into their marriage provided the necessary 
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capital to maintain his legal affairs.  Ramakrishna's oldest son, Narendra Krishna (N. K.), 
who at this time was 21 years old,  bore the tremendous responsibility for the family's 
survival - in difficult times.  Prices were rising, the country was at war and the patriarch 
was well past his prime. 
 Having earned a degree with honors from Calcutta University, N.K. was able to 
secure a job in a trading firm, but as a junior employee, his wages were minimal.  In the 
house at Mommenpur, there were mother and father, two brothers, Kalinath and 
Somnath, three sisters (of nine) who were approaching marriageable age, his oldest, 
childless sister and her husband, the hands who tended the cows, and the servants who 
cleaned, cooked, and kept the compound running.  When preparations for war began, and 
the call for Air Raid Precautions (A.R.P.) officers was made, N.K. signed up.  With his 
father's connections, as well as with his own educational background, he was able to 
secure the remunerative position of neighborhood warden of the A.R.P.  It was an 
important job, as Mommenpur backed onto the Kidderpore docks - assumed to be the 
primary target of enemy attack -and as such carried with it a certain prestige as well as 
responsibility. 
 When Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, and Britain at Rangoon a 
few weeks later, Ramakrishna made the decision, like many others, to secure his family 
in the countryside at their village residence.  All but he and his oldest son, made the 
difficult journey across several rivers, and south into the Sundarbans to Bahadupur.  
Kalinath, Ramakrishna's second son was, at this time, eleven years old.  He was a 
promising and intelligent boy.  In preparation for the trip to the village he manufactured a 
"radio" so that he might be able to follow the news from Calcutta in the village.  From a 
magazine that he had come by, he painstakingly cut from cardboard the exact designs for 
all the components that were pictured in an illustration of a crystal radio.  With equal 
precision, he hand-painted every component so that it looked identical to the illustration.  
The reproduction was so effective that he was not the only one surprised when he turned 
the switch on and no sound came.  Nevertheless, he carried his radio to Bahadupur, 
crossing the wide river at Taki, and sailing by launch from Satkira through Budhhata and 
on down to the village from where his father had come.  Life in the village, as mentioned 
earlier, was among the only fond memories that Kalinath would have of his war-torn 
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childhood. The peace that he found there was transient, and the realities of his youth were 
far from idyllic. 
 A passage from a popular children's magazine, published in the early forties, 
describes the circumstance that the children of Bengal faced, encouraging them to keep 
faith in frightening times - as Bengal confronted war: 
 
      My Dear Little Brothers and Sisters! 
 
 A new month has come, and the old has gone.   
 In this way many more months will come and go. 
  And what do I have new to tell you? 
  The earth itself is being soaked in blood, 
  The sky has gone dark. 
  Bombs and gunpowder are piled in heaps. 
  All of India has been watching this war closely, 
  Knowing that we too are never far from peril. 
 
Now the flames of war have come close to our land.  The jaw of Calcutta is veiled 
in darkness.  Bengal has been proclaimed what they call an 'essential area.'  
Civility and culture have been stricken to the root.  And yet, I see, so many of our 
young boys and girls remembering their faith are speaking from their hearts, 
narrating dreams of happier days to come - even while the earth is stained with 
blood, even amidst the cries of distress and fear.  You are like white lotus flowers, 
blooming in the sunshine, surrounded by the light of heaven, in harmonious 
strains - from the depths of this ignorance and darkness - singing of deliverance, 
praying for the gifts of logic and wisdom.  I pray that your prayers will be 
answered...  
          Didi-bhai, 
        Magh 134850
  
  
                                                 
50 This passage is extracted from the Bengali monthly children's magazine, Rangmashaal.  The magazine 
was published bi-monthly according to the Bengali calendar.  Magh 1348, corresponds to January 1942 by 
the Gregorian calendar.  The section "letter box," from which this passage is taken, was a regular feature. 
Didi-bhai  means "big sister."  No other reference was given to determine who Didi-bhai was. This section 
begins every issue with a communication to "my dear little brothers and sisters," relates the news of the 
day, and then goes on to answer questions sent in by readers the previous month. (The translation is mine.) 
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Chapter One: War 
 
 
 On December 30th 1940, in an industrial suburb of colonial Calcutta, an imitation 
Nazi aircraft circled low over a small formation of native huts erected in the shadows of 
the sprawling jute and cotton mills that line the banks of the river Hooghly. Across the 
river, in Calcutta proper, stood the grand, if now somewhat weatherworn, Victorian 
buildings that formerly housed the central administrative apparatus of the British Raj in 
India.  As the plane came into view, according to the Amrita Bazar Patrika of the 
following day: 
Lighting restrictors who were tasking people of the peaceful hamlet over which 
the enemy aircraft was spotted flying met with opposition from a group of 
villagers who flashed their torch lights for locating their huts.  Following this 
bombs were hurled by the bomber plane demolishing a number of huts and as a 
result fire broke out in the locality.  The entire personnel of the A.R.P. [Air Raid 
Precaution] organization handled the situation promptly, extinguished fires, 
demolished dangerous structures, rescued people from underneath debris, 
rendered first aid, and removed cases to Hospital in ambulance cars.1
 
   
The A.R.P. services had performed admirably in this test of air-raid preparedness: "all the 
different parties, the messengers, the lighting restrictors, the reconnaissance party, the gas 
decontamination party, the fire extinguishing party and the first aid party all worked 
together in complete harmony as soon as the sirens were sounded on spotting the enemy 
aircraft."2
 In subsequent press releases, and over the All-India Radio airwaves, guidelines 
laid down in Sections 2 and 3 of the Bengal Air Raid Order were reiterated to the public.  
On the sounding of the warning sirens, a series of five second blasts from street-side and 
factory "hooters:"  
  If only the public could be educated to the necessities of maintaining order and 
desist from their oppositional indiscipline. 
                                                 
1 Amrita Bazar Patrika, "Air Raid Precaution," 24 December 1940 
2 Ibid 
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1.) Any person who has no duties and is within a building shall remain. 
2.) Any person who has no duties and is in the open shall take nearest cover. 
3.) All vehicular traffic shall pull to the left and stop. 
4.) All animals drawing vehicles shall be unyoked and tied to the nearest post. 
5.) Only police and Civic Guard vehicles, ambulances, fire engines and lorries,  
      Rescue Party lorries, authorized Air Raid Precautionary staff vehicles, and  
      defense service vehicles shall be permitted to proceed on roads.3
 
 
When the sirens sounded again for the second test of civil preparedness on 
January 30th, however, there was again "opposition."  In his notes on this second 
occasion, A.R.P. controller, N.V.H Symons grumbled, "too much attention was paid to 
vehicular traffic and little or none to pedestrians.  I found trams, buses, cars and lorries all 
well parked on the side of the road, but pedestrians were wandering all over the place 
under the very noses of the police."4  To add insult to injury; "draft animals were not 
unyoked... large numbers of the public stayed under verandas and in doorways instead of 
going into houses... too many people, amongst whom women were noticeable, were 
gazing out of windows...and on the whole [police] constables were very lazy...they 
frequently were found standing about doing nothing... they need more instruction as to 
the reasons for all these orders and as to how to enforce [them] by reasoning with the 
public and polite requests rather than shouted commands."5  Training would be needed to 
temper the authoritarian tone.  Laborers were found to be less lethargic, if just as lacking 
in discipline, "in Strand Road, North, coolies were still loading jute onto carts at 3:50 
P.M....and near the Talla Bridge a gang of men were found pumping water."6
 This exercise, a second test of war-readiness in Calcutta, had been a failure.  
Great Britain was at war - and with it India - and yet, in Calcutta, the putative "second 
city" of  Empire, the general public remained unconcerned.  Urgent work was needed to 
"train the general public in their duties."
   
7
                                                 
3 WBSA, Intelligence Branch, W-72/41 
  Even the sirens  were deficient, Symons noted, 
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them to startle anybody into a realization that danger is imminent."8  In order to rouse the 
public from their apathy, vigorous measures would need to be undertaken. A.D. Gordon, 
Inspector General of the Bengal police, also felt that the realization that danger was 
imminent needed to be "dinned into their minds by constant propaganda."9  The fact that 
Nazi Germany was, in fact, an extremely remote "enemy" to colonial Bengal, did not 
temper official consternation with the public's apathy.  Britain was at war, and, as such, 
all its subjects needed to digest the ideology of imminent danger.  Resources limited 
imagination, however, and measures taken to "discipline" the recalcitrant public were 
fanciful. "As to date," Symons  wrote in early 1941, "we [have] discussed the question of 
politically educating the public by gramophone records played in cinema halls, eating 
houses, social gatherings, and on the radio as well as from the publicity vans."10
 
  The 
majority of the population of Bengal, however, was beyond the state's rhetorical reach, 
and would remain that way throughout the period.  The acuteness of their material 
concerns did not allow them frequent visits to cinema halls or eating houses.  The 
publicity vans, on the other hand, would have their own limitations.  
Food Security 
 In London preparations for war were rather less ad-hoc, with food security, rather 
than public order, or propaganda vans, taking precedence. As early as 1936 plans for 
assuring the nutritional health of England in case of war were already underway.  
Winston Churchill, for one, had long experience with the role that the food supply could 
play in  wartime.  As England's First Lord of the Admiralty during World War I, he had 
overseen the British naval blockade of Germany, which - as he himself later wrote - had 
"treated the whole of Germany as if it were a beleaguered fortress, and avowedly sought 
to starve the whole population - men, women, and children, old and young, wounded and 
sound - into submission."11  For his role as the architect of such blockades, he had earned 
the nickname "the famisher" in France.12
                                                 
8 Ibid 
 (His involvement in "famishing" the population 
of Bengal during World War II will become apparent in what follows.)  British war-
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Baker, p.2 
12 Ibid, p. 280 
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planners, in any case, knew well that hunger was still a working weapon in the arsenal of 
modern warfare and that food security remained a top priority in preparation for war. By 
the mid-1930's war was again on the horizon, and pragmatic steps were promptly taken to 
ensure the public welfare.   
Early in the summer of 1936 a subcommittee on rationing was formed with Sir 
William Beveridge, Permanent Secretary to the first Ministry of Food (during WWI) as 
Chair.  Beveridge insisted that to "think out in advance and as a whole, the civilian side 
of the next war is as important as to design measures of military attack and defense."13 
The result of the discussions held within this subcommittee was the establishment of the 
Food (Defense Plans) Department in December of the same year.14  "A comprehensive 
rationing policy was formulated so that 'every member of the public would be able to 
obtain a fair share of the national food supply at a reasonable price.'"15  Nineteen regional 
divisions were demarcated and 1,400 local food committees organized in order to ensure 
the necessary administrative apparatus to achieve the "fair share" goal.16 Detailed 
schemes for flat-rate rationing of sugar, butter, bacon, ham and meat were drawn up.  A 
"buffer" of bread and potatoes was to be provided for, and subsidized restaurants would 
be established to bolster the ration scheme and provide variety to the public.17
The primary priority of the subcommittee, however, was to control bulk 
purchasing more than it was, even, to directly guarantee availability to all.  In its report 
for October 1936, the committee noted that rationing was necessary "not merely [to] 
prevent people from buying more than the prescribed amount, but also to make certain 




                                                 
13 Quoted in Zweiniger-Bargielowska, p. 16 
  Bulk purchasing by vested interests and speculators, 
committee members well understood, could radically destabilize markets during war-
time, leading to uncontrollable inflation, and ultimately shortages.  This knowledge 
would be starkly reinforced by the counter-example of Bengal in the years to come. In the 
context of the homeland, however, detailed plans were drawn up for governmental 
14 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, p. 14 
15 Zweiniger-Bargielowska quoting Board of Trade, Report, 1937, p. 14 
16 Zweiniger-Bargielowska,p. 14 
17 Ibid 
18 Report of the Sub-committee on Rationing, 5 Oct. 1936, Quoted in Ibid, p. 16 (emphasis mine) 
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appropriation and storage of large quantities of essential food supplies to offset the 
potential of private interests manipulating markets.  The pace of these preparations was 
accelerated after the Munich Crisis of September 1938, at which time, "additional food 
stocks were being purchased, details of transport and storage policy were under 
discussion, and legislation to implement for control was being drafted."19 As further 
guarantee that the preparations made by the Food Department would meet with a smooth 
transition into operation in the advent of war, it was agreed that a second Food Ministry 
would be established immediately so that "within hours of the outbreak of hostilities" 
war-time controls could take effect.20
Britain's second Ministry of Food was thus established almost immediately upon 
the declaration of war against Germany on September 3rd, 1939.  Ration books, which 
had been printed in advance, were distributed and the rationing of sugar, butter, ham and 
bacon began in early January of 1940.  Meat was included in March and tea, margarine 
and cooking fats, in July.  Early in 1941 preserves and cheese were rolled in, and 
rationing of clothing was also begun.  Differential access to non-rationed foods created 
some discontent, however, and so a "points-rationing" system was introduced in 
December of 1941 for the purchase of items like canned fish, dried fruits, rice, and 
biscuits that did not necessarily comprise an "essential" diet in Britain.  Although the 
supply of milk and eggs was unreliable, a "quasi-rationing" system was worked out in 
1941 to ensure equitable distribution.  In 1942 a separate scheme for rationing chocolate 
and confectionaries was also launched, and by the end of that same year "rationed and 
controlled foods accounted for more than half of total food expenditure."
 
21  In the 
industrial sector heavily subsidized canteens were set up, increasing in number from 
1,500 before the war to 18,446 by 1944, and agricultural workers were given a 
supplementary ration of cheese.22
                                                 
19 Zweiniger-Bargielowska,p. 16 
  Daily meals served to schoolchildren similarly 
increased from approximately 160,000 before the war to 1.6 million by 1945.  Children 
under five were guaranteed free fruit juices and cod-liver oil.  The Ministry of Food also 
20 Ibid, p. 14 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid, p. 33 
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implemented vitamin fortification of flour, which would go to subsidized bread for all - 
all with great success. 
The results of such foresight and initiative were remarkable, "the wartime system 
of rationing and food controls reduced long-standing class and income differentials in 
food consumption and nutrient intake... thereby contributing to improvements in public 
health."23 The Ministry of Food, also pleased in retrospect, noted: "general health was 
good throughout the period of war [and the] fitness of babies and school children was 
particularly striking."24  Despite the fact that food imports had fully halved during the 
war from 22 million to 11 million tons,25 average per capita spending on foodstuffs, due 
to the success of the rationing system, actually declined.26 In short, historian Zweiniger-
Bargielowska concludes, "The Second World War represented a major turning-point in 
the history of British diet.  The rise in consumption of brown bread, milk and vegetables, 
coupled with food fortification resulted in a healthier diet and no social group fell short of 
basic nutritional requirements."27
 
  British citizens in other parts of the empire, however, 
did not fair so well. 
With the lack of any similar initiatives in India, the only real guidelines for 
administrative management of the food supply in Bengal was the Bengal Famine Code, 
first published in 1897, updated once in 1905, and then lastly in 1913.  The Bengal 
Famine Code was the product of Britain's long experience with starvation in India.  Since 
1770, there were no fewer than twenty-five officially recorded famines in colonial India, 
with those of 1783, 1873-4, 1866, and 1896-97 (the largest since 1770), all effecting 
Bengal in varying degrees.28
                                                 
23 Ibid, p. 12 (emphasis mine) 
  It is in this context that the Bengal Famine Code was 
developed and first published in 1895 following the recommendations of the Famine 
Commission of 1880.  Famine had been recurrent, entailing nagging administrative 
difficulties as well as embarrassing PR in relations to Britain's claim to efficient 
administration in India.  Some guidelines were needed. 
24 Quoted in Zweiniger-Bargielowska, p. 44 
25 Ibid, p. 36 
26 Ibid, p. 53 
27 Ibid, p. 44 
28 See Brahma Nand's appendix "Famines in Colonial India, 1750-1947" in Famines in Colonial India, 
p.60-4 
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The Bengal Famine Code is an encompassing document, outlining detailed plans 
for identifying and ameliorating famine.  Central to the "duties of officers and local 
government in ordinary times," is to watch for and promptly report on any "rise in prices 
above 20 percent over normal rates."  Instructions on bi-weekly reporting of crop 
conditions, rainfall, "the health of the people" and the "existence of any scarcity or 
distress" are given.  Statistical compilations of records that can be used to determine 
"normal rates" for prices are sketched in detail. If these normal rates fail to apply a report 
should be made, and in the event that prices continue to remain abnormal, prompt 
reporting of early signs of impending famine are required.  They include: 
1.) The contraction of private charity indicated by the wandering of paupers. 
2.) Contraction of credit. 
3.) Feverish activity in the grain trade. 
4.) Restlessness shown in an increase of crime. 
5.) Unusual movements of flocks and herds in search of pasturage. 
6.) Unusual wandering of people.29
When any number or combination of these occurrences are observed, a Famine 
Commissioner should be appointed and District Officers should open "test works" to 
determine the extent of need. The nature of the "test works" (essentially labor-camps for 
the hungry) is outlined in detail.  If such test works attract labourers in large numbers, the 
Code stipulates, famine should be officially declared and various schemes of famine 
relief should commence at once. The "test" has proved positive.  As will be demonstrated 
in the pages to follow, all of these indicators were multiply in evidence throughout the 
period under investigation. 
 
 The administrative apparatus deemed necessary to deal with famine was also 
outlined in detail in the Bengal Famine Code. At the local level, guidelines are given for 
the establishment of District Boards: "each district affected shall be divided into relief 
circles, the boundaries of one or more of which shall be coterminous, as far as possible, 
with territorial divisions made for purposes of administration (such as subdivisions or 
thanas.)30
                                                 
29 Bengal Famine Code, Revised Edition of 1905, p. 54 
 Each "circle," it goes on, should have an Inspector of Relief Operations who 
30 Bengal Famine Code: Revised Edition of December 1895, p. 16 
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reports directly to the District Magistrate. Moreover, although relief was to be 
administered through local channels, there was also the recognition that famine entailed 
distinct extra-local, as well as extra-provincial, responsibilities.  In this context, the Code 
stipulates that local officials should notify their superiors, and their superiors should 
notify the Government of India promptly of: 
1.) The extent to which Imperial aid is likely to be required... if there is any reason 
to believe that the Provincial funds will prove insufficient to meet the exigencies 
of famine. 
 
2.)The extent to which suspension or remission of land revenue may be 
considered necessary. 
 
3.) The extent to which the Provincial staff requires to be increased by drafts from 
Imperial departments or otherwise.31
 
 
Famine is thus to be understood as a central governmental - and even Imperial - concern, 
which, again, should be kept in mind in relation to all that will follow.  
The remainder of the Bengal Famine Code is an elaboration of relief operations, running 
to three hundred and thirty-two pages in all. In short, the Bengal Famine Code is a 
comprehensive document, with detailed and sophisticated instructions on how to identify 
and ameliorate famine.  I include it here because, as I have said, it was the only guideline 
for food security available in Bengal during the period under consideration.  It is, 
however, a rather moot point:  famine was never declared and the Bengal Famine Code 
failed to apply.  As K.C Neogy, Bengal MLA, in representation of the Indian Association 
(one of the earliest nationalist organs), testified to the Famine Enquiry Commission in 
1944, moreover, the Bengal Famine Code, long before the period of mass starvation in 
Bengal, had been, in any case, out of print.32
                                                 
31 Ibid, p. 12 
  A "Famine Manual" stamped "for official 
use only" had been drafted in 1941, but was not readily available, even to members of the 
provincial administration.  Neogy himself could only get a hold of it "surreptitiously."  
Neogy revealed at the Famine Enquiry that the manual itself began: "This Manual is 
intended not to displace the Bengal Famine Code but to indicate how its leading 
principles ought to be applied."  This despite the fact that Neogy, when he asked about 
the implementing the Famine Code, had been told by the Revenue Minister of Bengal, 
32 Testimony of K.C. Neogy in Nanavati Papers, p. 1287 
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some months earlier, that it had been "superceded since Provincial Autonomy."33
 
  Neogy 
was suspicious. 
Enforcing Morale 
 Short of a comprehensive plan to secure the public welfare in terms of the food 
supply, then, Government went forward with plans for securing public safety by 
enthusiastically supporting organizations such as the A.R.P, the Civic Guards and the 
Bengal Home Guard.  The conglomerate of these forces, eventually comprised of several 
hundred-thousand Bengali civilians, would constitute a somewhat ad-hoc native, and 
loyalist, police force that - as will be seen in abundant detail - served the colonial regime 
in diverse and creative ways, many having an only tenuous relationship to the "war 
effort."  These forces would also sow seeds of contention in society at large, and create 
deep divisions among the population of Bengal, that they would be then called on to 
police. 
 In July of 1938 a committee was established to sketch out a plan for the A.R.P. 
organization in Calcutta and its surrounding suburbs; the docks at Kidderpore and the 
industrial belt spanning both sides of the river Hooghly - the factory districts of Howrah 
and Hooghly across the river, and the 24 Parganas adjoining Calcutta proper to the north 
and south.  The Commissioner of the Presidency Division (comprising all the districts 
involved) was appointed Chair of the coordinating committee, with the District 
Magistrates for Howrah, Hooghly and the 24 Parganas responsible for development in 
their respective jurisdictions.  The municipality of Calcutta was to be managed by the 
Commissioner of Police.  This last allocation of authority, however, did not please 
members of the Calcutta Corporation.34
                                                 
33 Ibid 
   The Corporation, always a hotbed of political 
contention, objected to infringement on its jurisdiction, arguing that the Mayor of 
Calcutta, appointed himself by the Corporation, should be in charge of the Calcutta 
A.R.P.. Concessions were made, but at length the Corporation condemned the scheme as 
34 The administrative body of "self-rule" in the city, established by he Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923.   
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"unscientific and puerile,"35 and refused to take part, discounting, furthermore, the 
likelihood of any "enemy" attack on Calcutta.36
 Operating, then, according to the initial plan, "the whole of 1940 and 1941 saw 
the expansion and development of the Air Raid Precautionary measures...[and] during 
this period an intensive propaganda campaign for recruitment of volunteers was 
undertaken."
   
37 Recruitment in Howrah and the suburbs went well, but in Calcutta it did 
not.38 It seems that the rift with the Corporation had damaged the reputation of the A.R.P. 
in the city from its very inception. The Corporation's strong affiliation with Congress and 
its program of "non-cooperation," specifically in relation to the war effort, compromised 
the situation further.  Additionally, "it was no easy task educating the public.  There was 
a common belief that once recruited in he A.R.P. they would be sent abroad as fighting 
forces. "39  On December 10th of 1941, however, a system of pay was introduced and 
recruitment picked up. With rapid inflation taking hold and increasing scarcity beginning 
to bite, a remunerative position of local authority in and around Calcutta became 
increasingly more attractive, despite any political misgivings.  By the time of its 
demobilization at the end of 1945, in addition to at least 66,000 volunteers40, the paid 
A.R.P. ranks numbered over 26,000 members, nearly 14,000 of whom were engaged in 
"administrative" work.41
 Given that the Indian Army itself, as late as mid-1942, was "starved of money and 
poorly equipped,"
 
42 the A.R.P. had its work cut out. Along all the main thoroughfares of 
Calcutta, as well as throughout the residential and industrial districts, "slit trenches" were 
dug to serve as shelters in case of bombing. 43
                                                 
35 Chatterjee, Pranab Kumar , p. 104 
  The slit trenches were protected by "baffle 
walls" made of local brick, and reinforced with sand bags. Baffles walls were also 
constructed at the entrances to governmental and residential buildings in the downtown 
area that would also serve as public shelters.  A Mosquito Control Officer was appointed 
36 Ibid 
37 Sen, P.K., p. 4 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid  
40 Casey Diaries, Feb 9th, 1944 
41 WBSA, Home Confidential, Confidential Fortnightly Report on Bengal, Second Half December, 1945 
42 Bayly and Harper,  p. 72 
43 All information following is taken from WBSA, Home Confidential, W-551/41 
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to ensure the cleanliness of the trenches, and a store of bleaching powder was stockpiled 
by the A.R.P. for the same purpose.  Fearing the possibility of an enemy attack on the 
Corporation water treatment facility, arrangements were made to sink 2000 deep tube 
wells (at an average depth of 250 feet) and 500 shallow tube wells (averaging 70 feet in 
depth.)  In Calcutta, 20 hospitals were also selected and asked to reserve 100 beds on 
their premises for A.R.P. purposes.  After the initial failure of the warning systems, 
resources were allocated for an increase in the number of "hooters," and the system was 
augmented by gongs and conch shells, that would carry the warning into the adjacent 
countryside.  
 In addition to the labor that such extensive measures necessarily involved, A.R.P. 
officers were appointed to serve as local Wardens, and managers assigned to various 
work crews were commissioned to oversee and execute lighting restrictions, fire fighting, 
rescue and demolition, medical treatment, gas decontamination, and corpse disposal. The 
question of the scope of the A.R.P. in relation to Mortuary Services was subsequently 
addressed in a governmental circular, and it was found that their duties in this regard 
"should not be construed narrowly."44  In this context, mass burial pits were dug at Gobra 
on the northern outskirts of the city to accommodate many thousand of corpses.45 The 
A.R.P. was also made officially responsible for the maintenance of essential services 
such as sewage, gas, electric, and food supply.46 Its role in relation to maintenance of the 
food supply was not further elaborated upon. In the A.R.P. Handbook "cooperation with 
military authorities" was also listed as a central responsibility, as was "control of the civil 
population," this last responsibility according to "special schemes for maintenance of law 
and order."47
 In respect to these various duties, A.R.P. staff were provided with uniforms that 
would confirm their level of rank.  The Controller, as well as Chief Wardens, Additional 
Chief Wardens, Deputy Chief Wardens, Officers in charge of Services, Assistant Officers 
of Services, and Instructors were to wear khaki drill tunics ("as worn by officers of the 
 These schemes for maintaining law and order were not, however, outlined 
in any detail.  The authority of the A.R.P. over the public was thus left open-ended. 
                                                 
44 WBSA. Home Confidential, W-112/43 
45 WBSA, Home Confidential, W-351/46 
46 A.R.P. Handbook, WBSA, Home Political, W-551/41 
47 Ibid 
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Indian Police") fastened with four A.R.P. silver buttons.  Slacks or shorts were also to be 
of a "khaki drill," as were shirts, socks or stockings and neckties. Uniformity was 
maintained by a mandate of brown shoes, and the whole outfit was topped off with a steel 
helmet also bearing the A.R.P. insignia.  Lesser administrative ranks were deprived of the 
tunic, but were to maintain the khaki patterns outlined above.  And finally, as proclaimed 
in the A.R.P. Handbook, "All ranks when on duty, and only when on duty, shall wear on 
the left upper forearm a navy blue brassard on which the prescribed Air Raid Precautions 
Service Badge shall remain imposed.  The brassard and badge will be supplied by the 
Provincial Government and will remain the property of the crown."48  To further ensure 
the legitimacy of their authority, Ordinance No. IV of 1941, signed by the then Viceroy 
of India, Victor Hope, Second Marquess of Linlithgow, declared: "No suit, prosecution or 
other legal proceeding shall lie against the Controller or any member of an Air Raid 
Precautions service for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in 
pursuance of this Ordinance or any rules made there under."49
 In addition to the A.R.P., the central government, pressed by the ostensive 
immediacies of war, began organizing a second mechanism to maintain order amongst 
urban populations in the provinces. On November 1st, 1941 it was thus announced: "His 
Excellency the Governor of Bengal [Sir John Arthur Herbert] has, in the exercise of the 
powers conferred by the Civic Guard Ordinance, 1940, made certain rules for the Civic 
Guard organization in Bengal."
 As such, the A.R.P. were 
granted pervasive immunity in relation to their nebulously defined civil authority.    
50
According to these rules, the Commissioner of Police is responsible for the 
organization in Calcutta, while elsewhere such responsibility rests on the 
superintendent of police under the general guidance of the District Magistrate.  
Recruits shall be formally enrolled with due ceremony on parade and during this 
ceremony each recruit shall take the oath of allegiance to His Majesty the King 
Emperor.




At the time of this announcement the duties of the Civic Guard were few, but broad in 
scope.  They were: 
1.) to assist the regular police force in the protection of the civil population 
                                                 
48 Ibid 
49 WBSA, Home Confidential W-477/42 
50 Amrita Bazar Patrika, November 1, 1940  
51 Ibid 
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     against the forces of crime and disorder 
 
2.) to work in close touch with air raid precautions and to maintain and enforce 
     order during black-outs and air raid alarms 
 
3.) to perform such duties in connection with the protection of persons, the  
      of property or the public safety as the Provincial Government may, from 
      time to time, assign to them.52
 
 
A few weeks later, however, a new resolution was drafted in fear that the importance of 
the Civic Guard would be "lost if the members of the Civic Guard or public generally 
think that the organization is only to function within the necessarily narrow limits of 
[these] statutory rules."53  As such, the promotion of communal harmony, the prevention 
of "the spread of false rumors and dissemination of subversive literature," and the 
circulation of "accurate war news" were all amended to the duties of the Civic Guard by 
this second order.  Additionally, it was noted, "Government expect that every member of 
the Civic Guard will consider himself a servant of the public at all times, and be ready to 
help, without hope of reward, anybody who is to be found in distress or difficulty."54
 The lack of reward, however - and again - did seem to inhibit recruitment as well 
as enthusiasm.  In government's quarterly "War Diary" of Summer 1942, A.D. Gordon, 
Inspector-General of the Bengal Police, writes,  
 
In Dacca city the Civic Guards assisted the police during the outbreak of 
communal hostilities...in most districts, however, the Civic Guards have been 
inactive; little progress has been made with training in drill and law, while 
physical training has been [altogether] neglected...it is hoped that with the posting 
of Adjutants and Quarter-masters, the issue of new uniforms, and a scheme of 
allowances...the waning enthusiasm will be revived.55
 
 
These hopes seemed to have been realized.  The scheme to pay the Civic Guards bore 
fruit. By the next year the ranks of the Civic Guard in Calcutta alone numbered close to 
5000, and they acted as an effective "special police" in the urban centers of Bengal.56
                                                 
52 Ibid 
  
Full time employees of the Guard, by 1944, were earning Rs. 30 per month, with a Rs. 11 
"dearness allowance," and part-timers were getting Rs. 7.  Keeping in mind that the 
53 Amrita Bazar Patrika, November 7, 1940 
54 Ibid 
55 WBSA, Home Confidential, W-77/42 (italics mine) 
56 Casey Diaries, May 7th, 1944 
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average salary at this same time for a higher secondary school teacher was around Rs. 25 
per month without any dearness allowance57
 Control in the countryside was an even more complex question.  With its more 
than 90,000 villages and 20,000 miles of water communications winding through thick 
jungle, together with what Sugata Bose calls an "infinite variety of local agrarian 
structures,"
 - and taking into consideration, also, the 
additional privileges that can be assumed to have accrued in relation to such a position of 
Imperially recognized authority during a period of acute scarcity and administrative 
chaos - it can be ventured that the benefits of membership in the Civic Guard were 
significant. 
58 the province of Bengal proved a governmental conundrum from the earliest 
days of its incorporation into Empire.  From the times of the East India Company, 
colonial forays into the Bengal countryside were "a journey into the unknown in more 
than one sense."59
I do hope that some of the members of the Commission will go on tour by the 
watercourses along the coastal routes of Bengal; if they do so they will appreciate 
how impossible it is to administer that area in detail with the staff that exists...the 
whole area is a network of tidal khal running between very big and dangerous 
rivers and your staff consists of the sub-divisional officer, perhaps a couple of 
circle officers for an area of 600 square miles, and a thana staff of a sub-inspector 
with perhaps one assistant for an area of - I would not like to exactly say.  
  With Permanent Settlement, and a transfer of revenue collecting 
responsibilities to local landlords (zamindars), Government was able to maintain a light 
administrative footprint, extracting revenue and raw product from the countryside 
through native agents, and intervening directly only as necessary - to enforce order. Order 
in rural Bengal, however, seemed chronically beyond colonial reach.  As late as 1942, 
even as rebellion gripped the countryside, the vast hinterland of Calcutta still remained 
something of a mystery to colonial administrators. In his testimony before the Famine 
Enquiry Commission , Special Officer L.G. Pinnell, in charge of the "denial" program of 
1942 defended his less-than-stellar record irritably: 
 
                                                 
57 Casey Diary, January 27th, 1944 
58 From this "infinite variety" Sugata Bose is able, however, to construct a working typology of agrarian 
patterns of land use in his Agrarian Bengal.  
59 Ranjit Guha, Rule of Property, p. 13.  Guha traces the difficulties that company revenue officials had in 
sorting out the heterogeneous nature of Bengal's rural land relations based on "tradition recorded only in 
memory and customs embedded in a variety of local usages [which] wielded an authority equal to that of 
any written code."   
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Such environmental difficulties were considerably complicated during the period under 
study, not only by the threat of external enemies, but perhaps more tangibly by what the 
Viceroy called "by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857" - the 'Quit India' 
movement, to which I will return.  
 Government, however, could not content itself with civil defense measures that 
focused on the urban centers alone, which comprised only 10 percent of Bengal's 
population.  In Memorandum No. 1379 of 1942, therefore, the Governor of Bengal, 
acting under Government of India authority, introduced the Bengal Home Guard, or 
Bangya Griharakshi Dal.  The duties of the Home Guard were officially four in number: 
 1.) the preservation of peace and order 
 
 2.) aiding and assisting evacuees or refugees who may pass through the area 
 
 3.) raising and stiffening the morale of the people, discounting and denying false  
      rumor and rumor-mongering generally, and; 
 
 4.) in the areas near the coast and eastern frontiers, watching for and reporting  
       anything of a suspicious nature. 
 
To these was added, it was added, that "if necessary, in times of emergency, they would 
also be available for maintaining the food supply and similar activities."60
The Home Guard would be organized under police supervision and would operate 
in rural areas only.  Circle Officers and Circle Inspectors of Police, acting under direction 
of District Magistrates were responsible to enlist ranks in the following manner:  
  No specific 
plans for this last function were, however, outlined.  
within the area of a police station they will co-opt two influential non-officials, of 
whom one will be Hindu and one Muslim...in consultation with these co-opted 
members Circle Officer and Circle Inspector of Police will select a suitable local 




In this way Government would be able to extend its authority, if not its own human 
resources, into the far reaches of the countryside.   Home Guard members, the 
memorandum goes on to say, would be required to wear an identifying badge "indicating 
                                                 
60 WBSA, Home Confidential, W-477/42 
61 Ibid 
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in Bengali letters the title of the organization."  They would, furthermore, be armed with 
lathis, but would receive no pay.  Perhaps based on previous experience with recruitment 
in such volunteer organizations, however, it was added in the initial memorandum itself 
that, "if the Home Guards prove a success and establish themselves in the esteem and 
affection of the persons whose services they are enrolled, there is no need to anticipate 
insurmountable difficulties in the way of providing them with uniforms and possibly 
other amenities..."62
In addition to the considerable forces mobilized by special governmental sanction, 
the regular police force in Bengal numbered 38,981, nearly 18,000 of whom were 
armed.
 By the end of the war the Home Guards in Bengal numbered close to 
200,000. 
63  Meanwhile a massive build-up of military troops continued apace, with All-
India numbers increasing from 225,172 in 1939 to nearly 1.4 million by January 1st of 
1943.64  With waves of troops passing through the city to be stationed in Bengal frontier 
districts, and on their way to fortify other strategic locations throughout Southeast Asia, 
the "defense" of Calcutta became a central goal.  Bengal's industrial infrastructure by 
1944, moreover, accounted for as much as 80% of munitions production in India,65 and 
textile factories in and around Calcutta fed the voracious appetite for cloth to uniform and 
shelter Allied armies operating throughout the region, and beyond.66   As such, Viceroy 
Linlithgow well recognized the vital strategic importance of Calcutta, worrying even 
before Japan's successes in Southeast Asia, that losing the city would be "tantamount to 
the 'loss of India.'"67
 
   
Hearts and Minds 
For many Indians, however, the involvement of India in Britain's war effort was, 
itself, a grave injustice.  The battle for freedom from colonial rule trumped the battle to 
ensure Britain's supremacy - particularly in colonial Asia.  In 1939 when the Viceroy 
declared war on India's behalf, without any consultation with Indian politicians, long 
                                                 
62 Ibid 
63 Bhattacharya, Sanjoy,  p. 42  Numbers from second half of December, 1942. 
64 Ibid, p. 24.  Actual number for Jan. 1, 1943: 1,382,048 
65 Casey Diary, February 8, 1944 
66 In his essay "State and Class in India, 1939-1945," Indivar Kamtekar suggests the verity of the saying 
that "India clothed the armies east of Suez."  p. 195 
67 Chatterjee, Pranab Kumar, p. 103 
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standing resentment of colonial rule only sharpened.  Radical Bengali nationalist, Subhas 
Chandra Bose, resigned from the All-India Congress leadership after Mahatma Gandhi 
refused to launch a mass movement against being co-opted, without consent, into war,68 
and the Indian National Congress was shaken to its roots. Despite Gandhi's note of 
caution, however, opposition to the war was widespread, and the risk of rebellion could 
not be overlooked.  On June 1st 1940 the War Cabinet in London thus approved the 
Viceroy's scheme for a Revolutionary Movements Ordinance, "conferring extraordinary 
powers [on the Government of India] in the event of civil disobedience."69  But as 
maverick British journalist, Arthur Moore, former Chief Editor of the Calcutta Statesman, 
wrote to incoming Secretary of State for India Leo Amery a few weeks later, "the idea 
that, with their base in England largely out of the reckoning, the handful of British here 
can, by invoking a Defense of the Realm Act, keep army and police control and hold the 
country down, is dangerous madness."70
In October, riding the wave of discontent, the Congress High Command decided 
to withdraw its ministers from the seven provinces that it controlled since the 1937 
provincial elections, to protest unrepresentative involvement in Britain's war. Section 93 
of the Defense of India Rules was enacted, which gave the imperially appointed 
Governors of these provinces emergency rule for several years to come.  Provincial 
Autonomy, established in 1935 to diffuse demands for self-governance, was turning out 
to be something else in practice than what it had been imagined in theory.  Linlithgow 
himself, panicked by the breakdown in governmental order, according to the Secretary of 
State in London, "was getting very desperate, felt he could do nothing and wanted to 
resign and come home."
   
71
                                                 
68 Bayly and Harper, p. 17 
  Perhaps his sense of dignity could not accommodate the nitty-
gritty business of holding an empire together in times of war and rebellion. According to 
his Reforms Commissioner, Henry Hodson, the Viceroy "was a formidable-looking man. 
Very tall, ungainly in motion, with a long solemn face like a sad clown that belied his 
rich humor, he displayed the deterrent reserve of a naturally shy man. As if this were not 
69 The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 606 
70 Ibid, p. 605-6 
71 Ibid, p. 621 
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enough to awe an official caller at Viceroy’s House, he always sat on a big throne-like 
chair raised several inches on a dais behind a massive desk."72
 War did, however, facilitate what Winston Churchill regarded to be the 
"bulwark of British rule in India," namely "the Hindu-Muslim feud."
   
73  Communal 
relations in India, and particularly in Bengal, had grown increasingly tense since the 
Communal Award of 1932 was realized in the provincial elections of 1937.  The question 
of quotas in government services, in particular, was contentious and divisive, and 
Hindu/Muslim relations were entrenched in economic inequalities, but alliances were, as 
of yet, still complicated and fluid. The province at the time was 55% Muslim, and most 
of the Muslim majority was comprised of poor agriculturists in eastern districts, while the 
Muslim League continued to garner the bulk of its support from the capitalist elite in 
Calcutta.  In the 1937 elections, populist Fazlul Huq, a Muslim perennially in conflict 
with the leadership of the All-India Muslim League, managed to form a coalition 
Ministry in Bengal that garnered support along class, rather than communal, lines, which 
left the League scrambling to gain a more representative foothold in Bengal. Meanwhile, 
with the Congress leadership in jail, the Hindu Mahasabha hastened to fortify its own 
political base.  At  its 1939 national meeting, held in Calcutta, the Hindu leaders 
convened with alarm to remedy the imagined realities of a "dying Hindu race."  Central 
to the platform were plans to incorporate schedule castes, tribals, and Sikhs into a newly 
defined "Hindudom."  Vinayak ("Veer") Savarkar in his Presidential address argued that 
"every person is a Hindu who regards... this land from the Indus to the seas as his 
fatherland as well as his holy land."74
                                                 
72 Henry Hodson's Autobiography at: http://www.athelstane.co.uk/hvhodson/hvhbiogr/biogr09.htm (last 
accessed 1/20/10, 1:02 PM), Chapter IX, p. 1 
  Such rhetoric, however, only belies the anxiety 
with which communalist organizations such as the Mahasabha greeted the reality of a 
prevailing lack of unity entailed by such categories as "Hindu."  Nevertheless, when 
Congress announced their opposition to India being co-opted into war dissent was 
officially coded as a "Hindu" phenomenon, and similarly, the Muslim League's support of 
the British war effort was extended to signify "Muslim" loyalty more generally.  In this 
way, the progress of the war served to concretize previously fluid allegiances in 
73 The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 605 
74 WBSA, Intelligence Branch, file# 822/39 
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pernicious and catastrophic ways, reifying the rhetoric of communal exclusivity espoused 
by both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League, and realizing the simplistic 
Hindu/Muslim binary in increasingly "official" ways.    
Particularly in the early days of the war, however, a majority of the population of 
Bengal remained skeptical of the colonial government's "defense" measures.  On the third 
air raid test exercise held in May of 1941, despite extensive propaganda, "the public 
again stood or walked about on streets and in the open and made no effort to take shelter.  
Buses and trams were not emptied and nowhere was there any indication of 
instructions...being enforced."75  A month prior, the A.R.P. Controller had hesitated to set 
a date for this exercise because, he explained, the [gramophone] records which 
[were]...being played on the publicity vans [had] not yet been in circulation long 
enough."76 No doubt the vans would need to continue their rounds now, before the goal 
of holding exercises "with diminishing and vaguer periods of warning - until they can be 
held without warning at all," could be realized.  And again there were systemic problems 
contributing to disorder: "the warning system was [again] found to be totally inadequate 
and revealed defects which were not so prominent in previous tests. The number of 
sirens...is insufficient and reports indicate that mill hooters are unsuitable for conveying 
the warning."77
While the imminent dangers of war failed to properly mobilize the citizens of 
Calcutta, however, the privileges associated with Civil Defense Services membership 
were gaining a certain, if unsanctioned, currency.  During the third exercise, in 
Sovabazar, not only were "numbers of bhadralok
  As of yet, Air Raid Precautions were something of a farce. 
78 walking about on their business and 
ignoring the exercise," but even more alarmingly, "two chokras79 aged 13 or 14 were 
seen wearing A.R.P. armlets."80
                                                 
75 WBSA Home Political, W-72/41 
 An investigation was launched and it was found that at 
least seventeen firms in Calcutta were selling unauthorized A.R.P. brassards and badges 
to civilians.  An order under Defense of India Rules was issued prohibiting manufacture 
or sale of unauthorized badges, and a directive was circulated stating that "it should be 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid 
78 Middle-class, educated "gentlefolk" 
79 Menials 
80 Ibid 
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made clear that anyone found in unauthorized possession of such articles shall be 
severely dealt with."81
But in Bengal, where anti-British sentiment had long been sharp, there were also 
more alarming signs of disorder.  Posters were hung in 1940 warning:  
 Several orders followed to detail the exact procedure of 
authorization and distribution of badges and other identifying paraphernalia related to 
A.R.P. and Civic Guard membership - to what effect it is difficult to discover.   
 
The British Empire Is On The Verge Of Annihilation: Don't Be A Recruited 
Soldier!"82
 
   
Leaflets, entitled "Civic Guard or a Treacherous Force?"  were circulated, and strident 
anti-war appeals were openly publicized: 
Civic Guard Corps of Government is a Devilish Scheme for Suppression 
 
If the British Agents Would Approach You for War Contributions  
Turn them Out! 
 
Do Not Betray Your Country by Enrolling Yourself in the Civic Guard! 
 
Killed by Hitler on the other side of the ocean,  
the British Raj has greatly increased repression on us.  
Let us get ready to retaliate!83
 
 
Distrust of the British war effort filtered down to the population of Calcutta and 
took on less overtly political guises as well.  In some communities participation in the 
war effort was considered unseemly, if not treasonous.  In the struggle for survival 
overtly political gestures may tend to become attenuated.  In Bimal Kar's novel, Dewal - 
the most insightful and thorough treatment of the era here under consideration84
                                                 
81 WBSA, Home Confidential,, W-477/42 
 - a small, 
lower middle-class family moves to Calcutta from a rural village in Bardhaman sub-
division of western Bengal. They arrive in Calcutta in 1939.  Father, Chandrakant, is 
convinced to try his luck in the big city by a cousin-brother who has opened a publishing 
business in Calcutta.  The economic life of the countryside is moribund and it is all 
Chandrakant can do to eek out a living as a schoolteacher in the village.  In Calcutta there 
82 All the following from WBSA, Intelligence Branch, file #250-40.  Translated from Bengali in file.   
83 Ibid 
84 Many thanks to Gautam Bhadra for insisting on the importance of this novel. 
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are real opportunities.  The publishing, industry, in particular is booming.85
Look at your son!  Determined to drive out the last trace of dignity that this family 
has left.  Walking the streets like some petty village watchman in the company of 
 Though he 
has taken pride in his life in the village, the enticement of income wins out.  Once in the 
city, however, his labors are exploited by his relative whose greed and exploitation fuel 
his cousin's demise. Overworked and out of sorts, Chandrakant dies of a fever, leaving 
his small family in dire straits. Ritimoy, Chandrakant's widow, is left with their two 
biological children, Shudha and Basu, as well as a young girl adopted at the time of 
another relative's death. They cling desperately to Calcutta for survival, knowing there is 
nothing left for them in the impoverished countryside.  Shudha, the eldest child, leaves 
college and joins a trading firm, earning enough to keep the family precariously afloat 
amidst rising prices and increasing scarcity.  Her brother Basu, an errant and angry young 
man facing a dismal future, joins the Civic Guard.  Shudha reports his enlistment into the 
Guard to their mother with horror: 
a gang of other thieves and miscreants.86
 
   
Ritimoy asks if he will be sent to war, to which question Shudha responds caustically, 
"How should I know? Now he's reduced himself to a common constable, I suppose if he 
feels the need for a few more coppers, he'll take on the job of a sweeper or a crematorium 
worker!"87
 Even after Japan's entry into the war, while there was considerable anxiety and 
uncertainty in Calcutta and the countryside, an undertone of cynicism remained. 
Significant contributions to the war fund failed to materialize, and withdrawals from post 
office banks further undermined the finance of the war.
 
88
                                                 
85According to the Government of India's "War History of the Labor Department" private presses in India 
increased from 79,677 in 1939-40 to 1,818,810 in 1942-43.  Table reproduced in Sanjoy Bhattacharya,  p. 
77.  
 Measures to improve "morale" 
continued to meet with failure, and repeated calls to "stand to" were met with the contrary 
inclination to flee. The alarm with which the British looked east from Calcutta, in short, 
was not shared by many among the population of Bengal.  In fact, the vulnerability of the 
British Empire was greeted with a measure of glee as well as uncertainty.  Even as the 
86 Kar, p. 39 (Translation mine) 
87 Ibid 
88 See Kamtekar 's "State and Class in India, 1939-1945," p. 199 "The Indian public showed no desire 
whatsoever to contribute to the state's finances." 
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A.R.P. and Civic Guard paraded in the streets, behind closed doors; in schoolrooms, 
playgrounds, and in Bengali kitchens, a humorous ditty - that few would forget89
      Sa-re-ga-ma-pa-dha-ni         
 - made 
the rounds:  
      Bom phelechhe Japani,      
     Bomar maidhe keute sap        
      British bole bapre-bap!       
  
  (Do-re-mi-fa-so-la-ti 
   A bomb was dropped by the Japanese 
   In the bomb is a cobra snake 
                               The British shout "For Heaven's Sake!") 
 
As such popular expressions demonstrate: the threats facing British imperialism in Asia 
during WWII were not easily transferable to the colonized population.  
 
The Countryside 
 Particularly in the countryside, concern for the war was muted by more pressing 
concerns of elemental survival that had developed over the last decade.  In 1934, Satish 
Chandra Mitter published a book with the retrospectively (and sadly) ironic title A 
Recovery Plan for Bengal. In his appended, hand typed, appreciation to this work, 
Rabindranath Tagore calls Recovery Plan "the best possible book one can wish for," at a 
time when "our villages are driven to desolation," and the inhabitants of the countryside 
"are grown inconspicuous by the deadly pallor of their anemic existence." Mitter himself 
paints a grim picture of rural Bengal circa 1934.  "It is evident," he wrote, "to anyone 
familiar with agricultural conditions...and with the lives of the cultivators that they exist 
rather than live, and that the margin between starvation and existence is an extremely 
small one."90  The index of jute prices, set at 100 in 1914, plummeted to 40 in 1934.91
                                                 
89 Of the many Bengali people surviving from these times that I have interviewed, all remember this rhyme 
gleefully.  It is interesting, moreover, that the next generation, those born after the war, also know this 
rhyme and can recite it - with similar satisfaction.  
  
Jute producers, particularly in eastern Bengal were pushed to the brink. Rice prices, 
similarly, were perilously deflated, with the value to the cultivator at that point, half that 
90 Mitter,  p. 42 
91 Ibid, p. 5 
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which it had been five years earlier.92 Malaria had depopulated important sectors of the 
economy, and the fishing industry was in shambles.93 Cattle breeding and milk cows 
were being slaughtered because of economic necessity, and, with the cost of living 
standing at 150% of pre-WWI levels, the citizens of Bengal's countryside, by 1934, 
Mitter cautioned, "[could not] but be hunger-stricken and starving, and eventually 
insolvent."94
  Writing many years later, historian Sugata Bose touches upon many of the 
same themes as S.C. Mitter had, extending his argument into the 1940s.  Restrictions on 
rent increases, mandated by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, compounded by increasing 
pressures of population and diminishing sizes of land holdings among the gentry, made it 
increasingly difficult for landlords to profit from rent extraction. Rural capitalist turned to 
usurious credit schemes to augment their diminishing rent returns, which further 
straitened the already impoverished peasantry.
 
95  With increasing commercialization of 
grain markets and the vicissitudes of a volatile jute trade, "many peasants fell into debt 
and could only carry on by borrowing seed and grain from year to year; and in course of 
time, some were reduced to a position close to that of landless laborers."96 As such 
cultivators were trapped in a cycle of debt and repayment that left them on the verge of 
starvation between crops.  Small scale producers (which comprised the majority of 
agriculturalists in Bengal97
                                                 
92 Ibid 
) were forced to sell their products at deflated prices during the 
post-harvest glut in order to pay loans taken during the pre-harvest "starvation" season.  
Interest rates on loans ranged as high as 75%, and so needed to be repaid as soon as 
repayment was possible.  Lack of local storage facilities also meant that peasants lacked 
the resources to stockpile against annual shortage.  By mid-August, yearly, many were, 
again, borrowing against imminent starvation.  This cycle led to the increasing 
impoverishment of the countryside during the first three decades of the twentieth century. 
93 Ibid, p. 23 
94 Ibid, p. 13 
95 Bose (1986), p. 102 
96 Ibid, 31 
97 Table 1.1 on page 24 of Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, taken from the Land Revenue Commission of 
Bengal, 1940, indicates that in eastern districts of Bengal 84% of families had land holding less than 5 
acres, in western and central Bengal 72% held lands less than 5 acres. 
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 During the depression things only got worse.  Beginning in the late 20's, there 
was a precipitous flight of capital from the countryside and the rural credit market totally 
collapsed, leading to the abject destitution of millions of agriculturalists in Bengal.98 
Deflation of prices on rice and jute throughout the decade meant unpaid credit balances, 
which, again, deepened a crisis of liquidity.  While "recovery" was seen in the 
international sector by the middle of the decade, credit relations in Bengal failed to 
rebound.99  The cycle of subsistence and starvation remained.  To make ends meet in the 
absence of ready credit, cultivators entered into usufructary mortgage relations and lost 
their lands, or managed to hang on from year to year by selling off family ornaments, 
brass-wear and other moveable possessions. By the turn of the decade moneylenders "had 
shut their money-chests...[and] the supply of grain had largely been taken out of the orbit 
of credit and subjected to the convulsions of a wartime product market"100
 Due to dislocations in commodity markets as a result of war, meanwhile, by 
September of 1940 the price of rice had risen 33% in a single year.
 The poor of 
Bengal had been through a perilous decade.  By 1940, as such, large segments of the rural 
population were already deeply impoverished and, indeed, starving. 
101
That the gloom of a frightful famine has cast its shadow all over Birbhum cannot 
be contradicted by anyone...it is high time that the authorities at the head of the 
Provincial Government should gather first hand knowledge of the exact situation 
and do everything in their power to combat the famine.  Let it never be said to the 
eternal disgrace of the responsible ministers at the head of a provincial 
autonomous Government that, like the bureaucratic administration of the past, 
they have also studiously refrained from declaring famine when actually that 
condition prevailed.
  In October, 1940, 
Mihirlal Chatterjee, member of the All India Village Association issued an appeal to the 




Dr. Profulla Chandra Ghosh, ardent Gandhian and future Chief Minister of independent 
West Bengal, set up the West Bengal Famine Relief Committee to raise relief funds for 
the "famine-stricken people of Midnapur, Birbhum, Bankura and Murshidabad."103
                                                 
98 Bose (1986), p. 111 
 
99 Ibid, p. 125 
100 Ibid, p. 140 
101 Ibid,, p. 88 
102 Amrita Bazar Patrika, October 27th, 1940 
103 Ibid 
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Floods during the monsoon season had compounded the difficulties of inflation and 
scarcity was taking a toll. On the same page a report came out that the A.R.P. would hold 
its first "black-out" exercise in Calcutta on November 6th, plunging the city into darkness 
in preparation for attacks from the enemies of Britain, at this time Germany, who might, 
"imminently" begin bombing the Second City of British Empire. Disinterest in this 
exercise, given the prevailing economic situation, is understandable. 
 A year later, in September of 1941, the price of rice had risen another 36%,104
In the districts the abnormal rise in prices of paddy, rice and piece goods has hit 
the poorer section of the people very hard.  Though the general rise in prices is 
taken to be an outcome of the war, the failure to exercise any effective control 
over the price of rice...has been a great disappointment to many.
  
and distress deepened for many in rural Bengal who had lived on a razor's edge of 





In Noakhali and Tippera, eastern Bengal, with jute prices failing to follow the 
inflationary curve, the rice-purchasing power of jute cultivators plummeted still further.  
The Commissioner worried that "economic distress and the high price of rice may lead to 
organized goondaism."106  "Test Works" - the primary indicator of famine laid out in the 
Bengal Famine Code - were opened in both Tippera and Noakhali.  Rates of recompense 
were negligible, but the works drew "considerable numbers."107 The "test" had proven 
positive, but no further resources were expended and famine was not declared. Hunger 
marches were organized to demand relief,108  and in north Bengal sharecroppers 
(adhiars) and landless laborers looted rice paddy from the storehouses of rich landholders 
(jotedars.)109  Reports came in from all over the province of widespread distress.  Prices 
of sugar, cooking oil, kerosene and pulses of all varieties were on the rise.110
                                                 
104 Bose (1986), p. 214 
 "The price 
105 "War Diary, Aug. - Oct. 1941," WBSA, Home Confidential, W-60/41 
106 Quoted in Bose (1986), p. 214.  A "Goonda" is something like a "thug,"  "goondaism" is something of a 
code word during the entire period to refer to demonstrations and/or violence perpetrated against 
government, local authority, or military. 
107 Bose (1986), p. 215 
108 Ibid 
109 Ibid, p. 261 
110 "War Diary, Aug. - Oct. 1941," WBSA, Home Confidential, W-60/41 
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of yarn hit the hand-loom weavers in the province so hard that they had to suspend 
business."111
 In the same quarter "25 important articles on A.R.P., war, war funds, etc. were 
published [by the Government of Bengal's Publicity Department.]  38 press notes were 
issued and 22 leaflets, pamphlets, etc. were distributed, and movie tone war news reels 
and war films,  prepared, purchased, or hired, continue to be displayed by the National 
Welfare Units."
 And yet the word "famine" failed to appear in any official circles.   
112 For this last purpose Government had at their disposal, not only the six 
publicity vans already mentioned (which moved primarily in urban areas), but also 8 
bullock carts, and 4 river boats with which they might be able to penetrate the 
countryside and spread the word of imminent danger.113 One can only imagine how such 
efforts might have been received.  According to the Director of Public Instruction, 
literacy rates in Bengal were not more than 15%.114 According to the Minister of Public 
Health there were approximately 1,500 doctors working with 6000 available hospital 
beds to tend to the medical needs of some 58 million rural inhabitants of the province.115
 Even after Japan's entry into the war, concern in the countryside was focused 
elsewhere. As historian Sunil Sen wrote in 1972, "The slogan of 'resist Japan' [could 
have] hardly made any sense to the [impoverished, illiterate and disenfranchised]  
peasant."
  
Life expectancy was 27 years. In this context, there is little doubt that knowledge about, 
not to mention support for, the British war effort was extremely limited.  Illiteracy, ill-
health and hunger were far more pressing concerns.  
116
                                                 
111 Ibid 
  In a poignant scene in Satyajit Ray's 1973 movie Asani Sanket ("Distant 
Thunder"), in a typical village of central Bengal circa 1942, the population is struggling 
to survive.  Prices have risen prohibitively, the poorest have already begun to starve, and 
the rest have begun to worry. An educated member of the village reads a newspaper to a 
gathered crowed.  "The British have been defeated!  Singapore has fallen to the 
Japanese!"  This news is accompanied by much excitement.  One naive member of the 
audience enquires hesitantly, however, "...but where is Singapore?"  The newsreader 
112 Ibid 
113  Bhattacharya, Sanjoy, p. 75 
114 Casey Diary, Jan. 27th, 1944 
115 Ibid, Jan. 23rd, 1944 
116 Quoted by Bose (1986), p. 262 
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pauses to consider, then responds confidently, "not far from Midnapur..."117
 
  Perhaps the 
"bullock vans" had not made it yet to this particular village... 
Establishing Priorities 
 In the factories surrounding Calcutta there were also acute economic anxieties.  
From the earliest days of the war, strikes for wage increases, "dearness allowances," war 
bonuses, and the opening of controlled shops were common.  Labor condition were poor, 
wages were low, and job security was always tenuous.118 The dominant commercial 
industry in Bengal, at the time, was jute, employing more than 285,000 workers, the 
majority of whom were migrant laborers from Bihar, United Provinces and Orissa,119  
Labor in jute mills, as well as in cotton mills and other industries, was primarily 
unskilled, and as such workers remained highly replaceable. Nevertheless, during the war 
industrial management needed to maintain a steady work force, even amidst rising prices 
and increasing insecurities.  War meant profit, and maximization of profit demanded 
stable labor conditions.  As operations got underway in the Middle East and North Africa, 
India was supplying as much as 1.2 billion yards of cloth per year.120
  In November, 1939 a strike involving more than 11,000 workers at the 
Hukumchand Jute Mill in the northern suburbs of Calcutta drew quick response from the 
Indian Jute Mills Association (IJMA). Bengal's jute production at the time accounted for 
more than half the supply of jute world-wide.
 Much of the 
production of cloth was done in the factories of industrial Calcutta. The inflation that 
such a boom in industry precipitated, however, tended to impoverish and disaffect an 
already marginal labor force, impinging on record profits. As such, concessions had to be 
made. 
121
                                                 
117 Midnapur is a district 100 miles east of Calcutta, often and again, the center of anti-British "terrorist" 
activity in Bengal.  
 After a long slump, prices for jute 
manufactures were showing signs of resuscitation with the advent of war. The IJMA 
quickly settled the strike at the Hukumchand mill and instituted a flat-rate wage increase 
of ten percent throughout the industry. In 1941 there were, however, additional strikes in 
118 See Chakrabarty (1989) 
119 Chakrabarty (1989), p. 105.  Actual numbers for jute mill workers place of origin, 1940: 11.6% Bengal, 
43.1% Bihar, 36.4% U.P., 3.4% Orissa, 2.4% other. 
120 Kamtekar, (2002a), p. 195 
121 Chakrabarty (1989) p. 9 
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the jute industry around questions of dearness allowance, war bonuses, and related issues.  
In May, 9000 workers at Baranagar jute mills went on strike, and in July 12,000 workers 
at the Anglo Indian Jute Mills followed suit.122 In September Calcutta Tramways and 
Calcutta Port Trust workers also began petitioning for war-bonuses, and as early as 
March, 1940, 20,000 workers of the Calcutta Corporation; street cleaners, sewage 
workers, and other menial laborers, went on strike.  The strike ended with police firings 
and small wage concessions.  Earlier, the President of the Bengal Labor Association 
moved a resolution in the legislature asking for the grant of a 25% war-bonus to all 
factory and mill labor.123
 If industrial interests were initially reluctant to grant the war-related demands, 
however, and labor in Calcutta was not easily mollified.  The appeal of remaining in 
oppressive mills and factories, and run the additional risk of being targeted by "enemies," 
began to pale just as labor requirements were increasing.  In this context, in February of 
1941, the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance was authorized by the Government 
of India.  The Ordinance defined as "essential" war industries, not only cotton and jute 
mills, armament factories, engineering firms, paper mills, and printing facilities, but also 
tobacco factories and gin presses, as well as food service workers, stone masons and 
employees of municipal, provincial or central governments.
  The resolution was defeated, but two things were made 
apparent: 1.) that even early in Britain's war effort, inflation had begun to pinch industrial 
labor seriously and labor would use its leverage to survive in times of acute scarcity, and 
2.) that industry had both the means and the will to take the measures necessary to keep 
the wheels turning, and would do so to maintain production.  This dual dynamic defines 
labor relations throughout the period under consideration. 
124
The ordinance makes it an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to one year and with fine, for any person [covered under the 
ordinance] to abandon such employment or absent himself without reasonable 
excuse.  The fact that a person apprehends that by continuing in his employment 
 All of these workers, 
because the were deemed "essential" to the war-effort, were put under extraordinary 
restrictions: 
                                                 
122 Chatterjee, Pranab Kumar, p. 84 
123 Ibid p. 77 
124 Bhattacharya, Sanjoy, p. 85 
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In declaring the workers, essential, in another sense, the government was also signifying 
them as "priority" citizens.  Such a designation would have a significance in the coming 
years that was of primary importance - as the differential "priority" of citizens of Bengal 
became a measure of life and death.   
 The process of "making essential," as Bernard Cohn has famously argued, was 
in fact part and parcel of the colonial project of control.  To order and prioritize the 
colonized into objectified (and thus "knowable) categories was a central strategy of 
colonialism in India from the start. The imposition of classificatory schemes such as the 
census, caste matrices, and language groupings, gave the British a sense (if illusory) of 
jurisdiction over the complicated and often fluid loci of identifications that comprised the 
diverse and intricate indigenous social fabric of South Asia.  With the advent of World 
War II, the hunger for "order" became only more acute.  Though the German threat was 
distant to India, the insecurities gripping Europe reverberated throughout the Empire. The 
British were also facing disconcerting governmental difficulties in India, stemming from 
an increasingly vocal independence movement, as well as from increasingly contentious 
fracture lines running through Indian society itself. In this context previous classificatory 
schemes needed to be re-evaluated under "emergency" conditions.  The Intelligence 
Branch, therefore, shifted into high gear, redefining, clarifying, and prioritizing residents 
of India according to the new criteria of war.  Enemies lurked everywhere and might 
cloak themselves in any disguise. The true identification of Indians and "foreigners" alike 
could not be taken for granted.  
 As urged in a secret note prepared by the Intelligence Bureau in August 1940, 
"a country's danger does not commence with the first sound of the iron-shod tread of the 
armed invaders."126
Germany utilizes all available material - her own nationals, refugees who are 
made her possibly unwilling tools, nationals of occupied countries who are 
blackmailed, bribed or coerced, political parties of the home country sympathetic 
  Rather, a host of "camouflaged helpers," however haphazard their 
allegiances may appear, are lying in wait to facilitate and assist enemy attack: 
                                                 
125 Quoted from Home Political Files, GOI 218/42 in Sanjoy Bhattacharya,, p. 41 
126 WBSA, Intelligence Branch, "Alien Danger in India," file #729/40 
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to the Nazi ideology or antagonistic to their own Government on account of 
special grievances, youth movements... and other indigenous elements, according 
to opportunity and, very often, regardless of the fact whether they know they are 
helping Germany or not.127
 
 
Files were started to monitor nationals of Germany, America, Latvia, Brazil, Romania, 
Belgium, Mongolia, Egypt, Russia, Yugoslavia, Japan, Nigeria, France, Italy and Sweden 
(to name a few.128)  After "further reconsideration" the Government decided it would be 
"unsafe to continue the former lenient policy of leaving so many [enemy nationals] at 
liberty," and the Intelligence Bureau suggested, "the likelihood that the great majority, if 
not all, [would] soon be either in internment or in parole centers."129 Primary suspects 
were listed as "refugees, missionaries, women, and those who have cloaked their original 
enemy nationality under naturalization or in any other manner." "Do not accept a Jew as a 
Jew because he has a 'J' passport," the report goes on, "or a Pole as a Pole because his 
travel documents say so."130
 The attitudes of political parties to the war were also assessed, and separate files 
were opened to monitor the disposition of all the major parties in Bengal. 
 In effect, all prior means of identification would have to be 
abandoned, and the State alone would command the power to stamp any individual an 
"enemy" or "ally." 
131  The dangers 
of "whispering penetration" were likewise addressed: "bad speeches, intemperate talking, 
the spreading of alarmist talk and rumours...all come within the purview of the police and 
on them devolves the duty of ensuring that none goes unnoticed who breaks the country's 
laws."132 Nor could peasants be exempt from suspicion: "A farmer ploughing his field is 
an ordinary sight, but in some European countries fields were ploughed and crops were 
cut in such a manner that guidance and indications were given to the enemy."133
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 Imported 
cans of sardines might contain bombs.  House fires could be "signals." And furthermore, 
"repeated suspicion has fallen on the cosmopolitan cabaret artists and artistes, not only 
128 In the Intelligence Branch files for 1939 there are at least 39 files (representing 39 countries) opened in 
the same year to monitor the activities of "foreign nationals" in Bengal.   
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here but in other countries."134
 Such hysteria, even in the early days of the war, led to a redoubling of efforts to 
classify and categorize.  "Caste Hindus," not to be equated with bhadralok Hindus (who 
were largely opposed to war being declared on India's behalf), should be enlisted into the 
armed forces, and might do well in motor units.
 In short the enemy might be anywhere and society at large 
needed to be mapped and monitored with extreme vigilance.  
135 Scheduled castes should also be 
employed according to their capacities, and thus prioritized. The "Namasudras of east 
Bengal (particularly Dacca and Faridpur) [would] do very well for coastal defense 
battalions."136  The Rajbangshis of north Bengal, on the other hand, would be suitable for 
labor battalions and as "camp followers generally."137  Muslims, though considered loyal 
to Britain, at least in relation to Hindus, could not be taken for granted either.  The 
Auslands Organization, a cleverly disguised German cultural club, was corrupting even 
their fidelity: "in India, although our knowledge of the organization is still too meagre to 
show exactly the lines on which the party is working, it has been reported that it aims at 
fostering anti-British feeling among the martial races, i.e. Moslems."138
 At this stage, however, the war itself seemed ephemeral to most.  The British 
themselves, though they had mobilized a native police force of close to 300,00 in Bengal, 
appear to have been rather less than well-organized on the military front.  In his Official 
History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, Bisheswar Prasad admits, 
"till the end of 1941 no effective measures for the defense of Burma or India on the 
eastern side had been adopted."
     
139 For all the fanfare, the Empire's second city was 
largely unprotected.  "There were virtually no anti-aircraft guns, air-raid flood lights, or 
radar sets, and the Royal Indian Air Force could only deploy 8 'serviceable Mohawks' to 
defend Calcutta."140
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  Historian Eric Stokes, who himself had served in the British forces 
in India during the war, places further doubt on the urgency of British preparedness.  
Bayly and Harper note: 
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Throughout the war India Command's fortnightly situation appreciations 
conventionally began with an account of operations on the North West Frontier in 
which British officers pursued shadowy Mullahs over the hills and frustrated the 
plots of obscure tribal insurgents.  Stokes felt that the Faqir of Ipi, a Muslim rebel 
[in Waziristan] and long time thorn in the imperial flesh, seemed to loom as large 





 Attitudes and priorities, both administrative and popular, underwent a radical 
change when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941.  The bombing of 
Rangoon began later in the month, and the importance of Calcutta in the expanded war 
effort became central.  The last eastern industrial frontier of the British Empire, war 
production in, and troop movements through the former capital of the British Raj became 
critical in the pushback against Japanese advance. Labor and services in and around 
Calcutta did, indeed, become increasingly "essential" to Empire.  However allegiance to 
Calcutta proved a slippery problem. The British, much to their chagrin, quickly found out 
that though they had built it, and the people had come, Calcutta was not yet "home" to 
those who had migrated there in search of employment or education.  
 Between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth the population of 
Calcutta had mushroomed from approximately 400,000 to over 2,000,000.  Economic 
pressures, and lack of opportunity in the vast hinterland throughout this period drove 
waves of immigrants into the city in search of means of survival.  Laborers from Bengal 
itself provided the bulk of the industrial workforce early in the 19th century, but by late-
century the demographics were changing fast, and cheaper, semi-transient laborers from 
Bihar, Orissa and the U.P.  began to outnumber Bengalis.  In the jute mills, by 1941, 
Bengalis comprised less than 25% of the labor force.142
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 In textile mills and other factories 
the demographics were similar. The Bengali population of Calcutta consisted primarily of 
Bengali babus (clerks) and bhadralok who had left the countryside in search of 
educational and white collar employment opportunity.  As the saying goes, Calcutta was 
their basa ("nest" - temporary dwelling) but in their districts of origin were their barhi 
(homes.)  Marwari traders, with roots in Rajasthan, had also come to the city in 
142 Chakrabarty (1989), p. 9 
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increasing numbers late in the 19th century, and by the mid-twentieth were the primary 
Indian capitalist class in Calcutta. By 1940 they controlled major shares in the jute and 
textile industries,143 and were deeply entrenched in the grain trade as well.  Their 
speculation, or trading in fatka shares, in commodity markets was legendary and could 
influence prices sharply.144
 When Japan attacked at Pearl Harbor, and a few weeks later began their blitz of 
Rangoon, a crisis of confidence ensued and the immigrant-dependent mosaic of labor, 
industry and administration began to unravel.  On December 18th, 1941 Calcutta and its 
suburbs were declared a 'dangerous area,' and despite all calls to stand-to, residents of 
Calcutta began to flee the colonial city in numbers. The war had at last entered into 
popular consciousness, and clinging to Calcutta had risks outweighing the penalties 
established by the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance.   Non-Bengali laborers 
boarded trains and congested roads, heading for their native provinces.
 
145  Defections 
from the Ishapore Rifle Factory and the Cossipore Gun and Shell Factory were cause for 
alarm.146  On January 1st, 1942 the Mayor of Calcutta issued an appeal, calling on 
laborers to remain at their posts, but the exodus continued.147  "Marwari businessmen in 
Calcutta were selling their stocks at reduced prices, closing down their businesses and 
moving in large numbers to central and north India."148
 The British themselves were making hasty plans for retreat. While Londoners 
were gritting it out back home, playing cards in bomb shelters and toughing out the 
German blitzkrieg with stoic resolve, Calcutta emptied out.  I.C.S. Special Officer, L.G. 
Pinnell, whose assorted appointments by the Government of India would have deep 
implications for Bengal, hustled off to Darjeeling with his family even as he wondered at 
 This meant immobilizing of a 
significant sector of Calcutta trade, including in rice. The air was rife with rumors of 
Britain's imminent defeat.  "Black-outs" were observed every night, and the Bengali 
middle-class fled to their native districts in numbers, leaving only earning members, as 
necessary, to face the risks of clinging to a city that had never quite become "home."  
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the Indian exodus. "Before Burma had actually fallen," he testified later, "the trains 
leaving Calcutta were crowded beyond capacity with people trying to get away...and to 
get their valuables away.  Large numbers of merchants and traders left and I was told that 
ordinary shop commodities in Calcutta could be bought for nothing."149
 A scene in Bimal Kar's Dewal depicts the chaos of exodus more intimately: 
   
Burdened down with any belongings they can carry, people are boarding taxis, 
and lorries, horse-drawn buggies and ox-carts and moving on. Their faces are 
dark and lined with worry.  Small children stare dully and cry.  Girls, 
abandoning their accustomed modesty, push desperately onto fly-swarmed 
railway cars, tearing their saris or falling into strangers' laps. Feverish babies 
cry and vomit.  Old folks gasp for breath, more dead than alive.  Men are 
running in every direction, withdrawing money from banks, handing out bribes 
for favors, and falling at the feet of taxi drivers to beg them for consideration.  
Yesterday's fare of five rupees has become twenty-five today.150
 
   
Those left behind, mostly those without the means to flee, dwelt in a city depopulated, 
houses were boarded up and dark, the streets desolate, and the mood apprehensive.  Kar's 
small family were among those who remained, having lost connection to the countryside 
with Chandrakant's death.  In a telling scene, Shudha shivers in the desolation of 
abandoned Calcutta, remarking bitterly to her friend that "even if the shadow of death 
haunts them in the city, outside it they will find no food or shelter."151
 The war had revealed that loyalty to the city was entirely contingent, and 
Calcutta itself, now 150 miles from the front, was revealed to be an unfixed and 
transitional urban space, a place of alternating alienation and belonging, refuge and flight 
- nobody's home.  And there was cause for abandonment.  Britain was proving highly 
vulnerable, and residents of the cities they left behind - in fast and repeated defeats - did 
not fare well.   
 Observing the 
exodus she ponders, "once people came to Calcutta from the districts (mofussil) to save 
their lives, now they flee from Calcutta to the districts to survive."  
 
The Fortress Falls 
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 Britain's defense strategy for its colonial possessions in South and Southeast Asia 
hinged on the presumed invulnerability of 'Fortress Singapore.'  Originally under the 
administrative ambit of the Bengal Presidency, Singapore became a crown colony in 
1867 and gained increasing importance as a trading port throughout the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.  By 1930, 23% of all British trade passed through Singapore.152
In 1940, Japanese officers on a reconnaissance mission to the area informed their 
commanding Colonel, Masanobu Tsuji, that Singapore was indeed vulnerable to attack 
from the Johore Strait to the north.
  The 
naval base built at Sembawang (on the northern coast of the island) at the outbreak of 
World War II boasted the largest dry dock in the world and the southern coast was 
fortified with a battery of huge artillery guns poised to repel naval attack at long range - 
but, importantly, only if that attack came from the south.  In late 1941, however, there 
were no large warships docked at Sembawang and Singapore lacked any anti-infantry 
capability.  As the course of events proved, the "Gibraltar of the East," as Winston 
Churchill called it, was less a "rock" of invulnerability than it was a shaky pillar of 
imperial hubris.   
153  Later the same year, when the British commander 
of Malaya, Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, surveyed the situation, he similarly 
concluded that the defense of Singapore remained contingent on the defense of the Malay 
peninsula to the north and that preparations against this eventuality were necessary.  Yet 
only symbolic measures of defense were taken.  Bond had suggested that a minimum of 
336 first-line aircraft were needed to secure the peninsula.  By December of 1941, 
however, Malaya was defended by only ninety antiquated "Brewster Buffalo" aircraft, 
rejected for service in Europe.  The seas were patrolled by the ad hoc 'Force Z,' consisting 
only of the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, backed by four 
destroyers.  There were no aircraft carriers within range, and not a single tank on the 
ground.  In November of 1941, when approached by "frantic" Australian generals, 
Churchill pointedly declined to reinforce the Southeast Asia defenses, citing the urgency 
of war in the Middle East.154
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 Several hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan launched an ambitious 
assault on the northern coast of Malaya at Kota Bahru, raining bombs on unprepared 
aerodromes and landing infantry battalions on unguarded beaches, marshaling 125,000 
men, 534 aircraft and 79 tanks.155 The British were caught completely unawares.  Sixty 
Allied aircraft were destroyed in heir hangers. The Indian troops of the 1st Hyderbads 
fought to defend the railhead, then in disorganized retreat shot and killed their British 
commander.156  Force Z steamed from Singapore on the afternoon of December 8th and, 
without air support, engaged the Japanese naval force off the northern coast of Malaya.  
The Prince of Wales and Repulse were quickly sunk and Admiral Phillips and 840 of his 
men were killed. Word of this startling defeat shook the Empire.  The following day in 
the House of Commons, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in WWI, 
mourned, "in my whole experience I do not remember any naval blow so heavy or so 
painful as the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse on Monday last.  These two 
vast, powerful ships constituted an essential feature in our plans for meeting the new 
Japanese danger as it loomed against us in the last few months."157
Japanese divisions, each equipped with 6,000 bicycles and light tanks, advanced 
down the Malaya peninsula rapidly, following in the wake of the III Corps of the Indian 
Army, who blew bridges and scorched the earth behind them.  Several lines of defense 
were hastily erected, but fell quickly to the swift advance of Japanese troops. At Jitra 
British/Indian defenses were consolidated, but collapsed in fifteen short hours.  
Retreating soldiers left behind vast stores of tinned food, petrol and other military 
supplies that fell into the hands of the enemy.  Japan, meanwhile, had almost complete air 
superiority and pummeled British staging grounds at Panang and Singapore.  The 
majority of Brewsters had been destroyed and the remaining planes in the region were 
equally outdated and ill-equipped.  The Japanese navy, similarly, met with minimal 
resistance after the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.  The colonial 
administration hastened to evacuate Europeans from the lines of fire, leaving Malayans 
   Kota Bahru was 
abandoned by the British, and Japanese forces, landing in Thailand, pushed south to 
reinforce the invading army.  
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and Indians to their own devices.158
Singapore itself had been under attack since the 8th of December, and many of its 
European residents had already been evacuated.  When Malaya fell, retreating and 
reinforcing troops flooded into the bomb scarred city.  The big guns on the southern coast 
were silent, useless as they were against Japanese infantry pouring in from the north.  The 
Japanese air force redoubled its assault, blanketing the island from high altitudes.  
Communication lines were knocked out.  The hospitals overflowed with wounded 
soldiers and civilians alike.  Rumors of gas attacks circulated through the besieged town 
and as menial labors began to flee in mass, civic services collapsed.  The remaining 
Europeans gathered in luxury hotels and country clubs and guzzled whiskey from 
basement casks. In the Asian quarters, corpses rotted on street corners. The fall of 
Singapore as of yet, however, could not be countenanced.  Churchill telegraphed his 
regional Commander in Chief, Archibald Wavell, on the 10th of February: 
  A last line of defense was attempted at Johore across 
the strait from Singapore, but this too was overwhelmed by Japanese advance, and by 
January 27th, 1942  Malaya was surrendered and Allied forces, demolishing the bridge 
behind them, retreated to 'Fortress Singapore.' 
There must be at this stage no thought of saving the troops or sparing the 
population.  The battle must be fought to the bitter end and at all costs... 
Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops.  The honor of the 
British Empire and the British Army is at stake.159
 
 
Churchill's orders, however, were met with skepticism from commanding officers.  The 
governor himself argued for capitulation.  Allied troops, demoralized by defeat, looted 
city shops and threatened their own officers with revolvers.160
 
  Surrender came on the 
afternoon of February 15th, 1942.  In  all the British Army had lost as many as 130,000 
troops to death or capture, many of them Indian forces, in their failed attempt to defend 
Malaya and Singapore.  Churchill called the defeat "the worst disaster and the largest 
capitulation in British history." 
Burmese Days 
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 The subsequent debacle in Burma was a heavy dose of salt poured into imperial 
wounds.  Giving priority to the defense of Singapore in early 1942, Burma was left 
perilously vulnerable.  Reginald Dorman-Smith had been appointed Governor of Burma 
in May of 1941, even while admitting his pervasive ignorance of the territory: "my 
knowledge of Burma was precisely nil," he later wrote, "I knew approximately where it 
was on the map, that its capital was Rangoon and that the Irrawaddy flowed through it, 
but my knowledge did not extend beyond this."161  Three bitter wars fought to secure 
British control over Burma in the 19th century had established only a complacent 
colonial administration with fragmentary control over a resentful Burmese population.  
With colonialism had come a large immigrant population of Indians, over one million by 
1931162
 When Japan began bombing Rangoon in the last week of December chaos broke 
out immediately.  The Burmese population fled the city in droves, retreating to 
monasteries and homes in the countryside.  The majority Indian population of the city
, who served at the lowest and highest levels of society.  From Bengal and Orissa 
waves of mostly Muslim immigrants had come to find work as sweepers and "coolie" 
laborers. Upper caste Hindu Bengalis were imported to serve as functionaries in the 
colonial bureaucracy, and from trading communities in the Punjab and Gujarat, Marwari 
and Chetiar businessmen had come to turn profits in lucrative agricultural and piece 
goods markets. The success of these immigrant populations created considerable 
resentment among the Burmese population.  Throughout the 1930s Burma had seen anti-
Indian riots and pogroms that left simmering ethnic tensions in their wake. British defeat 
would only further highlight existing colonial disparities.   
163 
"simply scattered in terror."164
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 Rumors of violence against Indians circulated widely.  
The British began evacuating all their own non-essential personal and prepared for a long 
siege.  With success in Malaya well in hand, however, Japan turned more of its military 
might in the direction of Burma and the fissures in the British system opened further.  
Inexperienced and disaffected British troops put up only sporadic and uninspired 
162 Kamtekar (2002b),, p. 83.  In his footnote on the same page Kamtekar quotes Ma Mya Sein, 'The Indian 
population in Burma according to the 1931 Census was 1,017,825 of whom 630,000 were born outside 
Burma.  This formed 6.9% of the total population..." 
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resistance to Japanese land advance.  Indian troops, pared with Burmese recruits, fought 
better, but were hampered by language difficulties that plagued their bi-national 
battalions.  American volunteer forces, in Burma to secure the Burma Road that 
represented the main supply line into Chungking China, were openly critical of British 
military prowess, going so far as to burn lend-lease vehicles rather than allow their use by 
British forces.165  British heavy artillery, though impressive in theory, was unsuitable for 
jungle warfare, becoming easily bogged down in the Burmese mud.  Dorman-Smith 
reported with dismay that Japanese troops were able to simply "walk around" British 
defensive positions, sunk deep in mud, as they made their way towards Rangoon.166
 As Japanese forces approached the city, life in the capitol deteriorated 
precipitously.  Disease spread as sweepers fled in terror. In the chaos Dorman-Smith 
learned an important lesson that would also haunt Bengal in the years to come; life in a 
colonial metropolis, he confessed, "begins with the sweeper.  That lowest of all human 
beings who holds in his hands the difference between health and disease, cleanliness and 
filth."
   
167  Nightly bombing raids left fires burning all day. The British army itself 
withdrew large contingents of troops to the north in order to regroup, while the US consul 
departed for Chungking. The bombings continued.  Telecommunications broke down and 
looting was rampant. The docks were overwhelmed by frantic refugees looking for 
passage to safer harbors.  Evacuations were, again, starkly inequitable, with moneyed 
Indians and Europeans squeezing out less fortunate immigrants who would begin a long 
and perilous land journey into India in coming weeks.  By the 21st of February defeat 
was certain, if not yet admitted.  The official report of the same day records: "The docks 
during the night were in a state which it is hardly believable could have existed in any 
British possession... I do not think there was a single sober man anywhere.  The crews of 
the boats alongside and the troops had looted liquor and were rolling about the place in 
last stages of drunkenness."168
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 Conditions only deteriorated further before Japan moved 
into a largely deserted and decimated city after Allied surrender on March 7th.  Waves of 
Indian refugees had followed the British troops north and, as Japan pushed passed 
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Rangoon on their heels, these dispossessed refugees began the long and excruciating 
journey across the mountains and into Bengal. 
It is estimated that at least 600,000 Indian refugees fled Burma after Japanese 
invasion, with at least 400,000 forced to travel the 600 miles of perilous mule tracks and 
cart-roads across high mountain passes and thick jungle, in eastern India, most passing 
through the villages and by-lanes of rural Bengal.169 There were few, if any, provisions 
along the way, and only the most persevering survived at all. As many as 80,000 died on 
the trail.  Evacuation began in December, with tens of thousands of Indian residents of 
Burma crossing the hill tracks from Rangoon to the Bay of Bengal, where they could 
board coastal ships bound for Calcutta and Chittagong on the far eastern coast of Bengal.  
The first refugees landed in Calcutta on January 19th of 1942.170  Those who got out 
early were the lucky ones, and most often the wealthiest.  Fearing an exodus of labor 
from Rangoon, British officials blocked the escape routes to the Bay, issuing orders for 
local police to turn back people seeking to cross the river to access the port.171
 Along the way there was no shelter, no medical aid, and little or no food.  People 
traveled with whatever possessions they could carry, and left their dead on the side of the 
  Further 
regulations were established banning Indians from boarding any ships out of Burma as 
deck-passengers, effectively excluding all but wealthier Indians from sea passage.  While 
these measures limited options considerably, even before the fall of Rangoon, a mass 
exodus of Indians of every social class was underway. Those without resources or 
connections (the vast majority) pushed north into the Burmese hills, fleeing Japanese 
advance, at times targeted by local Burmese, and squeezed by British regulation.  The 
British themselves were, meanwhile, evacuating all their "own" non-essential personnel 
in starkly discriminatory fashion.  The evacuation route into Assam was barred to 
Indians, because there were no canteens along the way serving 'Indian food' - only 
'European food,' and as such Indians would have to remain behind.  But remaining in 
Burma was not an option, and so they found their way further north and began the long 
and deadly journey through the mountain passes of Northwest Burma, via Manipur into 
Bengal. 
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road as they pushed on. British caravans, complete with local porters and pack animals, 
edged starving families to the side of the road as they hurried past to safety.172 At 
improvised encampments, dysentery, small pox and malaria flourished.173 When the rains 
came the road itself was washed away in places and the refugees had to make their way 
on their knees through mud and along perilous precipices.  The Government of India sent 
no help.  They had now conceded Burma, and the fate of the British Indian citizens 
stranded in that country was not a priority.  Those who survived the journey, according to 
a British Army Brigadier who witnessed their arrival in Bengal, were in a sate of 
"complete exhaustion, physical and mental, with disease superimposed...all social sense 
lost...they suffer from bad nightmares and their delirium is a babble of rivers and 
crossings, of mud and corpses...emaciation and loss of weight are universal."174
  
 But even 
in India, there were few provisions available, and so these bedraggled refugees began 
filtering into the villages of Bengal, begging at the bazaars, and telling stories of Japanese 
atrocities and British callousness and capitulation, and also providing a (barely) living 
example of colonial priorities.   
 Provincial Politics and War 
 No doubt the black-outs and A.R.P. exercises now gained a relevance that had 
been entirely lacking earlier, but the alacrity with which Calcutta was abandoned can also 
be understood to demonstrate a continuing skepticism of British security measures and 
priorities.  Allegiance to Calcutta, residents knew, meant association (if only by 
proximity) with British power. In the past, this had meant economic survival. The shock 
of Britain's defeats, however, had perilously eroded the appeal of such association.  The 
evidence of the disregard with which they had abandoned their colonial citizens further 
undermined morale. Finally, Britain's enemies were not necessarily the enemies of the 
India people.  Alliances across the sub-continent remained complex and fluid, and Bengal 
politics were, as always, especially complex and fragmented.   
 Radical Bengali nationalist Subhash Chandra Bose, jailed for his 
uncompromising insistence on self-rule in India, had escaped confinement in January 
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1941, and a year later was in Berlin advocating immediate independence for India over 
the airwaves of Radio Berlin.  From Nazi Germany he would shortly travel to Japan, and 
with Japanese assistance organize the Indian National Army with the explicit aim of 
driving the British from Indian soil by force.  Bose had resigned as president of the All-
India National Congress in 1939, advocating a militant movement in opposition to the 
war that Gandhi, for one, was unwilling to countenance.  Bose broke from Congress to 
form the Forward Bloc, campaigning for immediate independence from British rule and 
advocating active sabotage of the British war effort. Congress itself, meanwhile, also 
remained in bitter opposition to Indian involvement in the war. Together these two parties 
could claim a significant, if mostly Hindu, following in Bengal.  The declaration of war 
on India's behalf had been greeted bitterly in 1939, with Germany a distant and 
inconsequential "enemy."  The threat of Japanese invasion did little to instill a sense of 
allegiance to the colonial state among Congress or Forward Bloc followers, rather it 
appears to have only further galvanized opposition to the dictates of an imposed authority 
that put its colonized subjects at unwarranted risk.  
For many Muslims in Bengal allegiances were still more complex. 175
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 Though the 
All-India Muslim League leant provisional political support to the British war effort, the 
battle for Muslim hearts and minds in Bengal rendered loyalties contingent. Throughout 
the period, the Muslim League struggled to gain a more representative popular foothold 
in the province, employing increasingly communalist rhetoric to counter the various 
claims on Muslim political sympathies that circulated widely.  Fazlul Huq, in particular, 
proved a thorn in the League's side on numerous occasions.  By the 1930s Huq was 
already a well-seasoned politician with a wide base of support in Bengal.  He had been a 
founding member of the Muslim League in 1906 and had served as its president from 
1916 to 1921, but he had also served as joint secretary to the Indian National Congress 
during the same period, and never fully embraced the League's political agendas.  
Throughout his career he was decidedly anti-communal, and the League's increasingly 
divisive communal idiom did not sit well with him.  Prior to the 1937 elections Huq 
canvassed and consolidated the Praja Samitis ("peasant organizations") of eastern 
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Bengal, establishing himself as the leader of the newly formed Krishak Praja Party 
(KPP), which opposed League candidates directly.176
The existing praja samitis provided a ready network for canvassing rural support, 
and the KPP gained fast traction throughout the countryside.  In response to the League's 
call for 'Muslim Unity,' Huq and the KPP raised the slogan of 'dal bhat' ("pulses and 
rice"), promising food security and fair opportunity to all.
  The KPP campaigned on a 
platform of tenants' rights issues, arguing for the abolishment of Zamandari land 
settlement, fixation of rents, debt settlement boards, educational reforms and other 
populist issues.   
177  Such a message had broad 
appeal among the impoverished masses of Bengal - Muslim and Hindu alike.  Scheduled 
caste tillers joined fellow Muslim peasants in support of the KPP as the election 
approached. The Muslim League, with its urban, elite base, struggled to counter, accusing 
Huq of currying Hindu favor.  Huq stuck to his message: "It is not all a civil war in the 
Muslim community but it is a fight in which the people of Bengal are divided on a purely 
economic issue...the problem of 'dal and bhat' and some kind of coarse cloth to cover our 
nudity is the problem of problems which stares us in the face and which must be solved 
immediately."178  Further engaging the League's attacks, Huq and KPP campaigners 
noted that considering that 90% of Muslims in Bengal were peasants, the causes that they 
were advancing were, indeed, Muslim causes, as such.179
The results of the 1937 election, the first provincial elections since the communal 
award had greatly enhanced Muslim representation in Bengal, proved a disappointment 
for the Muslim League.  Muslims of Bengal had failed to "unify" as a political unit. 
Though the Muslim League narrowly won more assembly seats than the KPP, Huq's 
party won 31.5% of the popular Muslim vote to the League's 27%.
 
180
                                                 
176 Bose (1986), p. 202 
  Perhaps even more 
telling is that independent Muslim candidates beat out both parties, winning 43 seats in 
the assembly compared to 39 for the League and 36 for the KPP.  Congress took the most 
seats of all competing parties, but entrenched as they were with landed interests in the 
province, failed to come to terms with the KPP.  Instead, a rather awkward alliance was 
177 Shila Sen,  p. 80 
178 Quote from a campaign speech printed in Amrita Bazar Patrika, December 16, 1936 
179 Shila Sen, p. 85 
180 Ibid, p. 88-89 
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struck between the Muslim League and the Krishak Praja Party, and Fazlul Huq became 
the first Chief Minister of Bengal under provincial autonomy.  Given the bitterness of the 
election and the qualms that All-India Muslim League President Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
in particular, had about Huq, it was a unlikely alliance, and one that war, among other 
things, would severely test.   
The All-India Muslim League's support for the British war effort was received 
equivocally in Bengal from the start.  In 1939 when Congress withdraw its ministries in 
protest of the war, Jinnah was jubilant, announcing a "Day of Deliverance" to celebrate 
relief from "Congress oppression."181  Members of the Bengal Provincial Muslim 
League, however, were less sanguine.  Abdur Rahman Siddique, one of only three 
Bengalis on the Working Committee of the All-India League, resigned in protest of 
Jinnah's announcement, calling it "an insult to national prestige" and a "flattery of British 
Imperialism."182
Fazlul Huq, though he had fought bitter political battles with League candidates in 
1937, became a member of the All-India League's Working committee following the 
ministerial detente.  As Chief Minister of a divided house, he struggled to balance his 
populist KPP election pledges with the more narrowly communal considerations of the 
Muslim League.  The war situation strained his efforts to the breaking point. The League, 
in fact, while publicly supporting the war, had disagreements with Linlithgow's 
Government when the Congress Ministries resigned.  Jinnah felt disappointed that the 
Viceroy established emergency rule in the formerly Congress provinces rather than 
inviting the League to form ministries. Furthermore Britain's militarism in the Middle 
East had angered many Muslims.
  Anti-colonial sentiment ran deep in Bengal and such open contempt for 
principled opposition to British rule could not be countenanced along lines of communal 
affiliation.  Furthermore the All-India Muslim League's position on war support was, 
itself, equivocal. 
183
                                                 
181 Shila Sen, p. 126-27 
 In June of 1940 the All-India Muslim League 
Working Committee passed a resolution barring Muslims from participating in war 
182 Ibid, p. 127, footnote 1 
183 In the Government of Bengal's "War Diary" for August-October 1941, it is noted: "Muslim reaction to 
campaign in Iran were undoubtedly uneasy...an undercurrent of dissatisfaction and distrust which 
principally takes the form of criticizing Great Britain for actions which, in its methods, is represented as 
being exactly like that of Nazi Germany."  WBSA Home Political File W-60/41 
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committees.184
Huq resigned from both the All-India Muslim League Working Committee and 
the National Defense Council, and penned an acerbic letter to the League's Secretary, 
Liaquat Ali Khan, defending his decision to represent Bengal in Delhi.  In somewhat 
legalistic language Huq argued against Jinnah's accusation that he had contravened the 
Working Committee's prohibition against "Muslims" serving on war committees.  
Defending himself and the Chief Ministers of Assam and Punjab, who also happened to 
be Muslim, Huq noted that "despite the President's declaration that we were selected as 
Muslim representatives, I maintain that we were selected as Premiers.  From this point of 
view membership of the Defense Council does not involve violation of League principles 
and policy."
  Jinnah felt that unequivocal Muslim support for the war was a bargaining 
chip that he needed to keep in hand.  At the Viceroy's invitation, however, Fazlul Huq 
agreed to serve on the newly formed National Defense Council, and traveled to Delhi in 
August of 1941 to represent Bengal's interests in war-planning. Jinnah was enraged by 
Huq's indiscipline and the Working Committee convened to demand Huq's resignation.   
185  In more direct language Huq squarely condemned the "unfair and 
unconstitutional" policies of "political dictators" who sought to gain "omnipotent 
authority" over Muslims in India.186
Such attacks were not well received by Jinnah.  The All-India League leadership 
threw their weight behind more faithful Bengal members, two influential Ministers in 
Huq's cabinet:  Home Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Minister of Commerce and 
Labor, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy.  On September 11th 1941, Suhrawardy held a 
meeting on the Maidan condemning Huq's letter.  Huq's followers retaliated in the 
legislature, joining with Hindu members to table a resolution against Suhrawardy on the 
  Huq further denounced as "baseless" Jinnah's 
suggestion that in accepting a representative post outside of the League's political 
jurisdiction, he was creating a "split in ranks of Muslim India."  Rather, Huq went on to 
suggest, Jinnah and other League leaders coming from Muslim minority provinces, were 
subverting democratic representation in their efforts to suppress the political expressions 
of leaders in Muslim majority provinces.   
                                                 
184 Ibid, p. 127, footnote 2 
185 Fazlul Huq's letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, September 8, 1941.  Printed in Shila Sen, Muslim Politics, 
Appendix IV, p. 265. 
186 Ibid, p. 267 
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16th of September.  On the 29th of November no-confidence motions were advanced 
against both ministers.  A few days later the Muslim League members of Huq's cabinet 
resigned and the ministry was dissolved less than a week before Calcutta would be 
thrown into panic by the bombing of Pearl Harbor and invasion of Malaya.  Huq, the 
consummate politician, struck a hasty deal with Congress leader Sarat Chandra Bose 
(Subhash Chandra's brother) and Hindu Mahasabha leader Shyama Prasad Mookerjee.  
Bengal Governor, John Herbert, delayed just long enough for Sarat Bose to be arrested.  
On the same day Herbert sanctioned the Second Huq Ministry, which consisted now of 
the highly unlikely partnership of a stalwart Muslim populist and a polarizing, bhadralok 
Hindu Nationalist, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee.   
Where ordinary residents of Bengal stood in relation to the war, however, is 
difficult to assess.  It is unlikely that the bitterness and chaos of provincial politics in 
Bengal did anything to shore up confidence.  Given that 90% of the rural population were 
peasants, progressively impoverished by the long shadow of economic and social 
injustice in Bengal, it is reasonable to assume that the quarreling and uncertainty of 
ministerial politics only disoriented and disillusion many. Franchise was, in any case, 
extremely limited, and the rural peasantry, as well as the urban poor, had little say in 
electoral politics.  In this context, again, the "panic" that gripped the Calcutta is difficult 
to understand in political terms, except to the extent that large segments of the population 
felt un-represented and unprotected. Exodus from Calcutta, and the panic that 
accompanied it is better understood as a de facto vote of no confidence in the overall 
political structure. Flight was a matter of personal expediency, rather than political 
expression. The city had drawn migrant populations from its vast hinterland for many 
years.  The promise of high wages and abundant opportunity had lured factory workers 
and middle-class workers alike from the economically stagnant countryside.  In short, 
residents of Calcutta had immigrated in order to survive.  With the advance of Japanese 
forces and rumors of the collapse of Singapore and Burma rife, they fled now in numbers 
with a similar impetus of self-preservation in mind.  The city of refuge for several million 
economic refugees from the impoverished mofussil had become a city of flight.  In the 
countryside, however, things were coming unraveled at an alarming pace. 
 77 
Chapter Two: Denial 
 
 
"Confusion" in the Countryside 
In the districts, L.G. Pinnell testified before the Famine Enquiry Commission, 
"there was little panic...but there was a great deal of confusion."1 By December of 1941, 
the price of rice had risen by nearly 75% since the beginning of the war.2  Wheat prices 
had risen still more sharply, and as such rice was in high demand across western India 
and Ceylon as a hedge against wheat - which precipitated a drain of rice from eastern 
India. The export from Bengal of 45,000 tons of rice in January of 1942 represented a 
quadrupling of exports for the same month in the previous year,3 and rice continued to 
leave the province in record numbers. In February exports increased again to 60,000 tons, 
in March to 61,000 tons, and in April, 66,000 tons were exported.4
With war fueling inflation and threatening the economic stability of India as a 
whole, the Viceroy convened a "Price Control Conference" in New Delhi to discuss what 
  Additionally, the 
influx of Calcuttans into rural districts, with their relatively substantial economic 
resources, was stressing commodity markets further, as poor villagers were now forced to 
compete with rich city folk for increasingly dear provisions.  Local shortages of sugar, 
coal, matches, raw cotton, cotton yarn, piece goods, paper, and cooking fuel were making 
life that much more difficult for many millions. As the situation in Burma continued to 
deteriorate, moreover, and the likelihood of losing important imports from across the bay 
further escalated the value of Bengal rice, life for the rural poor of Bengal, already 
suffering from acute scarcity for many long years, grew still more uncertain, and 
"confusion" mounted.   
                                                 
1 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L.G. Pinnell, p. 548  
2 Appendix IV of the Famine Enquiry Commission's Report n Bengal, p. 217, indicates that the price index 
for rice, pegged at 100 for the week ending August 19th, 1939, reached 172 in December of 1941. 
3 Report on Bengal, p. 28 
4 Ibid 
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policy to adopt.  It was, in fact, the Fourth Price Control Conference, the preceding three 
having accomplished little to stem the rising prices of a wide range of essential 
commodities.  The war was going poorly in the East and inflation was only picking up 
steam. In this context, nineteen representatives of the Government of India, together with 
thirty-one representatives of provinces and princely states, met in Delhi on February 6th 
to assess the situation.  At this time the Government of India had no Food Department, 
however, and so the question of civilian food supply fell under the auspices of the 
Commerce Department.  The Supply Department, on the other hand, was responsible 
only for the purchase of food for the armed forces and essential services.5
No price control was adopted.  Instead it was concluded that facilitation of "free 
trade" - essentially the enabling of corporate private purchasers - would solve the 
problem. As for the more immediate "scramble for supplies, rising prices, competitive 
buying, reluctance to sell, and speculation,"
 The idea that 
civilian food security remained under Commerce (rather than Supply) created something 
of a tautological outcome to the Conference.  
6 the president of the conference advocated a 
"process of tightening up the belt."7 The question of how tight the belt already was for so 
many millions of India's poor was not addressed.  Free trade entailed a pervasive de-
centralization of authority over the purchase and movement of foodstuffs. Provinces were 
encouraged to lift bans on exports and allow foodstuffs to move freely about the nation 
with the idea that this would cause prices in deficit provinces to stabilize. It was also 
concluded that transportation was the primary difficulty.  Accordingly, a Central 
Transport Authority was established under the auspices of the Commerce Department to 
see to the unimpeded movement of civilian food supplies.  In the coming months food 
did, in fact, begin to move.  Major General Wood, in charge of military supply transport, 
testified before the Famine Enquiry Commission that he himself "was procuring and 
moving a considerable amount of food all the time, and in 1941-42 commenced to 
wonder why."8
                                                 
5 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Nalini Ranjan Sarker, p. 278-79. 
  That the Major-General himself was uncertain why such quantities where 
being shifted is telling. What was less mysterious was that foodgrains were, in fact, 
6 Knight, p. 47  
7 Ibid, p. 49 
8 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Major General E. Wood, p. 503 
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moving out of the hands of those who needed it most - the rural poor - and into the 
warehouses of large capitalists, the military and the government.  In this context, the 
deregulation of the movements of foodgrains, Major-General Wood argued, was "the 
most significant single factor that led to the food crisis."9
Meanwhile, though exports from Bengal continued apace, transportation of 
foodstuffs into Bengal would remain a central problem for years to come. When Burma 
fell to Japan exactly one month after the Price Control Conference, imports into India as a 
whole suffered a 5-6 % decline.
  
10  In Calcutta it was now clear that rice had become a 
central strategic necessity in the increasingly complicated chessboard of war in Asia.  
War-related labor actions, as detailed in the preceding chapter, were nothing new, but 
now that war production was in full gear, the government and industrial employers were 
quicker to grant demands for wartime concessions in order to keep services and 
manufacturing functioning without interruption.  Calcutta Corporation workers, whose 
strike in March of 1940 for wartime "dearness allowances" had ended in police firings 
and minimal wage concessions, again threatened a strike for access to subsidized 
foodstuffs in February 1942. In response this time, however, the Corporation opened food 
stores to sell rice and other staples to its employees at concession rates.11  This kept 
sweepers, waste workers and other essential city services working throughout the period, 
an outcome well known to be necessary to the prosecution of war.  But labor unrest was 
widespread.  In January, 4,400 thousand workers of the Hastings Jute Mills went on 
strike, and in February 15,000 workers of the Andrew Yule Mills walked out, demanding 
"dearness allowances" and preferential access to rice.12  On March 3rd of 1942, the 
Government of India, fully cognizant of mounting difficulties, advised the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce that "industrial concerns should adopt the practice of making 
themselves responsible for feeding their employees."13
                                                 
9 Ibid 
 Toward this end it was 
recommended that industrial firms should keep three months of food grains in stock at all 
times.  
10 Ibid, p. 47 
11 Nanavati Papers,  Testimony of Mr. Barman of the Calcutta Corporation, p. 1276 
12Chatterjee, P.K., p. 84 
13 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Representatives of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, p. 1404 
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This injunction, according to D.C. Fairbanks of the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce, was not a warning based on a shortage of supplies, but rather was a 
precautionary measure related to A.R.P. planning.  "Maintenance of the food supply" 
had, indeed, been a cardinal responsibility listed in the A.R.P.'s handbook published the 
previous year,14  but the organization had no real means of controlling either prices or 
supplies.  What it did have at its disposal was access to a growing propaganda network to 
spread the central government's word throughout the city and down into the countryside. 
Apart from its uniformed foot soldiers and publicity vans, the A.R.P. also had the 
resources of the Publicity Department at its disposal, which oversaw the publication of a 
government sponsored "Bengal Weekly," issued in both English and Bengali, with a 
circulation of as much as 38,000.15
Beginning in March this appeal was broadened to include the general public and 
ordinary citizens were also advised by the A.R.P. to keep three months of stocks at 
home.
  As such, injunctions made by the A.R.P. could now 
reach a relatively wide audience, even while the organization, itself, had limited 
functional capacities. When the Government of India began exhorting big business to 
stockpile food supplies, then, the A.R.P. was enlisted to advertise the call.  
16  This warning, according to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, had "extremely 
adverse" effects on the food supply, and widespread hoarding soon began by both 
industrial interests and private citizens alike.17  Azizul Haque, first speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly of Bengal after the 1937 elections, and at this time High 
Commissioner for India in London, also pointed to the deleterious effects on the food 
supply that the injunction to stockpile had entailed: "if a Government asks its people 
publicly to hoard stocks for three months," he noted, "the tendency [will] be for 
everybody to store up stocks for six months or more, and to that extent the stocks are 
immobilized."18
                                                 
14 WBSA, Home Political, file W-55/41 
  Which does seem to be exactly what happened.  With record exports 
draining available supplies of rice, and increasing demands from the military and 
industrial firms putting further pressure on prices, the injunction to stockpile sparked 
panic. There were already reports of famine in several districts and the influx of moneyed 
15 Casey's Diary, p. 63 
16 Nanavati Paper, Memo of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, p. 197 
17 Nanavati Papers, Memo of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, p. 197 
18 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Azizul Haque, p. 435 
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Calcuttans fleeing an imperiled city had put poor villagers at a distinct competitive 
disadvantage in local markets. Now the A.R.P., without any real authority to guarantee or 
control supplies, was issuing urgent warnings to individuals and industries alike to 
prepare for their own survival in uncertain times.  Hoarding, with official sanction, now 
began on a large scale, and by June the price of rice had risen an additional 30%.19
Concurrent with the A.R.P.'s call for the stockpiling food, were intensive 
negotiations at the national level.  Sir Stanford Cripps, sanctioned by the House of 
Commons in London, arrived in Delhi in March to attempt to broker a political solution 
to the impasse between India and Britain.  The Cripps Mission has been written about 
extensively elsewhere, and so there is no need to detail its failure here.  For the purposes 
of this study it is enough to say that negotiations with the Indian National Congress broke 
down around the all-important question of war support.  Congress demanded immediate 
concessions towards self-government in exchange for backing the war effort, and the 
colonial representatives promised independence only after the war - if Congress agreed to 
cooperate in the meantime.  Government of India Reforms Commissioner, Henry 
Hodson, discussing the failure to reach agreement noted that, "Linlithgow’s opinion of 
Indian character and political sense was," in any case, "not high."
  
20
A grand charity ball was announced to take place at Viceroy’s House in New 
Delhi during the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942. When it was 
cancelled I assumed that Cripps himself had protested, but the Times resident 
correspondent told me that he had been responsible. He had warned the Viceroy’s 
private secretary that demonstrations against the ball were planned, denouncing 
the scarcity and high price of food and mocking the lavish supper menu that had 
been published in the press; his advice that this would do great harm to the image 
of British rule at a critical time had been reluctantly accepted.
  Nor did his office 
seem to have any understanding of the difficulties that the Indian population was facing 
at the time.  While in London and New Delhi war was determining the parameters of 
political debate, on the ground in India, food security was increasingly the over-
determining problem of the day. A telling anecdote by Hodson illustrates the disconnect, 




                                                 
19 Greenough (1982), p. 102 
20 Henry Hodson's Autobiography at: http://www.athelstane.co.uk/hvhodson/hvhbiogr/biogr09.htm (Last 
accessed 1/20/10, 1:15 PM) Chapter IX, p. 3 
21 Ibid, Chapter XII, p. 5 
 82 
The ultimate failure of the Cripps Mission was disappointing, but Linlithgow was 
pragmatic, “We can carry on easily enough,” he told Hodson, “so long as the war lasts 
and people are afraid of stirring up too much trouble."22
 
 War, in this sense, was 
understood to be an expedient means of controlling a recalcitrant colonial population.  
Denial 
 Under the mandates of the Government of India Act of 1935, which had 
established "Provincial Autonomy," governmental authority was de-centralized in novel 
ways that also facilitated tighter control. As of the 1937 elections, Ministers of the 
provincial Legislative Assembly had been given a wide range of administrative 
responsibilities that comprehensively limited the central government's accountability in 
regards to regional affairs, but the real limits of the power allocated to elected officials in 
the provinces proved to be surprisingly contingent.  The Governor - appointed by the 
King and officially a representative of the Government of India - retained certain broad 
"discretionary powers," including the authority to suspend ministerial authority altogether 
and enforce emergency rule in accordance with Section 93 of the constitution.  
Furthermore, in the "special circumstances" related to the prosecution of war, particularly 
in Bengal, the breadth of the emergency powers available to the Governor - even without 
Section 93 - proved rather expansive, and the latitude given to the Governor "to exercise 
individual judgment" under the 1935 Act proved extremely far-reaching.  Bengal's 
Governor, John Herbert, moreover, seems to have been particularly reluctant to include 
his Indian ministers in decisions that fell under the ever-expanding rubric of "defense," 
and made liberal use of his discretionary powers at several critical junctures.  Events in 
Bengal, in this sense,  revealed the policy of "Provincial Autonomy" to be something of a 
farce. 
By early 1942 Japanese victories in Southeast Asia had, ostensibly, enlivened 
military authorities to the dangers of attack on Bengal.  Sometime toward the end of 
March, Governor Herbert was instructed through central government channels to begin a 
scorched earth campaign in the province. The vast deltaic coastline of Bengal, until this 
                                                 
22 Ibid, Chapter IX, p. 4 
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time, had been left almost entirely undefended by the British military.23
Without informing Fazlul Huq (or any other Ministers of the Legislature), Herbert 
appointed British civil servant, and former Personal Secretary to the Viceroy, L.G. 
Pinnell, "Special Officer" in general charge of "denial" operations.  Shortly thereafter, 
Herbert summoned the Joint Secretary of the Commerce and Labor Department, M. K. 
Kirpalani, a member of the Indian Civil Service - also appointed by the Governor himself 
- and assigned him the more specific task of implementing the policy of "rice denial" in 
three districts; Midnapur, Barisal, and Khulna.  Kirpalani estimated that in these three 
extremely productive districts there would be a surplus of 123,000 tons of rice, but to 
remove of that much rice from the far-flung backwaters of coastal Bengal and move it 
two to three hundred miles into the interior presented an estimable challenge.
 The 
recommendation was, however, not for a concerted effort at organizing military defense, 
but rather for an ad hoc campaign of "denial."  In their landings in Malaya and Burma, 
Japanese forces had made expedient use of existing resources on the ground to facilitate 
their advance. In Bengal, no doubt, they would utilize a similar tactic in the event of 
invasion, appropriating resources from the local population and commandeering all 
available means at their disposal to advance on Calcutta.  If - the logic went - the colonial 
government itself could make a preemptive strike and denude the coastal region of the 
resources that might enable invasion, they would be able to discourage attack without 
unnecessary expenditures on defense.  "Denial," was the term used for the various 
measures undertaken by the Government of India to deprive invading Japanese forces of 
the means of sustaining an advance on Calcutta by means of naval landings along the 
undefended coastline of Bengal.  
24  Kirpalani 
later testified that because he "was asked to get this done almost immediately by the 
Governor,"25
                                                 
23 In his testimony before the Famine Enquiry Commission Special Officer L.G. Pinnell, in charge of denial 
policy, suggests: "I don't think anybody has been able to explain why the Japanese did not invade us...there 
was nothing whatsoever to prevent the Japanese from coming whenever they wanted."  Nanavati Papers, p. 
544 
 he had no time to consult Huq or his cabinet, who were out of session for 
24 M.A. Ishpahani's testimony: "When I met the Commerce Secretary he said that they found it difficult to 
remove rice and paddy from the coastal area to about 200 to 300 miles in the interior."  Nanavati Papers, p. 
631 
25 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of M. K. Kirpalani, p. 779 
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the Easter recess, and so proceeded immediately and without informing the elected 
Ministry. Before they had returned from recess operations were already underway. 
Kirpalani approached M. A. Ishpahani, whose firm had considerable experience in the 
rice markets of Bengal, though they had limited experience in any of the districts 
involved.  More alarmingly in certain circles, Ishpahani was a staunch supporter of the 
Muslim League with intimate ties to Muhammad Ali Jinnah.  As such his appointment 
was sure to draw fire from Huq, Mookerji and Congress supporters.  Ishpahani himself 
recognized the potential for political conflict if he was directly contracted, and so 
suggested that the commission be given, in name, to an agent of his, Mirza Ali Akhbar, 
while Ishpahani Ltd. would guarantee standing accounts.26  Because the Governor was 
anxious to get the work done at once, the Joint Secretary advanced 2 million rupees to 
Ishpahani's man to expedite the process.27  The purchases did begin, but when the 
Ministers got word of the plan already underway there was, indeed, a "hue and cry" in the 
Assembly.  Fazlul Huq accused Herbert of having acted "as if the Government of India 
Act in Bengal had been suspended, and [the Governor] was at the head of an 
administration under Section 93 of the Act,"28 and members of the ruling coalition 
decried the Governor's appointment of "political opponents" who would use the platform 
of "denial" to penetrate the countryside in order "to make political propaganda there."29 
 The protests were loud enough to force the Governor's hand.  Four other agents 
were appointed; one, H. Dutta, was a Hindu Mahasabhite put forward by S. P. Mookerji,  
another, B. K. Poddar, was advanced by the Scheduled Caste Ministers, a third, Ahmed 
Khan, was a Congress man, and lastly, Ashutosh Bhattacharjee, made the list by dint of 
his commercial connections.30
                                                 
26 Nanavati Papers,  Testimony of M.A. Ishpahani, p. 631 
  Appointments were thus allocated by "community," 
demonstrating the government's understanding of how to placate charges of abuse of 
power by colonial agents.  As long as "Hindus" and "Muslims," in particular, were 
27 In his letter of August 2nd, 1942 to Governor Herbert, Fazlul Huq writes: "The Joint Secretary says that 
when he was arranging to carry out your orders, you grew impatient and gave him definite directions to 
arrange for removal of excess rice from three districts within 24 hours...The Joint Secretary, in his haste 
and hurry to oblige you, advanced twenty lakhs of rupees to a nominee of a friend to begin the work."  
Huq's letter was widely circulated and the allegations here never denied by either Herbert or Kirpalani, 
which tends to lend them credence.  The letter itself is reprinted in the Nanavati Papers, p. 743.  
28 Ibid 
29Nanavati Papers, Testimony of M. K. Kirpalani, p. 780  
30 Ibid 
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equally represented, impunity could be safely maintained. The contentious political 
nature of these appointments, however, together with the inexperience of several (three of 
the agents (Poddar, Dutta, and Khan) had no experience at all in the rice business31
 
) 
contributed greatly to the pervasive chaos and corruption that characterized the whole 
"denial" scheme. 
Rice: 
In Bengal there are three season of rice paddy production: the boro crop planted in the 
winter and harvested in spring, the aus crop, planted in early spring and harvested in July 
or August, and the aman crop, planted in late spring and harvested in the winter months. 
Because the aman crop is planted just prior to the monsoon season, and receives rain-fed 
irrigation throughout its maturation, it is the most consistent and abundant of the three 
crops, accounting for at least 75% of the total paddy production in Bengal.32  Once the 
aman crop had been consumed or marketed, however, a long season of hardship often 
followed.  According to Ishpahani, "the Bengal cultivator, [even] before the war, had 
three months of feasting, five months of subsistence diet and four months of 
starvation."33 "In an average year," Azizul Haque similarly explained, "the cultivator in 
Bengal had been living on a starvation diet."34
                                                 
31 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of representative of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 1211 
  The aman crop, harvested between the 
end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately 
anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November. In 
these same months, most cultivators would be forced to take loans in order to survive.  
The merchants (paikars, beparis, or farias) who bought their paddy were often also 
moneylenders, who would advance them cash or paddy towards the next harvest.  During 
these lean months, the price of rice and paddy would increase, sometimes precipitously, 
so that a loan, whether in cash or kind, taken at this time was a disproportionate burden to 
pay off.  With the aman harvest, an abundance of paddy made its way to the market and 
prices would again sink.  The indebted cultivator, however, had to square his accounts, 
and so was forced to hold less rice for consumption and sell at deflated prices - starting 
32 Harris-White, p. 5  
33 Nanavati Papers,  Testimony of M.A. Ishpahani, p. 639 
34 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Azizul Haque, p. 63 
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the cycle of feast and famine yet again. The relationships that cultivators were able to 
forge with merchants and creditors, therefore, were of vital importance to their very 
survival.  Furthermore, in Bengal there were tens of thousands of petty traders who 
bought from cultivators,35
In Bengal, as probably in many parts of the world, the trade is not carried out as a single 
unconnected transaction.  Most of the beparis, paikars, merchants, etc. have got an 
undefined but fairly rigid area of operation, for each and every person in the trade has got 
his own sellers, beparis, paikars and mills which he has been in trade association with for 
many years.  Frequently this association has not merely meant the sale and purchase of 
the goods year after year for many years...such transactions have frequently been carried 
out as partly cash and partly credit transactions on the basis of a running account.  The 
association has been in many cases one of several generations.  Mutual influence and 
obligations between the parties in such cases... has therefore been enormous.
 and as such  relationships were highly personalized. A 
memorandum drafted by the Bengal Rice Mills Association describing these relationships 
circa December 1941 is worth quoting at length: 
36
 The fact that three of the principal agents employed during "denial" had no 
experience in purchasing from cultivators caused profound disruptions in the existing 
system of trade and contributed greatly to the "confusion" in the countryside. Sub-agents 
were enlisted indiscriminately and existing market systems were completely ignored.  
Credit relations, patronage, commercial familiarity and existing patterns of trade 
collapsed, leading to a dangerous breakdown in the operations of the rice markets in 
Bengal almost overnight.  Resistance to governmental schemes was met with force, and 
without the necessary expertise or knowledge of existing agrarian relations, extraordinary 
means were often resorted to in the pursuance of "rice denial:" 
 
Persons acting on behalf of Government [did] not always act either tactfully or 
fairly and the [Bengal Rice Mills Association] got the information that in many 
cases undue pressure was used on the growers and sellers to compel them to sell 
to people entirely unknown to them...this further stiffened the resolve of the 
growers.  A few of the agents of Government...did not know the real and actual 
sources whence substantial stocks could be collected and were further 
handicapped by the attitude of the sellers... this exasperated them and also 
enraged them especially, because...Government was putting pressure on them for 
                                                 
35 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 179 
36 Ibid 
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showing better purchases.  At this stage it was reported that considerable pressure 
amounting in some cases to oppression was used on many people for obtaining 
stocks and it was not un-often said that such action was not merely countenanced 
and tolerated, but backed by local officers of Government who had been 
instructed to help the agents.37
 
 
Such statements, it might be noted, particularly concerning the "stiffened resolve" 
of growers to resist the expropriation of their stocks by force, are interesting 
counterpoints to the received trope that the Bengal Famine passed off without a word of 
protest.  Not only were growers reluctant to part with their product, but the pre-existing 
petty merchants approached by denial agents where likewise harassed to sell under 
Government conditions, and their stocks were reported to have been summarily seized for 
non-compliance.38
 Special Officer L. G. Pinnell, for his part, rued that "for anyone who knows the 
Bengal cultivator it was a completely heart-breaking job."
  
39 But a job is a job, and so he 
also admitted that he, himself, "had no objection to 'taking the gloves off.'"40  On at least 
one occasion in Midnapur, late in the scheme, police "had to open fire because people 
would not let [government agents] shift rice."41 Pinnell himself gave the directive to open 
fire when he "got information that our rice was being held up by people who were trying 
to obstruct its movement." 42  For the most part, however, Pinnell was careful to gauge 
the threat of resistance and adjust to the opposition. "If we had moved along certain 
routes," he noted in regards to purchases in Bakargunj, "the transport would have been 
obstructed or looted by the people."43  In many areas, however, despite the threat - and at 
times reality44 - of looting, Government was able to exercise their scheme without 
violence.  In this regard Pinnell testified: "We got away with it by luck and money."45
At the beginning of the denial scheme the maximum price that was to be paid for 
rice and paddy was fixed at the current market price, plus 10%.  But with "denial" agents 
    
                                                 
37 Ibid 
38 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 179 
39 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L.G. Pinnell, p. 545 
40 Ibid, p. 566 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid, (italics mine) 
43 Ibid, p. 569 
44 Pinnell notes elsewhere: "We told the Government of India in one of our messages that people were 
reluctant to move rice because there was looting."  Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L.G. Pinnell, p. 569  
45 Ibid 
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combing the countryside looking for "surplus," this ceiling soon became market price, 
and by late May the going rate had superceded even the value added price established at 
the commencement of denial.46  As the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce noted: 
"the fact that it was the Government who were buying in the market... was sufficient to 
induce both a rise in prices and a feeling of panic among the general public."47
Charges of corruption were also rampant, and not easy to dismiss.
   
48  Nawab 
Habibullah Bahadur of Dacca, who had ignored the directive of the All-India Muslim 
League and had joined the Huq-Mookerji Government as Minister of Agriculture, 
testified before the Famine Enquiry Commission that denial agents had been operating 
well outside the stipulated "denial" zone, "pretending in other areas that they were buying 
on behalf of Government."49  Amongst desperate peasants, strapped by long years of 
marginal subsistence, the heavy hand of Government-backed agents, using coercive 
means to extract their crop, created a sense of panic and acute uncertainty.50  The fact that 
primary agents recruited outside sub-agents, rather than working with existing paikars 
who had long standing relationships with growers in denial areas, compounded distrust.51 
Furthermore, the dislocation of non-denial agents from districts in which they had 
established sellers and practices, created a general displacement whereby "owing to the 
practical monopoly of Government agents in [denial] districts, others flocked to non-
denial areas and affected markets [disrupting] established organization and 
connections."52
                                                 
46 Report on Bengal, p. 25  
 In short, though the objectives of "denial" were ostensibly limited to 
removal of rice from certain coastal districts, in effect the denial scheme threw provincial 
rice markets, as a whole, into a state of chaos.  On April 24th the Bengal National 
Chamber of Commerce sent a memorandum to the Government of Bengal protesting the 
47 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, p. 35 
48 In his analysis of charges of corruption during "rice denial" Paul Greenough, for instance, in his 
Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal, concludes that the nature of the appointments and the 
government cover granted to agents, make is seem "more than likely that the popular suspicion of fraud and 
rapacity was correct."  p. 95 
49 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Nawab Habibullah Bahadur of Dacca, p. 914 
50 In the Famine Enquiry Commission's Report on Bengal, very little importance is given to "rice denial."  
The report does, however, note that denial purchases "brought home to the people in the most emphatic 
manner, the danger of invasion; they increased local nervousness and probably encouraged cultivators to 
hold on to their grain as an insurance against invasion and isolation." p. 26  
51Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 180  
52 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of representatives of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 1211 
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scheme, but "denial" continued unabated.53
The question of the real impact on actual stocks of paddy and rice is, in fact, 
impossible to determine. By official account the total of purchases transferred to 
Government warehouses, was rather small - 40,000 tons.
  Though the Famine Enquiry Commission 
(for one) gave little emphasis to the "rice denial" scheme in its evaluation of the causes of 
events that transpired in 1942, the market dislocations and the rise in prices that "denial" 
precipitated, were profound and extremely pernicious.   
54  This number, however, does 
not represent either the true level of purchases made under government auspices, or the 
extent to which the turmoil in the rice markets effectively drove stocks underground. 
During this period, as already mentioned, Bengal was seeing heavy exports.  No records 
exist to determine what percentage of these exports where related to purchases made, 
officially or unofficially, under the nebulous umbrella of "denial."  Furthermore there is 
ample evidence that the recorded export statistics were, likewise, incomplete.  Pinnell 
himself testified that exports were being made without Government authorization and 
that backroom deals were being struck between large-scale dealers and transportation 
officials.55  "In the public mind," in any case, "there was the belief that large scale 
exports were going out."56 In this instance, moreover, there is ample evidence that the 
public mind may have been correct.  In the 24 Parganas, south of Calcutta, by May 1st, at 
least one hundred boat-loads of rice per month were "getting away."  The District 
Magistrate, in a secret memo to the Joint Secretary, estimated that if this pace could be 
maintained through August all "surplus" rice would be cleared by the end of the 
summer.57
                                                 
53 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, p. 44 
 Though this massive effort was being undertaken under Government notice, 
and in relation to the "denial" scheme, none of the rice or paddy involved appears to have 
been destined for government warehouses.  Rather, the Magistrate was granting special 
permits for boat transport to Calcutta rice mill owners and large stockists so that they 
54 Report on Bengal, p. 25 
55 Pinnell, in his testimony before the Famine Enquiry Commission: "while I was touring the denial 
districts, the steamer agent at Chanpur in East Bengal told me that some big Bombay firm had just bought 
up a whole lot of rice at Chanpur, and significantly added that somehow the Bombay firm had managed to 
get transport to move the whole lot of rice to Bombay - and that in the middle of a war situation!" Nanavati 
Papers, p. 551  
56 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of S. P. Mookerji, p. 1479 
57 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-493/42 
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could "buy up and remove most of the surplus stock."58
 
  Accounting for the extent of rice 
removed during "denial" by resort to rice transferred directly into government facilities, is 
thus entirely misleading. 
Boats: 
The special permits mentioned above were necessary in relation to the second 
main prong of the Government of India's scheme - "boat denial."  The coastal region of 
Bengal lies in the vast and volatile Ganges river delta.  The silt of the Ganges and its 
tributaries have fertilized the delta for millennia, and as such it is one of the most 
productive regions in India.  The Padma, Jamuna and Meghna rivers, with rich cultural, 
as well as economic significance, converge in a seemingly infinite and shifting series of 
tidal estuaries, bayous and backwaters that constitute the coastal belt of Bengal.  The 
people of this region are deeply connected not only to the land that sustains them, but just 
as importantly to the waters that move them, that bathe them, that feed them, and that 
deliver them news of the world beyond. The "country boats" of Bengal, in this context, 
were, until this time, as much an inextricable part of the landscape of Bengal as the 
waterways themselves. These boats represented the primary - and during rainy seasons, 
the sole - means of transportation and trade for a significant population of the province.  
Potters in Chittagong depended on country boats to move the earth that was necessary for 
their livelihood.  The khalasis of Noakhali, expert at navigating the shifting deltaic tides 
from Midnapur to Burma, also depended on country boats to survive.  The char 
cultivators of Khulna and Bakargunj transplanted their paddy and harvested their crops 
from extremely fertile islands off the coast by means of country boats, and even the 
babus of Calcutta moved to and from their native villages onboard these same river-craft.  
Jute also moved to and from markets on country boats, as did paddy and rice. The 
fishermen of Bengal, the largest producers of foodstuffs other than rice, also depended on 
these boats, both for netting in the rivers and bayous, as well as for voyaging out to sea.  
In short, country boats were an unequivocally essential component of the economy of 
Bengal.   
                                                 
58 Ibid 
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 On April 2nd, after plans for "rice denial" had been leaked in the press, Governor 
Herbert stood before the Bengal Legislative Assembly and confirmed Government's 
intention to remove all "surplus" stocks of grain from the coastal region. "The other form 
of denial to the enemy that is intended," he went on, "is to prevent any means of transport 
from falling into his hands."59  This prong of "denial" was to be implemented, by official 
reckoning, in the event that "the invasion of any district in Bengal [was] imminent."60
The destruction and disabling of country boats in Bengal was the job of Special 
Officer, L. G. Pinnell.  No elected members of the Bengal Government were consulted 
and little warning had been given.  In a letter to Herbert a few months later, Fazlul Huq 
complained that the Governor "seem[ed] to have been consulting with Military 
authorities in secret and discussing plans with permanent officials... without taking 
Ministers into confidence."
  A 
Press Note was released the following day informing district officials that all country 
boats capable of carrying ten or more persons should be registered in the coastal districts 
of Midnapur, Hooghly, Howrah, 24-Parganas, Jessore, Khulna, Bakargunj, Faridpur, 
Tippera, Dacca, Noakhali and Chittagong - all districts where water-conveyance 
constituted, by far, the most important means of travel and trade.  In the subsequent 
weeks 66,563 watercraft were registered, and though there was no information of any sort 
that there was a threat of "imminent" Japanese invasion, the active implementation of 
"boat denial" was announced on May 1st.  The confiscation and/or destruction of 
thousands country boats in Bengal began shortly thereafter.  
61  Military authorities, meanwhile, had expressed it necessary 
to "reduce the boats to the absolute minimum required for the subsistence of the 
people."62  By what matrix military authorities were able to gauge the subsistence 
requirements of an already impoverished Bengali population is impossible to guess, but 
the measures were drastic. "What was definitely and openly allowed [was] about 6,800 
boats."63
                                                 
59 Quoted in Kali Charan Ghosh, p. 52 
 In the coming weeks 46,146 country boats were removed from the possession of 
their owners, some were sunk, others burnt, and still others warehoused in military 
60 Ibid 
61 Huq's letter to Herbert of August 2nd, 1942.  Nanavati Papers, p. 742 
62 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L. G. Pinnell, p. 545 
63 Ibid 
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compounds were they rotted in the open air.64 Some 20,000 boats, Pinnell admitted "were 
hidden and could not be traced."65
However, despite dissent, government, backed by military authority, left a deep 
footprint.  With the removal of more that 46,000 country boats from coastal districts, the 
economic infrastructure of rural Bengal collapsed.  If the initial objective of denial, as 
was officially stated, was the "complete destruction of internal economy, trade and 
administration,"
  It seems, perhaps, that the Bengali population may 
very well had different ideas about what was necessary for their subsistence than did the 
military authorities.  As in the case of rice denial, it can be seen, resistance to colonial 
dictates that would deprive them of the means of survival belie the supposed passivity of 
the Bengali population in the face of famine. 
66 nothing could have furthered that goal more swiftly than the removal 
and destruction of the majority of Bengal's country boats. From the beginning, the 
Famine Enquiry Commission reported, "it was always recognized that the removal of a 
large number of boats from the delta, in which communications [means of transport] are 
almost entirely by river and not by rail or road, would cause considerable hardship and 
difficulties."67  And that it did.  "In the districts of Khulna, 24 Parganas, Bakargunj and 
Tippera, it completely broke the economy of the fishing class."68  In districts where 
people were involved in pottery making, an important and substantial industry that 
required large inland shipments of clay, many people "were put out of trade and...their 
families became destitute."69
                                                 
64 Ibid 
  The productive and important paddy fields at the mouth of 
the delta in several districts could not be cultivated, and,  moreover, the primary means of 
transportation of people, as well as goods and services, was almost entirely crippled.  
Pinnell admitted that boat denial had "throttled down" the rice trade, but the true impact 
of this massive dislocation of conveyance on the food supply in Bengal is impossible to 
65 Ibid 
66 "Army Proposal of 23 April submitted to Chief Civil Defense Commissioner, Bengal" in Pinnell Papers, 
p. 5.  Quoted in Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal, p. 89 
67 Report on Bengal, p. 26 
68 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L. G. Pinnell, p. 543 
69 Nanavati Papers, Testimony  of Lieut. Col. Cotter, Public Health Commissioner of the Government of 
India.  p. 382 
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gauge.70
Compensation was initially only given to the owners of boats, which meant little 
to those who made a living from these same boats.  Owners were, often enough, from the 
wealthier strata of society and leased their boats to those who actually made their livings 
from them.  Those whose livelihood depended on these boats (fishermen, khalasis, 
potters, cultivators, paikars of the jute and paddy trade, etc.) at first received nothing.  
After protests from several quarters, however, it was decided to give three months 
compensation to workers.  But for this segment of the population, already living on the 
margins of subsistence, this compensation was entirely insufficient.  The livelihood of 
generations was lost in a matter of weeks, and for that loss, three months of wages were 
received - wages that even before they were dispersed had lost considerable value against 
continuing increases in the cost of living - and many quickly began to starve. Apart from 
the unimaginable consequences of such a policy on the existing economic and social 
structures of Bengal, the enormity of the undertaking also brought home to residents of 
the countryside the extent of British fears as well as their ruthlessness.  Regardless of the 
extent to which British fears of Japanese invasion were transferred to the colonized 
population, the very presence of British authority and the impunity with which they were 
able to act throughout the countryside was enough to create a general sense of panic and 
uncertainty. For now, it looked to many, as if it were the British - not the Japanese - who 
were launching an attack on the coastal population. 
 It would, however, have far-ranging ramifications, both economically and 
politically, which are more easily traced.  
 
Territory: 
At the same time, the military was entrenching itself in and around the 
commercial and strategic centers of Bengal, even while administrative workers were 
removing their kin from "non-family areas," and non-essential government employees 
were receiving "exodus allowances" to relocate.71
                                                 
70 In the Famine Enquiry Commission's Report on Bengal, it is noted: "As regards the extent to which the 
movement of rice was impeded, it is impossible to frame an estimate."  p. 26-27 
 Aerodromes, army encampments and 
supply dumps were carved out of the heavily populated countryside south of Calcutta.  In 
the Diamond Harbor area, an order for military appropriation of land resulted in the 
71 WBSA, Hone Confidential, "War Diary for May-June 1942," file W-77/42 
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summary eviction of at least 36,000 people.  The Minister of Commerce received 
directions from the Governor that as many as 47 areas had to be cleared in as little as 24 
hours.72  In Chittagong District a sub-divisional officer received a similar order: he was 
to evacuate 20 villages within 48 hours.  "He did it with expedition... [but] it was 
afterward discovered that it was a mistake, and it was really only wanted to evacuate 
some 6 or 7 villages, the remainder being required for a defense zone."73 In Noakhali 
another 70,000 were dislocated.74 The total number of mostly poor tenants evicted from 
their lands in relation to such measures is not possible to determine.75 The impact on 
those dislocated was more apparent: "compensation was off course paid, but there is little 
doubt that the members of many of these families became famine victims in 1943."76
Uneasy about how such measures would be received, Government issued an order 
towards the end of May to appoint police guides and interpreters "to facilitate the work of 
troops and at the same time to reassure villagers against any apprehension or panic."
 
77  
These guides and interpreters were, furthermore, tasked to "ensure cordial and friendly 
relations between troops and the people."78  District officials were also enlisted in the 
public relations campaign.  Herbert's Deputy Secretary sent out a memorandum to all 
District Magistrates reminding them that "everything possible should be done by 
propaganda...to instill into the general public the lesson that troops are their friends and 
that they have nothing to fear from them."79  However, the circular went on, the public 
should also be warned that troops would not be confined to evacuated area, and in this 
regard, when and where military exercises were underway: "it would be far more 
satisfactory for [the public] and everyone else concerned if they remain in their houses, as 
otherwise they might only get in the way and suffer unnecessary inconvenience."80
Ostensibly "necessary" inconveniences were, however, pervasive.  A.R.P. medical 
facilities were buckling under the influx of refugees from Burma, and even in Calcutta 
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74 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of P. N. Banerjee, p. 868 
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hospital bed-space was insufficient.  Banks were having difficulties recovering loans, as 
people were reluctant to part with cash in increasingly uncertain times, and a "shortage of 
essential commodities such as rice, salt, kerosene oil, cloth, etc., in the countryside [was 
having] a further unsettling affect on the agricultural population."81 The Bengal Home 
Guard, as already mentioned in chapter one, was organized at this time also, even as the 
"unsettling" of the countryside continued apace.  Arrangement for the guards were 
another point of contention between the representatives of the provincial government and 
the King's representative, John Herbert.  Fazlul Huq complained  of "the mischief of 
officialisation of Home Guards" without consultation with his Ministry as yet another 
example of the Imperial Government making a "mockery of Provincial Autonomy."82
But even while plans were being made to ameliorate dissent in rural Bengal, 
national politics were becoming ever more embroiled in controversies emerging from 
"denial."  Resentment simmered in the wake of the failed Cripps Mission and relations 
between the Indian National Congress and the colonial government were strained to the 
breaking point.  Even before the official announcement of denial policies, Gandhi was 
warning against the intended measures in his weekly Harijan.  In the March 22nd edition 
of 1942, sub-titled "Scorched Earth," Gandhi reminded his readers, "India is not fighting.  
Her conquerors are."
  
83  He continued crossly, "are we to contemplate with equanimity, or 
feel the glow of bravery and sacrifice in destroying life or property at the prospect of 
India's earth being scorched and everything destroyed in order that the enemy's march be 
hampered?"84  On the next page of the same issue a column entitled "How to Ward off 
Starvation," recommended several pragmatic measures to ensure an equitable supply of 
food in the circumstance of increasing scarcity.  Three weeks later, writing again in 
Harijan, Gandhi warned that the people of Bengal were already "suffering from famine," 
and explained the hardships of military evacuations taking place in eastern Bengal. He 
noted that as long as the uprooting of entire villages was "left in the hands of many and 
petty officials, fairness [could] not be assured."85
                                                 
81 WBSA, Home Confidential, "War Diary for May-June 1942," file W-77/42 
 By May 3rd the consequences and 
scope of "denial" were becoming ever more clear, and Gandhi wrote with increasing 
82 Nanavati Papers, Letter from Huq to Herbert, p. 743  
83 Harijan, March 22, 1942, p. 3 
84 Ibid 
85 Harijan, April 19, 1942, p. 1 
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alarm: "No promise of compensation can be any comfort for the dispossession 
of...tenements.  To the poor people it is like taking away their bodies.  The dispossession 
of the country boats is almost like that of tenements. To deprive the people of East 
Bengal of their boats is like cutting off a vital limb."86  Similarly, the "denial" of rice, 
Gandhi wrote, could not be countenanced: "people cannot be asked or advised to starve 
or die of thirst for fear of the Japanese helping themselves to the people's provisions or 
water."87
"Denial," however, continued.  Instructions were given in May for the 
confiscation, destruction or removal of all mechanical transport; private cars, bicycles, 
carriages and bullock carts "not required for Military or Civil Defense purposes."
   
88 and 
plans were hatched to blow up as many as 17 bridges in and around Calcutta.89
 
  
The Fifth Price Control Conference was held in April, only two months after the 
Fourth Price Control Conference had failed to stem the rise of prices.  Though the food 
situation in Bengal was becoming increasingly grave, it was concluded that the 
maintenance of the civilian food supply was to remain a provincial affair.  Towards this 
end the Foodgrains Control Order was drafted and enacted on May 21st, 1942.  The 
objective of this order was, ostensibly, to strengthen the hand of provincial governments 
so that they could gain control of food supplies. The central clause of the Order restricted 
the purchase, sale or storage of foodgrains in excess of 20 maunds to any but those 
licensed by the Provincial Government.  Implementation of the Order was left to 
government discretion, and while Huq's Ministry did not immediately enforce the Order, 
even the threat of Government monopoly of grain markets appears to have further 
embolden "denial" agents operating under Government authority.  Huq himself noted that 
although denial purchases were to have ceased in June, they continued well after that 
date.90
                                                 
86 Harijan, May 3, 1942, p. 4 
  The denial of boats was a protracted process as well.  As late as the first week of 
July, in fact, a secret conference on the administration of denial policy was held and the 
question of "evasion" was addressed.  In certain areas of Bengal, the panel concluded, "if 
87 Ibid 
88 WBSA, Home Political, "War Diary: May-June 1942," file W-77/42 
89 WBSA, Home Political, "War Diary: May-June 1942," file W-77/42 
90 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Fazlul Huq, p. 728 
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there is no improvement, armed patrols or the use of the flotilla might have to be resorted 
to."91
 
  But, once again, the containment of local resistance to military appropriation of 
Indian resources would prove insufficient. 
The "Denial Resolution" 
It is a point that has received scant historical notice, but the colonial government's 
"denial" policy played a central role in the fiercest conflict between the Indian population 
and their colonial rulers since the rebellion of 1857.  Not only did the "denial" policy 
meet with opposition at the local level, but opposition to "denial" at the national level 
created the grounds for the impunity with which the colonial government would suppress 
the independence movement in the fall of 1942.  That the leadership of the Indian 
National Congress took issue with the scorched policies taking place in eastern India, was 
considered a dire threat to empire at war, and one that would be met with extreme 
measures. "Denial," in this sense, galvanized both the Nationalist struggle in India and 
London's extreme response to the same, contributing significantly to the way that the 
"Quit India" movement of 1942 played out.  Though the All-India Congress Working 
Committee's resolutions of July 14th and August 8th are most often cited as the signal 
events that led to the "Open Rebellion" of 1942, the strategies of the colonial state were, 
in fact, forged in reference to an earlier resolution - that of July 10th, the "denial 
resolution."92
After the failure of the Cripps Mission in April, the Secretary of State for India, 
Leo Amery and Viceroy Linlithgow, along with the War Cabinet in London, waited 
apprehensively for Congress's next move.  On the 10th of July the Working Committee 
met at Wardha, and on the same day passed a resolution that was subsequently published 
in the nationalist media.  The resolution, echoing Gandhi's earlier publications in Harijan, 
began with the injustice of "denial:" 
  In as much as "denial" was a significant factor contributing to famine in 
Bengal, moreover, opposition to "denial" at the all-India level can - and should - also be 
understood as yet another example of resistance to war-time famine in Bengal.   
                                                 
91 WBSA, Home Political, file  W-658/42   
92 Linlithgow adopted this terminology to refer to the July 10th resolution.  See, for instance, Linlithgow to 
Amery, T.O.P. Volume II, p. 382   
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Whereas various complaints have been received regarding Governments orders 
for evacuation of villages, lands and buildings without due notice and proper 
compensation, seizure and destruction of country-boats, even were life is 
impossible without them, requisition of vehicles without proper compensation and 
regard for needs of civil population, Working Committee issue following 
instructions for guidance of the people concerned...with regard to evacuation and 
other orders involving temporary or permanent loss of landed property full 
compensation should be demanded...there should be no interference with use or 
disposal of private property except with consent of owner or on adequate payment 
of compensation.  In case of requisition of boats full compensation should be 
demanded and no boats should be surrendered until question of compensation is 
settled.  In areas surrounded by water where boats are indispensable for normal 
everyday life they should not be surrendered at all.  Fisherman dependent on boats 
for earning livelihood should be compensated for loss of employment in addition 
to price of boats.  In case of requisition of vehicles full compensation should be 
demanded and until compensation is settled they should not be parted with.93
 
 
 When Amery received the draft of this resolution in London, he replied with 
urgency and alarm.  Such a resolution by Congress, he warned the Viceroy, amounted to 
the declaration of a "parallel authority acting in defiance of established Government in 
respect of measures necessary for the prosecution of war," which, in turn, would, 
according to existing British law, "involve not only internment but prosecution and 
drastic punishment."94  Amery, while anticipating a "more general" resolution from 
Wardha, urged Linlithgow to take "drastic action with Gandhi and Working Committee 
(such as immediate arrest pending prosecution) and with Press (in any case it would seem 
necessary to impound so far as possible all copies of papers carrying the Resolution.)"95  
On the same day, he quickly penned a minute to Winston Churchill warning the Prime 
Minister: "we are dealing with men who are now definitely our enemies...to appease them 
or delay in striking at them can only discourage the army and all other loyal elements."96
                                                 
93 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 363 
 
The Secretary of State also personally authorized any extreme measures that Linlithgow 
should find expedient, extending him de facto emergency powers to deal with the 
situation immediately and forcefully.  In the meantime, he brought the resolution before 
the War Cabinet in London for advice. The War Cabinet convened on the 13th of July 
94 T.O.P. Volume II, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 374 
95 Ibid 
96 T.O.P. Volume II, Amery to Churchill, p. 376 (emphasis mine) 
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and supported Amery's authorization of Linlithgow's emergency powers, agreeing that 
the "denial resolution" amounted to treason.97
The Viceroy, however, argued for a measure of caution, fearing that the 
immediate arrest of Gandhi and the Working committee would only strengthen the 
Nationalists' position.  He did, however, promise prompt action as soon as any of the 
instructions given in the resolution were executed.  "I have no intention," he wrote to the 
Secretary of State, "of allowing these people to break the law,"
    
98 Amery, was not happy 
with Linlithgow's restraint, and reminded the Viceroy that "feeling may inevitably run 
high among ignorant villagers and people on whom hardship will necessarily be 
inflicted," but indiscipline could not be tolerated.99   He again urged Linlithgow to adopt 
harsher measures with Gandhi and the Working Committee rather than "merely 
punish[ing] the wretched villager who refuses to hand over his boat or his bullock 
cart."100
On the 14th of July the "general resolution" came out.
 Linlithgow, in response, noted the "regrettable spirit of defeatism" that had 
gripped the country, and again argued that a militant response to the July 10th resolution 
would only inflame Nationalist sentiment and play into Gandhi's hands.  In the meantime, 
he sent an urgent telegram to all Provincial Governors warning them of possible 
disturbances and directed them to see that requisitioning of lands and property was done 
as non-intrusively as possible and that compensation was paid swiftly.  Amery deferred to 
Linlithgow for the time being, but the July 10th resolution would remain central to the 
colonial response to Congress agitation. 
101
                                                 
97T.O.P. Volume II,  War Cabinet 91st Conclusions, p. 377-378 
  This resolution did not 
deal directly with "denial," but was, instead, a plea for Indian independence, deeply 
couched in terms of "defense."  In the wake of the Cripps Mission, the Working 
Committee warned, "a growing satisfaction at the success of Japanese arms" was 
sweeping the nation.  In this context, the resolution continued, "Congress is anxious to 
avoid the experience of Malaya, Singapore and Burma."  The only means of defending 
India, the Congress concluded, was for Britain to agree to grant the nation complete 
98 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 382 
99 T.O.P. Volume II, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 390 
100 Ibid 
101 The text of this resolution is reprinted in T.O.P. Volume II, p. 385-387.  All quotes are from this 
reprinting. 
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independence, at which time a treaty could be struck with the Allies for the continuance 
of war against Japan.  Without such an agreement there could be no partnership, the 
defense of India would remain an impossibility, and India would fall to the Axis.  In 
adopting this either/or stance, Congress was maneuvering to adapt the rhetoric of the day  
to its own purposes.  Victory against Japan was contingent upon Indian independence, 
independence, therefore, was a "defense" policy and nothing less.  In this spirit of 
patriotism and national defense, Congress warned of a "widespread struggle...under the 
leadership of Mahatma Gandhi" if Britain refused to come to terms.  A meeting was 
scheduled for August 7th. 
In a telegram to Linlithgow on the 16th of July Amery adopted a dismissive 
attitude toward this "main resolution," while again pressing his concerns about the earlier, 
"denial resolution."  It might be the case, Amery wrote, that the main resolution would 
necessitate no immediate action, but that of July 10th, he again insisted, could easily be 
understood to be in direct breach of Defense of India Rules 38 (1) (a), dealing with acts 
"prejudicial" to the authority of His Majesty's Government.  In this context, Amery 
advised Linlithgow that he "already [had] ground for action if and when expedient."102  
Linlithgow again argued for restraint, finding some encouragement in the "conciliatory" 
tone of the July 14th resolution, however "blatantly hypocritical" its demands.103  He also 
saw a possibility that the July14th resolution could be used to drive a wedge between 
religious communities, thus isolating Congress in its claims.  In this context Linlithgow 
assured Amery that he was doing everything to "energize propaganda" against Congress 
in the hopes of "stimulating" open denunciations of the Nationalist principles outlined in 
the main resolution amongst "Muslims, Depressed Classes & c."104 The Viceroy sent a 
special telegram to Bengal Governor, John Herbert, enlisting him to encourage Fazlul 
Huq, in particular, to issue a public condemnation of the Congress resolution.105  Huq 
declined, preferring to maintain his pluralist position in Bengal, and resisting 
Government bait to publicly cross Congress.106
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103 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 394 
104 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 398 
105 Linlithgow to Herbert, July 16, 1942.  Telegram 2109-S, MSS.EUR.F. 125/42 
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Relations between Huq and Herbert were, at this juncture, particularly acerbic in 
any case.  Huq felt deep resentment towards Herbert's contraventions of Provincial 
Autonomy.  As already noted, the denial policy had been carried out by military fiat, with 
little or no consultation with elected officials.  The Home Guards had been established 
under Imperial, rather than Provincial, authority.  Herbert had directly obstructed Huq's 
motions to expand his Provincial Cabinet, and local officers of the Bengal Police had 
been authorized with special powers under the Defense of India Rules, again without 
consultation with provincial authorities.  Cases of alleged rape by army personnel had 
been suppressed in the districts by Permanent Officials.  And grievances about 
inequitable A.R.P. appointments to Hindus at the expense of Muslims by the appointed 
A.R.P. Controller were completely ignored.107 In his long and angry letter to Sir John 
Herbert of August 2nd, 1942, Huq listed these, and several other grievances, as ample 
evidence that, under Provincial Autonomy "Ministers had been given [only] a mockery of 
authority, and the steel frame of the Imperial Services still remain[ed] in tact."108
With his propaganda campaign showing mixed results, Linlithgow was, 
meanwhile, making less rhetorical preparations against Congress.  Consulting with his 
own legal council, the Viceroy confirmed Amery's opinion that the Defense of India 
Rules could be invoked against Gandhi and the Working Committee in response to both 
resolutions (that of July 10th and that of July 14th.)  The "denial resolution," however, 
represented a more clearly actionable offence in that it contained "direct and authoritative 
instruction to the people to interfere with the administration of law."
  Huq 
further deplored such a state of affairs at a moment when Bengal was "faced with a rice 
famine," which threatened the survival of millions in the already impoverished province.  
Herbert sent no reply to Huq's letter. 
109
                                                 
107 Huq points out in his letter of August 2nd, 1942 that not even 5% of appointments to the A.R.P had gone 
to Muslims.  
  As such, the 
resolution of July 10th fell foul not only of the Defense of India Rules, but also of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, which gave the colonial government grounds to declare 
the Congress as a whole, not merely the Working Committee, an unlawful association, 
108 Huq to Herbert, August 2nd, 1942.  Reprinted in Nanavati Papers, p. 742 
109 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 448 
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greatly expanding the emergency powers with which to suppress any eventual popular 
movement.   
The resolution of July 10th was thus central to the three-staged plan that 
Linlithgow developed to deal with the "open rebellion," and the proposed resistance to 
"denial" that this resolution suggested, central to the brutality with which the "Quit India" 
movement would be dealt. The first stage, the propaganda campaign against Congress, 
was gaining little traction.  The second stage would involve not only the arrest of Gandhi 
and the Working Committee, but also the arrest of the leaders of Provincial Congress 
Committees under the Criminal Law Amendment Act.  The third stage would be to 
promulgate the Emergency Powers Ordinance, which would allow even broader impunity 
to suppress any movement that could not be squelched by stage two measures.110
 
 
Secretary of State Amery brought Linlithgow's plan of action before the War Cabinet in 
London on the 5th of August and won approval for the three-staged plan the next day.  
The course of action that government would take against Congress during the 'Quit India' 
movement was thus established even before the Working Committee had convened to 
issue their much more famous August 8th declaration.   
Quit India 
Winston Churchill needed little convincing that the hard line proposed by the 
Government of India was warranted.  The Prime Minister had been a long time and 
particularly staunch advocate of Empire. "India," he had said some years earlier, "is a 
geographical term.  It is no more a united nation than the equator."111
                                                 
110 This plan is outlined in: Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State, July 24, 1942.  
T.O.P. Volume II, p. 447-450  
 The Cripps Mission 
had been salt in Churchill's wounds after losing Singapore.  Cripps, a political opponent 
of Churchill's, had become Speaker of the House of Commons and a member of the War 
Cabinet only after the defeats in Southeast Asia.  His appointment as emissary to 
negotiate a political settlement in March of 1942 was further evidence of a lack of 
parliamentary confidence in Churchill's own imperial acumen. During the mission, 
Churchill worked behind the scenes directly with Linlithgow to undermine Cripps' 
111 Churchill's Complete Speeches, March 18, 1931. (Winston Churchill (1874-1965), British statesman, 
writer. Speech, March 18, 1931, Royal Albert Hall, London. "On India," Maxims and Reflections, ed. Colin 
Coote (1947).) 
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positions.112  The "denial resolution" had prompted the Secretary of State to warn the 
Prime Minister that the leaders of Congress were dangerous,  but it is likely that Churchill 
understood freedom fighters in India as "enemies" even without further advice. Already 
entrenched in pitched battles on three continents, the unrest in India struck Churchill as 
yet another front in a "Total War" that Britain had yet to master. On the 11th of August 
he chastised Amery for using the word "independence" in a broadcast from London, and 
on the 2nd of September, while preparing a statement for the House of Commons on the 
worsening situation in Quit India, he exploded to his Secretary of State, "I hate Indians.  
They are beastly people with a beastly religion."113
 The 'Quit India' resolution was passed in Bombay by the All-India Congress 
Working Committee on the night of August 8th, 1942.  Early the very next morning, the 
leadership of Congress was rounded up and summarily jailed.  Maulana Azad, President 
of the Working Committee, admitted that this swift move by the British had caught 
Congress on their back foot. "If the Government had accepted the demand," Azad wrote, 
"or at least shown a conciliatory attitude there would have been scope for further 
discussions."
 
114 The terms of the resolution were similar to those put forward in the July 
14th resolution115 and the nature of the movement that would follow if Congress 
demands were not met, remained vague. The sudden over-determining response by the 
colonial state thus came as a surprise to Azad and other Congress leaders. Of the August 
8th resolution historian Sumit Sarkar too has argued, "far from ruling out further 
negotiations, the whole thing may conceivably have been an exercise in brinkmanship 
and a bargaining counter which was followed by an explosion only because the British 
had decided on a policy of wholesale repression."116
 Without leadership, nationalist elements across the country were left to their own 
devices and interpretations.  Gandhi's appeals to non-violence had been recently 
 But the fact of the matter is that even 
before the resolution had been drafted - in response to the "denial resolution" - the die 
had already been cast. 
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113 Ibid, p. 832 
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115 Azad calls the July 14th resolution a "first draft" of the August 8th resolution, Ibid, p. 78 
116 Sumit Sarkar, p. 391   For a more complete treatment of the extent, spread, and nature of the Quit India 
movement, see the same, pp. 388-404 
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attenuated by his increasingly and uncharacteristically extreme rhetoric throughout 1942.  
Even since the spring Gandhi had been urging Britain to "leave India to God or anarchy," 
expressing a final willingness to risk "complete lawlessness" if such would be the price of 
freedom.117  On the 8th of August he gave his now famous "Do or Die" speech, which, 
while still advocating non-violence, expressed a tone of finality that would characterize 
the intensity of the movement.118
 By the 15th of August things had spiraled out of control to the extent that 
Linlithgow had authorized the military, in aid of civil power, to begin machine-gunning 
saboteurs from the air.
  With the arrest of Gandhi and both national and 
provincial Congress leadership the next day, the masses of India proceeded with their 
own interpretation of "Do or Die."  Disruptions of transport, communication lines, 
factory operations, and open challenges to police and governmental authority began in 
most urban centers immediately.  Violence moved into the countryside shortly, with 
peasants participating in open rebellion in large numbers.  In rural districts of Bihar and 
the United Provinces, the movement was particularly intense; railway tracks were cut, 
telegraph poles were downed, goods-sheds were looted and police stations ransacked. A 
rebellion of a scale unseen since 1857 had broken out. 
119
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  Sabotage of railway lines in and around Patna had successfully 
inhibited the movement of troops to disturbed regions.  Attacks on communications lines 
had delayed dispatch of troops still further. Moreover, and perhaps most worrying to 
official in London, dissatisfaction with British heavy handedness was drawing complaints 
from China and the United States.  Gandhi, imprisoned at the Aga Khan's palace in Pune, 
blamed the Government of India for precipitating the crisis, noting that no call to action 
had even yet been given by he or Congress before the Government began its crackdown.  
Linlithgow and Amery worried that if Gandhi choose to hunger-strike, world opinion 
might sour even further.  Meanwhile the movement continued to gain strength. On the 
31st of August Linlithgow telegraphed Winston Churchill and confided, "I am engaged 
118 In his book Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992, Shahid Amin, traces the interesting 
and innovative manner in which Gandhi, as national icon, came to influence the popular uprising of 1922 in 
contradictory, contingent and colorful ways.  A similar argument could be made for the ways that Gandhi 
as a socio-political symbol shaped the 'Quit India' movement of 1942.  
119 T.O.P. Volume II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 708 
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here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent 
of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security."120
 In Bengal, the pattern of disturbances followed the all-India model, with 
disturbances breaking out in Calcutta and Dacca shortly after the arrest of Congress 
leaders, and violence spreading to the countryside subsequently.  Student demonstrations 
began on August 10th in both cities, and picked up momentum in the following days.  
The police and the Civic Guards were mobilized to deal with widespread transportation 
disruptions and vocal demonstrations.  Military reinforcements were requested as the 
violence escalated.  Scuffles broke out between the public and the police, and on the 14th 
police firings killed two in Calcutta.
 
121 Marwari industrialists, led by Gandhi's staunch 
ally in Calcutta, G.D. Birla, organized strikes at jute mills and steel works in and around 
the city.  At the Kesoram Cotton Mills, Birla's own textile mill in Metiabruz, striking 
workers clashed with police on the 24th, and other serious incidents were reported from 
the jute mills at Cossipore and Chitpur.  The Imperial Tobacco Company was also 
attacked by a mob of at least 1000, and five were killed in police firings.  In Calcutta 
alone, by the beginning of September, 20 protesters had been killed by the police, with at 
total of 229 reported injured, including 74 police.122
 By the end of the month, urban demonstrations had petered out just as the call to 
'Do or Die' was gaining strength in the countryside.  In Midnapur, a district just south-
west of Calcutta, the "open rebellion" took firm root.  Local activists organized attacks on 
police stations, post offices, transportation facilities and other symbols of imperial rule, 
and under the remnants of Congress leadership, an alternative "national government" (the 
Tamluk Jatiya Sarkar) was founded.  A weekly journal, Biplabi, was also established to 
report on socio-political events in the district.  With 57 army battalions mobilized across 
India, the 'Quit India' movement was suppressed in many rural areas of the country by 
main force.  But due to organizational sophistication in Midnapur, the movement held 
together, despite brutal military intervention (that would have national repercussions) and 
proved an enduring problem for colonial authorities for years to come.  The Congress had 
a strong foothold in Midnapur, and, moreover, denial policies, increasing scarcity of 
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essential commodities, and outrage at military heavy-handedness, created conditions for a 
sustained movement under dedicated leadership.123
 
  In other parts of the province, it 
could be argued, many of these same factors blunted overt political expressions among 
the peasantry, as the hardships of material scarcity began to unravel social networks and 
undermine political solidarity. 
Economic Warfare 
 With the effects of massive rice exports from Bengal, coupled with the 
psychological effects of "denial" policies, and the chaos in rice markets that "denial" had 
entailed, rice and paddy prices continued to rise precipitously as the lean season fast 
approached.  A statutory ceiling on rice and paddy prices was established on July 1st, and 
exports from the province were proscribed later in the month, but prices were already 
moving too fast for government to keep step.  The controlled price announced on July 1st 
was already below prevailing market rates, which drew protests from stockists who 
would be operating at a loss for recent purchases if they sold their stocks.  The price was 
adjusted according to these demands later in the month, but black markets had already 
begun functioning on a large scale.124 By August official stocks of rice in Calcutta were 
exceedingly low, and Government began worrying in earnest about feeding labor in war-
production factories.125  About 100 control shops were established in Calcutta to feed the 
large number of industrial employees not provided for by large firms, and a Directorate 
of Civil Supplies was haphazardly set-up.   "Denial" mastermind, L. G. Pinnell, was 
appointed Director of Civil Supplies and large purchases were made on government 
account from Birbhum district, north of Calcutta, at prices well above the price ceiling 
fixed by Government in July.126
                                                 
123 In his introduction to Biplabi: A Journal of the 1942 Open Rebellion, Bidyut Chakrabarty argues that 
local leaders of the movement in Midnapur were particularly adept at converting "suffering into political 
support." Introduction to Biplabi  p. 2 
 The fact that the government itself was buying at almost 
any price led to panic in rice markets across the province and the further proliferation of 
black market forces, which again fueled inflation.   
124 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 182 
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 The Directorate of Civil Supplies, it was apparent, had little real organizational 
capability to manage even its own affairs.  Established under the authority of the 
Department of Commerce and Labor, it had no Minister of its own, only Pinnell as 
Director, D. L. Mazumdar as Deputy Director, one Assistant Director, and two trained 
clerks.  "Briefly speaking," Pinnell admitted, "the department never even had 'the staff to 
ask for the staff' for months." 127  Recruitment was further handicapped by Pinnell's 
reluctance to comply with communal ratios, which would have necessitated hiring an 
equal proportion of Muslims to staff the directorate.128
 The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, representing all the major jute mills, 
the Paper Makers Association, the Engineering Association, the Tramways, and other 
industries in the province, initiated its "Chambers Foodstuff Scheme" in late August 
1942.  According to this scheme, the Chamber began making large purchases of rice and 
paddy from districts and supplying it to its members directly for the first time.  
Constituent firms, meanwhile, continued bulk purchases on their own accounts, doubling 
down on the most essential commodity in the province.  The Central Government had, 
some months earlier, imposed an Excess Profit Tax (E.P.T.) to raise revenue from 
industrial firms recording record profits in war industries.  With developing difficulties in 
the food supply being reported from across India, however, the Labor Department of the 
 Pinnell's attitude drew ire from the 
Muslim League, which further complicated administrative execution.  The very 
establishment of the Directorate, however, did spur alarm.  "Civil Supplies," it was well 
understood by now, meant only supply to "essential" industrial labor in and around 
Calcutta, and the rest would be left to fate. Government alarm was read as inside 
information - if the government can't even feed Calcutta, what of the remaining 56 
million in the province?  Many of the big industrial firms, including jute mills, textile 
mills, the Calcutta Port Trust, the Calcutta Corporation, the railways, and steel 
manufacturers, had been granting "dearness allowances" and opening control shops since 
the beginning of 1942, which put further pressure on the market.  With prices failing to 
stabilize even after controls were announced in July and Japan within striking distance, 
anxieties proliferated. 
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central government notified employers in August that expenditures on foodstuffs for 
"essential" employees could be written off against the E.P.T..  And so, with the provincial 
government showing an "extremely panicky mentality themselves,"129 high prices were 
freely paid on bulk purchases by industrial interests with priority access to transportation 
facilities130 - and the expenditure was subsidized by the central government in the form of 
tax credits.  With prices skyrocketing, speculation in increasingly volatile commodity 
markets fueled the fire still further. Between July 7th and August 21st alone, the price of 
rice rose 65% - and the "starvation season" in Bengal was about to begin.131
 In its first issue of Biplabi the Tamluk Congress Committee reported the attack 
and attempted sinking of a boat trying to carry rice away from the Danipur rice mill by a 
group of villagers on September 9th.  Police, backed by armed soldiers, had been making 
arrests in the sub-division for a week past. The villagers were fired upon by troops and 
three were killed.
 
132 On September 14th, in Dinajpur, north Bengal, a crowd of as many 
as 10,000 villagers armed with lathis and other weapons, attacked government buildings 
and looted hoards of rice and paddy from stockists in the countryside.133 Two weeks later 
a similar crowd gathered in Jalpaiguri, the chief grievance being a scarcity of paddy in 
the locality.134  Local officials requisitioned paddy from large stockists and released it on 
local markets, pacifying the restive mob.  "Workers and peasants," a government report 
noted, "are primarily concerned with problems of high prices and short supplies.  
Increased lawlessness... is commented on in several districts and is causing 
apprehension."135
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  In a weekly report during the same quarter the Deputy Inspector 
General of Police noted a sharp rise in 'dacoity cases.'  "It is a very significant sign of the 
times," the Inspector wrote, "that in not less than 33 cases utensils and/or cloth are 
specifically mentioned amongst the stolen property and in seven cases foodstuffs were 
130 Source needed 
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134 Ibid.  Bose quotes from the District Officer's Chronicles: "the chief grievance of the mob appeared to be 
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either the sole objective or were taken along with other things.  It is many years since 
dacoits bothered themselves with such items."136
 Faced with increasing disorder throughout the country, the Government of India 
adopted novel measures in accordance with the Defence of India Rules.  On September 
8th, 1942 the Collective Fines Ordinance (Ordinance Number XX of 1942) was executed 
for the first time.  A fine of Rupees 10,000 was imposed on inhabitants of Bolpur in 
Bengal for unspecified "Congress-inspired disturbances." 
  
137  A similar fine was imposed 
on inhabitants of Birbhum district a week later, and collective fines were subsequently 
levied in Malda, Burdwan, Midnapur, Tippera, Dinajpur, Faridpur, Murshidabad, 
Hooghly and Dacca. The concept of the collective fine was to create a backlash against 
political agitators, who were known to be in a minority in most districts, at the (literal) 
expense of the already impoverished masses.138  In this way a wedge could be driven 
between the poor and the "political."  Other measures were adopted for those with 
resources.  In September a secret memorandum was sent out by the central government to 
all provincial Governors outlining general guidelines for "economic warfare" against all 
corporate anti-government entities. 139  Provincial governments were requested to black-
list companies associated with the nationalist movement, confiscate the funds of 
"unlawful associations," prosecute all contributors to the same, withhold advertisement 
from newspapers printing "anti-government reports," and otherwise economically 
disadvantage sectors of the population in non-compliance with wartime authority.  It was 
noted, furthermore, that "no public notice or warning of the action [to be taken] should be 
given in advance...and economic sanction [should] be enacted without publication of 
intent to do economic damage."140
 At the same time, the more overt economics of warfare were undermining the 
financial system of India still further. Since the beginning of the war, India had been 
providing Britain with a large number of troops and supplies for its campaigns in the 
Middle-East, North Africa and Southeast Asia.  Because India (however firmly wedged 
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under the colonial boot) was recognized as a sovereign state, Britain was under obligation 
to pay for the Indian resources (both human and material) that it was utilizing across the 
globe. The Exchequer in London, however, was reluctant to part with the money that 
such exports from India entailed, knowing that the outlay of so much cash to India could 
spur inflation back home.  Britain opted, instead, to float a massive I.O.U. to India in the 
form of "sterling balances" held on account by the Exchequer in a safe in London.  In the 
meantime the Indian Government paid out large sums to manufacturers and the army, on 
Britain's (frozen) account.  In order to cover these expenses, the Reserve Bank of India 
printed money at an accelerating pace -  by the end of the war the currency in circulation 
in India had increased six-fold 141
 With inflation whittling away at the security of the sub-continent, Amery pressed 
the issue of sterling balances owed to India in the War Cabinet.  Churchill, however, 
could not be convinced that anything at all was owed to India, but rather "burbled away 
endlessly" that Britain was India's protector not its debtor!
 -  which precipitated economic chaos in the colony.  
142  India should simply be 
grateful that Britain was there to defend her.  "It is an awful thing," wrote Churchill's 
Secretary of State for India, "dealing with a man like Winston who is at the same moment 
dictatorial, eloquent and muddleheaded.  I am not sure that I ever got into his mind that 
India pays for the whole of her defense including British forces in India, or that there is 
no other possible way of reducing these accumulating balances except by stopping to buy 
Indian goods or employing Indian soldiers outside India."143 As for the rest of the 
Cabinet, Amery noted, "none of them ever really have the courage to stand up to Winston 
and tell him when he is making a fool of himself."144
 
  Needless to say, sterling balances 
on India's account continued accumulating in London, while Rupee notes continued 
flying off the presses in Delhi.  
 In the last week of September massive demonstrations against colonial rule 
rocked Midnapur.  Thousands of villagers marched on police stations and government 
offices in Tamluk, Nandigram, and Contai sub-divisions.  Troops stationed in the area 
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responded with overwhelming force, killing at least 44 in Tamluk alone including 
Matangini Hazra, a 73 year old woman who would become an icon of the anti-British 
movement.145 Villagers fought running battles with police and soldiers, blocking roads, 
burning down police thanas, and raising nationalist flags over government offices.  The 
violence spread and was directed, also, against big landholders.  The rent-collecting 
offices of the zamindar of Mahisadal were gutted, and the granary looted.  Rice and 
paddy were distributed amongst the crowd and the grain bin was burnt to the ground.146 
Chowkidars' tax record offices and Debt Conciliation Boards were attacked and 
documents destroyed, and uniforms of local police agents were burnt in effigy in many 
places across the district.147
 
  Indiscriminate police firings were widely reported, and 
evidence of military atrocities multiplied.  In the pages of Biplabi there were stories of 
rape, looting, arson and cold-blooded murder perpetrated by military troops.  The 
situation was spiraling out of control. 
Storm 
 On October 16th a strong wind was blowing and untimely rains were falling in 
Calcutta.  On the same day, Midnapur went silent.  Not a word of news about the 
prevailing situation in the district reached Calcutta for the next three weeks to come.  
Even the Chief Editor of Calcutta's premier newspaper, The Statesman, heard neither fact 
nor rumor about what was happening in the rebellious region.148  It was only later 
revealed that on the 16th a massive cyclone and an accompanying tidal wave had swept 
through the district, destroying paddy land, houses, cattle, and communications.149
                                                 
145 Biplabi, p. 33 
  The 
Bengal Government later estimated the death toll to be 14,443, but accurate information 
was difficult to gather. Corpses lay scattered over several thousand square miles of 
devastated land.  7,400 villages were partly or wholly destroyed by the storm, and 
standing flood waters remained for weeks in at least 1,600 villages. Cholera, dysentery 
and other water-borne diseases flourished. 527,000 houses and 1,900 schools were lost. 
146 Ibid, p. 35 
147 Ibid,  
148Stephens,, p. 71 
149 All numbers used here, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Paul Greenough's Prosperity and Misery 
in Modern Bengal, p. 92-97 
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Over 1000 square miles of the most fertile paddy land in the province was entirely 
destroyed, and the standing crop over an additional 3000 square miles was damaged,150  
and 70,000 head of plow and milk cattle were drowned.151 Amongst the worst hit sub-
divisions were Tamluk and Contai, the same areas were revolutionary activities had been 
most violent: 786 villages in the two sub-division had disappeared without a trace.152
 In all as many as 2.5 million people were killed, displaced or dispossessed by the 
October cyclone. When the devastation was finally announced, the Secretary of the 
Revenue Department, B. R. Sen, was put in charge of relief operations.  The most 
pressing issue of concern was getting food into the cyclone-struck area.  Sen approached 
the newly inaugurated Directorate of Civil Supplies for help.  In his testimony before the 
Famine Enquiry Committee, he reported that he was told that "since the Department of 
Civil Supplies found it impossible to cope with the demands made on them by different 
authorities, I should myself go into the market and buy what I could."
  
153
On October 28th, even before the Midnapur cyclone had been reported, the 
American Economic Warfare Board sent a communiqué to the Indian Government 
expressing deep concern about the "critical" food situation in India.  Crop shortages, the 
loss of Burma rice, a  lack of effective controls, dangerous speculation, large exports, 
hoarding, thriving black-markets, rail priority for military shipments creating pockets of 
acute shortage, and sharp inflationary pressures were included as causes for immediate 
redress.  "The rice situation," the letter read, "is especially critical."
  In his 
Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal, the only full length scholarly work on the 
Bengal famine to be published in English, Paul Greenough argues that the cyclone that 
struck Midnapur might be understood as the "first stage" of the famine. While there can 
be little doubt that the dispossessed of Midnapur fell victim to starvation in large 
numbers, the question of the beginning and end of famine in Bengal is an extremely 
complex one, and, as I have demonstrated until now, defies the fixing of any particular 
event as a sign post.  
154
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151 Sumit Sarkar (1983), p. 400 
152 Greenough (1982), p. 93 
153 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of B. R. Sen, p. 441 
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 113 
remained entrenched in denial.  At the Sixth Price Control Conference, it was finally 
admitted that Central Government needed to concern itself with the civilian food supply 
and a "Basic Plan" for procurement and distribution was outlined, but no measures 
towards actual implementation were undertaken.  "Such food shortages as occur," the 
External Affairs Department responded to American Economic Warfare Board, "are local 
and mainly experienced by relatively small urban populations."155
 Three days later, however, and a full three years after the war had begun, Viceroy 
Linlithgow - in something of admission that the food situation was dire - approved the 
establishment of a separate Government of India, Department of Food.  No independent 
Food Member was, as of yet installed, however.  Instead, the Food Department portfolio 
was assigned to the Commerce Member of the Government of India, Nalini Sarkar.  
Sarkar, earlier in his life, had been President of the Bengal National Chamber of 
Commerce as well as Commissioner of the Calcutta Port, a fact that surely comforted 
government with its concerns about feeding the industrial population of Calcutta.  The 
War Transport Member of the Government of India, Sir Edward Benthall, was, similarly, 
a Calcutta based industrialist, whose firm Bird & Co. on the Hooghly River was a major 
player in war productions.  As such, the Government of India did appear to be staffed 
with crucial personnel who had both the resources and incentive to keep the industrial 
population of Calcutta fed at all cost.  The question of the Bengal countryside was 
another matter.   
 Feeding urban 
populations by means of rural appropriation, the letter explained, would be tricky 
business. The letter then went on to address each point in the Warfare Board's 
memorandum, assuring proactive measures taken on each count that would contain the 
situation. 
Reports of death from starvation, quite outside the cyclone decimated area, were 
being reported from several districts. 156
                                                 
155 India Office, L/I/1/1106, Telegram no. 8953 (emphasis added) 
  In fact; every indicator outlined in the Bengal 
Famine Code, by October 1942, had already been met.  The impact of disaster, war and 
want had dislocated several hundreds of thousands Bengalis and non-Bengalis who 
156 See, for instance, the Communist Party's weekly, Janayuddha, October 28, 1942, "Sara Banglay Khadda 
Sanket"  (trans.: "Food Crisis Grips All of Bengal")  This article, alone (printed before news of the cyclone 
leaked out), reports cases of death by starvation in Faridpur, Mymensingh and Jalpaiguri. 
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wandered the rural districts looking for shelter, work, food and safety.  Credit in rural 
districts had contracted to the extent that the poor were selling off their household 
possessions in large numbers. Speculation, black-marketing, and a general atmosphere of 
uncertainty and fear had rendered rice markets increasingly volatile. There had been a 
high spike in crime, including the theft of foodstuffs.  Looting of food stores and 
transportation facilities had been reported widely across several districts, and "test 
works," the final measure of prevailing distress, had been opened in several places as 
early as 1941, and had drawn large numbers, indicating, according to the Bengal Famine 
Code, that famine should have officially been declared and appropriate steps taken to 
alleviate its predations immediately.    Yet the administrative focus on feeding labor in 
war factories would continue to be the sole priority of the Central and Provincial 
Governments alike for many months to come, and the proliferating misery in the 
countryside would be studiously ignored and, indeed, exacerbated by the anxieties of 
empire. 
 Late in November a ship arrived at the Kidderpore docks in Calcutta and began 
loading large quantities of rice bound for Ceylon and Mauritius.  The coolies along the 
dock were busy hoisting sacks of grain onto the steamer, when a curious public gathered 
to watch.  Rumors of a massive export of rice (even after exports had been banned in 
July) spread quickly.  Director of Civil Supplies, L. G. Pinnell, was aware of the deal cut 
with the Central Government for a shipment of rice to Ceylon, but was shocked, himself, 
by the spectacle, given the extremely precarious situation already prevailing in the 
province.  "The effect of such a kind of thing is disastrous," he explained, "you can easily 
buy two or three thousand tons [of rice] in different places quietly without upsetting the 
market, but if a man runs around Ramkrishnapur market area in Howrah for the whole 
quantity to be obtained in the course of a day the effect of that is very severe...rice 
disappeared from the Howrah market and prices in rose in Calcutta, [which] had far 
reaching effects, the Calcutta market dominating the rest of Bengal."157  Pinnell was 
himself, however - and at this same time - planning "an intensive attack on the market 
and backing it up by requisitioning" in the Rajshahi division of northern Bengal.158
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Having experience in rural Bengal with unwilling agents during "denial," his Rajshahi 
Scheme was designed to extract rice, by force if need be, from unwilling villagers in 
order to feed industrial Calcutta. Meanwhile, in Midnapur, cyclone survivors were 
unearthing water-damaged paddy and subsisting on stores that "were black in color, with 
the smell of decaying flesh, which was not completely removed by cooking."159
 On December 3rd, 1942 the Viceroy cabled the Secretary of State to relay a 
"serious deterioration in the food situation in India."
   
160 Amongst the causes of the "acute 
difficulty" Linlithgow listed prominently "the tendency on the part of small subsistence 
farmers to keep back more of his grain than usual for his own consumption, a course 
rendered possible by enhanced prices realized by such part of his produce he sells."161  
Linlithgow warned that the food situation was dangerous to internal security and had 
already "excited considerable public criticism."162  The Viceroy recommended an 
immediate stop of all exports from India and the necessary arrangements made for 
subsequent imports to stabilize markets. "The food situation is so acute," he cabled to 
Amery, "that immediate substantial assistance is essential if war work in India is not to be 
seriously disorganized and law and order gravely menaced."163
On December 12th "an acute scarcity of rice" was reported to be prevailing in 
Burdwan, just north of the city.
 This pairing of the "food 
situation" with "law and order" and the effects that hunger might have on the prosecution 
of war, became the only working "famine code" in India for the foreseeable future.  
According to this code, the threat to war industries and internal security that scarcity 
might entail were extremely serious matters that demanded imperial attention and 
immediate action.  In contrast, as long as war work was progressing smoothly, and threats 
to law and order remained in-check, the country could push on with the status quo.  
Above all, the Viceroy knew: production and order needed to be maintained in the 
industrial capitol of Calcutta.   
164
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recommendation for rationing the city was tabled.165  On the 16th of December, the 
Bengal Government tried to assuage mounting panic, assuring the public that there was 
no shortage of rice.  Prices were skyrocketing, it was suggested, because of "large scale 
un-coordinated buying all over the province...and widespread speculative buying in both 
Calcutta and the rice-growing districts."166  On the 18th of December the Employers' 
Federation of India met at Calcutta.  The Federation recommended that employers adopt 
a policy of paying dearness allowances in kind, rather than in cash, as access to food was 
becoming highly contingent.167  "Akin to the problem of foodstuffs," it was noted at the 
conference, "and second only to it in urgency, was that of cloth, the prices of which had 
risen to an abnormal extent."168 On the 19th of December a joint meeting of all Chambers 
of Commerce operating in Bengal was convened.  "Grave alarm" was expressed at the 
"unprecedented and unnatural" rise in the price of foodstuffs.169 A few days earlier, the 
British Indian Association had sent an urgent memorandum to the Government of India 
in Delhi warning of a "grave situation that threatens the Province of Bengal in the matter 
of steep rise in price of rice and apprehended famine conditions."170
 
 The following day 
the Viceroy left for Calcutta. 
Christmas in Calcutta - 1942 
"When Lord Linlithgow traveled from Delhi in the cold weather as he always did 
to Calcutta around Christmas,," wrote his Reforms Commissioner, Harry Hodson: 
he used the famous white train, preceded for security’s sake by another 
locomotive and guarded by armed policemen stationed at short intervals along the 
route. The vice-regal establishment occupying the train on these journeys was 
reputed to number 500. When you consider that His Excellency’s entourage 
included official staff from private secretary to typists and cypher clerks, the 
Viceroy’s Bodyguard of cavalry with all their appurtenances, chaprassis, syces 
and servants domestic and personal, together with servants of the servants in the 
caste-bound Indian tradition, five hundred begins to seem too few... in 1941-42 
the Viceroy was still a great potentate, successor to the Mogul throne, surrounded 
                                                 
165 The Statesman, December 15, 1942 "Food Shortage in Calcutta" 
166 The Statesman, December 17, 1942 "Rise in Price of Rice" 
167 The Statesman, December 19, 1942  "Employers in Conference" 
168 Ibid 
169 The Statesman, December 21, 1942 
170 The Statesman, December 13, 1942 "Rice Position" 
 117 
by a court whom his unfortunate hosts had to entertain, as aforetime grandees in 
England were obliged to lodge the train of a medieval or Tudor monarch.171
 
   
In December of 1942, Linlithgow found Calcutta "in very good trim... the streets" 
he wrote to Amery, "were full of British soldiers and airmen, there was any quantity of 
military transport, jeeps & c. about; and in the center of Calcutta one of the principal 
avenues has been made into a runway."172  The city was well prepared for war, the 
Viceroy thought.  However, Linlithgow noted in the same correspondence, he continued 
to be "greatly exercised about the food position...we are terribly hampered by the absence 
of personnel with expert experience in this line... I hope very much that you may be able 
to borrow me man from the Ministry of Food."173
 The admirable preparedness of Calcutta was severely tested the very day after the 
Viceroy left the city.  On December 20th Air Raid sirens began to sound throughout the 
city and industrial areas, but residents of the city had become inured to false alarms, and 
largely went about their business unperturbed.
  No man was sent. 
174 An hour later, however, the air filled 
with the rumble of Japanese fighter planes and bombs fell in several parts of the city and 
the industrial suburbs. An hour later the "all-clear" signal sounded.  News about damage 
from the raids was censored from Delhi, with official reports denying any significant 
destruction or dislocation.175 After the first air raid it was reported only that "the number 
of casualties was very small."176   Night time air-raids followed on the 21st, 23rd, 24th, 
and 28th.  The third air raid, on Christmas Eve, was heavier, coming in two waves of 
attack, with "sticks" of heavy explosive bombs falling "slap across the middle of the 
city."177
"Fear of the unknown seized the industrial labor in and around Calcutta, the 
members of essential services including A.R.P. organizations, the members of public 
utilities services like Tramways Corporation, and even the constabulary and warders in 
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Jails."178 An exodus from the city was again underway, with people packing their 
belongings and setting out on foot, traveling trunk roads out of the city with whatever 
belongings they could carry perched on their heads.  By the 23rd "every imaginable 
vehicle seemed to be in use."179 The Bengal Chamber of Commerce called the exodus 
"immense," estimating that between six and seven hundred thousand people left the 
Calcutta area. 180  Sir Edward Benthall, War Transport Member of the Viceroys 
Executive Council, had given a figure of 300,000 fleeing by rail.181 With the exodus of 
"sweepers" as well, the depopulated city had been left to "crows, kites and pi-dogs 
squabbling over the debris amidst much smell."182
 Linlithgow, however, congratulated the citizens of Calcutta for their steadiness 
and fortitude: "Well done Calcutta!"
   
183  On the 23rd of December a press release was 
issued from Delhi commending the fact that there had been "no evacuation" from the 
city.184  Ian Stephens, editor of The Statesman took Government denials to task over the 
next several days.  "We do not know what the term 'evacuation' officially means," an 
editorial of the next day read, "but large numbers of people could be seen leaving the 
city..."185  On the 27th a second editorial was published, roundly condemning 
Government's air-raid publicity.  After the heavy raids of the 24th, no information about 
damage had been released for a full 12 hours and the announcement that eventually came 
was "of the most meager sort."186  Photographic evidence was censored and false claims 
about the lack of exodus from Calcutta were continuing to be circulated.  "When 
authority fails to put forth reliable information promptly or in adequate amount about 
outstanding local happenings," Statesman reporters argued, "it is inevitable that rumors 
should gain currency... the population would have been less suddenly depleted had rumor 
been less."187
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 Lurking behind governmental denials were simmering anxieties that were about to 
explode.  Though, by all accounts, material damage from this first series of Japanese 
bombings was, by contemporary standards, "light," the ramifications of Japanese attacks 
on Calcutta in 1942 were to be extremely profound.  In some sense, it could be argued, 
the air-raids on Calcutta in December of 1942 were among the most devastating of World 
War II, and can be implicated in the death of as many as 3 million residents of Bengal.  
  
   
 
 









While British defeats at Rangoon and Singapore had been a shocking blow, 
Calcutta was an immensely more important city; psychologically, strategically, and 
economically.  It had been the foundation of British imperialism in Asia, the "second 
city" of Empire, the "London of the East," and the first capital of colonial rule in India.  It 
was now the central collection point of personnel and resources for the Allied military 
mobilization against Japan.  Hundreds of thousands of British, American, African and 
Indian troops passed through the city on their way to the front, and returned there for 
"rest and recreation."  It also served as the gateway to vital coal and iron ore fields to the 
west, which fed industrial production essential to the war effort.  Its factories were 
running at full tilt to supply armaments and other supplies to the military.  Huge profits 
were being made in the textile, engineering, food services and entertainment industries. 
The city was, in many ways, awash in cash..   The loss of Calcutta under these 
circumstances, as the Viceroy himself confessed, would be "tantamount to the loss of 
India."  As such, the pressure on governmental officials in Bengal, and particularly on 
I.C.S. officers like L. G. Pinnell, to supply Calcutta and keep its industries functioning 
was tremendous. Moreover, it came from all quarters; the military, big business, the 
Secretary of State's office in London, the Government of India in Delhi, and also from 
foreign governments, particularly the Americans, who were investing more and more of 
their own resources in the war in the Pacific.   
When Calcutta was bombed there was, therefore, a desperate re-entrenchment that 
in its intensity belied the acute panic and uncertainty that lay just below the surface.  
Calcutta needed to be kept going at all costs, it could not fall. With record numbers of 
laborers having migrated to the city and its industrial suburbs to drive the production 
boom, the maintenance of Calcutta depended, above all else, on keeping them at their 
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posts.   The fourth Japanese bombing, on December 24th, had been the heaviest until that 
point, and panic ensued.  Thousands amongst the ranks of "essential" labor, together with 
many civilians from all walks of life, packed up their portable belongings and headed for 
safer harbors.  Once again Calcutta began to empty out. The exodus only picked up pace 
when more bombings followed in the last week of December.  With the exit of Marwari 
merchants, in particular,  the circulation of goods and services was crippled.  Of ultimate 
importance to government officials, meanwhile, was access to stocks of rice.  The 
question of feeding industrial Calcutta, had been weighing ever-heavier on government 
officials for some time, and now with bombs falling four nights out of five and merchants 
and stockists putting padlocks on their doors and seeking passage out of Bengal,  Pinnell 
rolled the dice.  
On December 27th an order was issued giving agents of the Directorate of Civil Supplies, 
in conjunction with police and A.R.P. officers, authority to break open the rice shops and 
storage sheds of Calcutta and Howrah and seize all the rice that they could lay their hands 
on.1  According to the order, any and all "godowns" and stores dealing in rice, wheat, 
atta, flour, dal, mustard oil, salt, coke or matches (all of which were increasingly scarce 
across the province) which failed to open for business within 24 hours of the "all clear" 
siren where subject to forcible entry and confiscation of goods.  The order also gave the 
Directorate of Civil Supplies authority to dispose of the seized commodities "in such a 
manner as they consider expedient."2
                                                 
1 The Statesman, "Control of Stores in Calcutta,"  December 31, 1942 
  So that stocks could not be removed from Calcutta, 
further authority was granted to seal up mills, shops, offices, or any other place of storage 
of rice, sugar, or dal regardless of their period of closure. A second order restricted the 
sale or movement of any of these commodities by any manager or person in charge of 
places of storage sealed off by the government, except under written permission of the 
Director of Civil Supplies.  All imports into Calcutta and Howrah were also restricted, 
prohibiting delivery of any rice arriving by rail or steamer to any consignee, except under 
the authority of the Directorate.  These orders essentially amounted to a state of martial 
law in the commodities markets of Calcutta and Howrah, denying private businesses the 
2 Ibid 
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rights to their own products, while conferring extraordinary powers of seizure and control 
on the Director of Civil Supplies, L. G. Pinnell. 
In the subsequent days a full two thirds of the "visible" stocks of rice in and 
around Calcutta was seized by the Directorate of Civil Supplies.3
Instead of sending for the mill owners and seeking their co-operation to maintain 
supplies in the city, Government sent around a large number of police staff who 
descended on the mills without notice and sealed godowns of a large number of 
mill owners.  The action destroyed all faith the mills still had in Government's 
good dealings.  The usual channels through which the mills supplied the Calcutta 
market immediately dried up.
  Little contact had been 
made with the merchants or stockists whose goods were seized, and the scheme was 
enacted with such speed and impunity that effected parties had little scope to protest.  The 




In addition, the price given to mill owners and stockists was below existing market rates, 
breeding intense resentment.  Pinnell himself was forced to admit that some stockists 
must have incurred considerable losses in relation to the compensation paid.5  A letter of 
protest from the Rice Mills Association followed, stating that "the sudden seizure of rice 
by Government and payment of an arbitrary rate to stockists and mill-owners in 
Calcutta... created panic in the minds of all owners of paddy and rice and [other] 
legitimate trade interests."6  In its Report on Bengal, the Famine Enquiry Commission, 
couching its language in diplomatic terms, concurred: "On the 27th December, the 
Government of Bengal, in order to maintain the distributions of supplies in Calcutta, were 
reluctantly compelled to requisition stocks from wholesale dealers and from that moment 
the ordinary trade machinery could not be relied upon to feed Calcutta.  The crisis had 
begun."7
If the manner and extent of requisitioning in Calcutta had deeply alienated 
"legitimate trade interests," it had also revealed the true extent of Government's anxieties. 
All stocks that were requisitioned had been identified in relation to applications filled out 
under the Foodgrains Control Order - these were what Pinnell called "visible" stocks.  
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Meanwhile a thriving black-market was already operating.  After the bombings and 
associated requisitioning, the black market began to expand rapidly as the potential 
liability of playing according to government rules was laid bare.  Duly reported stocks in 
the city began to decline, as traders, mill-owners and large stockists in Calcutta became 
increasingly mistrustful of government interference. Stocks, in other words, increasingly 
went "under-ground," and government estimates of the rice position in the province, as a 
whole, became increasingly speculative and unreliable.  The less officials - as well as the 
public at large - knew of the true position, the more anxious they became.  The need to 
balance uncertainty with large stocks of rice-in-hand increased, and Government again 
turned to the countryside to achieve this objective.    
 The Civil Supplies Department began its Rajshahi procurement scheme just two 
days after Calcutta was bombed.  Rajshahi, a productive agricultural district in the 
Dinajpur division north of Calcutta was cordoned off and soon thereafter government-
appointed agents entered to buy up large quantities of rice and paddy for Calcutta.  
Competition was excluded by a permit system, and government agents were backed by 
the threat of forceful requisitioning if their restricted price structure was contested.8  
Dinajpur, while normally a surplus district, had, in the past, provided little rice to 
Calcutta.9  That the government was now making large purchases there for Calcutta, 
alone, was cause for alarm.  When word got out that Government were resorting to 
strong-arm tactics to extract foodgrains from Rajshahi, moreover, "confusion" in the 
countryside mounted.  Rumors spread that Government was buying to supply massive 
military requirements elsewhere, or that the British were planning to withdraw from 
Bengal altogether, and were taking all the rice they could lay their hands on with them.10   
"The least the people could think was that there must have been something 
extraordinarily wrong as otherwise Government would not take such extraordinary 
action."11
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 Though the Rajshahi scheme had been planned in advance and was unrelated to 
the bombings, the timing of the scheme only served to maximize distrust, suspicion, and 
panic. 
9 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 183 
10 Ibid 




The "Steel Frame" 
 Government officers, particularly non-elected, colonial officials, were themselves 
in a state of extreme anxiety.  The losses in Singapore, Malaya and Burma had deeply 
shaken the confidence of members of the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.).  The I.C.S. was an 
elite and rather closely knit network of colonial officials whose skills and aptitudes had to 
be adjusted according to contingent colonial appointments.  Governors, Secretaries, 
District Magistrates, Commissioners, and the Directors of various agencies, all forming 
the "steel frame" of colonial authority in some 250 districts of British India, rotated 
through positions and postings that were as dependent on social networks at least as much 
as on administrative competence.  I.C.S. officers, moreover, operated under the authority 
of the Secretary of State in London and the Viceroy in New Delhi, and as such were 
largely unanswerable to provincial Indian governmental authority.  With the advent of 
"provincial autonomy" they were ostensibly responsible to the Ministry, but, in fact, the 
I.C.S. became increasingly instrumental to the circumvention of self-rule during the 
period under consideration. The I.C.S. was, however, at least since the time of WWI, a 
fairly moribund and anemic corps.12
The more far-sighted of these tired middle aged civilians, sipping their 'pegs' in 
the Bengal Club's vast airy exclusive rooms, clad in bow-ties, black jackets, 
cummerbunds and white trousers - to the perplexity of someone's colonel-guest, 
fresh from England, open necked and en route to the front - doubtless felt they 
were performing a charade; that however total the Allies' [eventual] victory, the 
India they knew, the privileges they'd enjoyed... were fading and largely 
irrecoverable... whatever emerged from the diverse confusion without - to be 
glimpsed through the Club's verandahs traipsing up and down Chowringhee - 
  Particularly in the vast province of Bengal, the 
I.C.S. was undermanned, poorly equipped and, increasingly, ill at ease. The local 
population was disaffected, starving and rebellious.  The war was going badly and upon 
their shoulders rested the prestige of colonial rule in South Asia. The mood in the clubs 
and parlors of Calcutta where the governing elite met to discuss the events of the day was 
sour:   
                                                 
12 See: Ann Ewing, "The Indian Civil Service 1919-1924: Service Discontent and the Response in London 
and in Delhi."   Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1984), pp. 33-53 
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The calamities in Singapore and Burma reflected particularly badly on colonial 
officials, who were seen as apathetic, ill-prepared and ultimately timorous in the face of 
Japanese threat.  The chaotic and desperate evacuations of Rangoon and Singapore had 
been sordid and humiliating.  Many of the colonial officers from the fallen cities had 
made their way to Chittagong and Calcutta, sometimes in desperate condition, with little 
or no help from military or magisterial authority.  They "came out" and were welcomed 
into the clubs and parlors of colonial Calcutta with hair raising stories to tell.  The 
collapse of British colonial authority had been so swift and so disorganized that many had 
made the journey by boat or by land with nothing but the shirts on their backs.  With 
morale among colonial servants in Bengal already at a low point, this influx of 
disillusioned comrades from further east only served to compound the enervation of war, 
rebellion and administrative impasse.  Would they be next to be driven from their posts 
and suffer the humiliations of enemy defeat in a foreign land?  Whatever the outcome, the 
"defense" of Calcutta, they knew, was as much about rice as it was about anti-aircraft 
guns, as long as the city's production could be maintained, the war could be won. 
Early in January, while food still remained a subsidiary directorate under the 
Labor Department, a Foodgrains Purchasing Officer (F.G.P.O.) with far-ranging authority 
was appointed by the Governor to scale up procurement for Calcutta.  Mr. A.A. McInnes, 
I.C.S., had been in service in India for 24 years past, most recently as the manager of the 
National Bank in Chittagong.  He had no experience whatsoever in foodgrains 
purchasing, but had great confidence in his understanding of things Bengali. McInnes, 
something of a lay anthropologist, boasted that he had always "made a special hobby of 
spending weekends and holidays living among the villagers and studying life from their 
point of view."14
                                                 
13 Stephens, p. 103-104 
 Along the way he had learned some Bengali and imagined that his 
linguistic achievements would stand him in good stead with the local population.  
However, and by his own admission, rice procurement was tough business and villagers 
remained unimpressed by his assurances in broken Bengali. According to his own words, 
14 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of A.A. McInnes, p. 647 
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"they thought that more and more of their supplies [were] going to be in danger, and they 
had no confidence in us."15  L.G. Pinnell, on the other hand, having already mixed with 
villagers extensively during "denial," was less of a romantic.  He had no illusions about 
the difficulties that he and McInnes were likely to face in the countryside and was happy 
to be able to "pitch into the villagers...in their own language which," he admitted,  "I find, 
I can speak with force if not with grammar."16
When the rural procurement scheme got underway in January of 1943, there were 
again disagreements between the Governor and the Bengal Ministry about agency 
appointments.
 
17  Again Pinnell wanted to enlist Ispahani's firm - which was deeply 
enmeshed with the Muslim League - as a primary agent.  Again this caused a backlash 
from the Huq Ministry and Hindu interests.  Seeking to ameliorate the political tensions 
that quickly emerged when the agency scheme was announced, Pinnell opted for a 'Dutch 
Auction' to select agents.  At length, seven agents whose turn-over in the province was 
thought to be the highest, were given exclusive contracts to purchase on Government's 
behalf.  Each was assigned a particular area of operation and tasked with buying up as 
much rice as possible in that zone.  To minimalize competitive buying, "free run" was 
given to these agents in their assigned districts and "considerable restriction on other 
people" was enforced.18  In addition, embargoes were placed around purchasing areas, 
restricting export to all but government agents.  Even in areas not covered under the 
scheme, embargoes were levied in order to prevent speculative purchasing by non-
government agents in these markets.19
In January of 1943, less than one year after "denial," with the essential aman crop 
again making its way to the market, agents and purchasers employed by the government, 
  In "denial" areas special passes were given so that 
agents could bring boats into coastal areas to remove rice and paddy.  A ceiling price was 
also fixed for the agents of the scheme, and purchases and sales above that ceiling were 
outlawed by threat of arrest and confiscation.  This de facto price control measure was in 
contrast to earlier indications that the fixed price would not be enforced, which only 
added to confusion.   
                                                 
15 Ibid, p. 658 
16 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L.G. Pinnell, p. 558 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, p. 556 
19 Report on Bengal, p. 37 
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protected by executive orders, and backed by police and ultimately military force, fanned 
out across the districts to buy up the "surplus" rice of Bengal.  A special deal was struck 
between the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and government for the Chamber to cease its 
own purchases during the government's drive.  The Chamber itself did lay off the market, 
but there was little to prevent their constituent members, primarily jute mills, railways, 
and other large industries, from buying on their own accounts.  As his first priority was to 
supply foodgrains to these same interests in any case, it made no sense to block their 
purchases and, as such, permits were issued liberally by McInnes. 20  The Calcutta Port 
Trust, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the big railways, the military and even the 
Revenue Department of the Government of Bengal itself, continued heavy purchasing, 
writing off the expenditure against the Excess Profit Tax.21  The Railways and the Port 
Trust were especially advantaged by their ability to arrange their own transport at a time 
when transportation facilities were under intense pressure due to military requirements.22
 
 
The drain of the countryside that had begun with "denial" continued. The alienation of 
trade interests falling outside the governments scheme also continued and not 
surprisingly, large quantities of rice continued to disappear into thriving black-markets 
across the province, driving up prices still further. 
Durbhikkho 
With rumors about governmental intentions swirling, the frenetic purchasing 
activities of agents, sub-agents and district officials, was received with alarm in the 
countryside.  It was well understood that the government was in a state of panic and 
would use any means at its disposal to acquire rice and paddy from the districts - even 
while conditions in the mofussil continued to deteriorate.  The Rajshahi scheme had 
ended, but even then, in Chittagong the Collector began "requisitioning hard" from 
cultivators towards the middle of January, and "this caused strong local resentment - 
                                                 
20 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p. 184 The text reads:  "practically 
all purchases made by the F.G.P.O. went to feed what were called the essential industries and essential 
priority consumers" 
21 See: Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce, p. 1446,  Testimony of Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce, p. 1406, Testimony of Ashutosh Bhattacharjee, p. 1468  
22 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce, p. 1446   
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people on their knees weeping or cursing before the District Magistrate."23  A shortage of 
kerosene across the province was becoming acute and made the cooking and 
consumption of rice that much more difficult.  Sugar, lentils, coal, and matches were also 
growing increasingly scarce.  A dearth of small coins in circulation was also hampering 
trade, with hoarding of copper and other metals on the rise.  In Rangpur District it was 
reported that desperate farmers had eaten up their seed stocks and had nothing to sow for 
the summer season.24  In Jessore the price of milk and fish were rising out of the reach of 
all but the wealthy, and in parts of Rajshahi, famine conditions were being reported, with 
as many as 50% of households in some areas without any rice stores left at all.25
Even in Calcutta,  at control shops around the city, queues began increasing and 
supplies were being shifted without explanation.  At some shops, government lorries, 
aided by police officers, removed wheat to unspecified locations, leaving nothing at all 
behind for local residents.
   
26  At Ballygunge Station, on the southern fringe of the city, 
when rail wagons arrived loaded with coal, a crowd of 2,000 local residents gathered and 
surrounded the train, demanding that the goods-cars be unloaded so that they could 
purchase coal.  Armed police were called in to disperse the crowd and the shipment was 
moved on to an unknown destination in the middle of the night.27
The hardships of white-collar workers, on the other hand, did receive attention 
from the highest quarters.  The Commerce Member of the Government of India, N.R. 
Sarkar, also in charge of the newly minted Food Department, visited Calcutta in early 
January to inaugurate a canteen system for the middle-class public, which, he said, had 
"been so badly hit by food shortages, high prices, disruption of the family, and, lastly, the 
  Priorities in Calcutta 
were becoming ever-more inequitable, with provisions for "essential" laborers at large 
industrial firms enjoying precedence.  Sweepers, servants, contract laborers, and other 
menial workers employed in private residences and factories, however, were, for the most 
part, left to fend for themselves.  They had little security, either in terms of food or even 
shelter.  That these workers fled from the city in large numbers after the bombings, then, 
is not surprising.   
                                                 
23 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L.G. Pinnell, p. 564 
24 Janayuddha, February 17, 1942 "Banglar Grame Grame Khanna-Samasya" 
25 Ibid 
26 Janayuddha, January 20, 1942 "Garhi Garhi Atta Pacharer Chesta"   
27  Janayuddha, February 3, 1942 "Pach Hajar Mon Koyla Aday" 
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exodus of servants."28  That the Executive Council Member in charge of the Food 
portfolio was catering to the middle-class of Calcutta at a time when the poor in the 
countryside - and the city itself - were actually starving is a sad comment on the true 
priorities of the colonial state. Such realities led to considerable resentment, a hardening 
of class animosities, and the increasing fragmentation of a society already under 
economic siege.  Even while Sarkar was inaugurating his canteens, J.C. Roy, president of 
The Refuge, an organization feeding homeless people in Calcutta, applied to the 
Directorate of Civil Supplies to obtain a permit to purchase rice and wheat at controlled 
prices in order to continue feeding the destitutes in their care.  The permit was refused 
without explanation.29
By January 1943, Calcutta was filling up with "beggars."  A string of letters 
written to The Statesman complained that these "gentlemen of leisure" were increasing, 
spreading filth and shame throughout the city, squatting in air raid shelters and pestering 
hard working citizens with their plaintive grumblings.
  The problem of acute destitution and homelessness, however, was 
fast becoming impossible to ignore. 
30  The newspaper reported that 
while urban poverty was an "old evil" in Calcutta,  the numbers of desperate immigrants 
had sharply increased in recent months.  Another editorialist worried at the discomfort 
more fortunate residents of the city must surely be suffering, crowded with these 
wretches in air raid shelters during drills.31 A Press Note on the topic was released in the 
middle of January by the Government of Bengal explaining that government had every 
good intention to round up the "beggars" and place them in detention, but were facing 
certain administrative obstacles.  Suggestions that they should be "kept under restraint" in 
relief centers built for air-raid refugees were impractical.32 These shelters, on the 
outskirts of Calcutta, had been built for evacuees "on the move" and did not have the 
sanitation or logistical facilities to house Calcutta's mounting indigent population. 
Furthermore, the shelters were unsecured and would have to be fortified with compound 
walls, as, it was noted, "beggars will not remain voluntarily in detention."33
                                                 
28 The Statesman, January 7, 1942, "Cheap Meals for Citizens" 
  The prospect 
29 The Statesman, January 10, 1942 "No Supplies" 
30 The Statesman, January 11, 1942 "Letter to the Editor" 
31 The Statesman, January 24, 1942  "Calcutta's Street Beggars" 
32 The Statesman, January 22, 1942  "Beggar Problem in Calcutta: Government Action" 
33 Ibid 
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of building new detention facilities for the poor was, however, also fraught with 
difficulties.  For one thing, bricks were in extremely short supply, and for another, the 
location of such detention camps was tricky.  Proposals for building thatched structures in 
Murshidabad district were floated, but in the meantime Government could only reassured 
the more fortunate public, that "it [was] fully conscious of [the] urgency and [was] 
constantly considering possible ways and means for the earlier collection and detention of 
at least those beggars who are suffering from dangerous or infectious diseases."34
On the 24th of January an editorial in The Statesman read,  "there seem more 
beggars than ever in the city's streets and dirtier than ever; many are more importunate in 




                                                 
34 Ibid 
  The question of profit aside, it would not have been difficult to 
determine where they were coming from.  They were coming from the cyclone ravaged 
towns of Midnapur to the west, the militarily evacuated regions of Diamond Harbor to 
the south, the impoverished districts of Rangpur and Rajshahi to the north, Faridpur to the 
northeast, and Khulna to the southeast.  Across the province as a whole, in fact, the price 
of rice had risen far beyond the reach of many millions of Bengalis. As the government 
strained ever-more fitfully to bring the rice of Bengal into Calcutta, there followed - as if 
on a string - an ever-growing stream of starving people from every corner of the province 
who understood that survival, if it could be found, could only be found in Calcutta. In the 
countryside there were soldiers and government agents, there were police convoys and 
sub-divisional officers, there were purchasing agents for large industrial firms and the 
military - all after rice.  It took little acumen to understand that a landless agricultural 
laborer - who lived by debt and prayer in the best of times - could not compete.  It did 
take, however, a tremendous amount courage - and despair - for these same landless 
laborers, fishermen, potters, and, increasingly, small holders who had lost their lands to 
need, to pick up and leave their native villages behind in search of the barest survival.  
But, for many, Calcutta proved to be only a mirage of fleeting hope. In the city too there 
was brutal hardship, and charity had become extremely strained.  
35 The Statesman, Jan. 24th, 1943 
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The most common Bengali word for scarcity, often translated as "famine" in 
English, is durbhikkho; a word that might be more literally translated as "scarcity of 
alms."  In a province historically ravaged by hunger and with a long trajectory of 
dispossession and impoverishment, the poorest members of society had long depended on 
the charity of the wealthy to survive hard times. When times were especially hard, 
however, they found no help, and starved in large numbers. With the rural credit system 
in shambles, and after more than a decade of especially pernicious economic conditions, 
the dislocations of war, natural disaster and governmental predation were taking a brutal 
toll.  The uncertainties and anxieties that gripped Bengal had dried up the compassion 
that in less tumultuous times created a buffer for the poorest of the poor.  Every indicator 
listed in the Bengal Famine Code had been long in evidence, and yet famine was not 
declared . However, that Calcutta was filling up with "beggars" by January 1943, and that 
their plaintive moans were increasingly going unheard, was a clear indication to many of 
the city's residents that durbhikkho was well underway. 
 
Imports 
The Government of India in Delhi, it should be said, had few illusions.  
Linlithgow, in his official capacity as head of the (only days old) Government of India  
Food Department, wrote to the Secretary of State in London on December 9th informing 
him that the food situation had "deteriorated seriously," and was causing "acute 
anxiety."36  He asked for the immediate import of 600,000 tons of wheat to forestall an 
imminent catastrophe. For "psychological effect," he suggested, the request should be 
made without specific reference to military or civilian allocation.  The Food Department, 
the Viceroy assured London, "will see that military needs are given preference."37 Using 
the peculiar "famine code" that would prevail in official circles throughout the most acute 
stage of starvation, he also lamented the imposition of asking for imports, but noted: "the 
food situation is so acute that immediate substantial assistance is essential if war work in 
India is not to be seriously disorganized and law and order gravely menaced."38
                                                 
36 T.O.P. Volume III, Govt. of India Food Dept. to Secretary of State, December 9, 1942 
 Amery 




to the main war effort" that such imports would entail.  The Government of India was on 
its own, he continued, and in this regard "should therefore lose no time in setting on foot 
measures which, though drastic, will serve to place maximum food supplies at disposal 
of Government and full cooperation of Provincial authorities should be secured by all 
means available."39
Linlithgow sent several more telegrams, pleading the case, noting that the Food 
Conference held in Delhi on the 14th and 15th of December had revealed that the 
situation was even worse than he had originally thought.
 
40 All efforts being made from 
Delhi to deal with the crisis were further hampered by a lack of competent personnel, and 
if nothing was done, he warned, there would even be the possibility of "shortage being 
felt by the armed forces here."41 Amery remained skeptical, wondering whether or not the 
statistics that Linlithgow was using were of any merit: "judging by the use which the 
Congress people have made of the Midnapore disaster," he replied, "they are no doubt 
capable of doing their utmost to aggravate the food situation by encouraging hoarding on 
the one hand and, on the other, [by] denouncing the Government for deliberately starving 
the people."42  Linlithgow persisted, assuring Amery that Government would take every 
measure possible to "place maximum food supplies at disposal of Government," but 
maintained that immediate imports were "absolutely essential."43  He also enlisted the 
influence of the Commander-in-Chief for South and Southeast Asia, Field Marshall 
Archibald Wavell, who agreed that the situation was grave.  Military rations, Wavell 
informed the War Cabinet, were already being cut for both men and draught animals.44
On or about the 8th of January, Amery - convinced by Linlithgow's repeated 
entreaties - sent a memorandum to the Minister of War Transport in London, Lord 
Leathers, outlining Linlithgow's request for imports.  "It is the urban population," he 
wrote, "who are the first to experience any shortage, and since it is the urban population 
on whose labour the Indian  munitions and supply industries depend, any marginal 
shortage of food tends to reduce the output of those industries. Such a shortage may have 
   
                                                 
39 T.O.P. Volume III, Secretary of State to Govt. of India Food Dept, December 15, 1942 (emphasis mine) 
40 T.O.P. Volume III, Govt. of India Food Dept to Secretary of State, p. 394 
41 T.O.P. Volume III, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 396 
42 T.O.P. Volume III, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 413 
43 T.O.P. Volume III, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 421 
44 T.O.P. Volume III, Linlithgow to Amery, p.455 
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the effect of driving labour from factory centres back to the country where they may be 
lost to industry and constitute a threat to law and order with the possibility of food riots." 
Government's "famine code" encapsulated.  A meeting of the War Cabinet was held in 
London, and at length it was agreed that in lieu of the 600,000 tons of grains requested by 
the Viceroy, a maximum of 130,000 tons might be made available by the end of April.45  
Amery suggested that to make full use of the propaganda value of this decision, the 
announcement of imports should be made without mentioning the tonnage involved.  In 
return for imports into India, the War Cabinet was pressing for Indian assistance to 
Ceylon. Ceylon, a former major importer of Burmese rice, was a critical strategic base 
against Japan as well, and there too labor and rice was needed to keep operations going.  
While Bengal Chief Minister Fazlul Huq was in Delhi towards the end of January, the 
Viceroy approached him with the Ceylon problem: "Mindful of our difficulties about 
food I told him that he simply must produce some more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon, 
even if Bengal itself went short!  He was by no means unsympathetic," Linlithgow wrote 
hopefully, "and it is possible that I may in the result screw a little out of them."46
Recognizing the insufficiency of imports promised, on February 3rd, 1943 the 
Viceroy wrote to all provincial Governors detailing the gravity of food situation in India.  
"The Central Government," he warned, "regard the position more seriously than might be 
supposed from their communications to the general public."
 
47 Wheat imports were 
promised, he noted, but would necessarily be far less than adequate.  "As for the problem 
of rice," he added, "no help can be expected from outside the country and we are forced 
back on our own resources."48
                                                 
45 T.O.P. Volume III, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 520 
  It would be imperative, he added, for provincial 
Governments to use all means necessary to get control of as much food as possible.  
Rather than suggesting that Governors attempt to work with elected Provincial Ministries, 
however, the Viceroy advised Governors that "for the fullest measure of success" they 
should rely on the I.C.S. for the execution of procurement.  With this, Linlithgow 
contented himself with the "food position" for the time being.  Other vastly more 
46 T.O.P. Volume III, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 544 
47 T.O.P. Volume III, Linlithgow to Provincial Governors, p. 580 
48 Ibid 
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spectacular events were on the immediate horizon, and it was to them that all 
administrative eyes now fell. 
 
Starving Indians 
The Government of India regret to announce that Mr. Gandhi died in detention at 
Poona at ....... hours on ....... from collapse/heart failure following a self-imposed 
fast. Gandhi started his fast on 10th February and refused to conduct it under his 
own arrangements outside the Palace.  Government therefore put all medical 
resources available at his disposal and allowed him to have his own doctors and 
nurses.  It had earlier become apparent that at his age he could not stand the 21 
days' fast he had imposed upon himself and he was warned to that effect by his 
medical advisers.  However, he persisted in it with fatal results. 
 
                Press release prepared in case of Gandhi's demise  
                                                                February 19, 194349
 
 
 Even before Gandhi was arrested on August 9, 1942, plans for what course of 
action to take if he chose to go on a hunger-strike were being urgently discussed in Delhi 
and London.  On August 2nd the Viceroy relayed to the Secretary of State his intention to 
follow the officially codified "cat and mouse"  procedure,50 releasing Gandhi if his health 
declined enough that he was in danger of dying on Government hands, then re-arresting 
him if he survived.51 The War Cabinet rebutted Linlithgow, staunchly advocating 
allowing Gandhi to fast too death in detention, if it came to that. The political 
implications of his possible death in custody, could be blunted, the War Cabinet argued, 
if Gandhi could be deported upon arrest and detained in Yemen or Sudan - where news of 
his demise could be carefully censored.52
                                                 
49 T.O.P. Vol. III. Linlithgow to Amery, p. 692 
 Additionally, and with a pointed lack of 
deference to the Government of India, the War Cabinet expressed its jurisdictional 
primacy, noting that the treatment of State Prisoner Gandhi "was a matter in which His 
50 The "Cat and Mouse" procedure was officially recognized in the Prisoners (Temporary Discharge for Ill 
Health) Act of 1913, was thus considered a humanitarian solution to the thorny problem of hunger strikes 
that plagued Britain since the turn of the century.  Its advantage was that Government could absolve 
themselves of responsibility for the care of prisoners - allowing them to die in "freedom."  The 
disadvantages were that release of prisoners in reaction to a hunger strike showed weakness, and 
furthermore, the released prisoner could resume political activity upon discharge.  Re-arrest, in the case of a 
popular leader like Gandhi, could also prove a second political liability. 
51 T.O.P. Volume II, Government of India, Home to Secretary of State, p. 535 
52 T.O.P.  Vol. II, War Cabinet W.M. (42) 105th Conclusion, p. 588 
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Majesty's Government must [ultimately] be responsible for the decision taken."53  
Linlithgow, though still worried about popular unrest if Gandhi died in detention, sought 
to appease the War Cabinet.  He drafted a new plan that involved keeping Gandhi in 
detention, but rushing the Mahatma's son, Devadas, to the site and providing him with 
food, medical supplies, and other amenities, and leaving him in charge of his father for 
the duration.54  Perhaps this would shift responsibility away from Government in the 
event of Gandhi's death.  The War Cabinet found this suggestion more or less amenable 
and the urgency of the debate ebbed as Gandhi gave no indication of resorting to a fast 
for several months to come.55
The first inklings that Gandhi would venture to starve himself while in custody 
came in an uncharacteristically angry letter to the Viceroy on New Year's Eve, 1942.  In 
this correspondence Gandhi focused on the lack of evidence linking the Congress 
Resolution of August 8th to the violence that had swept the country since the arrest of 
Congress leaders the following day.  Such arrests, Gandhi argued, were unjust unless and 
until some objective proof could be given that the leadership of Congress had, in fact, 
instigated the violence directly. He added that a fast would be his "last resort" to redress 
this governmental injustice. The Viceroy replied tersely that Gandhi was merely trying to 
evade responsibility, and that he should, at once, denounce the popular movement that he 
had set off.  In a subsequent letter to the Viceroy on the 12th of January, Gandhi 
reiterated his argument that Government heavy-handedness, not Congress instigation, had 
precipitated the uprising, and added that as a "helpless witness to what is going on in the 
country, including the privations of the poor millions owing to the universal scarcity 
stalking the land,"
  
56 he was morally compelled to fast in solidarity with the masses.  In a 
third and final correspondence to Linlithgow before beginning his fast, Gandhi again 
cited the "privations of the millions due to India-wide scarcity," and the administrative 
injustice leading to the same, as grounds for carrying out a "fast according to capacity" 
beginning on February 9th.57
                                                 
53 Ibid, p. 587 
 
54 T.O.P. Vol. II, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 844 
55 T.O.P. Vol. II, War Cabinet W.M. (42) 121st Conclusion, p. 917 
56 T.O.P. Vol. III, Gandhi to Linlithgow, p. 518 
57 T.O.P. Vol. III, Gandhi to Linlithgow, p.559 
 136 
With a hunger-strike likely, the debate about how to handle Gandhi's fast again 
heated up. Governor of Bombay, Sir Richard Lumley, under whose jurisdiction the 
immediate matter of dealing with the intricacies of Gandhi's detention fell, argued frankly 
against the plan to keep Gandhi in detention, warning Linlithgow that in Bombay, if not 
across India as a whole, Gandhi's death under arrest would be sure to create considerable 
unrest, and would seriously hamper the war effort by souring Indian opinion further. He 
also warned Delhi that the Surgeon-General of Bombay had alerted him to the fact that at 
Gandhi's age, and given his high blood pressure, Gandhi would be unlikely to last more 
than 3 or 4 days.58  Linlithgow seconded Lumley's apprehensions, and relayed these 
concerns to London. "Personally," the Secretary of State wrote in his diary, "I should be 
all for letting Gandhi fast to death if he likes.  However great the sensation at the 
moment, in the long run India is unlikely to make any progress while he is alive."59  He 
did, however, submit a memorandum to the War Cabinet in London, outlining Lumley's 
objections and urged reconsideration of the case given sentiments on the ground in 
India.60
Amery knew that the case for release would be a hard sell, particularly with 
Winston Churchill at the helm.  Churchill, it was well understood, was deeply opposed to 
Indian independence, and had a particularly arch opinion of Mohandas Gandhi. When 
Gandhi had met with a previous Viceroy to negotiate a detente between nationalist forces 
and the colonial government, Churchill had been aghast: "it is alarming," he commented, 
"and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing 
as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half naked up the steps of the 
Viceregal palace, while he is still organizing and conducting a defiant campaign of civil 
disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor."
   
61
                                                 
58 T.O.P. Vol. III, Lumley to Linlithgow, October 22nd, 1942. 
   
Amery's memorandum, moreover, was considered by the War Cabinet on a day that 
seems to have found Churchill in a markedly acrimonious mood - particularly on the 
topic of Empire.   
59 The Leo Amery's Diaries, p.866 
60 T.O.P. Vol. III, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43),  p. 452 
61 Quoted in Baker, p. 23 
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The War Cabinet began discussions with a proposed joint declaration on colonial 
policy. Amery, himself a conservative with close ties to the Prime Minister, was 
dismayed to find Churchill "at his worst as a Chairman" that day.  He had "not really read 
the Declaration itself," but, in any case, "started off with a terrific tirade against 
apologizing for the Empire, appeasing the Americans, etc."62
when he is really stupid like that and simply cannot see obvious points, I find 
myself getting very impatient... At one moment he got onto a long discourse on 
Imperial Preference and Ottawa and could not see that this was not raised one way 
or other by the declaration.  In the end after an hour and a half or more of time 
wasted it was decided that a revised draft with one or two further amendments 
should again be submitted.  We then got on to Gandhi.
  Amery tried to keep the 
meeting on track, but confessed:  
63
 
   
Unsurprisingly, the War Cabinet stuck to its guns, and found that Gandhi should remain 
in detention, until death if need be. 
Linlithgow was disgruntled, and wrote to the Secretary of State that he, after all, 
was in the best position to judge these circumstances, priding himself on a "close 
acquaintance with the working of Gandhi's mind."64  Furthermore he was obliged to give 
some relevance to the attitude of his Executive Council. "Resignation of Hindu members 
on such an issue," he wrote, "would have most unfortunate effect and I doubt certain of 
them would be willing to shelter behind the fact that responsibility was mine."65  To 
make matters only more complicated for the besieged Governor-General,66
The War Cabinet met a again on January 12th, and while reaffirming its own view 
that Gandhi should continue to be held in detention even if he starved to death, deferred 
to the urgency of the Viceroy's insistence on jurisdiction. It also considered the letter the 
Viceroy had drafted.  In it Linlithgow had expressed his "disappointment" that Gandhi 
 Franklin 
Roosevelt's "personal representative" to India, William Phillips, had arrived, and was 
snooping into colonial affairs at this particularly sensitive moment.  In the meantime 
Linlithgow prepared a stern response to Gandhi's New Year's Eve letter, and Amery 
prepared to present the Viceroy's arguments for Gandhi's release to the War Cabinet. 
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had failed to take responsibility for, and subsequently disavow, the violence that had 
visited the land: "[the] murders, the burning alive of police officials, the wrecking of 
trains, the destruction of property, [and] the misleading of... young students, which [had] 
done so much harm to India's good name, and to the Congress Party."67 The letter was 
approved without amendment.  It is worth noting - particularly in the context of Gandhi's 
mention of India-wide food scarcity as a primary cause for his fast - that at the same 
meeting of the War Cabinet the "Food Situation" in India was also discussed, "for another 
ten minutes or so."68  Despite dire warnings by the Secretary of State, it was decided that 
the imports that Linlithgow had requested would be quite impossible.69
Gandhi responded to the Viceroy's letter promptly, roundly rejecting the charge 
that Congress was responsible for the violence in India.
 
70  Again he blamed 
Government's excessively belligerent posture of the previous August, when Congress 
leaders were preemptively arrested. He compared this unwarranted act of repression with 
the Amritsar massacre of 1919, the Cawnpore incident of 1913, and the Partition of 
Bengal in 1905 - all of which had precipitated wide-spread unrest in India.  After each of 
these offenses,  the Government of India had ultimately "owned their mistakes," and had 
made efforts at redress.  The heavy-handedness of the government  in August 1942, 
Gandhi argued, was an analogous case in point. If Government were unprepared this time 
to own their mistakes, Gandhi warned, he would be inclined to undergo a fast.  This 
inclination, he added, was not simply the result of the injustices being done to him, but 
rather was the fruit of his frustration, as a leader of the people, at being incarcerated when 
"universal scarcity [was] stalking the land," and millions were being deprived of the 
means of survival.71
Linlithgow sent back a blunt and uncompromising response.  Again he strained to 
associate the violence with the Congress Working Committee and its August Resolution.  
He urged Gandhi to "face the facts," accept responsibility for the "sad campaign of 
violence and crime" that had swept the country, and disown the August Resolution, 
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which, he argued, had instigated the same.72
Behind the scene, however, a potential hunger strike was of primary concern.   
Linlithgow's reputation was at stake in relation to the high profile arrest and detention of 
Gandhi.  The diplomacy demanded by war was increasingly complicated, and the U.S., 
Britain's now essential ally, had made its distaste for British colonial policy known. The 
Labour Party in Britain was another thorn in the conservative Government's side. 
Linlithgow himself, moreover, had announced his intention of stepping down within the 
year.  The fiasco of a fast, and the possibility of Gandhi's death while in detention, was 
therefore a liability to the Viceroy's personal, as well as professional, legacy.  After 
replying to Gandhi, Linlithgow grumbled to his Secretary of State that Gandhi seemed to 
be hell bent on a hunger strike, even "in connection with the food situation if he is 
deprived of an excuse for fasting on political grounds."
 He did not mention the "food situation" or, 
for that matter, Gandhi's threat of a fast.   
73 The Secretary of State was 
sympathetic, agreeing that in reality the Mahatma did look to be intending a fast only "in 
order to focus the limelight on himself again."74
Gandhi's next reply was even more direct.  The August resolution had made no 
mention of violence, and had, in fact, been only meant as an opening salvo to 
negotiations.  It had laid out a clear plan of support for the war and had soundly 
condemned the fascist enemy. It had mentioned civil disobedience as a last resort, but 
civil disobedience, Gandhi assured Linlithgow, could not be equated with the violent 
unrest in India.  The violence in India he argued, stemmed instead from the "leonine 
violence" of the government's summary arrests.  Such authoritarian measures, Gandhi 
argued,  had "goaded the people to the point of madness."
 That Gandhi would be actually 
concerned with the deprivation of millions of Indians was somehow inadmissible.  
75
                                                 
72 T.O.P. Vol. III, Linlithgow to Gandhi, p. 536 
  The madness of the people, 
he argued further - and again - had been significantly compounded by hunger.  The 
scarcity stalking the land, he asserted, was violence in its own right, stemming from the 
injustices of colonial rule.  This injustice of hunger, Gandhi insisted furthermore, "might 
have been largely mitigated, if not altogether prevented, had there been a bona fide 
73 T.O.P. Vol. III, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 540 
74 T.O.P. Vol. III, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 557 
75 T.O.P. Vol. III, Gandhi to Linlithgow, p. 558 
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national government responsible to a popularly elected assembly."76
After receiving this more definitive declaration of Gandhi's intentions, the 
Viceroy hastened to finalize Government's plan.  That Gandhi was insisting on making 
"publicity use of the food situation," was deplorable, but ''however flimsy the 
justification," the Government of India needed to proceed with great caution and 
foresight to avoid popular unrest.
 The fast would begin 
on February 9th, he concluded, six months to the day after the arrest of the Congress 
leadership.  If he survived, it would end 21 days later, on the 2nd of March.  
77  Linlithgow, for his part, informed Amery, that he had 
"never wavered that Gandhi, if he desired to do so, should be allowed, on his own 
responsibility, to starve to death."78
 
  But, the Viceroy admitted, there were intricate 
strategic considerations that could not be ignored. Lumley had written a series of 
telegrams to Linlithgow, arguing that Indian opinion would be perilously inflamed if 
Gandhi were to die a prisoner, which was an argument the Viceroy could not refute.  
Furthermore, Gandhi's death in detention was an eventuality that the political left in 
Britain would make hay out of and Washington would revile.  What was required was for 
the Government of India to present a united front.  Towards this end the Viceroy felt it 
necessary to enlist the opinions of his Provincial Governors, and most importantly, his 
Executive Council. 
The Executive Council 
 The Viceroy's Executive Council, established by the Indian Councils Act of 1861, 
was an advisory body of appointed Members, vetted by the Crown, who were assigned 
governmental "portfolios" deemed essential to the various tasks of colonial 
administration. At its inception the Executive Council consisted of six British members. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, "Indianization" of the Executive Council became 
a bargaining chip in the independence struggle.  Gradually, Indians were to be 
incorporated into the Executive Council, presumably to groom them for eventual self-
rule.  In 1941 Linlithgow advanced the most comprehensive expansion and Indianization 
of the Council, adding four additional portfolios; Supply, Civil Defence, Information and 
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Broadcasting, and Indians Overseas.  All the new positions were to be filled by Indians, 
and the new Labor Member would also be an Indian, shifting the overall composition 
from 5 Europeans and 3 Indians, to 4 Europeans and 8 Indians.  In all, the Executive 
Council, at this time, remained a loyalist body with little public accountability, 
particularly with Congress refusing participation after the declaration of war on India's 
behalf.  The ramifications of a fast by Gandhi, and the disruptions that any mass 
movement on his behalf might have, however, represented a particularly pressing 
dilemma for the Council, most of whom had vested political and economic interests in 
maintaining a "peaceful" status quo. 
War Transport Member, Edward Benthall, for one, had extensive connections in 
Calcutta industries.  Appointed to the Executive Council in July 1942, he was the long-
time Chairman and Senior Partner of Bird & Co., the largest European industrial firm 
operating in and around Calcutta.79  Bird & Co had made its name in Bengal's booming 
jute industry during World War I, but had diversified into coal and paper by the 1940s 
and remained a formidable presence in all three industries.  Benthall himself was an 
uncompromising advocate of free trade, arguing in 1941 that business interests in India 
needed to "avoid like a plague anything that involves protection."80  He was also well 
schooled in the rough and tumble of Bengal politics; the influence peddling on which it 
revolved, and the systems of patronage which were necessary to grease the wheels.  For 
European firms, manipulations within the Bengal  Legislative Assemble depended on the 
influential European Group of legislators, with whom Benthall was quite well acquainted.  
Even in the late 1930s, when profits were still moribund, Benthall could brag of the 
powerful position he and Bird & Co. exercised in the Bengal Legislature.  "In fact," he 
remarked to an associate, "if we work things rightly I believe they would adopt any 
policy that we liked to press on them."81
Between Benthall and Congress Nationalists there was little love lost.  Any mass 
disturbance, the War Transport Member fully understood, could have crippling effects on 
Calcutta trade.  Disruptions to the transportation infrastructure during the "Quit India" 
unrest, had hampered war production in Bengal significantly, and as such.  In a time 
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when paper shortages were an increasing concern, Bird & Co. continued supplying paper 
at cost to the Muslim League's local organ, The Star of India.82  Moreover, Bird & Co.'s 
primary competitor in Bengal had been, for many years, Marwari business mogul, and 
unabashed Indian nationalist, G.D. Birla - Gandhi's close friend and ally.  Birla had 
muscled his way into the European boys club of the Bengal jute industry in the 1920's 
and had succeeded beyond expectations.  Making use of elaborate networks of finance, 
wholesale purchasing, and labor recruitment (unique to the Marwari community in 
Bengal,) Birla had established a foothold in the jute business that posed a direct threat to 
Bird & Co.'s supremacy by the early 1920s.  In 1926,  Birla had played a central role in 
setting up the Indian Chamber of Commerce to rival the European dominated Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce, a move that rankled Benthall.  Based on success in the jute 
industry, the Birla family had subsequently branched out into coal, paper, and cotton, 
thus contesting Bird & Co. on several fronts. In 1942 the Birlas also established 
Hindustan Motors in Gujarat, diversifying into the booming war-time engineering sector 
at exactly the right time.  Frustrated by Birla's successes, Benthall's associate at Bird & 
Co, Monty Thomas commented that if Birla "can't get us by kicking us out, he will get us 
out by unfair competition."83
But it is important not to exaggerate the rivalry between Birla and Benthall's 
concern, Bird & Co, the two largest employers in Bengal.  Birla, although a renegade in 
many ways, had joined the Indian Jute Mills' Association (IJMA), and as such Birla and 
Benthall had corporate interests that coincided at least as much as they collided.  The 
IJMA exercised tremendous influence, setting regulations for crop acreage, working 
hours and profit margins.  While there were discrepancies of opinion within the IJMA, its 
ultimate mission was to benefit the industry as a whole.  Similarly in 1943, as leading 
industrialists in a highly profitable market, both firms had a vested interest in maintaining 
order in industrial Calcutta, to keep trade booming. As did another Member of the 
Viceroy's Executive Council, Nalini Sarkar.  Sarkar, like Benthall (and Birla), had deep 
roots in Bengal's industrial infrastructure.  Appointed to the Viceroy's Executive Council 
as Commerce Member in 1942, Sarkar's experience included terms as President of the 
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Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce & Industry and, later, the Bengal National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as Commissioner of Calcutta Port Trust. He 
also had his own jute mills, was an active member of the IJMA, and his expertise in the 
notoriously "irregular" workings of the Bengal Legislature was, like Benthall's, 
formidable.84
It is very interesting to note that even while Gandhi was declaring his intention to 
fast in relation to the "privations of the poor millions," these three industrialists, Birla, 
Benthall and Sarkar, all intimately involved in the drama of Gandhi's fast, were, at the 
very same time, all extremely busy buying up large quantities of rice in the Bengal 
countryside at sharply escalating prices in order to keep their industrial interests in 
Calcutta booming.  The scramble to stockpile rice for Calcutta, was their scramble, and 
the various plans at increasing appropriation from rural districts, were for their direct 
benefit. Sarkar, as Commerce Member, had been recently assigned the new Food 
portfolio, and as such had gained important official leverage and influence in the area of 
civilian (which at the time was synonymous with "industrial") food supply.  And 
Benthall, as War Transport Member, held perhaps the most important key to solving the 
supply situation in Calcutta, namely an inside track on transportation facilities at a time 
when shipping was extremely tight owing to military requirements. Reports of 
irregularities in the movements of food by railway transport, in particular, were wide-
spread, and the extent of Benthall's knowledge of these irregularities is an interesting, if 
open, question.  In any case, that these two critical Members of the Viceroy's Executive 
Council had such substantial interest in feeding industrial Calcutta - at the expense of the 
Bengal countryside - cannot be easily overlooked.  Their concerns were decidedly not 
related to the hungry masses. 
   
Discussions in the Executive Council were complicated and "tense," but at length 
the Viceroy was able to hammer out a unanimous policy in relation to the Mahatma's fast. 
In its statement the Council declared, "the Government of India deplore the use of the 
weapon of fasting to achieve political ends [and] regret that Mr. Gandhi should think it 
necessary to employ such a weapon on this occasion , and should seek a justification for 
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it in anything which Government may have said or done in connection with the 
movement initiated by him and his co-workers in the Congress Party." 85  The Council 
went on to attack Congress as a whole as an autocratic organization with arrogant 
presumptions of representing the Indian masses.  Note was made of the Muslim League's 
suspicions that the democratic "Quit India" slogan had been merely a smoke screen, when 
"what was really meant was supreme control of Government of the country by Congress."  
In a brief nod to Gandhi's inclusion of the "food situation," the Council ended by 
contending that the violence that Gandhi had instigated had also and "incidentally, 
aggravated the difficulties of the food situation."86  Given these facts, the Executive 
Council decided that it could not be burdened with the responsibility of Gandhi's health 
in the event of a fast: "if he decides to do so, he must do so at his own risk, and under his 
own arrangements. They have accordingly decided to release him for the duration of the 
fast."87
When Winston Churchill got wind of the Council's conclusion and Linlithgow's 
insistence on giving it weight, he was apoplectic.  At the War Cabinet meeting, according 
to the Secretary of State for India, Churchill, as Chair, was "in an aggressive mood."
  The Executive Council had decided on the "cat and mouse" strategy. 
88  
He argued for an immediate contravention to "force the Viceroy to override his 
Council,"89 and ordered Amery to draft a telegram to Linlithgow at once to this effect.  
Amery went off and composed what he deemed "a telegram of the most dictatorial kind," 
and returned to Churchill to argue his case further before sending the telegram.  
Solidarity with the Executive Council, Amery argued, was an essential tactic in dealing 
with the Gandhi affair.  If a hard line were to be dictated from London, it could lead to 
resignations in the Executive Council that would seriously effect public opinion.  
Churchill was unimpressed and accused Amery of weak-kneed appeasement, "as for the 
Council," he told his Secretary of State, "what did it matter if a few blackamoors 
resigned!"90
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Viceroy's proposals."91 Linlithgow was order by the Cabinet to "suspend action on [his 
proposal] until further notice,"  and Amery's "dictatorial telegram" contravening the 




While this drama is an instructive example of the colonial chain of authority, its 
practical import was mooted.  Linlithgow had already broadcast his offer of release to 
Gandhi, and Gandhi had refused his "freedom," preferring to fast while still in detention.  
Amery breathed a sigh of relief at not having to override the Government of India from 
London.93 The Viceroy convened his Executive Council in the middle of the night and 
they voted, by majority, that since Gandhi had refused Government's offer once, he 
should now be held in detention for the duration of his fast, even if he died in custody.94
After the flurry of activity leading up to the fast, Gandhi's hunger-strike began on 
the 10th of February with little fanfare.  Lumley telegrammed the pre-arranged code word 
- "repudiation" - to convey that Gandhi had begun his fast, and thereafter Government 
shifted into a tense and ironic mode.  Amery, in his diary of the day, jotted a single line: 
"The fast seems to have begun in a most amiable mood on the part of Gandhi and all 
concerned."
  
Those in the minority, Linlithgow pondered, might cause problems down the road, but for 
the time being they took the majority decision with relative equanimity.   
95 Linlithgow wrote a "Private and Personal" telegram to Churchill, 
apologizing for his "flank march," which had cause the Prime Minister "some 
uneasiness."96  He also apologized for his Executive Council, which, after all, was the 
true source of Churchill's disquiet. "They are not precisely the troops I would choose for 
a close encounter,"  the Viceroy assured Churchill, "but I think we shall manage well 
enough.  May you never have to handle a Cabinet of NO-men.  Love and good hunting.  
Hopie."97
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Much to the Viceroy's relief, the Indian general public remained relatively calm as 
well.  Reports from many of the previously volatile provinces, including Bombay, Bengal 
and Bihar, indicated a lack of public "excitement" over the fast.98 (The word "hunger-
strike," itself, had been censored from the press.99) Linlithgow informed London that he 
had consulted with Central Intelligence Officers from all Provinces and "all [were] 
perfectly confident of the ability of the Police to hold the position."100  The Muslim 
League distanced itself from concern over the fast, and ran articles in Dawn ridiculing 
Gandhi, which greatly pleased the Viceroy.101 Bengal industrialist G.D. Birla was 
pressuring sympathetic members of the Executive Council to resign, but all Members 
remained at their posts, at least for the time being.102 Linlithgow, in any case, had been 
prepared for resignations.  He had a standing pool of I.C.S. officers from which he was 
ready to appoint replacements at a moment's notice.103  Churchill, for his part, remained 
singularly unimpressed by Gandhi's "fasting antics," conveying his suspicion to the 
Viceroy that Gandhi was surely sneaking glucose into his water.104
All was not quiet, however, on the diplomatic front.  William Phillips, Roosevelt's 
"Personal Representative in India," began asking questions. In the absence of any formal 
diplomatic relations between Washington and Delhi, Phillips was assigned the task of 
drawing up a report on the political situation for the U.S. President. A meeting with 
Gandhi, Phillip's suggested to the Viceroy, was in keeping with this mission. Linlithgow, 
resenting the intrusion, but ever-conscious of the delicacy of international relations at the 
present moment, told Phillips "in the politest and most definite language that the answer 
to his request was NO."
 
105  Not wanting Phillips to harbor any illusions on the matter, 
Linlithgow furthermore informed him that it was "quite likely that [Gandhi] would die in 
prison."106
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unpleasantness steadily declining in volume... [and] after it was over, India would be a far 
more reliable base for operations."107  By such frank communications Linlithgow hoped 
to "disabuse Phillips of any misconceptions he may have had about his work [in 
India.]"108
In the meantime, the Mahatma's physical health quickly began to deteriorate.  On 
the night of the 13th he had not slept well and his blood pressure stood at 195/104 the 
next morning.  The Surgeon-General of Bombay had warned that Gandhi wouldn't last 
for more than 3 or 4 days, and now the body of the Mahatma seemed to be confirming 
this diagnosis.  Nausea on the 14th inhibited his ability to take fluids and acetone was 
reported to be found in his urine.  The Viceroy expressed his frustration that Gandhi 
seemed "insistent on submitting himself to the full rigor of the game."
   
109 A Congress 
doctor was transferred from Yeravada Jail to attend the Mahatma. The Viceroy 
telegraphed Churchill on the 15th, informing him that despite repeated entreaties from his 
attendants, Gandhi had, in fact, refused to be administered glucose, even in his precarious 
position.110  On the 16th Lumley relayed the Surgeon-General's opinion that Gandhi was 
unlikely to last more than five days, that is unless "sudden collapse" didn't terminate his 
life sooner.  The Surgeon-General, himself, was convinced that "there [was] more danger 
of death from heart attack than of a slow petering out from starvation."111  Secretary of 
State Amery, having received the news in London, could only hope for heart attack so 
that "the period of suspense and growing hysteria not be prolonged."112 He inquired of 
Linlithgow whether or not flags across the country would be "half-masted" when Gandhi 
died, and encouraged the Viceroy to write the Mahatma's obituary forthwith (see 
above.)113
On the 17th, unnerved by the Surgeon-General's reports, and relenting to the 
ongoing pressure of Birla and other pro-Gandhi nationalists, three Hindu members of the 
Viceroy's Executive Council; Homy Mody (Supply), Madhao Aney (Indians Overseas), 
and Nalini Sarkar (Commerce) resigned.  Since the fast had begun, Government had been 
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at pains to paint it as a Hindu affair, reveling at the Muslim League's lack of concern, and 
couching references to support for Gandhi in terms of "Hindu elements."114 The 
resignation of Mody, Aney, and Sarkar, fortunately, fit the bill.  Muslim, non-League 
affiliated, Law Member, Sultan Ahem, and Sikh Health and Lands Member, Jogendra 
Singh, though they had voted for Gandhi's release and were also under pressure to resign, 
were convinced by the Viceroy to remain.115  J.P. Srivastava, the remaining Hindu 
member (Civil Defence), had been put in a desperate situation by the fact that he had 
been in the majority arguing for holding Gandhi in detention for the duration, and so 
remained in his post. The remaining Indian members of the Executive Council, Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar (Labour), Sir Mahomed Usman (Posts and Air), and Sir Firoz Khan 
(Defence), also stayed put.  That the resignations had been thus minimized (and Hindu-
ized), relieved the Viceroy.  He made plans to "fill the vacancies at leisure," and assigned 
departmental secretaries to the vacant portfolios in the meantime.116
Two days after these resignations the "Leaders Conference" was convened.  With 
the leadership of Congress in jail, and the Muslim League refusing participation, an 
eclectic patchwork of influential Indians, provincial politicians, businessmen, et al, was 
organized to draft a resolution addressing Gandhi's fast and imprisonment.  Invitations 
were sent from "Birla House" in Delhi, and a wide variety of prominent Indians attended.  
At the opening ceremony special mention was made of the Executive Council 
resignations, and Madhao Aney (the only ex-Member in attendance) received the largest 
round of ovations from the gathering when he was introduced.
   
117 Though the Viceroy 
was want to characterize the Conference as a "Hindu" concern,118
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of international goodwill."119  The conference, unsurprisingly, had little, if any, political 
impact.120
It is interesting (and also a rather sad commentary) that, though Gandhi's 
correspondences with Linlithgow had been published in the press, and were circulated at 
the Leaders Conference itself, no mention at all was made of the "privations of the poor 
millions" or the "scarcity stalking the land" to which Gandhi had made meaningful 
reference. In his "welcome speech," C. Rajagopalchari (C.R.) confessed that Gandhi was 
"a strange man," but had a profound and consequential relationship with the Indian 
masses.  "What is it that Gandhi wants?" C.R. queried.  "The only thing he asks," and the 
reason for his fast, he contended, "is the right to review the position as a free man."
  
121 In 
his presidential address, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, while distancing himself as far as 
possible from Congress, did offer a fairly comprehensive defense of Gandhi's non-violent 
credentials, rebutting the charges contained in the Viceroy's responses to Gandhi's letter, 
but - again - made no mention of Gandhi's references to privation or scarcity.  Next up to 
the podium, Bengali Hindu Mahasabha leader, Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, also made no 
mention of Gandhi's concern for the hungry.  And the "Leaders" were not alone. The 
Viceroy, for his part, was satisfied that "it [was] not too obvious to anybody for what 
precisely the old man ha[d] decided to fast."122 Linlithgow, himself, concluded that 
Gandhi simply intended "to kill himself and to get out of his difficulties in that way," 
adding, "I can see no other possible explanation."123
Given the contemporary erasure of Gandhi's inclusion of the "food problem" in 
the context of his 1943 fast, it is perhaps not a surprise that the same has been entirely 
ignored in historical evaluations of the event.  The Communist Party, legalized in July of 
1942 by the Government of India for their support of the war effort, was the only 
organization that seems to have even noticed, or at least taken seriously, Gandhi's 
warnings - even as developments in Bengal were reaching a critical stage.  "The clue to 
Gandhi's fast," they declared at the Fourth International in March, 1943, "is to be found in 
one of the passages of his letters to the Viceroy.  In it Gandhi refers to 'the privation of 
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the poor millions, due to the India-wide scarcity.'"124  At a time when, "food shortages 
and inflationary price increases have brought a new stage of hunger to the hundreds of 
millions who have always known hunger," Gandhi's fast, the authors suggested, was "a 
protest against... steadily worsening conditions of life."125  The Communist Party's organ 
in Bengal, Janayuddha, also featured prominent stories on the fast.  One such article, 
under the headline "Gandhiji Fasts for the Hungry," began, "in a small town in Rajshahi 
sub-division, a boat carrying away paddy was looted by a crowd.  The police fired upon 
the looters and several were killed.  The starving villagers clamored for rice and instead 
they got bullets."126
It was, however, the American press which was of primary concern to the 
Government of India.  Roosevelt's envoy, William Phillips, expressed grave anxiety over 
the possibility of Gandhi's death in detention.
  The article then went on to translate Gandhi's message of fasting for 
the "poor millions" into Bengali.  
127  Linlithgow, abandoning his earlier 
jurisdictional jealousy, informed Phillips, in no uncertain terms, that he was, at present, a 
"war Viceroy," and that every decision made regarding Gandhi's fast was being made 
from London and in relation to securing overall Allied victory. As such, Phillips needed 
to convey to the U.S. Government that it should address its appeals not to the 
Government of India, but to the British Ambassador to the United States in Washington 
or the Foreign Office in London.128  The situation with Phillips and the Americans, he 
told Amery, was becoming "intolerable."129  Amery suspected that two women were 
behind all the anxiety over Gandhiji: Eleanor Roosevelt and Madame Chiang Kai-
shek.130  The Secretary of State sent a stern telegram to Washington reiterating 
Linlithgow's request that all input from the U.S. regarding the "Indian situation" should 
be directed towards H.M.G. in London.131
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On the 21st of February Gandhi suffered what the Surgeon-General termed a 
seizure, and his "pulse became nearly imperceptible."132  The Viceroy had already written 
Gandhi's obituary, made plans for the disposal of his ashes, and broadcast policy on half-
masting of flags (negative), and so felt confident that preparations were "well in hand."133 
Later in the day, however, Gandhi had recovered somewhat and was able to ingest fluids. 
On the 22nd Gandhi remained stable and the doctors "looked less worried."134  The 
doctors' bulletin of the following day was, likewise, encouraging. The Viceroy was 
pleased with the news, but still cautious.  On the 23rd, Horace Alexander of the Friends' 
Ambulance Unit - in India to aid with cyclone relief work in Midnapore - visited the 
Mahatma.  Gandhi and Alexander were friends and as such the conversation was cordial.  
Alexander asked Gandhi what he would do if he was released and Gandhi replied that "he 
would naturally deal with all forces of violence in the way that he knows, and he would 
also naturally plunge into the task of bringing relief to those who are suffering from the 
present scarcity of food and other necessities."135  The following day doctors reported 
another "slight improvement," and on the 25th Linlithgow received intelligence that G.D. 
Birla had received a telephone message from Gandhi's doctors in Poona that the Mahatma 
was out of danger.136  Hearing of the likelihood of Gandhi's survival, Winston Churchill 
sent a cable to the Viceroy to convey his suspicions about the "bona fides of Gandhi's 
fast."137  The Prime Minister urged the Viceroy to search out and expose any evidence of 
"fraud."  "With all these Congress Hindu doctors around him," Churchill maintained, "it 
is quite easy to slip glucose or other nourishment into his food."138
As it became increasingly apparent, over the next several days, that Gandhi would 
survive his hunger-strike, Government in both Delhi and London became increasingly 
jubilant - as well as increasingly denigrating.  Linlithgow responded to Churchill that he 
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successful humbug," and would not be surprised if the whole affair was revealed to be 
just another act of "Hindu hocus pocus."140  Churchill wrote to Field Marshall Smuts that 
he imagined that Gandhi had "been eating better meals than I have for the last week."141  
On the 28th Churchill again wrote to the Viceroy "that the old rascal [would] emerge all 
the better from his so-called fast."142  He praised Linlithgow's fortitude and highly 
recommended the "weapon of ridicule" to further deflate Britain's foe now that he was 
likely to survive.  Linlithgow, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of State for India, "We have 
exposed the light of Asia - Wardha version - for the fraud it undoubtedly is; blue glass 
with a tallow candle behind it!!"143 Amery joined in the fun, calling Gandhi a "wooly 
pacifist, (a) simple... life preacher with no ideas of any particular distinction who has 
combined a reputation for holiness most successfully with a political dictatorship 
exercised in a wrecking and negative sense."144  "Hindu India," he rankled on, would be 
"immensely relieved that the old fraud's precious life is spared," but, on the whole, 
Gandhi's "antics" had amounted to nothing.145
On March 3rd, 1943 Gandhi broke his fast.  He remained in prison for another 14 
months - as India starved.    
   
 
De-Control 
  On February 16th, the day before Food Member Nalini Sarkar resigned from the 
Executive Council, the Government of India sent provincial authorities a memorandum 
ordering them to fix strict targets for procurement of foodgrains.  Official purchases in 
Bengal were faltering, with competition from industrial firms, the military and 
speculators, meanwhile, driving prices still higher.  On the 18th the Bengal Government 
abandoned the agency system, and Food Grains Purchasing Officer, A.A. McInnes, was 
made sole purchaser for the government.146
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of government appointed private agents were maintained, and export restrictions 
continued.  Meanwhile, police officers were stationed at all points of entry into Calcutta 
to assure that rice was moving only to approved locations.147 The aim initially had been 
to "break the market"148 in the city by dumping large quantities of rice on open markets, 
but by this point all shipments were heading directly to large factories and control shops, 
without regard to open market prices.149  Secret conferences between the Civil Supply 
Department and "priority" purchasers were held to facilitate their procurement efforts, 
and again, with government sanction and collusion, tea gardens and other large 
employers continued buying in bulk on their own accounts, laying in as much as one 
year's stock to keep their operations running smoothly.150
 Given the nexus between different chambers of commerce, war-production 
industries, the Port Trust, the big railways, and government agencies, including the Civil 
Supplies Department, the Legislative Assembly, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and 
a panoply of district officers; the actual extent of "Government" purchasing in Bengal 
during the entire period, as has been mentioned, is extremely difficult to assess, but the 
official numbers continued to disappoint Pinnell. On the 11th of March, therefore, the 
Government of Bengal took another drastic step and decided to abrogate price control 
entirely.  "The Bengal Government," the order read, "in full accord with the Government 
of India, adhere to a policy of buying as much rice and paddy as possible by free market 
operations in order to secure the best use of the resources of the province."
  
151 Towards 
this end, it was announced, "The Bengal Government declare categorically that there is 
and will be no statutory maximum price for wholesale transactions in paddy and rice."152 
In some definite sense the black-market had won out and was now receiving official 
sanction. McInnes and the Government of Bengal were now able to report large scale 
purchases of their own,153
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 and as prices began to rise still more precipitously, the stream 
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and though the same were intended to go to the Civil Supplies Department, they, in fact, 
went directly into the possession of the Chambers of Commerce.154  Within a little more 
than two weeks of the announcement of the abrogation of any and all price controls, the 
price of rice, already at more than twice its pre-war index rate in December of 1942, had 
doubled yet again.155 A few weeks later the Revenue Commissioner of Chittagong 
reported that "starvation [was] spreading from towns to villages," and test works would 
soon be opened. 156
The true impact of these events on the countryside, and particularly on the 
impoverished and terrorized poor, is impossible to fully appreciate. Scarcity, dislocation, 
war, governmental impunity, and, above all, hunger had created a situation which the 
term "panic" (often used in official accounts) fails to capture.  As prices continued to rise, 
and as the tactics employed by Government and big business alike became ever more 
desperate, many of Bengal's poor began to sell off their stocks of rice in order to secure 
hard currency in increasingly uncertain times. Cultivators in Khulna protested embargoes 
around the district that inhibited their access to markets where they could unload their 
crop,
 
157 and paddy growers in Bakargunj disposed of their rice to black-market agents 
that moved through the district in boats.158
 
  Rice or paddy, they knew, was not secure in 
their hands.  In the best of times, given the cycle of debt and repayment, they had little 
holding power.  With powerful forces attacking the market with seemingly limitless 
resources, and with prices sky-high, the temptation to sell became irresistible.  Who could 
say, after all, that their turn at physical dislocation from their land, or summary 
requisition, would not be next?  Cash, at least, would be portable.  But cash-in-hand, 
relative to the price of rice, was, meanwhile, becoming less and less relevant.  As such 
many villagers were in a worse position by early 1943 than they would have been even 
under normal circumstances - and help would be a long time coming. 
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With Sarkar's resignation, the Viceroy was now managing India's Food portfolio 
himself, though "without letting that to be publicly known."159 In Bengal, as well, there 
were secret happenings underway.  On the 16th of February the Viceroy informed his 
Secretary of State that a "tiresome" and "school-boyish" quarrel had erupted between the 
Chief Minister of Bengal, Fazlul Huq, and Provincial Governor, Jack Herbert.  Relations 
between the Governor and the Chief Minister had been strained to the breaking point at 
least since the time of "denial."  In his letter of August 2nd, 1942, Huq had detailed at 
length, the extent to which he believed the Governor had abrogated his authority on a 
number of fronts, including both rice and boat "denials," but had received no reply. In 
January of 1943, Huq had sent another letter to the Governor protesting the appointment 
of A.A. McInnes, a man who Huq knew "nothing about,"  to the post of Foodgrains 
Control Officer.  The duties attached to this office, the Chief Minister explained, he 
likewise knew nothing about.160  This habit of making critical appointments and plans 
without any consultation with the Ministry, Huq charged, had completely undermined the 
principles of "provincial autonomy."  The Governor, Huq added, was repeatedly acting as 
if "the Ministers must be completely eliminated and the Government carried on by you 
through the various Departments as if the constitution did not exist."161
Meanwhile, rumors, outrage and rancor about Government repression in the 
districts had been rife at least since the time of Hindu nationalist S.P. Mookerjee's 
resignation from the Assembly in November 1942. Since that time, Huq had been under 
increasing pressure from Mookerjee and his supporters to order an investigation into the 
alleged atrocities committed by officials in Midnapur to suppress the "Quit India" 
movement. The Governor was well aware of these murmurings, and in the first few 
weeks of 1943 was pressuring Huq and his cabinet to make an unequivocal statement 
distancing himself from the same.  The European Party and Huq's Muslim League 
opponents joined forces with the Governor to lobby for Huq's compliance.  Instead, on 
the 12th of February, Huq allowed S.P. Mookerjee to make a statement on the floor of the 
Assembly outlining the circumstances behind his resignation and detailing his 
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allegations.  The push for an investigation gained steam. Huq felt compelled to agree to 
debate the merits of an inquiry, and on the 15th announced this decision on the floor of 
the house - without consulting the Governor.  Now, a little more than one month after 
Huq's letter regarding the appointment of a Foodgrains Purchasing Officer, the tables 
were turned, and it was Herbert who felt that Huq was stepping on his authority.  
The Governor wrote a sharp letter to his Chief Minister, reminding him that the 
issue of an enquiry into atrocities in Midnapore "attract[ed] [his] special responsibilities" 
and was "undesirable," at best.162  Herbert ended his letter curtly, informing Huq that he 
"expected an explanation," in person, by the very next morning.  Huq failed to appear.  
Instead he responded in print that he "owed [Herbert] no explanation whatever," and 
issued a "mild warning that indecorous language such as has been used in your letter 
under reply should, in future, be avoided in any correspondence between the Governor 
and his Chief Minister."163  Huq went on to defend the right of the elected house to find 
in favor of establishing a committee of enquiry - a  decision which, he argued, most 
certainly did not "come within the purview of [Herbert's] special responsibilities."164 In 
the event that the Governor refused the establishment of such a committee, on the other 
hand, it would be the Legislature who would have "the right to expect sufficient 
explanation as to why a committee of enquiry [could not] be constituted."165
Herbert conveyed his dissatisfaction with Huq to the Viceroy, who, annoyed, 
proposed to let them "fight the battle themselves."
  
166  The budget session in the Bengal 
Legislative Assembly, however, had begun by early March and the acrimony between 
Huq and Herbert was complicating an already excruciating process.  Herbert, seeking to 
rid himself of the Chief Minister somehow, proposed to the Viceroy that Fazlul Huq 
would be an excellent choice to replace Azizul Huque as High Commissioner to India in 
London.  Once Huq was shipped off, Herbert maintained, he would be able to work 
Muslim League stalwart Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy into the chair of Chief Minister.167
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in Huq - or for that matter Herbert, who he asserted was the weakest of all his provincial 
Governors.168   Meanwhile the budget session ground on and the impasse of a fragmented 
Assembly wore on the Chief Minister, who suffered only luke-warm support from the 
European Party, and obstructionist opposition from the Muslim League.  Huq informed 
Herbert on the 26th of March that for the good of Bengal he would be willing to resign if 
that would facilitate the installation of an all-parties Ministry.169
 
  Herbert now saw his 
chance.  On the eve of the final budget vote, the Governor summoned the Chief Minister 
to his office where a letter of resignation was already waiting.  Huq initially refused to 
sign, but the Governor was persuasive.  He assured Huq that the letter would be used only 
in the interests of forming an all-parties Ministry.  He would keep it as evidence of Huq's 
goodwill to all parties, and use it only to lobby support for a coalition.  Huq, however 
naively, signed the letter.  The next morning his resignation was already a hot topic on 
the Assembly floor.  The budget session was adjourned and the Ministry fell.  On March 
31st Emergency Rule was declared in Bengal under Section 93 of the Defence of India 
rules and Governor John Herbert, himself, signed the budget into effect. 
The Scramble for Rice 
In the last week of March 1943, Japan launched daily air raids on the 24 Parganas 
just south of Calcutta.  It was reported that thousands of displaced residents of the district 
flooded into the city that same week: "their stomachs burning with hunger they arrived 
dazed and desperate, thinking that if they could just make it to Calcutta, they could find 
rice to eat... but when they reached Calcutta, their hopes were dashed.  They quickly 
realized that if many residents of the city themselves were unable to secure food supplies, 
what could they, as outsiders, expect?"170
With the sharp rise in the price of essential foodstuffs that had accompanied 
Government procurement schemes, labor actions, too, were again widespread.  The 
Communist Party, while in unequivocal support of the war effort, reported in its Bengali 
  Police drove them from street corners and 
crossroads, and in short order they disappeared into the eclectic chaos of wartime 
Calcutta.   
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weekly that, "even today, while the whole of Bengal is under threat, those working in 
factories that supply the arms and equipment necessary to defeat fascist advance, are 
without any arrangements as far as food supply."171 Factories were cutting rations and 
workers were responding with threats of walkouts and petitions for better guarantees of 
access to rice, increases in wages, and inflation-pegged dearness allowances.172  
Meanwhile, in the countryside, hunger marches, drawing thousands of participants, were 
held across the province.173  For reporting on the same, Janayuddha was fined 1500 
rupees by the Government of Bengal in April.174
 The Government of Bengal (and along with it, the various chambers of commerce 
and corporate concerns with which Government efforts coincided) were, likewise, 
increasingly restive about their own access to rice. With the Ministry disbanded and the 
Governor wielding emergency powers, the Civil Supplies Directorate, lead by I.C.S. 
officer L. G. Pinnell, was freed from accountability for the time being.  Decisions within 
the department during this period went largely un-recorded, with Civil Supplies officials 
holding oral discussions that left no documentation of deliberations.
   
175
Pinnell himself had argued staunchly for a further commitment to unrestricted 
"free trade."
 The policies that 
emerged from this period, however, left little doubt about where priorities lay.    
176  On April 23rd it was announced that all restrictions on river transport 
throughout the Bengal delta were to be removed in order to accelerate the movement of 
rice into Calcutta from the countryside. 177   Though the number of boats actually plying 
had been sharply reduced a year earlier by "denial," the extraction of rice from the 
countryside remained dependant on river transport, and as such Government gave the "all 
clear" - even while bombs were actually now falling across the province.  A week later 
another order was issued which removed all restrictions on the movement of rice between 
districts "except existing restrictions on exports from Calcutta [i.e. to districts] and the 
industrial area [i.e. to districts]."178
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contravention of the "Basic Plan," designed to eliminate competitive buying by 
establishing Central Government authority over inter-provincial purchasing. A letter was 
sent to the Government of India, that in Pinnell's words, "virtually demanded" the Bengal 
Government be given sanction to purchases outside the province.179
 Governor Herbert found this demand "admirable,"
  
180 but was less involved in the 
deliberations than his robust authority under Section 93 might suggest.  The spat with 
Huq and the unorthodox way that he had ousted the Chief Minister had not been received 
well in Delhi or London.  The explanations the Viceroy had received from Herbert, he 
wrote to the Secretary of State, had been riddled with "a good many inconsistencies," and 
Herbert's handling of the affair had depleted the Viceroy's already wavering confidence 
in the Governor.181 Linlithgow, dismayed as he was by Herbert's incompetence, however, 
understood his duty of "protecting [Herbert's] position and saving face."182 He hoped that 
Herbert might "get out of it more lightly than he might [have] for the Muslim League 
detest Huq, and their anxiety to discredit him will divert attention a little from the 
Governor."183  The Viceroy, himself, was eager to have the Muslim League (which he 
thought would be more "loyal") in power in Bengal, and now feared that Herbert's actions 
had complicated that eventuality.  "I must say," he wrote to Amery, "that the more I 
consider the handling of this business the more lighthearted and irresponsible it seems to 
me to have been.  And Herbert may very well, unless he is very lucky, find himself in a 
position in which [Muslim League leader] Nazimuddin is unable to get a Ministry 
together, while Huq is in a position to claim he has a working majority behind him."184  
Moreover, Linlithgow predicted, the installation of a Muslim League Ministry in such 
circumstances, cobbled together with support of the European Group and Scheduled 
Castes, was sure to inflame "Caste Hindu" opinion, resulting in "an active increase in 
communal tension with a possible reversion to terrorism" in a province on the front line 
at a critical juncture in the war.185
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 The Governor, having received a stern letter of reproof from Linlithgow, sent off 
a "personal apologia" to the Viceroy, and forged ahead with his efforts to boot-strap 
Nazimuddin into power.  On the 13th of April he called Nazimuddin to form a Ministry, 
which in composition was entirely antithetical to the promise of an all-parties coalition 
that he had made to Fazlul Huq.  In the 11 days that followed, a Ministry consisting 
largely of the Muslim League, the Bengal Legislative Scheduled Caste Party and the 
European Group was formed and ushered into office on the 24th of April.186
 On the same day that the Ministry was formed, opposition leaders addressed an ad 
hoc meeting in the Calcutta Town Hall.  Hindu Mahasabha President, and former Bengal 
Minister, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, issued a stark rebuke to the newly formed 
government.  "Sir Nazimuddin can never hope," he declared, "to serve Bengal at the head 
of a Ministry which is opposed by a strong section of Muslims and by the entire Hindu 
community.  The grave problems that confront us, specifically relating to food and 
internal security, imperatively demand unity of thought and action."
   The 
composition of the new Ministry, and the animosities that it entailed, confirmed the 
Viceroys forebodings about alienating caste Hindus.   All Muslim cabinet positions went 
to League members, and only token Hindus could be persuaded to participate. With the 
installation of a Muslim League dominated Ministry politics in Bengal became 
increasingly communal, and with starvation mounting across the province, the primary 
issue at stake from the inception of the League Ministry was the "food situation," which 
lent a certain elemental, and for many, existential, hue to the acrimonious political (and 
increasingly communal) relations that characterized the Muslim League Ministry.   
187
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with the Ministry.  The Governor had proceeded autocratically, making a mockery of 
provincial autonomy, and this had destabilizing the entire province.  Now that the crisis 
was starkly manifest, Huq demanded, the new Ministry had the responsibility to cope 
with the situation post-haste.  
 Nazimuddin himself was not unaware of the situation that faced his fledgling 
Ministry.  The Civil Supplies Directorate, managed by L.G. Pinnell, had become an 
independent Department of the Government of Bengal a little more than a week before 
Huq's resignation.  Upon forming his Ministry, Nazimuddin appointed Midnapur native, 
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, to the critical post of Minister of Civil Supplies.  
Suhrawardy was a seasoned politician, well versed in the rough and tumble of Bengal 
politics, who had a particularly colorful history of sparring with Fazlul Huq.  Now as 
Minister of Civil Supplies he addressed Huq's admonitions promptly.  He was well aware 
of the seriousness of the food crisis, he responded in a press note, but could assure the 
people of Bengal that a solution was in sight.  The high price of rice was the result of 
hoarding by stockists and cultivators alike, and had no relation to any actual shortage, or 
for that matter, governmental interference.  "If only the people had confidence in the 
future," he lamented, "if only they realized their duties to their more unfortunate 
neighbors, and if only the hoards in Bengal could be made mobile, the situation could be 
eased."188
I am determined to use all the powers of Government to see that prices are 
brought down and see that these hoards are disgorged...I am giving a chance to 
the people to do it voluntarily, while I perfect my plans to make them disgorge the 
hoards.  If they do not listen to my warning, let them not think that they can run 
their hoards underground or that they will be able to succeed in dissipating the 
hoards.
 He warned all "hoarders" to liquidate their stocks at once, or face drastic 
consequences.  He ended his statement with a threat: 
189
 
    
 Suhrawardy's position was, in fact, conspicuously resonant with that of the 
Government of India.  In December when anxieties about the food supply to Calcutta 
began running high, Linlithgow had written to Amery that "building up of large reserves 
by middle-class consumers and the tendency on the part of the small subsistence farmer 
to keep back more of his grain than usual for his own consumption," were primary factors 
                                                 
188 The Statesman, "Warning to Hoarders,"  May 8, 1943  
189 Ibid 
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inhibiting the increase of food supplies to Calcutta.190  In April of 1943, the Government 
of India's Regional Commissioner for Civil Supplies, Mr. Justice Braund, made a 
broadcast over All-India Radio addressing the food situation in similar words.  The crisis 
in Bengal, he assured listeners, was the result of consumers withholding rice from the 
market and keeping it out of the hands of Government.  "Both the cultivators and the 
householder desire to keep in hand or purchase more food than in normal times," and as a 
result "there is nervousness and panic which makes a man produce the very scarcity the 
he dreads."191
 
 No mention was made of industrial concerns. To these evils, Braund added 
"the creature who, for sheer greed, grabs and withholds from circulation the food of his 
fellowmen."  He failed to identify this last creature further, but in this instance, at least, 
the evidence seems to corroborate his assumptions. 
Abandoning the Basic Plan 
 Several previous works on the Bengal Famine have centered around availability 
of rice in Bengal during 1943, but the numbers used to determine how much rice was 
supposedly available to the market have failed to take into account the substantial 
indeterminacy of how much rice was removed or "frozen" by the big players. The actual 
extent of purchases made by Government, big business, military, semi-military and the 
various Chambers of Commerce, is, in fact, quite impossible to assess.  The big jute 
mills, textile mills, paper mills, engineering works, armament factories, and other private 
interests were never called on to release numbers for their procurements.  That they had 
continued heavy purchasing throughout the period under consideration, is a fact that was 
corroborated by several reliable witnesses at the Famine Enquiry Commission held in the 
summer of 1944.192
                                                 
190 T.O.P. Vol. III, Linlithgow to Amery, December 3, 1943.  
  Whatever the actual numbers, there can be little doubt that given 
their almost unlimited purchasing capacity (particularly in relation to the E.P.T., 
mentioned above), they were substantial.   
191 The Statesman, "Bengal's Food Supply," April 9, 1943 
192 The participants who identified ongoing large-scale purchases by big business concerns in Bengal, 
included (but are not limited to); Marwari Chamber of Commerce (p. 1443), Nalini Sarkar, ex-Food 
Member G.O.I. (p. 1138), Bengal Chamber of Commerce (p. 1406),  B.R. Sen, Secretary Revenue 
Department, G.O.B. (p. 441), L.G. Pinnell, Director of Civil Supplies, Bengal (p. 581), Nawab Habibullah 
Bahadur of Dacca, ex-Food Minister, G.O.B. (p. 914), The Marwari Relief Association (p. 1041), Bengal 
National Chamber of Commerce (p. 1084).  All pages numbers from Nanavati Papers. 
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The British Military did release their figures for purchases of certain foodstuffs 
for direct rations to their troops.  From Bengal markets, at the time, these purchases 
amounted to, per month:  617,712 pounds of beef, 274,221 pounds of fish, 375,890 
pounds of goat meat, 623,593 pounds of milk, 1,120,406 pounds of vegetable, 1,213,478 
pounds of potatoes, and 185,230 pounds of poultry.193  These numbers, however 
substantial they may be, do not include purchases made for private canteens, restaurants 
or hotels in and around army encampments, which flourished, particularly in Calcutta.  
They are also limited to British military purchases, at a time when American military 
engagement in the region was growing, and American soldiers began extensive 
participation in the black market.194  The high demand for ice by military personnel put a 
further strain on fish markets (which depended on ice for preservation during transport), 
thus denying a primary source of protein to middle-class residents of Bengal.  In some 
districts fishermen, already crippled by "boat denial" were forced to throw away as much 
as a third of their catch due to a lack of ice.195  The Railways were also purchasing "at 
any price," and had the additional advantage of the ability to move stocks effectively at a 
time when transportation was scarce and competition for the same was fierce.196  Both 
the Railways and Port Trust, it was later revealed, also made arrangements to purchase 
and move large quantities of rice on the behalf of third parties.197
Whatever the stocks in hand of industrial interests in Calcutta, the military and 
other "priority" purchasers, Government continued to worry that they were not enough.  
At the beginning of May it was decided by the Government of Bengal to abandon the 
permit system, and allow unrestricted purchasing without, as earlier noted, any price 
controls or restrictions on movement. In the second week of May, Azizul Huq, who had 
been named Food Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, following Linlithgow's 
own tenure, and Major General E. Wood, Secretary of the Food Department, Government 
of India, visited Calcutta and met with Suhrawardy in the Writers' Building.
 
198
                                                 
193 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Major-General F.H. Skinner, p. 941 
  The three 
men held a press conference afterwards and cited "psychological factors" as central to the 
194 See: Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Major-General F.H. Skinner, p. 939 
195 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of S.L. Hora, Director of Fisheries, Bengal.  p. 984 
196 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Representative of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce, p. 1446 
197 Ibid 
198 The Statesman, "Food Situation in Bengal: Government of India's Assurance," May 14, 1943 
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food crisis in the province.  They urged cooperation of the public, politicians, and the 
press in order to "keep up morale."  Haque assured the people of Bengal that the 
Government of India was prepared to assist the provincial government at some future 
date, but, in the meantime, Bengal would need to "face the situation [on its own] in a 
spirit of courage and realism."199  Major-General Wood produced figures that showed 
that Bengal had at it's command more foodgrains than it had in 1939, and the 
Government of India proposed that provincial governments might collect their land 
revenues in kind, rather than in cash, in order to put more of that abundant rice into 
Government hands.200
The following day, the Civil Supplies Department seized large stocks of rice in 
Narayangunge, Dinajpur, Bankura, Pabna, and Barisal.
  Huseyn Suhrawardy reiterated his dismissal of Huq's contention 
that denial and exports had caused the crisis, and repeated that there was no shortage of 
foodgrains in Bengal.    
201  The merchants, all modest 
sized dealers, were reported to have been in breach of the Food Grains Control Order 
(which had been all but obliterated by "free trade"), having not properly declared their 
stocks.  Suhrawardy promised further action on this front in days to come.  Fazlul Huq, 
speaking at a meeting in Howrah's Town Hall the next day, noted that "each time Mr. 
Suhrawardy made a statement, food prices went up."202
                                                 
199 Ibid 
  Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, at the 
same meeting, agreed with Suhrawardy that hoarding was driving prices, but fingered the 
Government itself as the main culprit.  Professor Haricharan Ghosh of Calcutta 
University said that the statistical figures presented by the government the preceding day 
were inaccurate and unreliable. A resolution was passed calling for the immediate 
cessation of exports from Bengal, the import of stocks from surplus provinces, special 
transport arrangements for food grains, the establishment of an all-parties Food 
Committee, the immediate release of all Government stocks to the people, and the 
establishment of a rationing system for the entire population of Bengal.  Why these same 
proposals were not advanced while the petitioners themselves were in control of the 
200 The Statesman, "Problems of Food and Cloth Distribution," May 27, 1943 
201 The Statesman, "Atta to Replace Rice Rations,: May 15, 1943 
202 The Statesman, "Howrah Meeting," May 16, 1943 
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Ministry is not a mystery.  When they no longer had to placate pressures from the center, 
they were able to advocate the measures that cried out to be done. 
On May 18th the Government of India announced its own "free trade" policy. 
Heeding the demands made by the Government of Bengal, they abrogated the "Basic 
Plan," which had established Government of India control over inter-provincial trade in 
food grains.  All trade barriers between Bengal and its neighboring provinces of Bihar, 
Orissa, and Assam were abolished overnight, and as such the order effectively 
relinquished the last vestige of central authority (or accountability) over the food supply 
of India. The results of the order were predictable. "The introduction of free trade," as 
Famine Enquiry Commission found, "led immediately to the invasion of the provinces of 
Bihar, Orissa and Assam by a large army of purchasers from Bengal ."203  Conditions in 
Bengal were replicated in microcosm, as the mania to feed Calcutta destabilized large 
regions of the peripheral countryside.  Prices in Bihar and Orissa shot up immediately, 
while in Calcutta only a transitory dip in prices was registered.  The Government of Bihar 
lodged an angry protest.  "Bengal merchants or their agents," they charged, "went into the 
interior villages and offered fantastic prices, as a result of which the arrivals of supplies 
in local markets were extremely poor [and] prices fluctuated almost from hour to hour 
due to wild speculation."204  In Orissa the consequences were similar.  According to the 
provincial Government: "it was undoubtedly the greatest factor in causing high prices , 
hoarding and the un-availability of foodgrains to consumers in the later part of 1943."205
Two days after the inauguration of inter-provincial free trade, the Bengal Ministry 
announced that it had appointed a sole purchasing agent for the Government of Bengal: 
M. M. Ispahani Limited.  Both Mirza Ahem (M. A.) Ispahani and his brother and partner 
at Ispahani Limited, Mirza Abol Hassan (M. A. H.) Ispahani, were established members 
and staunch defenders of the All-India Muslim League, with intimate ties to its leader, 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah.  M. A. H. Ispahani and Jinnah carried on a long and genial 
 
In short, the Government of India's experiment had confirmed that the policies adopted in 
Bengal some months earlier, were just as "effective" everywhere. Meanwhile, growing 
provincial distrust only isolated Bengal further in its plight.   
                                                 
203 Report on Bengal, p. 50 
204 Ibid, p. 50 
205 Ibid, p. 51 
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correspondence throughout the period, with Ispahani reporting to Jinnah on the divisive, 
and at times fractious, workings of the provincial Bengal Muslim League.206  The firm 
itself, M. M. Ispahani Limited, was a well established trading company, with extensive 
connections to sub-agents and purchasers across the Eastern Region, which made it a 
valuable addition to Government's procurement plans.  The appointment of Ispahani, 
however, by a Muslim League controlled Ministry, with the rice situation rapidly 
deteriorating and starvation on the rise, was a move that greatly inflamed communal 
sentiment in Bengal and claims and counter claims about the Ispahanis' role in 
precipitating famine would circulate for many years to come.207 The Hindu Mahasabha 
met on May 21st and the 24th and excoriated the Government of Bengal's food policy, 
accusing the Ministry of "pro-Pakistan" activities, and again called for an all-Parties 
Committee to tackle the food situation.208  In conclusion a resolution was passed urging 
the government to make sanitary and feeding arrangements for the "thousands of men, 
women, and children coming from mofussil areas to control shops in Calcutta."209  With 
other supply concerns taking priority, however, the government instead began shortening 
the hours that control shops would operate.  Citing the "hardship" of waiting in long 
queues in the summer sun for rice at controlled prices, it was announced on May 27th 
that shops would remain closed in the afternoon forthwith.  In an addendum - as if 
incidental - it was noted: "it has also been decided to limit the sale of rice to one seer per 
head per day in the interest of maximum equity in distribution."210
"Equity," however, was again being prioritized.  A few days after its Press Note 
announcing restricted hours at control shops, the government released a second press note 
that it would be establishing one control shop in each approved market exclusively for 
"local people."  The aim was to "facilitate the obtaining of supplies by permanent 
residents of Calcutta."  Residency in Calcutta could be confirmed, the order outlined, by 
  
                                                 
206 Published as M. A. Jinnah - Ispahani Correspondence, 1936-1948 (Forward Publication: Karachi, 1976) 
207 By this time "denial" expert L. G. Pinnell had been transferred to Chittagong as Division Commissioner, 
and N. M. Ayyar, I.C.S., had been appointed Director of Civil Supplies, Bengal.  Ayyar revealed that the 
Government of Bengal was paying Ispahani between Rupees 16 and 20 per maund of rice, while prices in 
Bihar had been considerably lower. Intensive investigation by the Famine Enquiry Commission would 
largely exonerate Ispahani Limited, but the rumors of defalcation extend even to the present day. 
208 The Statesman, "Hindu Sabha Meeting," May 25, 2943 
209 Ibid 
210 The Statesman, "Distribution of Rice," May 27, 1943 
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presentation of an A.R.P. "enumeration" slip.   Both the A.R.P. and control shops, 
however, were thought by many, including Muslim League Ministers, to be Hindu 
enterprises.  The A.R.P., Fazlul Huq had also protested, was at least 95% Hindu, which 
was clearly the result of discriminatory recruiting policies.211
                                                 
211 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Fazlul Huq, p. 744 
  "Control shops," which 
were, in fact, private shops selling essential commodities supplied direct by the 
Department of Civil Supplies to the public at controlled rate, were also mostly Hindu 
owned.  These issues led to increasingly bitter communal relations, which would have 
disastrous consequences in the years to come.  In the meantime, conditions in the Bengal 
countryside were rapidly deteriorating and starvation was beginning to decimate the 
province.   
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 The period covered in the chapter to follow - May 1- December 5, 1943 - is often 
understood to define "The Bengal Famine."  In works on the famine, therefore, this 
period is typically prioritized.  As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, however, 
famine in Bengal was a far more protracted event than this periodization suggests.  Dire 
scarcity, hunger, disease, and, indeed, starvation, had been persistent realities in Bengal 
since at least 1940, and would continue to plague the province for several years to come. 
Above all it was the arrogance of power that led to the bracketing of famine in Bengal 
within the tight time-frame covered below.  This exercise at once justified the neglect of 
famine that preceded its begrudging official recognition in 1943, as well as valorizing the 
eventual relief efforts that were presumed to punctuate it.  Limiting the time-frame, in 
this way, limited blame.     
In my own effort to broaden the temporal frame of famine in Bengal, I will resist 
the impulse to sensationalize this particular period.  It is my aim, instead, to demonstrate 
that this period represents only an especially horrific phase in the continuum of colonial 
impunity, administrative dysfunction, and de-humanizing indifference that defined the 
final years of British rule in India. The ideological disposition of authority, even during 
this period of acute starvation, was, as before, deeply enmeshed in myopic concerns of 
"defense," "security," "law and order," and war-time "priority."  It is also a period during 
which capital profit continued to drive policy.  The chapter to follow will analyze this 
period in relation to these same and consistent objectives of empire. The starvation of 
millions of poor Bengalis, in this context, provides a foil against which the contours of 
colonialism can be viewed in better relief.  Though it is not my intention to advance a 
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counter-factual argument, one is forced to wonder, with Gandhi (and later Amartya 
Sen1
 
), to what extent a lack representative government and the denial of self-
determination were responsible for famine in Bengal.  
The Famine Enquiry Commission, even according to its conservative timeline, 
pegged May as the beginning of famine in Bengal; with increasing numbers of deaths 
from starvation being reported in Rangpur, Mymensingh, Bakargunj, Chittagong, 
Noakhali and Tippera districts.2  The May 23rd edition of Biplabi, from Midnapur, also 
recorded five deaths from starvation, eight cases of paddy looting, and a sharp rise in 
prices everywhere in the district.  "Driven by the pangs of hunger," it was reported 
further, "about 600 to 700 people [were] daily traveling by rail, mostly without tickets, 
from Mecheda and nearby stations in Tamluk police district to Orissa in the hopes of 
procuring rice at a cheaper rate."3 Those who came back empty handed were selling 
whatever possessions they still held and departing for Calcutta in "large numbers."4 On 
the 25th of May a hunger march, comprised of more than a thousand starving men, 
women and children, entered Tamluk from the surrounding villages.  The marchers were 
threatened by armed police and retreated empty handed.5  Several individuals, including 
Bankim Chandra Naskar, Upendra Nath Pradhan, and a ten year old son of Dharanidhar 
Roy, were reported to have died of starvation that same week.6  The writing was on the 
wall, the journal warned, "The situation in Chittagong is very insecure for the British, 
who probably have realized they will very quickly have to beat a retreat from Bengal 
with their tails curled under their bellies. It is for this reason that they are planning, we 
think, to decamp from this province with whatever booty they can loot - be it bits of straw 
or hay."7
                                                 
1 In his 1999 work, Development as Freedom,  noble prize winning economist Amartya Sen has famously 
argued "no famine ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy." (p.16)  This 
argument is resonant with Gandhi's assertion (included in chapter 3)that  famine in India could have been 
averted by a representative government in India. 
  
2 Report on Bengal, p. 112 
3 Biplabi, p. 197 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid, p. 209 
6 Ibid, p. 208 
7 Ibid 
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The circulation of such opinion was not entirely arbitrary.  In December of 1942 
British and Indian troops under Commander-in-Chief, Archibald Wavell, had launched a 
campaign to regain an Allied foothold in Burma, mounting an attack on the Arakan.8 The 
operation was launched in secret, but heavy troop movements through Calcutta to 
Bengal's border district of Chittagong belied a major offensive.9  It was less well known 
that Japanese troop reinforcements were creating havoc for Indo-British forces, and a 
lack of coordination, equipment and training, as well as malaria and other endemic 
diseases, were taking a sharp toll.  By the early spring morale was collapsing and the 
failure of the mission was imminent.10
Would the public in any war-theatre, we wondered, have been treated so stupidly?  
Could one imagine a fortnight's news-blackout in Britain about the ground-
fighting during the retreat from Dunkirk or, a year later, the withdrawals in Libya, 
Greece and Crete?  It wasn't as if Calcutta's inhabitants hadn't direct means of 
gleaning information.  'Security' there was always poor; often the city leaked like 
a sieve with military data of variable worth; and our own fighting men, Indian as 
well as British, were now streaming back through it.  Their comments on the 
handling of affairs, with ugly garblings and accretions, were of course widely 
repeated.
  Fearful as ever of how defeat would be received 
in India, a news black-out was imposed towards the end of March.  Word of yet another 
defeat at Japanese hands, however - only 300 miles from Calcutta - was not easily 
suppressed.  The denial of official information from the front only fostered what 
Statesman Editor Ian Stephens termed a "rumor-breeding silence" in Calcutta.  The 
demoralized return of another wave of defeated troops from the Burmese front fueled 
sentiment further.  Stephens and his staff at The Statesman could find no justification for 




On April 6th The Statesman published an editorial critical of the "officially 
created news-famine" on the Arakan campaign.12
                                                 
8 an area three hundred miles northwest of Rangoon and approximately equidistant from Calcutta. 
  Official silence in the face of an 
obvious defeat was only compounding popular anxiety, while official anxiety remained 
entrenched in denial.  A stop order was issued to block all circulation of the newspaper 
and the commander of the Arakan operation, General Irwin, held a press conference at 
9Stephens, p. 112 
10 Bayly and Harper, p. 274 
11Stephens,  p. 115-115 
12 The Statesman, "The Arakan Campaign," April 6, 1943 
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the military encampment in Barrackpore, just north of Calcutta, to rebuff suggestions of 
military bungling.  Disgruntled soldiers, however, continued to filter into Bengal, cursing 
the generals for the abject failure of the campaign.  Whatever slim local support Britain 
still had in Japanese-occupied Burma also collapsed.  And, even more alarmingly, Indian 
soldiers in the battle zone had deserted in numbers, with news of the re-organization of 
the Indian National Army, under the leadership of Bengali nationalist leader Subhash 
Chandra Bose, 13 eroding morale (and loyalty) further.14
 
  The suspicion of British 
intentions as far as Bengal was concerned - and as expressed in Biplabi - were surely 
widespread.  British troops were, again, returning from the front defeated and 
demoralized, reports of starvation were coming in from across Bengal, and Government 
had proven itself entirely incapable of taming the increasing scarcity that was blighting 
the province.   
Food Drive 
It was in this context that the Government of Bengal launched its province-wide 
Food Drive in June of 1943.  The idea of a "food drive" had been hatched in earlier oral 
consultations between the Government of India and the Government of Bengal, at which 
time the abandonment of the "Basic Plan" had also been agreed upon.  It was, 
furthermore, the fruit of the Muslim League Ministry's contention (shared by the 
Government of India) that there was no food shortage in Bengal, but that rural hoarding 
by cultivators was responsible for a crisis of price and supply.  The stated objectives of 
the Drive were: "to ascertain the actual statistical position, to locate hoards, to stimulate 
the flow of grain from agriculturalists to the markets, and to organize the distribution of 
local surpluses as loans or by sales to those who were in need of foodgrains."15
                                                 
13 The Indian National Army (I.N.A.) was an organization founded in 1942 by Mohan Singh.  Its ranks 
were comprised of Indian soldiers who had been captured by the Japanese in Malaya and Singapore.  
Disillusioned with their abandonment by Britain, they organized an irregular army with the goal of 
invading India from the east and joining with radical national forces to overthrow British rule in India. The 
I.N.A. was reorganized in early 1943 under the leadership of Subhash Chandra Bose.  Its message of 
militant resistance to colonial rule was broadcast over "Azad Hind Radio," which reached Calcutta over the 
airwaves, resulting in full knowledge and widespread support for the Indian National Army in Bengal.  By 
the end of the war, it was comprised of as many as 40,000 troops. 
  No 
mention was made of who, exactly, was "in need." To achieve the former objectives 
14 Bayly and Harper, p. 274 
15 Report on Bengal, p. 55 
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(enumeration, location and the movement of rice from the countryside to Calcutta) a 
militia of 8000 government employees, recruited from several governmental departments, 
was assembled under the authority of the Department of Civil Supplies.  In the districts, 
village organizations were set up according to the recommendations of Union Boards and 
authority was also delegated to selected, non-official residents of the community in ad 
hoc "food committees."  The Home and Civic Guards were enlisted to enforce "order," 
and the police, as well as the A.R.P., participated in urban areas outside Calcutta.16
The authority to requisition stocks was broad.  Any and all stocks of traders not 
licensed under the Foodgrains Control Order were to be confiscated.  Additionally, any 
stocks that were deemed to have been inaccurately declared under the same order, were, 
likewise, subject to requisitioning. More problematically, any trader, even with correctly 
declared stocks could have his license revoked if he was judged to be "withholding 
[stocks] from the market."
  
Calcutta itself was excluded.  
17 Exactly how such judgment would be made was left vague - 
presumably refusal to sell to Government or its agents would constitute "withholding 
from the market."  Once a trader's license was cancelled, his stocks would be 
"undeclared" and could be summarily seized.   In addition, any stocks held by either 
traders or agriculturalists could be requisitioned if in excess of a government decided 
maximum limit of 300 maunds.18  That traders, in particular, would be holding more than 
300 maunds would be nothing extraordinary.  But even stocks below this official limit 
were insecure.  District Officers, ultimately,  were given authority to requisition, 
regardless of the size of the holding, "whatever quantities they considered necessary," the 
only caveat being that they should leave enough behind to leave the stock-holder "self-
sufficient."19
                                                 
16 The use of the Home Guards, the A.R.P., and the Civic Guards presented nothing of a paradox to 
Government. That these forces, organized to deal with "enemy threat," were being used to monitor and 
manage the rice supply of Bengal, was in keeping with the rhetoric of "civil defence," that continued to 
mold all policy, and justify any means.  Question about the food supply, throughout the period, where 
enmeshed in the rhetoric of "defence," structuring the only "code" of famine that was ever invoked.  
 Given the breadth of these powers  - which essentially, even if variously, 
gave Food Drive officers authority to requisition any and all rice they decided it 
17 Report on Bengal, p. 56 
18 300 mds. = @ 10.5 tons, approximately enough to feed approximately one hundred people for six 
months. 
19 Report on Bengal, p. 56 
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"necessary" to appropriate - it is little surprise that distrust of the campaign was 
widespread.  
The exclusion of Calcutta and its industrial suburbs, in particular, was a feature 
that caused popular alarm and misgiving.  In the wake of a year that had included 
"denial," requisitioning (under various schemes), "free trade" (both provincial and 
regional), and, concurrently, continuous pressure from military, corporate and speculative 
purchasing - all in the name of feeding Calcutta - the suspicion that if there were large 
hoards anywhere, they were certainly to be found in the capital, was widespread. Though, 
as noted, the exact amount of rice that had already been transferred from the countryside 
to Calcutta is impossible to gauge, the popular impression was that it had been 
considerable. The exclusion of Calcutta from the Food Drive only tended to confirm this 
conviction.  The necessary early announcement of a plan on the scale now envisioned, 
moreover, presented large stockists throughout Bengal with the opportunity to shift their 
stores to Calcutta before the "drive" had begun in order to shelter their holdings and 
avoid confiscation.  This window of opportunity only added to the chaos as well as 
suspicion that accompanied the implementation of the Food Drive.20
Furthermore, though the rural population now had some experience with 
governmental penetration into the countryside - particularly one year earlier during 
"denial" - the administrative footprint in Bengal remained light, which presented other 
problems.  The Secretary of the Revenue Department, B. R. Sen, put in context the 
practical difficulties government faced during the Drive succinctly:  "The administrative 
machinery in Bengal," he told the Famine Enquiry Commission, "is weak.  It is a 
permanently settled area.  We have no revenue staff.  The Collector depends for 
information about agriculture mostly on his circle officers... unlike in ryotwari provinces, 
the District Officer has no grip over the agricultural situation in the district."
   
21
                                                 
20 According to the Report on Bengal  (pg. 57) the accusation of preemptive movements of "hoards" held 
outside Calcutta into the city after the announcement of the "food drive" was widespread.   
  This lack 
of contact with and official information about rural conditions, it might be noted, throws 
into question the charge of hoarding by cultivators that was the justification for the Food 
Drive.  It also goes some way towards explaining the panic and dismay that gripped the 
populations in the countryside when uniformed (and armed) Government officers 
21 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of B. R. Sen, p. 446 
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descended on the mofussil, yet again, in search of rice.  The government position was 
made only more complicated by the fact that the Union Boards, the most local branch of 
Provincial Government in rural Bengal, were notoriously rife with factionalism and 
corruption.22
In addition, and as L. G. Pinnell had found out during "denial," the environmental 
complexities, and the difficulties entailed by the same, were immense.  Pinnell, speaking 
of the difficulties he had encountered during "denial," estimated the topographical 
challenges of taking a proper inventory of rice in the region prohibitive: 
  Utilization of the Union Boards during the "food drive," therefore, was a 
further difficulty, both in terms of the coordination and perceived integrity of the 
campaign. 
There [are] no steam launches except one for the use of the district Magistrate in 
each district.  There are no mechanically propelled launches in the sub-division, 
and none in the thanas. You have sub-division which from north to south, taking 
inhabited portions, may be 50 or 60 miles long and your only means of getting 
about is a wooden boat which cannot travel against the tide. You can travel when 
the tide is in your favor, but you cannot when it is against you.  Similarly for 
police stations, which are composed of large areas; the same kind of transport is 
there.  The whole of this area is a network of tidal khal running between very big 
and dangerous rivers and your staff consists of the sub-divisional officer, perhaps 
a couple of Circle Officers for an area of 600 square miles, and a thana staff of a 
Sub-Inspector with perhaps one assistant for an area of - I would not like to say 
exactly.  Under such circumstances, to attempt to visit every village or send 
people to every village in a short period of time [is] quite impossible.23
 
  
Very little had changed in the year since Pinnell had undertaken to "deny" the 
countryside of rice, boats and all other modes of transportation along the 90,000 miles of 
Bengal's waterways, except the fact that more than half of the country boats that moved 
people and goods throughout the delta region had been withdrawn from service or 
destroyed during the same campaign.  And yet, now during the Food Drive, again, the 
government went off into the hinterland, with the objective of taking a "census" of some 
ten million homes (representing a population of 56 million) across the 84,000 villages of 
Bengal, in order to assess, and, as necessary - and with granted authority - confiscate, the 
rice supplies of the province and bring them to Calcutta.  The organizational difficulties 
                                                 
22 The evidence for this is rather anecdotal, but believable.  See for instance, the testimony of the Bengal 
Provincial Kisan Sabha (the most extensive, non-official organization in rural Bengal during the period) in 
Nanavati Papers, p. 148 
23 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of L. G. Pinnell, p. 547 
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of such a proposed course of action - which was scheduled to be executed in a few short 
weeks - were, indeed,  unimaginable.  But, in fact, there was only a very tenuous 
adherence to any sense of organization in actual practice.   
 The District Magistrates fortnightly report from Dinajpur, north of Calcutta, is 
revealing in this context:   
The drive was conducted under very many handicaps... the whole scheme had to 
be pushed through at break-neck speed... instructions [from Calcutta] given to 
squad workers were all in English and when one remembers that the average 
Primary Licensing Agent or clerk is not particularly qualified in 'English,' it will 
be appreciated that issue of such detailed instructions in English were not likely to 
be a very great insistence.24
 
 
And the confusion was indeed great. Boats moving rice from Assam into the front-line 
Chittagong Division were subject to "over zealous interference" from Food Drive 
workers and were forced to turn back.25  In the Bogra District of Rajshahi Division, 
"hoards were unearthed and about ten thousand maunds of rice and paddy were seized,"26  
but miscommunications, between Food Drive workers and Government officials created 
a very telling reversal.  After confiscation, "various quantities... had to be released 
subsequently on the representation of various Government Departments and District 
Officers that the seized stocks represented purchases on their behalf by their own 
dealers."27  Meanwhile, in the same district, the primary result of the campaign was "to 
drive out all hidden stocks to the exporting centers and railway stations where these were 
immediately snapped up by representatives of big dealers from outside, mainly from 
Calcutta, and promptly exported out of the district."28 In the Presidency Division, which 
included the non-excluded suburbs of Calcutta, the report read similarly.  Even the 
Additional Director of Civil Supplies, who was intimately involved in the operation, 
reported that the movement of stocks into the exempted Calcutta industrial area was 
widespread.29
 
  The fears of many rural Bengalis were thus confirmed. 
                                                 








 The question of what role the Food Drive played in exacerbating famine in 
Bengal, however, is tricky to answer.  By official account, the Food Drive had been a 
"success," but the recorded movement of rice to Calcutta during the period, according to 
the Famine Enquiry, had been unremarkable.  Official statistics, as in the case of "denial," 
and all subsequent schemes of appropriation, were, however, unreliable on a number of 
counts.  For one, the estimate of exports into Calcutta from the countryside were limited 
to those made by rail or river steamer.  The Enquiry Commission, supporting the 
contention that the Food Drive had created no unwarranted dislocation of rice, noted that 
"in view of the difficulties which were experienced with boat transport," it was unlikely 
that significant stocks had entered Calcutta by country boats.30 Assumably, the 
Commission is here referring to "boat denial" and the removal of some 46,000 country 
boats a year earlier.  As Pinnell testified, however, as many as 20,000 had evaded 
"denial" and were still plying.  With the removal of all restrictions on river transport in 
the days leading up to the Food Drive, it cannot be assumed that this traditional, and well 
developed method of foodgrains movement played no significant role in the transport of 
rice into Calcutta - as in the case of the 24 Parganas (which suffered heavy casualties 
from starvation in coming months), from where large quantities of rice were moved by 
exactly this means during the Drive.31
 Further complicating matters is that the extent of rice denied to the rural poor by 
the Food Drive and other appropriation schemes, cannot be quantified merely by citing 
figures of rice actually moved into Calcutta.  During the Food Drive, as well as during 
"denial" and other schemes, purchases by Government and industry were continuing 
apace.  With transportation facilities strained to the breaking point by military demand, 
however, the actual movement of large stocks of rice, and particularly rice paddy, into 
Calcutta was a constant problem.  Purchases made by Government and industry alike 
were often left with the seller for prolonged periods of time, pending transportation 
arrangements - and just as importantly, as a hedge against eventual need. Even during 
"denial," with the stated objective being the removal of rice from the coastal belt so that 
  
                                                 
30 Report on Bengal, p. 57 
31 WBSA Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for 2nd Half of June, 1943," file W-39/1943 
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(potential) Japanese invasion forces could not appropriate local resources, stocks of rice 
and paddy bought by Government agents were left at the site of purchase for many 
months.  As long as eight months after governmental purchase, in fact, much of the 
"denial" stock had not been actually transferred from buying areas. 32
Paddy, or unprocessed rice-in-the-husk, is the initial agricultural product of the 
rice plant. Rice for consumption is the product of milled paddy. In Bengal, at the time, 
only 17% of the paddy produced was processed in commercial rice mills.  The rest, as 
much as 83%, was processed locally by dhenki - a wooden, foot driven device consisting 
of a fulcrum and suspended weight that, with each pass, pounds the paddy, separating the 
rice from the husk and leaving the rice kernel to be sorted and air-dried for consumption. 
Because dhenki-milled  rice would only keep for two to three months due to high 
moisture content, it was of little value to Government or industrial interests, who where 
purchasing for future security.  In this sense, paddy processed by dhenki was "lost" to 
urban concerns, and fell into local consumption.  Unprocessed paddy, on the other hand, 
can be kept for two to three years before it deteriorates, and as such is optimal for storage 
against future scarcity.  The purchase of paddy, then, by governmental and commercial 
interests would effectively "bank" rice for future contingency, precluding it from local 
(dhenki)  processing and guaranteeing a long-term solution to supply uncertainties.  The 
movement of rice paddy, however, remained a chronic problem during this period, and, 
as such, much of the paddy that was purchased, throughout the period, remained at the 
site of purchase, awaiting transport to commercial mills. 
  This fact, which 
undoubtedly puts into question the entire premise of "denial," also demonstrates the 
difficulty of equating imports into Calcutta from the countryside with the actual quantity 
of rice and paddy bought up by corporate and governmental interests. While some 
statistics focusing on stocks actually held in storage facilities in Calcutta were revealed at 
the Famine Enquiry Commission, no evidence exists of quantities purchased by 
Government or big business.  Given the scope and intensity of consecutive schemes of 
appropriation, however, it is entirely reasonable to assume that far more rice and (perhaps 
more importantly) paddy was frozen from markets by Calcutta interests than has been 
previously taken into consideration.   
                                                 
32 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of D. L. Mazumdar, p. 523 
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Traditionally (and until the early months of 1942) paddy moved throughout 
Bengal, and, importantly, to rice mills and commercial markets, in relatively small 
quantities by a variety of means.  Paddy was purchased directly from growers by small 
traders who went door to door, and who, in turn, sold to larger traders in the region, or 
directly to rice mills themselves.  "In most cases," the Bengal Rice Mils Association 
explained to the Famine Enquiry Commission, "transport [was] arranged by the trade and 
a very large number of people and paddy transport vehicles (boats, carts, lorries, etc.) 
[were] used by scores of thousands of traders for such transport."33  The relationships 
between the scores of thousands of traders with the many millions of rice producers in 
Bengal were complicated, often involving credit relations based on trust and tradition, 
and networks of capital based on familiarity and trans-regional patronage. The enactment 
of "denial," therefore, not only disrupted the transportation of paddy to markets by a 
reduction of country boats, but just as importantly created havoc in the existing market 
system by alienating and dislocating local traders.  These disruptions led to an almost 
wholesale breakdown in the traditional system of purchase and movement  of paddy, 
precipitating the "locking up of large quantities of paddy."34
With the network of country boats and other local means of transportation 
crippled, Government and commercial agents from Calcutta,  did turn to more "modern" 
means of transportation, which, however, also proved problematic.  Even the post-Pinnell 
Director of the Civil Supplies, H. S. Stevens, simply could not get railway officials to 
move paddy. "For a very long time," he testified, "the railway priority put an absolute ban 
on the movement of paddy into Calcutta... there was some sort of idea in their minds... 
that this paddy ought to be going by more convenient lines into deficit areas... they do not 
like this back-tracking, as they call it, of paddy into Calcutta."
 The amount of paddy 
"locked up" during the Food Drive, as well as during other schemes, is not known. 
35  The Government of 
India's Regional Commissioner for Civil Supplies explained further that because of its 
extra weight and bulk, railways refused to transport rice paddy throughout the war.36
                                                 
33 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p 178 
 
Even the Government of Bengal's sole purchasing agent during the Drive, Ispahani 
34 Ibid 
35 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of H.S.E. Stevens, p. 1187 
36 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Justice Braund, p. 994 
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Limited, was unable to move paddy out of the districts and had to leave large quantities 
with sellers pending transport.37
The problem of supplying paddy to commercial rice mills was particularly 
pernicious.  In this context the very interesting question can be asked: to what extent did 
a scarcity of commercially milled rice available to Calcutta interests contribute to famine 
in Bengal?  Much of the panic that fueled consecutive procurement schemes (which in 
turn completely destabilized markets) was, in fact, the result of an insufficient supply of 
commercially milled rice, in particular.  Though rice supplied by commercial mills, even 
under optimal conditions, accounted for less than 17% of the rice consumed in Bengal at 
the time,
     
38 Government and commercial interests were ultimately dependent on this rice 
to feed Calcutta.  Commercially milled rice, unlike dhenki-milled rice, which keeps for 
only two or three months, will keep for a year without significant deterioration.  It is also 
easier to store than paddy, can be more easily transported, and is, unlike paddy, ready for 
consumption.  Of the rice available on the "effective market" (the market traditionally 
open to commercial, non-local purchase) more than 50% was processed in commercial 
mills, and it was on this rice that Calcutta interests relied.  As such, rice mills remained 
central to all procurement schemes. There was, however, an acute dearth of rice mills in 
Bengal at the time, which significantly limited commercial capacity. In all of Bengal 
there were only 477 mills, (while in Madras, for example, with annual production of rice 
25% less than Bengal, there were as many as 3,500.39)   Moreover, many of the mills 
operating in Bengal were in a dilapidated condition, which hampered output further.40
Whether the existing mill infrastructure, even under normal conditions, could 
have coped with demand is doubtful.  Mill output during 1942 and 1943 was, however, 
 Of 
the 477 mills that were in Bengal, 350 were grouped in the area around Calcutta, while 
several districts had no mills at all.  Meanwhile, the industrial population of Calcutta had 
more than doubled since the beginning of war, straining an already weak mill capacity, 
and the operations of a thriving black market also precluded a substantial quantity of 
commercial milled rice from the legitimate market.    
                                                 
37 Nanavati paper, Testimony of H. S. E. Stevens, p. 1191 
38 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Justice Braund, p. 990 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid, 993 
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only 50% of normal, with some mills closing their doors altogether and others sharply 
reducing output in response to governmental heavy-handedness, particularly after 
Calcutta was bombed.41
 
  Had the mills continued to operate even at normal capacity, it is 
likely that Government could have simply "sat at their doors" (a phrase used by Regional 
Civil Supplies Commissioner, Justice Braund) and collected much of the rice they needed 
to supply the Chambers of Commerce and feed industrial Calcutta. Instead the animosity 
that was created between Government and mill owners (as well as their traditional 
suppliers) crippled mill output and alienated essential trade elements, which, in turn, 
created a sense of panic over the supply of milled rice to Calcutta. This led to yet another 
round of desperate measures aimed at procurement, under the guise of the Food Drive.  
Given the dysfunction of the commercial milling industry, and the lack of interest that 
government and big business had in dhenki-milled rice, it has to be assumed that large 
scale purchases of paddy were being made to create a hedge against the difficulties with 
milled rice.  If these factors are taken together, it can be ventured that the amount of 
"government" paddy laying in local storage facilities - even while Bengal starved - was 
undoubtedly large.   
Darkening Clouds 
 Popular opposition to the Food Drive was also putting a wrench in the works.  
Country boats moving rice from the fertile 24 Parganas to the south of Calcutta (a major 
supply line) were attacked and paddy looting was "frequent."42  To address this hazard, 
the District Magistrate "found it necessary to institute a convoy system for rice and paddy 
boats under armed police guard."43  To further discourage resistance to the government's 
scheme, collective fines were imposed on villages lining the main waterways.44  In the 
Rajshahi Division there were reports of "considerable opposition to the food census," and 
rumors spread that "Government were going to take all the rice away."45
                                                 
41 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Representative of the Bengal Rice Mills Association, p.  
  Such rumors 
were, in fact, circulating throughout Bengal, being reported from almost every district in 
the province.  In Mymensingh there was panic, with people not aware that they would be 
42 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for the 2nd Half of June, 1943," file w-39/1943 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid  
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allowed to keep any stocks at all.  The city of Dacca, meanwhile, "decided to announce 
itself by an outbreak of stabbings," which were reported to have stemmed from 
contentions related to the Drive.  Public suspicion only escalated further when it was 
announced on the 17th of June that Field-Marshall Archibald Wavell, then Commander-
in-Chief of Armed Forces in Asia, had been selected to replace Linlithgow as the next 
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.  Wavell had overseen the defeats in Malaya, 
Burma and Singapore, and he had only recently suffered yet another humiliating failure 
in the Arakan.  Now he would be the head of the Government of India.  With military 
presence already pervasive, and uniformed and armed agents beating the bushes for rice, 
the appointment of Wavell "[came] as a surprise to most people.  The average Indian 
regards it as the prelude to martial law."46
 But by this time a significant portion of the Bengal population was falling well 
below "average."  Millions of Bengal's poor were face to face with extinction, teetering 
on the edge of starvation, and, indeed, falling over the precipice in larger and larger 
numbers. An incidental result of the Food Drive, with its consequent penetration into 
otherwise isolated rural districts, was a (however reluctant) realization that Bengal was 
starving. The District Magistrate of Faridpur conveyed to Government that "the drive 
[had] disclosed a very alarming state of things."
   
47 The poor were in an "extremely serious 
position," and starvation was being widely reported48 In Bakargunj the Food Drive had 
discovered "very little rice," but, "several deaths from starvation [had] been reported, and 
there must have been many more."49  Test Works had been opened in Dacca Division and 
were drawing large numbers (the final indicator of famine according to the Bengal 
Famine Code),50  and information was received from Malda that the whole district was 
"on the verge of starvation."51
                                                 
46 Ibid 
  In Nadia and Murshidabad an urgent call for "emergent 
action to avoid starvation in many areas" was issued, and in Pabna fisherman were 
reported to be starving.  In Chittagong, meanwhile, famine was only continuing to grow 







the fortnight, but admitted that the number in the rural areas was surely much larger.  He 
emphasized his concern concisely: "I am referring literally to 'sectional famine'52 and not 
to metaphorical talk of starvation which there has been for some months past."53
The panic, despair and trepidation that the march of a uniformed and armed 
militia, going from door to door in search of rice, must have wrought in an already 
starving population is difficult to fathom, but one is indeed reminded of W.W. Hunter's 
description of the 1770 Bengal Famines in this context: 
  The 
question of how "metaphorical" talk of famine had been previously has already been 
addressed.  
The troops were marched from one famine-stricken part to another, the movement 
being represented to the king as made for his benefit; and so far from the English 
administration having laid in a sufficient stock of grain for the army at the 
commencement of the famine, the peasantry complained that the military wrung 
from them their last chance of subsistence.54
 
  
As conditions in Bengal continued to deteriorate, comparisons with 1770 were inevitable.  
The Bengali journal Masik Basumati reported that day by day the situation was 
deteriorating and within a short time the whole province would be turned into a 
graveyard. In 1770, they reminded their readers: 
as much as a third of Bengal had died of famine.  The East India Company itself 
had created that famine.  They paid the cultivators whatever trifling price they 
saw fit to pay, and took away all the crops and hoarded them jealously.  And if 
they sold any of it back, they sold it back at ten times what they bought it for.  
Whatever arrived by boat from other provinces, they snatched that up too, while 
the starving cultivators sold off even their seed crop to survive. But there were 
also employees of the East India Company itself who protested this unfair 
situation, and their highest officers were found guilty of their sins - what can we 
expect from our rulers today?55
 
 
On July 2nd Bengal Governor, John Herbert, sent an apologetic letter to the 
Viceroy to convey some inconvenient news.  "I am sorry to have to trouble you with so 
dismal a picture," he wrote, but "Bengal is rapidly approaching starvation."56
                                                 
52  a famine of regional scope 
  Reports of 
deaths were being received from all districts, and the situation, he informed the Viceroy, 
53  WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for the 2nd Half of June, 1943," file w-39/1943 
54 Hunter,  p. 39 
55 Masik Basumati, "Khadya Samasya" Ashar, 1350 (July 1943)  (translation mine) 
56 T.O.P. Volume IV, Herbert to Linlithgow, p. 44 
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"could only be described as alarming."57 Employing the only, ever operative "famine 
code," he warned that, "unless we can get in foodgrains on something like the scale 
originally promised, the law and order... situation will get out of hand."58 In the margins 
of Herbert's letter, Linlithgow jotted his own note: "I wonder how far he is right about the 
Bengal situation."59 Linlithgow had little confidence in Herbert.  Earlier that same day 
the Viceroy had sent off a letter of his own to the Governor, sharply reprimanding him 
for his handling of the Bengal Ministry and putting him on official notice.60  The two 
letters had probably crossed paths along the way between Calcutta and Delhi.  His later 
response to Herbert's telegram on the food situation was similarly terse; he congratulated 
the Governor on the "success" of the Food Drive, and noted that the volume of stocks 
seized during the drive had shown just "how much [rice was] in fact available." 61
The Government of India, however, soon followed with its own warning to 
London, noting that food scarcity was creating an imminent threat of "internal disorder 
and strain, which will involve calling on defensive services for assistance in connection 
with internal security and thereby distracting them from their main objective."
  
62  A 
warning from Delhi carried more weight than one from Calcutta. Legislators in London 
opposed to the conservative government started asking questions. On July 14th, Secretary 
of State Leopold Amery, made a statement in front of the House of Commons on the food 
situation in India - it was the first of many to come. Hardships were being felt, he 
admitted, but they were due primarily to hoarding by cultivators and increased 
consumption of food by Indians as the result of a rise in the standard of living.  Prompt 
action was being taken to remedy the situation, and in particular, he promised, all 
necessary measures were being adopted to keep Calcutta fed.63
The Bengal Legislative Assembly also met in July for its first session since 
Nazimuddin's ministry had been sworn in.  Fazlul Huq addressed the floor with a long 
  Meanwhile, he began to 
prepare a statement on the "food situation" for the War Cabinet renewing his request for 
imports, knowing that his assurances were rather hollow. 
                                                 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid, p. 45 
60 T.O.P. Volume IV, Linlithgow to Herbert, p. 41 
61 Ibid, p. 45 
62 T.O.P. Volume IV, Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State, p. 77 
63 The Statesman, "Indian Food Situation," July 15, 1943 
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statement focusing on the injustices done to his ministry by Governor Herbert and the 
circumstances that led to his ouster.  He concluded with a stark warning to the present 
ministry, admonishing them to address, at once, the "serious questions effecting not 
merely the welfare, but even the existence of 60 million of the people of [the] 
province."64  The food situation had "degenerated to such an alarming extent," he warned, 
"that famine conditions, which are now raging in Bengal, are unprecedented in the annals 
of [the] province."65 All indicators, he added, suggested that the famine facing Bengal 
would be even worse than "the great famine of 1770 A.D."66  Civil Supplies Minister, 
H.S. Suhrawardy followed Huq and touted the new ministry's policy, particularly the 
Food Drive, which, he said, had "restored the confidence of the poor and... transferred the 
panic to the hoarders."67  The numbers of the drive were difficult to estimate, he 
admitted, but somewhere in the neighborhood of 300,000 tons of rice had been 
appropriated and "redistributed."  To whom they had been redistributed was, however, a 
matter of debate. The first of a projected 800 Government run "control shops" had 
opened, but the scheme was far from operational on any large scale.68  Fazlul Huq had 
other ideas about where the rice was going, "it is true that millions are starving," he jibed 
at a public meeting, "but there can be no doubt that the food situation has improved a 
thousand-fold within the last three months - in the homes of certain personages.  Sir 
Nazimuddin is, therefore, partially correct."69
A censure motion was brought to the floor of the Assembly on July 14th, 
condemning the Ministry's response to the crisis and demanding that "Bengal should be 




  The motion was defeated along party lines after acrimonious 
debate, and animosities in the Legislature became only further entrenched. 
Last Ditch Denials 
Starvation, however and in any case, was undeniably on the rise throughout the 
province.  In The Statesman, it was reported on July 22nd that people were now dying in 
                                                 




68 The Statesman, "Food Shop Opened," July 3, 1943 
69 The Statesman, "Mr. Huq's Criticism," July 21, 1943 
70 The Statesman, "Food debate in Bengal Assembly," July 15, 1943 
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the streets of Calcutta.71  "What proportion of these," the author pondered, "consists of 
ordinarily diseased beggars, and what of half-starved waifs immigrant into the city owing 
to rural food shortage, comparatively prosperous citizens have no means of gauging."72  
A day earlier Herbert had written to Linlithgow that starvation was continuing to increase 
throughout the province and that "masses of beggars" where boarding trains without 
tickets in an effort to make it to urban centers in search of food.  Such waves of starving 
people, Herbert noted, were a "particular nuisance" to troops stationed in these same 
areas and - "apart from being unsanitary" - should be understood to constitute "a danger 
to security."73
The province was, indeed, falling into cataclysm.  Not only had rice markets all 
but dried up, but there were also acute shortages of sugar, kerosene, coal, and - with 
increasingly dire consequences - cloth, across Bengal. The poor were on the move by the 
millions, trudging through the monsoon rains, now half-naked, falling by the wayside and 
dying, or straggling into urban areas to beg for food and shelter.  In the Bhola subdivision 
of Barisal, for one, it was reported that hundreds of starving villagers were filling the 
streets of the town.  The District Magistrate, doubtful of the reports, arrived to inspect the 
scene himself, and watched three people die on the spot.
  
74
 Already there had also been outbreaks of cholera in Calcutta.
  
75  Though it has 
often been assumed that disease followed in the wake of famine, it would be more 
accurate to say that starvation and disease were constant companions throughout.  During 
the Food Drive, all of the public health staff of the province had been removed from their 
posts to participate in the "census."  "A glimpse of the mortality figures [attributed] to 
epidemic disease from July 1943," the Bengal Health Association later suggested, "will 
reveal how fatal it was to withdraw the staff from their legitimate task for that period."76  
In any case, the public health system was in shambles, under-organized, under-staffed 
and lacking in basic supplies.77
                                                 
71 The Statesman, "Intolerable," July 22, 1943 
  Public health workers could not contest with public 
health concerns in normal times, and these were not normal times.  Under-paid as they 
72 Ibid 
73 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Herbert to Linlithgow, July 21, 1943. 
74 Famines in Bengal, p. 97-98 
75 Arani,  24 Ashar, 1350 (July 7, 1943) (translation mine) 
76 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Public Health Association, p. 236 
77 Ibid 
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were themselves, they were often enough struggling just to maintain their own 
subsistence. "[Government] could organize the vast A.R.P. organization [in Bengal] 
because they apprehended danger of bombing by the enemy," the Bengal Public Health 
Association noted,  "but they did not take the gravity of [public health] seriously."78  In 
all of Bengal, with a population of at least 60 million, there were 4000 doctors, with 
2,500 of those working in Calcutta.79  Meanwhile, even in Calcutta, sustenance for 
hungry children could not be organized, and already in July there were reports that 
infants were dying on the streets for want of milk.80
Other arrangements for the maintenance of "security" in Calcutta were, however, 
underway.  Complaints about the "filth" of the city had been making the rounds for many 
months.  With the war in Southeast Asia increasingly taking center stage, meanwhile, the 
international image of Calcutta was also gaining an increased diplomatic importance. 
Towards the end of July details of the scheme to round up Calcutta's "beggars" (which 
had been in the works since at least January
 
81) were finalized.  On July 30th, Governor 
Herbert promulgated the Bengal Vagrancy Ordinance of 1943.  The Ordinance, it was 
reported in The Statesman, "provide[d] for the police to arrest any person who appears to 
be a vagrant."82  Though no clear depiction of what a "vagrant" might look like was 
offered, begging in public was cited as a primary indicator.  The Ordinance, it was noted, 
was "[not] intended in practice to apply to persons who have only recently been reduced 
to begging by the abnormal rise in the cost of food,"  but no guidelines were suggested to 
determine the longevity of any given individual's beggary.83  Such judgments were left to 
the discretion of the police officer on the scene.  Once he was duly satisfied that the 
person he was dealing with was indeed a "vagrant," that person would be removed to a 
"receiving center where the vagrant [would] be medically examined and classified before 
being sent on to the appropriate Vagrants' Home."84
                                                 
78 Ibid, p. 239 
  Such facilities, however, were still 
under construction, and so a large warehouse building on the eastern outskirts of Calcutta 
79 Casey's Diaries, p. 43 
80 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bosepukur Relief Committee, p. 203 
81 See Chapter Three 




was commandeered as a temporary "home" for "vagrants."  It was intended "to put 1,000 
vagrants at once into this home."85
 But the numbers of "beggars" on the streets of Calcutta was rising rapidly - and 
would only continue to rise.  On the 4th of August, Secretary of State, Amery, presented 
his memorandum on the Indian "food situation" to the War Cabinet in London.  Heeding 
Linlithgow's increasingly dire warnings, Amery's memorandum was forceful and 
insistent:   
  
The Indian economy is being strained almost to the breaking point by the 
enormous demands laid upon it in its dual role as a source of supplies and of men 
for the Army, and a base for military operations.  The large sums of money which 
have had to be poured into the country, against which there have been no 
offsetting volume of imports, have created a serious inflationary situation, one of 
the manifestations of which is a tendency to hold commodities on the part of 
millions of producers scattered all over the vast countryside. India is essentially a 
primitive country with only a veneer of developed finance and industry, and the 
administrative system, although adequate for normal times, is a mere skeleton.86
 
 
Famine conditions, he noted, had already begun to appear and were spreading.  Such a 
state of affairs, Amery warned, could easily lead to, "a marked reduction in the 
production of munitions and supplies in India... with consequent detriment to the 
maintenance of the forces in, and drawing their supplies from, India."87  Furthermore, 
troops in the Indian Army, the Secretary of State cautioned, could easily fall prey to 
"subversive activities... if accompanied by reports from home that their families are 
starving."88
 The Cabinet agreed, instead, to a possible portion of 30,000 tons of wheat that 
was available in Australia, "some margin [of which] might be available for India after 
meeting whatever requirements for Ceylon and the Middle East might be judged 
necessary."
  In short, Amery concluded, operations in, and depending on, India would be 
seriously jeopardized if people began to starve on a still larger scale.  He asked the War 
Cabinet to accede to the Viceroy's request for the immediate shipment of 500,000 tons of 
foodgrains to avoid such eventualities.  
89
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  It also approved the shipment of 100,000 tons of barley from Iraq. Though 
86 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Document # 67 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid 
89 T.O.P. Vol. IV, "War Cabinet W.M. (43) 111th Conclusion," p. 155 
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lacking any statistics to substantiate the claim, the War Cabinet found that there was no 
"physical deficiency" in India, and that "hoarding" by cultivators was to blame.  They 
recommended a more vigorous propaganda campaign to dislodge hoards and more 
"attention" to the inflationary situation, finding, in conclusion, "that no further action 
should be decided on at the present time."90  Amery, feeling he had been merely "fobbed 
off with 100,000 tons of barley from Iraq,"91 was deeply frustrated.  Discussion had 
begun on the wrong foot, he wrote in his diary, "led off by [Minister of War Transport] 
Leathers, the Cabinet generally treated the matter as a bluff on India's part."92  More 
exasperating to the Secretary of State, however, had been the antagonism of Churchill's 
personal advisor, "The Professor,"  Lord Cherwell.  Cherwell held no official position in 
government, but had become ever-closer to Churchill, gaining the Prime Minister's 
almost dogged trust, and  advising him on any and every matter, from "Dehousing"93 in 
Germany, to sterling balances in South Asia.  Cherwell also had developed a statistical 
committee, and it has been suggested that by a complicated matrix of his own design, he 
was able to determine the status of a nation's food supply almost at the snap of his 
fingers.  In the War Cabinet's session Amery "fought hard" against the "nonsense talk by 
Professor Cherwell whom Winston drags in on every subject and who obviously knows 
nothing of economics, but, like Winston, hates India."94
The Viceroy, who had already delivered his farewell speech to the Assembly in 
Delhi a few days earlier, was dismayed by the news from London.  The quantity of 
imports suggested, he informed Amery, would do nothing at all to meet India's "essential 
demands."   As such, he continued, "I cannot be responsible for the stability of India 
now."
  Amery lost his case.   
95  Linlithgow was a tired man and wished for a better farewell.  The situation in 
Bengal, he reminded the Secretary of State, was spiraling out of control.  A few days 
earlier he had sent off yet another angry telegram to Governor Herbert.96
                                                 
90 Ibid 
  He had 
received reports, he scolded Herbert, that the streets of Calcutta had become a mess, with 
the "non-collection of refuse" going entirely unchecked.  Revenues in Bengal had been 
91 The Leo Amery' Diaries, p. 933 
92 Ibid 
93 Footnote on dehousing. 
94  The Leo Amery' Diaries, p. 933 
95 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 169 
96 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Linlithgow to Herbert, p. 164 
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flagging, and nothing was being done to collect more.  The "food problem," moreover, 
was being hopelessly mishandled.  Word had also reached Delhi that "Birla and the 
Marwaris" were opening relief canteens, upstaging Government's own weak efforts.  
What were the initiatives being taken by new Director of Civil Supplies, N. M. Ayyar, 
I.C.S., Linlithgow queried.  A rationing advisor, W. H. Kirby, would be sent from Delhi 
presently, he informed Herbert, to look into the situation. "You will understand," he 
concluded, "that I am far from happy about the present situation in Bengal."97
Herbert, shaken by the Viceroy's scolding tone, responded promptly.  The clean-
up of Calcutta, he promised, was underway.  Extra petrol had been sanctioned to the 
Calcutta Corporation so that its "conservancy" vehicles could ply twice a day, and in the 
same breath he assured the Governor General that, "under  the Bengal Vagrancy 
Ordinance, 359 beggars have been rounded up, and further action continues daily.  Many 
others have left the city fearing arrest, and these steps have brought about a welcome 
change for the better."
    
98  The Governor agreed with the Viceroy about the "necessity for 
additional taxation," and supported a doubling of the sales' tax, as well as the imposition 
of an additional agricultural tax.  As far as the Director of Civil Supplies went, Ayyar was 
doing a fair job, though, the Governor confessed, he "should have preferred a European 
officer for the post." 99  The arrangement of supplying charitable organizations, 
"including Birla and certain Marwaris," he also assured the Viceroy, was taking place 
under strict official supervision. (A few days later an order was passed barring any 
private organization from feeding more than 50 people a day in Calcutta.100
Special Rationing Advisor, Kirby, however, was meeting with considerable 
difficulties.  He had conferred with the Chief Minister, Nazimuddin, but had been sorely 
frustrated. "The general atmosphere in the minister's office," he later testified, "was so 
difficult that I had to tell [the Governor] that I could make no progress."
)  With Kirby 
now in Calcutta, Herbert added, a governmental rationing scheme would, of course, soon 
be organized.  
101
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  Kirby wanted 
to utilize the existing market structure to begin a rationing scheme at once, but the Chief 
98 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Herbert to Linlithgow, p. 166 
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Minister would not hear of it: "his attitude became so uncompromising," Kirby testified, 
"that I had to tell him on two occasions that we could not proceed further." Nazimuddin 
was dead set against the use of the private (mostly Hindu-owned) shops that were 
currently being operated as "control shops." If rationing was to be introduced it would be 
through Government shops, or nothing.  But the few Government shops that had been 
opened could do little to meet needs.  At the same time members of the Hindu 
community, arguing from expediency as well as self-interest, were lobbying hard for the 
use of private shops. The problem was, Kirby summarized, "that since 90% of the 
retailers in Calcutta were Hindus, the Minister very much wanted to encourage the 
Muslim trader [by utilizing Government shops], and [on the other hand, because] the staff 
that would be appointed to the Government shops would be mainly Muslim, there were 
strong protests from the Hindu trading community on that particular point."102
 
   
"Famine" 
Meanwhile Bengal was in freefall.  Dire reports of mass starvation were coming 
in from District Officers posted all over the province,103 and, much more alarmingly to 
the colonial state, the spectacle of famine could no longer be contained in the 
countryside.  Waves of starving villagers were accumulating on the streets of Calcutta 
and dying there in increasing numbers. On the 8th of August, Ian Stephens, Chief Editor 
of The Statesman, wrote and published a scathing editorial roundly condemning 
Government denial. "By mumbling that food shortage did not exist," Stephens charged, 
"they willed themselves into belief that the dread spectacle would vanish."104  But the 
scenes enacted on the streets of Calcutta were only becoming more spectacular.  Though 
the word "famine" itself had been banned from use, Stephens continued boldly, urging 
the Government of India to "take due cognizance of bitter realities in the war-threatened 
Eastern areas, where what may fairly be called famine prevails."105
                                                 
102 Ibid, p. 364 
  New Delhi took little 
notice to this first salvo.  Azizul Haque, the Government of India's Food Member, 
continued to defend central government efforts and returned the blame to provincial 
103 See Appendix VI, Report on Bengal, pp. 225-227 
104 The Statesman, "Plight of a Province," August 8, 1943 
105 Ibid 
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authorities, transportation problems, and environmental difficulties.106  Meanwhile on the 
16th and 17th of August, alone, 120 corpses (by official account) were collected from the 
streets of Calcutta, and many more bodies, in the final stages of starvation, were removed 
to government hospitals.107
Frustrated with the lack of response to earlier warnings, Ian Stephens took the 
courageous decision to publish a photo-spread of starving Bengalis on the streets of 
Calcutta.  Though any direct reference to the word "famine" was prohibited, the 
Emergency Rules were ambiguous regarding photographs. In a single afternoon a crew of 
photographers sent out by Stephens collected a shocking dossier of famine pictures, some 
so horrifying that the editor himself found them "utterly unpublishable."
 Then, on the 18th of August, official reports of corpse 
removal were suspended.     
108
The Bengal Famine, as it was soon to be known, had been announced to the world and 
could no longer be ignored.  By Monday, in Delhi, second-hand copies of the paper were 
selling at several times the new-stand price.
  Those that 
were a bit less appalling, were run in a photo-spread published in the Sunday edition of 
The Statesman on August 22, 1943 - and in some definite sense the event since referred 
to as the "Bengal Famine of 1943" was born. The Statesman, published both in New 
Delhi and Calcutta, was the most established and well-read newspaper in India.  It had a 
long history of editorial integrity and independence.  Though British owned, it was 
respected as a relatively objective source of information - particularly regarding eastern 
India - by Europeans and Indians alike.  Scraps with Government censors had been 
common throughout the war period, but, perhaps owing to a unique privilege associated 
with white ownership, the paper continued to push for greater editorial freedom without 
the same intense scrutiny which Indian newspapers had to endure.  The publication of 
famine photographs in August of 1943, however, was regarded by many as a singular act 
of journalistic courage and conscientiousness, without which many more lives would 
have surely been lost.  
109
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India, Chief Press Adviser, telephoned The Statesman office in Calcutta with indignant 
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reproaches.  The Emergency Rules, however, were indeed ambiguous about the 
publication of photographs, and so no immediate action could be taken.  Emboldened by 
the lack of penalty, Stephens prepared another photo-essay for the following Sunday, 
with an accompanying editorial, entitled "All-India Disgrace." In Calcutta alone, he 
wrote: 
Scores of persons collapsing from under-nourishment are daily picked up from 
the streets; recorded deaths from starvation cases in hospitals between August 16 
and August 29 were 143; 155 dead bodies are known to have been removed from 
public thoroughfares by the authorities' new Corpse Disposal Squad during the ten 
days ending on August 24; during the week ending August 21 mortality was 1,129 
as against and average of 574 in the corresponding weeks of the previous five 
years.  Cholera, epidemic since June, is again on the increase; there were 140 
cases and 74 deaths during the seven days ending on August 21.  Typhoid 
spreads; dysentery is exceptionally prevalent.110
 
   
But however bad conditions had become in Calcutta, Stephens continued, conditions in 
the mofussil were still much worse.  The editorial blamed famine on "the complacency 
and misjudgment, greed, myopia and political spite" of the ruling and commercial 
classes, both Indian and British, and coupled to it a "horrifying catalogue of 
administrative shortcomings."111
 A day before the second Statesman photo-essay came out, Bengal Governor, Jack 
Herbert, wrote to Governor-General Linlithgow that he was satisfied with the way things 
were shaping up in Bengal.  Despite "unhelpful tales of horror in the Press," he assured 
the Viceroy, "[Government could] claim to have made good progress with [its] plans and 
organization."
  Remedy, however, was, as of yet, a long way off. 
112 Arrangements for the use of A.R.P. evacuation centers on the outskirts 
of Calcutta for the "detention" of "beggars" had been made, and round-ups were 
continuing apace.  The use of the bamboo A.R.P. shelters, moreover, was preferable to 
earlier warehouse schemes because they could be easily "destroyed to prevent infection 
and rebuilt for their original purpose." 113
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  In addition, plans "for getting control" of the 
summer aus crop were almost complete.  Government "relief" centers, Herbert also 
informed Linlithgow, had gotten off the ground, and firm control of private relief 
operations had been established. The remaining problems, Herbert complained, were the 
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fault of political intrigue in the Ministry and sensational reports in the Press which were 
only designed to spread "despondency and panic." In a final note to the Viceroy, Herbert 
mentioned that he would be entering the hospital shortly to have his appendix removed 
and would be out of office for a few days. He never returned. 
 In any case, Linlithgow had never felt that Herbert had "carrie[d] the guns or 
[had] the intelligence to deal with that difficult province."114  The true severity of 
Herbert's illness (which was confirmed on his admission to the hospital) the Viceroy 
suggested to the Secretary of State, might "prove a blessing in disguise."115  However, he 
also warned, "there is a weak Civil Service; Indianization has further weakened a cadre 
not too good in any circumstances; the Ministry is not a strong one; the food position is 
critical; and a pretty firm hand and much experience will be called for."116
Discussions in the Council broke along communal lines, with Muslim members 
strongly opposed to deposing the Muslim League Ministry and Hindu Members arguing 
for just such an intervention.  The acrimony of the debate discouraged the Viceroy from 
proceeding along strictly constitutional lines.  Instead, he informed Amery, the path to 
Emergency Rule might be paved by more coercive means.  Accordingly the Central 
Government might : 
  Instead, the 
Governor of Bihar, Sir Thomas Rutherford, was drafted as a temporary replacement for 
Jack Herbert.  That Rutherford had no experience with Bengal, and, in fact, little 
executive experience in India whatsoever, may have contradicted the Viceroy's 
preference, but the emergent situation, now receiving increasing international attention, 
demanded expedient action.  Sir Thomas's appointment was signed by the King on the 
4th of September and he assumed office on the 6th.  At the same time, Linlithgow was 
pressing his Executive Council to declare a state of emergency in Bengal, dissolve the 
Ministry and grant the new interim Governor Emergency Rule in the province under 
Section 93 of the Defence of India Rules.   
impose requirements on Ministerial Government in Bengal of such a nature either 
(a) that no self respecting Government could or would carry on consistently with 
them since they would represent such an interference with that Government's 
responsibility [that it would be forced to resign]; or (b) that e.g. the Nazimuddin 
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Government would lose its Hindu supporters and might no longer have the 
requisite majority in the House.117
 
  
But this move would be time consuming and tricky, particularly as communal sentiment 
in Bengal was becoming increasingly embittered in the context of famine. In fact, and as 
the Viceroy noted to Amery, the entire issue of Bengal's "food situation" was rapidly 
entrenching communal sentiment even at the central governmental level.  The matter of 
suspending provincial government, then, had to be handled "with extreme care."118 In the 
meantime the Viceroy trusted to his new Governor the responsibility of getting Bengal 
"around the corner."119
But little was being done, either in Delhi or London to round off that long corner.  
Amery, heeding Linlithgow's increasingly strident concerns, pressed the War Cabinet 
again to consider immediate imports of food grains. In his initial discussion with Minister 
of War Transport, Lord Leathers, the Secretary of State was disheartened by the response.  
Leathers was unmoved by Amery's urgent appeal: the necessary shipping space simply 
could not be arranged.  With Field Marshall Wavell as the incoming Viceroy, however, 
efforts were made to enlist high ranking military officers to back the demand for imports.  
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Claude Auchinlek, convinced of the urgency 
of the situation, telegrammed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Alan 
Brooke, to recruit high-ranking support in London.  "So far as shipping is concerned," 
Auchinlek assured Brooke, "the import of food is to my mind just as if not more 
important than the imports of munitions."
 
120 The lack of any humanitarian language in 
Auchinlek's correspondence is no surprise.  The question of what famine would mean to 
the war effort was the only code with which famine had been discussed for some time 
now.  Brooke, together with the other Chiefs of Staff, presented a memorandum to the 
War Cabinet.  In it they warned that "unless the necessary steps are taken to rectify the 
[food] situation, the efficient prosecution of the war against Japan by forces based in 
India will be gravely jeopardized and may well prove impossible."121
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own report to the War Cabinet a few days later, urging, "the fact is to be faced that there 
are famine conditions in some Eastern Districts and that in Calcutta hundreds are dying of 
starvation." 122  The situation, he wrote, was grim: "the conditions so described are 
becoming a menace to supply operations and to the movement of troops.  The sight of 
famine conditions cannot but cause distress to the European troops..."123
The War Cabinet met two days later, and with Winston Churchill as Chair, 
decided against the Viceroy's request for at least 500,000 tons of imports.  Churchill, for 
his part, made the point that "the starvation of anyhow under-fed Bengalis is less serious 
than [that of] sturdy Greeks."
   
124   Of the 150,000 tons promised on August 4th, only 
30,000 tons of Australian wheat had, as of yet, reached India.  The 100,000 tons of barley 
promised from Iraq had also not yet been shipped.  At length the War Cabinet agreed to 
add an additional 50,000 tons of foodgrains which, together with the 120,000 tons 





In the countryside, as well as in Calcutta, the ravages of starvation and disease were 
becoming more and more horrific by the day.  At the point of starvation, a body does not 
simply wither up and die.  Rather, starvation is a complex battle of forces that excoriate, 
deform and eventually annihilate the bodies and minds that it is allowed to prey upon.  It 
is a humiliating, indecent and apocalyptic process of deterioration and eventual demise. 
The body becomes weakened to the point of complex breakdown, with organs failing one 
by one, a host of opportunistic diseases taking root, and madness often accompanying.  
But as the official Surgeon General's report on the Bengal Famine concluded, "[though] 
very few patients suffered from starvation alone... this does not mean, however, that 
starvation was not the predominant feature... and it was often starvation which was the 
ultimate cause of death."126
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dehydrated, with dry furred tongues, sores on lips, staring eyes, usually with... sores, or 
ulcers, frequently passing involuntary stools."127  Scabies was especially a problem, with 
as many as 90% of victims covered from head to toe in ulcerous sores. Acute edema of 
limbs was also a common factor, and anemia was universal. They wandered the streets, 
the Surgeon General wrote, "clad in filthy rags, and a peculiar body odor emanating from 
them was often noticed.  They were apathetic, oblivious of their surroundings or 
cleanliness and sometimes unconscious; the pulse was rapid and feeble, and temperature 
subnormal."128
Cloudy swelling of the liver and kidneys is a common finding.  Congestion of a 
marked degree is met with in sections of the lungs and the kidneys.  In addition, in 
some of the cases, the lung alveoli present evidence of exudate, chiefly composed 
of mononuclear cells.  The intestinal mucosa shows denudation of epithelium, 
particularly over the villi.  The villi themselves are implicated with mononuclear 
cells to an abnormal extent.  It appears that the cholesterol contents of the 
suprarenals diminish, as the usual vacuated appearance in the appearance of the 
cells of the cortex is not conspicuous.  Liver and spleen show evidence of 
congestion and in cases where malaria [is] consistent, deposits of haemozine 
pigments are also found in the cells of the reticula endothelial system.
  Meanwhile, within the body a battle to the death was raging. Even to a 
non-specialist unfamiliar with the anatomical terms below, the following description 




Malaria was, more often then not, present.  As were several other fevers, including kal-
azar and those associated with acute dysentery and several prevalent pulmonary diseases. 
A condition known as "famine diarrhea," which leads to an escalated pace of wasting and 
is extremely difficult to treat, was likewise endemic. Hookworms, round worms, and 
other intestinal parasites, also played their role in further devitalizing bodies.  Cholera, 
and - increasingly - smallpox, also found the famine-stricken exceedingly easy prey.  
How so many actually did survive such conditions is really a wonder of human 
endurance.  
 But human endurance has its limits.  Whether from the sheer horror of famine, or 
whether as a result of biological processes associated with famine (and most likely a 
combination of both), mental disorder and madness was yet another nagging and 
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widespread symptom of starvation. "One of the most distressing features of the famine," 
the Surgeon-General's office noted in retrospect, "was the mental attitude of the more 
advanced cases of starvation."130
The more desperate cases of hunger became childish in mind, wandering from 
place to place in search of food, ransacking rubbish heaps, and sometimes 
absconding from hospital where food and relative comfort and security were 
obtainable... these unfortunates seemed to be guided by an instinct compelling 
them to move on in fruitless and erratic attempts to find food.  Irritable and 
unreasonable, childish and apathetic, difficult to nurse and filthy in habit, the 
starving sometimes cried for food even when food was before them.  In one 
destitute hospital an emaciated man was observed to be crying and snarling like 
an animal.  He was sitting on a hospital bed with a brimming plate of rice and 
curry in front of him, making no attempt to eat.  Enquiries revealed that he was 
crying for food.  He could not realize that there was already ample food to eat in 
front of him and his instincts compelled him to cry for more and more food.  
Oblivious to his surroundings and more animal than human, emaciated, dry lips 
drawn back over decayed and septic teeth, coated tongue, uttering inhuman cries, 
filthy and scabrous, he represented the nadir of human misery and the epitome of 
famine.
  The report continues: 
131
 
      
A report by the Calcutta University Anthropology Department , released towards 
the end of September, confirmed the now starkly manifest disintegration of the entire 
social fabric of Bengal due to famine as well.  Across the province, a team of researchers 
had found, "husbands have driven away wives and wives have deserted ailing husbands; 
children have forsaken aged and disabled parents and parents have also left home in 
despair; brothers have turned deaf ears to the entreaties of hungry sisters, and widowed 
sisters, maintained for years together by their brothers, have departed at the time of direct 
need."132
One Bhogurdi Mandal of Lahapur, P.S. Nawabgunj, Malda, was charged under 
Sec. 302 I.P.C. for murdering his only son Mozaffar, aged about three years on 
September 16 on the ground of his inability to feed him and other members of the 
family, who, it is reported, had no food for 3 or 4 days.  The accused was tried by 
District and Sessions Judge, Malda, and was found guilty by the jurors.  He was 
sentenced to transportation for life but having regard to the tragic circumstances 
  In Malda a scene, the likes of which was becoming increasingly common by 
mid-September, was reported in the Amrita Bazar Patrika:  
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On the 12th of September an Assistant Inspector of Police in Faridpur was 
brutally murdered by a mob when he tried to enforce a new (and again, ad hoc) Control 
Order.134  The General Head-Quarters' own Weekly Intelligence Report had earlier 
confirmed that "cholera, small-pox and starvation are causing hundreds of deaths daily 
[in and around Dacca] and similar conditions prevail over a large area of East Bengal, 
and have given rise to widespread incidence of thefts and dacoities.  Suicides and child-
selling have also been reported."135
I would suggest to high-placed officials in Delhi, who deprecate the over-
dramatization of the sufferings of the people of Bengal to pay a visit to the 
province... at one of the kitchens in Faridpur I noticed a man lapping up gruel like 
a dog.  I saw abandoned children in the last stages of emaciation... a man vainly 
wandering for food collapsed on the doorsteps of the Collector's court room.  As 
the body was being removed, a woman huddled in a corner thrust out a bundle 
and cried "take that also."  It was her dead child...
  On the 15th of September the United States Council 




Throughout the countryside corpses were piling up too fast to count or properly 
dispose of.  In September, the District Relief Committee in Noakhali reported, "Men 
women and children are dying daily in great numbers, some on roads and at other public 
places.  Disposal of the dead bodies has become a problem with the living.  Sometimes 
dead bodies are thrown into the river instead of being properly buried or cremated."137 In 
Dacca, the Associated Press reported, "cremation of Hindu dead bodies has become quite 
a problem for want of fuel.  Dead bodies of destitute persons are often thrown into the 
river or buried."138
During the last fortnight there has not been a morning on which I have not seen, 
as I went out of the town on my jobs, dead bodies by the roadside.  A fight 
between vultures and dogs is not a rare sight... disposal of dead bodies has 
  In Midnapur a worker for the Friends' Ambulance Unit described the 
situation in mid-September vividly: 
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become a problem.  In the villages the affairs are worse; people are dying in large 
numbers of malaria and starvation.  There are not enough able-bodied men to burn 
the dead, which often are just pushed into the nearest canal.  If you go down the 
canal from Contai to Panipia, you will feel sick; for the bloated dead bodies you 





 The image of Calcutta, however, remained of critical importance.  The spectacle 
of famine could not continue to play out on center stage, and bodies could not be simply 
thrown into canals and ditches.  Calcutta was now one of the most important supply-
fronts in the entire Allied war effort, accounting for as much as 80% of the armament, 
textile and heavy machinery production used in the Asian theater.  Hundreds of thousands 
of Allied troops were moving through the city to the front, and returning there on leave, 
fueling a thriving "rest and recreation" industry that included dance halls, restaurants, 
bars, and a mushrooming prostitution industry. Huge profits were being made, both in 
war-related industries and entertainment, and the city was, in fact, more cosmopolitan 
than ever before. By 1943, Calcutta, in Ian Stephens words: 
was a great war-base... a vortex of humanity into which men doing war-jobs from 
all over the world, uniformed or not, were being sucked... American forces started 
arriving; and with their high living standards and total ignorance of India probably 
felt most alien of all.  There were Chinese troops, some 30,000 or so, who'd 
passed through the Bengal-Assam hills on their retreat from Burma... and Chinese 
merchant seaman, some thousands too... there were Australian, New Zealand, and 
Canadian Air Force types... [and] coal-black troops from West Africa under 
British officers... and, of course, masses of young men from Britain of every 
social class... and (also) Indians, mostly from the subcontinent's North-West or 
South and therefore feeling almost as foreign in Bengal as the so-called white 
men.140
 
    
Calcutta, in a definite sense was in the international spotlight.  Famine, and the associated 
accumulation of famine stricken bodies on the city's streets, came as a dreadful 
inconvenience. 
 The Bengal Vagrancy Ordinance of 1943 had made little progress.  Meanwhile, as 
conditions in the countryside continued to deteriorate, the influx of famished villagers 
into Calcutta only gained momentum. Bodies in the last stages of starvation were 
                                                 
139 Ibid, p.  
140 Stephens, p. 102-103 
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removed to government hospitals, but facilities to cope with the flood of famine victims 
were vastly inadequate. Emaciated individuals and families on the move lined the road-
ways of Bengal in their thousands and converged on the already over-burdened city, 
collapsing on street corners and by-lanes, filling the air with plaintive moans for food, 
and dying in increasing numbers. Slit trenches dug for air-raid shelter became festering 
gutters were malaria mosquitoes bred in unimpeded abundance, and meanwhile the 
A.R.P. had commandeered vast quantities of bleaching powder for decontamination after 
possible gas attacks, which might have otherwise been used to sanitize the trenches.141  
The A.R.P. air-raid shelters, which were being used now for famine relief, were likewise, 
filthy and ill-prepared.142  More than half of the tube wells sunk in 1941 for "emergency 
measures" were also out of order, and cholera was running rampant.143  Sweepers, 
amongst the lowest of the social groups in Bengal, were themselves unable to obtain 
sufficient food at the prevailing prices and were deserting from their posts in search of 
subsistence elsewhere.  Doms, the caste whose traditional role was the handling of 
corpses, were similarly (if ironically) rendered destitute, and were found to be in 
increasingly short supply.144
 Rutherford, on his arrival in Calcutta as the interim Governor, found the scenes in 
Calcutta "ghastly."  The removal of the dead, in particular, presented, a delicate problem. 
That there were so many corpses piling up in Britain's "second city" was a politically 
sensitive issue.  They represented a threat to "law and order."  Accordingly, the State 
itself assumed custodial authority over all corpses, and the police remained in 
"constructive possession" of the dead.
 And the number of corpses to be disposed of just kept rising.  
145
                                                 
141 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Col. E. Cotter, Public Health Commissioner, p. 386 
  Police officers, however, had little means to 
cope with the number of corpses which fell into their custody, and the bureaucratic 
necessities of disposal only further prolonged removal.  Towards the end of August, 
therefore, two private organizations, the Hindu Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul 
Islam, were contracted to dispose of corpses according to religious affiliation.  Hindu 
corpses were taken to the burning ghats and Muslim bodies were taken to the burial 
grounds.  How distinctions between "Hindus" and "Muslims" were made, given the 
142 The Statesman, "Corporation and Starvation," September 10, 1943 
143 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of D. Fraser, Inspector of Medical Services, p. 498 
144 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Calcutta Relief Committee, p. 69 
145 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, p. 198 
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abject condition of the bodies at the time of death, however, is extremely difficult to 
comprehend.146
Whatever the arrangements, delays in the disposal of corpses continued with 
unsightly and unsanitary consequences: rotting corpses on the streets of Calcutta 
continued to undermine "morale."  Moreover, the official publication of the numbers of 
famine victims dying on the streets of Calcutta (however inaccurate
  Though in life these victims had been deprived of the barest means of 
survival or dignity - stripped of all local affiliation, dispossessed of all lands and 
possessions, and, indeed, due to the prevailing scarcity of cloth, all but naked, if not 
wholly so - in death they were still "Hindu" or "Muslim."  All that was left of the dead, at 
least by official account then, was this one, assumably inextinguishable, marker.   
147) was extremely 
bad PR for the colonial government, particularly during wartime.  Since The Statesman 
had published its pictures, "The Bengal Famine" had become an international news story.  
Corpses in Calcutta were easy fodder for the media frenzy.  On the 9th of September, 
therefore, the government decided to withhold official death statistics from the press.  
Such statistics, the central government argued, could serve no particular purpose, and 
furthermore, in the midst of an acute paper shortage, newspapers might, indeed, 
"welcome" the suppression of statistics as an opportunity to save space on their front 
pages for more important stories.148
                                                 
146 Most of the "destitutes" were, at this point, wholly or partially naked.  For adult males, circumcision 
may have been an indicator, but for women, and small children, it is difficult to understand how 
distinctions were made. 
  Due to quick protest from the press, however, the 
order to withhold famine statistics was repealed after only two days. The statistics 
reported after the stop-order, however, were of a different kind.  The word "starvation" 
had been removed, and the term "sick destitutes" was substituted.  The number of "sick 
destitutes" who had died on the streets of Calcutta was accompanied by an appendix that 
assigned various causes of death to the corpses collected.  Most of the deaths, in these 
147 In its daily publication of the official statistics The Statesman noted that there was a conspicuous 
"uncertainty" regarding the official numbers, which (ostensibly) accounted for bodies disposed of by the 
Police Corpse Disposal Squad, and the two private organizations.  The A.R.P. was also disposing of bodies 
at the time, and these numbers were not included, nor is there any record of how corpses collected by the 
A.R.P. were disposed of.  Given that the government had every reason to underestimate the number of 
corpses collected from the streets of Calcutta, it is fairly safe to assume that the actual deaths in the city 
were considerably higher than reported. 
148 The Statesman, "Lessons in Secrecy," September 14, 1943 
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new reports, were euphemistically attributed to "chronic ailments, neglected in the 
past."149
Those still living on the streets of Calcutta posed an even more complicated problem.  
Despite his efforts, Rutherford admitted to the Viceroy on the 23rd of September that 
little progress had been made in "forcibly removing" destitute immigrants from the streets 
of Calcutta, due, he said "to preoccupation with [the] Assembly which was a riot 
yesterday."
 This, presumably, did not mean hunger. 
150 The "riot" in the Assembly, predictably, revolved around relief measures, 
Ispahani's purchasing, and charges that the "opposition" was intentionally creating panic 
in rice markets.  The budget debate was stalled and walk-outs and shouting matches 
continued for the next several days.  Rutherford, frustrated with the antics in the 
Assembly, was pressing for emergency powers to circumvent their authority.  A separate 
Relief Commissioner was appointed, and the task of "cleaning up" Calcutta was given top 
priority.  On the 28th of September, the Bengal Council (Governor's advisory committee) 
passed yet another Vagrants Bill, giving Government sweeping powers to round up "sick 
destitutes" in Calcutta.  The Council further urged that the A.R.P. and Civic Guards be 
used energetically in the campaign.151  In a related effort, Mr. O.M. Martin, I.C.S., the 
newly appointed Relief Commissioner, issued an appeal to "legitimate" residents of 
Calcutta on October 1st, requesting them to "refrain from indiscriminate charity" that 
would only encourage the "sick destitutes."  Poor houses outside the city, he assured 
Calcuttans, were being rushed into operation, and relief kitchens in the city, in the 
meantime, were sufficient.  "These unfortunates," Martin suggested, "are now more in 
want of shelter than food... As poor houses are established, one after another", he added, 
"it will be advisable to curtail the number of food kitchens so that vagrants may become 
accustomed to look for relief in the poor houses rather than in other places."152
In other places, however, famine deaths were becoming too numerous to properly 




                                                 
149 Ibid 
  Rice had all but vanished from local markets, and villages in 
150 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Rutherford to Linlithgow (in Linlithgow to Amery), p. 316 
151 The Statesman, Bengal Council Passes Vagrants Bill," September 29, 1943 
152 Ibid 
153 See T.O.P. Vol. IV, Enclosure to No. 180, p. 399 
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many districts had already become hollowed out by famine. On the 1st of October the 
Associated Press reported from a village in the Dacca Division: 
An unclaimed dead body of a Hindu boy of about 12 years partly devoured by 
jackals and vultures was found yesterday morning lying in front of the 
Government Grain Shop near Chashara Police Outpost at Narayangunj.  It is 
suspected that the boy was molested by jackals and vultures in the preceding night 
when he was in a precarious condition owing to starvation.154
 
 
In Burdwan a similar scene was reported by the united Press, "the dead body of a 
famished man was found almost entirely eaten up by vultures and lying by the side of 
Banisagar tank... the body was removed by police to the burning ghat."155  In Faridpur, 
the new District Magistrate, F. A. Karim, had arrived to find the streets "absolutely 
choked with famine-stricken people."  On one street corner an old man had collapsed.  
Karim approached and looked into the man's glazed eyes sadly, while all around him 
"people were laughing and saying 'The old fellow is dying! The old fellow is dying!'"156  
Death had become a public spectacle, and little more. Biplabi reported from Midnapur 
that on October 10th "a man driven by hunger was eating foodgrains scattered along the 
railway track... seeing this members of the railway police started pelting him with stones.  
The man started running and fell into a ditch alongside the track where he died."157
 
 
Round-ups and Resistance 
 Meanwhile, by the beginning of October, Viceroy Linlithgow was making 
preparation for his departure from Delhi after his seven and a half year tenure as 
Governor-General of India.  In a desultory report to Amery on October 14th he looked 
forward to seeing the Secretary of State in person in London.  "Then... I shall not propose 
to weary you," he wrote, "with arguments or representations on any aspect of the Indian 
problem; for I shall be functus,158 and it will be for my successor to carry the burden.  But 
broadly speaking, I can feel as I lay down this great charge that I leave the country in 
pretty good trim."159
                                                 
154 K.C. Ghosh, p. 86-7 
  Secretary of State Amery, for his part, was still in the hot seat.  On 
155 Ibid, p. 91 
156 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of F.A. Karim, p. 1375 
157 Biplabi, p. 297 
158 functus officio: finished with official duty 
159 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 349 
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the 14th of October he appeared before the British Parliament and estimated that as many 
as 1,000 people were dying a week in Bengal (including Calcutta.)  This absurdly low 
figure drew rapid fire from the Indian and international press alike.  The Statesman wrote 
that "the Secretary of State for India seems to be a strangely misinformed man."160  
Acting Bengal Governor, Rutherford telegrammed Amery to warn him of the stir that his 
statement had created and admitted that his own numbers, reported to London, had 
perhaps been misconstrued.  After more carefully considering the statistics, it was clear 
that no fewer than 9,000 people were dying "due directly or indirectly to starvation" each 
day.161
Meanwhile Churchill was the keynote speaker at a farewell ball for Field Marshall 
Wavell, Linlithgow's replacement.  In his speech Churchill valorized Britain's colonial 
mission in India in grandiloquent terms, heeding the world as a whole to "recognize the 
great achievements of Britain in India."
   
162 Famines, he suggested, had passed away, and 
pestilence had been defeated. With the "incredible result," Churchill continued, "[though] 
not by any means a satisfactory result or a beneficial result, [that] in ten years the 
population of India, under the 'blighting' rule of Britain, [had] increased by 50 million - 
50 million!"163
Wavell himself was known to be a rather dry and austere man, unimpressed by 
ceremony and unafraid to speak his own mind.  He was sworn in on the 20th of October, 
and set to work on the famine situation at once.  He, like Linlithgow, judged clearing 
Calcutta to be of primary importance, but (in fairness) he also seems to have been the 
first British official to view the loss of innocent life in Bengal as a moving priority as 
well.  He set up a Distress Relief Fund within days of assuming office and, whereas 
Linlithgow had failed to visit Bengal himself at any time during the famine, Wavell was 
"off to Calcutta" within a week to assess the situation first hand.
  Enthralled at the Prime Minister's exuberant judgment, the gathering 
broke into a chorus of enthusiastic applause.   
164
                                                 
160 The Statesman, "The Death-Roll," October 16th, 1943 
   Wavell landed in 
Calcutta on the afternoon of the 26th and began an "incognito" tour of  the city that same 
evening.  He met with "sick destitutes" himself, some of whom, despite the effort to 
161 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Rutherford to Amery, p. 399 
162 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Churchill's Speech at Farewell to Wavell, p. 376 
163 Ibid 
164 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 407 
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disguise his rank, were "scared by the visit, and ran away... others, including those in 
very bad condition, were indifferent."165  The next day, again traveling "incognito," the 
Viceroy flew out to Midnapur to survey relief centers, emergency hospitals and general 
conditions there.  On the following day, shaken by what he had seen, the new Viceroy 
announced that full use of military resources would expended to mobilize immediate and 
extensive famine relief efforts in Bengal.166
A day earlier, while the Viceroy was touring Midnapur, the Governor - having 
won support from the Ministry - promulgated the Bengal Destitute Persons (Repatriation 
and Relief) Ordinance.  This new ordinance empowered: "any officer authorized by 
Government to apprehend any person who, in the opinion of such officer, is a destitute, 
and detain him or her in a place provided for the purpose until the person is 
repatriated."
 
167  Temporary collecting centers, basically detention camps for "sick 
destitutes," could house up to 8,000 people.  A more permanent facility north of Calcutta, 
near the army barracks at Dum Dum, was prepared for the uptake of 4,000 persons 
immediately.  These were the "poor houses" that the Relief Commissioner promised 
would be opened "one after another." Those in the most acute stage of starvation were to 
be removed to hospitals immediately,  though in Calcutta only 2000 hospital beds were 
sanctioned for famine victims.   In the next three days the police, aided by A.R.P. officers 
- and other deputized agents of the state168 - rounded up as many as 3,000 "destitutes" 
from the streets of Calcutta and moved them to Government "reception centers."169
The initial round up of only 3,000 famine sufferers, however, proved a 
disappointment to authorities.  Government had estimated that there were at least 150,000 
"sick destitutes" clogging the thoroughfares and by-lanes of Calcutta, and the pace of 
removal needed to be vastly accelerated.
    
170  The chief problem, Relief Commissioner, 
O.M. Martin explained, was that "people did not want to go into shelters."171
                                                 
165 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell Sees Plight of Destitutes in Calcutta," October 27, 1943 
  Though 
they had been "rescued" by the government and taken to "poor houses" where "they got 
166 The Statesman, "Viceroy to Approach Army for Aid in Famine Relief," October 29, 1943 
167 K.C. Ghosh, p. 123 
168 It was noted in the press release that the government was also receiving "non-official aid" with the 
roundups,  though few specifics of the organizations involved was forthcoming. 
169 The Statesman, "Repatriating Calcutta Destitutes," November 1, 1943 
170 The Statesman, "Policy of Repatriation of Destitutes,"  November 6, 1943 
171 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of O. M. Martin, p. 529 
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two good meals a day and also got clothes - they kept running away."172  That people so 
thoroughly depleted by the ravages of famine, having traveled a perilous journey in 
search of bare sustenance, and having watched so many die along the way - family 
members, friends and strangers - were able, with the last of their energy, to resist the 
authority of the state by such measures, is again, an important counter-point to all studies 
that have asserted the "passivity" with which famine sufferers perished.  Government 
food kitchens in the "repatriation camps" were, in fact, severely under-staffed and ill-
equipped.  Moreover, the rations given amounted to approximately 800 calories per day - 
a quantity far from sufficient, or even humane.173  "You pretend to keep people alive by 
subsisting on that ration," T. G. Davies of the Friends Ambulance Unit decried, "but all 
the time [you are] slowly starving [them] to extinction."174
In the first few days the police, with the assistance of the A.R.P., tried to use 
"persuasion" with reluctant destitutes, but after five more days they had only managed to 
round up an additional 7,000.  Consequently, on the 5th of November the Bengal 
Government announced in a press release that, of necessity, stricter measures would be 
adopted. Because their efforts, so far, had "produced negligible results," and the "sick 
destitutes" continued to resist, force would have to be used to collect and detain them.  
This measure, it was explained, was "in the interest of the destitutes themselves as well as 
of the citizens of Calcutta."
  Escape from such facilities 
surely saved lives. 
175 Blame for the resistance shown by famine victims, in the 
press release, was allotted to opponents of the government, who were organizing to 
"defeat Government's policy of persuading destitutes to leave the streets, by spreading 
canards among them."  The objectives of these "designing persons," it was further 
claimed, was that "of keeping Calcutta streets full of destitutes so that the situation may 
be exploited for political and other purposes."176
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   With this new policy outlined, 
"destitute repatriation" took on the aspect of forcible round-ups of famine stricken men, 
women and children, by police, civil defence, and military personnel in broad daylight, 
173 Medical History of the Bengal Famine, p. 16 
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roving the streets of Calcutta in official vans and lorries, often chasing down their targets 
and loading them into removal vehicles by main force, against active resistance.   
That rumors continued to spread is not entirely surprising.  B. K. Guha, Relief Co-
ordination Officer in charge of collecting destitutes, for one, was having a hard time 
convincing the starving, half-naked, and diseased wretches that he was assigned to 
"repatriate," that Government was operating in their best interest.  Even children 
remained skeptical and resisted state custody. When an orphanage for famine refugees 
had been set up outside Calcutta, it fell to Guha to find orphans to occupy it.  From 
Calcutta he was assigned to send eight or ten children.  After three or four days, however, 
he became increasingly frustrated: "at first some of the orphans were persuaded to agree, 
but thereafter they would not go and when we inquired what was the reason, we were told 
that they had been told that they were being sent to Asansol and if they went they would 
be killed."177  For adults, Guha sadly informed the Famine Enquiry Commission, 
suspicions were equally hard to suppress. Many of the "sick destitutes" had fixed on the 
idea, he lamented, that "Government [would] take you to these centers and from there 
send you to Arakan or Assam [the war front]... and you would be sacrificed there."178
Royal Engineer, Alan Shaw, stationed with 345 Company Command, was 
working on the Imphal Road in the vicinity of Assam.  He remembers that during the 
famine: 
  
When asked who could have been spreading these rumors, Guha confessed that he could 
not be sure, but they were prevalent.  To some extent these apprehensions, however, seem 
to have been based on fact. 
the streets of Calcutta were cleared of starving men who were formed into labor 
battalions and sent up the Line of Control.  About two hundred of these 
unfortunates were placed under 345 Company command and occupied additional 
bamboo huts in our lines. We were ordered to use them for clearing jungle instead 
of the usual teams of Indian Tea Association laborers of which there was a 
battalion of one thousand every ten miles along the Imphal Road, each 
commanded by an ex tea planter Indian Army Captain. The “refugees” were 
accommodated in bamboo huts separate from our troop lines, but benefiting from 
the same carefully chlorinated drinking water and sanitary arrangements. At first 
they were pathetic sights, too weak with starvation to do useful work. But even 
after months of proper feeding most had little inclination to work, were a potential 
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On the open streets of Calcutta, Guha suffered similar disciplinary challenges.  
There was reluctance on the part of the destitutes to go to the poor houses, he told the 
Famine Enquiry Commission, "when we used to come with police lorries, they used to 
get frightened, the mother would run in one direction and the child in another."180 The 
separation of families, particularly of mothers and children, was a recurrent problem that 
created chaos and protest during removal operations.  As O. M. Martin testified, however, 
that such dislocation were all but inevitable: "when we picked up people under 
compulsion it very often happened that some persons were separated from their 
families... if anybody on the street said that his daughter or wife was lost, he was told to 
go to that particular poor house [set up for women and girls separated from families] and 
find her out."181 At length Guha discovered that the "dispersal of families" was 
particularly bad public relations; and so his organization had to change tactics and began 
operating under the cover of night.  In this way, he remembered, "sometimes we found 
them sleeping together and then we could collect the whole family."182
The determinations of who were, indeed, "sick destitutes" were, moreover, 
imperfect at best.  The testimony of a representative of the All-India Women's 
Conference Relief Committee is illustrative.  "A maid servant's daughter in my sister's 
family," Dr. Maitreyee Bose told the Enquiry Commission, "was sitting on the doorstep 
waiting for her mother to finish her job.  A lorry came and took her forcibly in sight of 
the mother, thinking her to be a destitute child.  No one would listen that she was not a 




                                                 
179Alan Shaw, archived in connection with the BBC oral history project "WW2 People's War."  Found at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/user/89/u894689.shtml  (Last accessed May 20, 2010, 7:49 PM)  
  With maid servants and many other menial workers in Calcutta 
making only starvation wages themselves, such mistakes were, perhaps, not uncommon.  
How many of Calcutta's "own" poor were picked up and locked in poor houses under the 
"repatriation" campaign, however, remains unknown.  
180Nanavati Papers, Testimony of B. K. Guha, p. 772 
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In order to demonstrate that undue force was not used during the round-ups, B. K. 
Guha related the following rather revealing, if disjointed, story to the Famine Enquiry 
Commission: 
I had information that a large number of destitutes had collected in South 
Calcutta, and I was asked to take charge of them because they had gathered in the 
portico of a retired government official and made the place filthy.  He could not 
drive them out.  The destitutes consisted of mother, children and grown up girls.  
On seeing us the police lorry, they all dispersed and raised a hue and cry.  I was 
surprised at this. I tried my best to collect them.  They ran into an adjoining 
house.  I approached the lady of the house and explained my mission to her.  She 
persuaded them to board our lorry.  While in the lorry they shouted and cried and 
actually created a scene.  They were shouting that they were being killed.  As a 
matter of fact, if any criminal charges were to be laid, it should be against me 
personally.   
 
Once in the poor houses, the destitutes continued to create scenes; refusing food, 
resisting regimens, stealing blankets and other items, and continuously attempting to 
escape.  As Relief Commissioner, O. M. Martin, explained, there was a certain "mental 
demoralization... that made [the] problem very difficult." The situation may have been 
worst of all with children.   
The wandering habit amongst the children," Martin noted, "was difficult to be 
stopped. Famine orphanages had to have prison rooms.  Children - skin and bone - 
had got into the habit of feeding like dogs.  You tried to give them a decent meal, 
but they would break away and start wandering about and eat filth.  You had to 
lock them up in a special room... they [had] developed the mentality of 
wandering.  People got awfully cruel.184
 
   
Imagination fails when attempting to fill in the silence between the penultimate period 
and the last, and chilling sentence with which O. M. Martin concluded his testimony 
before the Famine Enquiry Commission.   
In the context of famine, establishing a "right" to remain in Calcutta often meant 
the difference between life and death. A right to Calcutta meant a territorial claim.  The 
round up and removal of "sick destitutes" from the streets was, in this sense, only a more 
stark and authoritarian means of establishing "priority." The question of who "belonged" 
in Calcutta and who did not, who was to be granted residence and who removed, who 
was "essential" and who disposable - al these had been central to patrolling the urban 
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space of Calcutta at least since the onset of the war. Famine only heightened the stakes of 
"belonging." These same question, thus intensified during famine, would continue to 
breed contention and violence for many years to come. 
 
Bengal in Ruins 
"Repatriation," in any case, was a shibboleth.  By November of 1943, much of the 
countryside of Bengal had been decimated.  There was very little to go back to.  Lands 
and meager possessions had been sold off in mass, and deaths and desertions had emptied 
out entire regions.  No accurate statistics of deaths were available, but mortality figures 
compiled at a later date have conformed that mortality during this period was 
immense.185  The low-paid village chowkidars, who kept vital statistics in normal times, 
themselves had died or deserted in numbers.186
A special correspondent from The Statesman went on a tour of the 24 Parganas 
south of Calcutta, from where many of the "sick destitutes" in Calcutta had come.  He 
found the region starkly depopulated.  "The countryside at present," he wrote, "tells a 
strange story of desertion and despair."
  Where rice was available at all, its price 
was out of reach of the majority of population.  Starvation had already claimed many 
hundreds of thousands of lives, and malaria and cholera were running rampant, preying 
on already debilitated survivors and beginning to wipe out those who had so far survived 
starvation.   
187  The long-awaited aman crop was ripening, he 
wrote, "but who will harvest it?"  The peasant who in normal times would be looking 
forward to the harvest, the correspondent wrote, "sits on his doorstep, bewailing his lost 
family, and in many cases is too tired and too disease-ridden to take courage and hope out 
of the fast-ripening paddy."188
                                                 
185 The Famine Enquiry Commission's Report on Bengal pegged the "excess mortality" for the second half 
of 1943 at 1,000,000 (p. 108-9.)  This estimate is the most conservative available.  The University of 
Calcutta Anthropology Department, after extensive surveys, put the toll at 3.5 million for 1943.  And 
exhaustive analysis of these numbers is contained in Amartya Sen's, Poverty and Famines, "Famine 
Mortality: A Case Study." 
  In a typical village the reporter found, "all the members of 
families lying ill with malaria or dysentery and no one to tend them," other houses he 
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found, "lying desolate as all the occupants had died."189
Scenes in Midnapur were similar.  In November the artist Chittaprosad made his 
epic journey through the district, composing sketches of famine victims that were to 
become iconic with the Bengal Famine.  Chittaprosad, hailing from Chittagong, had been 
contributing pen and ink drawings to the Bengali communist weekly Janayuddha for 
some time.  During the early months of 1943 he began focusing his attention on the food 
administration in Bengal, composing satirical sketches of the nexus between government 
employees, control shops and black marketeers.  As conditions in the province continued 
to deteriorate, his sketches turned towards depicting the sufferings of famine victims.  In 
his journey through Midnapur Chittaprosad, like The Statesman correspondent, found 
village after village depopulated and the few survivors reeling in despair and disease.  In 
the larger towns "destitutes" had gathered hoping to find food.  In Midnapur town he 
found a small family who had abandoned their village in June.  When asked when they 
would go back, they told the artist,  
  The idea of "repatriation" under 
such conditions could have very little meaning. 
To speak the truth, babu, with what hopes can we go back to our village?  Last 
year's harvest was not poor, yet we couldn't get food in our own village.  Two 
days after harvesting, the paddy disappeared.  When we say we will go back to 
our village, it is because we are afraid of the military.  No one knows where they 
will send us or the children if they catch us.  What use is it to us if they send us 
back to our village?190
 
   
Chittaprosad published this, and his other accounts, together with his sketches from his 
tour in Midnapur in a book entitled Hungry Bengal shortly after his return from the 
district. The book was quickly banned by the Government of India and 5,000 copies were 
confiscated and destroyed.191
In the worse hit districts of eastern Bengal, where mortality was still higher, the 
scenes were, undoubtedly, still more desolate.  In certain sub-divisions in Barisal, 
Tippera, Faridpur and Chittagong, a careful study by the Indian Statistical Institute 
estimated that close to or above 10% of the population had been entirely wiped out in 
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1943 alone.192  The Institutes estimates were that across the province two million people 
had died of famine in 1943, most in just a few short months.193
Gone are the cultivators, gone are the householders, rice is gone from the houses.  
There are no longer cows to give milk.  The deities are starving, for there is no 
worshipful service.  The cultivators have sold their draft cattle for the sake of 
subsistence and somehow manage to survive, yet even they don't understand how 
to carry on.  The ponds have dried up, turning to mud.  Water is scarce and pure 
water completely lacking.  Numerous diseases have broken out, and the former 
spontaneous joy of the Bengalis is absolutely ruined... the noose of poverty has 
entangled them body and soul, and they have become paralyzed.
  Noted Bengali social 




Bengal was in ruins. 
 
The Good Viceroy 
 But substantial help, no matter how late, and how insufficient relative to the 
immensity of the catastrophe that had befallen Bengal, was on its way.  Field Marshall 
Wavell was good to his word, and perhaps more importantly, understood the famine to be 
a humanitarian disaster that demanded immediate and large-scale action.  The new 
Viceroy had been shocked at the inertia and apathy which he had found in Calcutta.  
Acting Governor, Sir Thomas Rutherford, was unhappy with his assignment and was 
only biding his time until he could be relieved of the monstrosity of Bengal and return to 
Bihar.195  Wavell found him to be "second rate, at best" and told the Secretary of State, "I 
do not think he is really trying very hard in Bengal.. and the impression he left on me was 
very poor."196  The Bengal Ministry, meanwhile was tying itself in knots, with Ministers 
"more concerned in their political rivalries than with the famine."197
 The very day he returned from Bengal, Wavell telegraphed the Commander-in-
Chief for India and requested immediate, and substantial, military assistance to cope with 
famine in Bengal.  His request was granted without hesitation, and on the second of 
  And in London, 
there was only more denial. 
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November he could inform the India Office in London that operations were already 
underway.  Commander in Charge of the Eastern Command, General Mosley Mayne was 
put in general charge of military aid to Bengal and Major-General A.V. T. Wakely, was 
put in command of the all-important movement of supplies. At their disposal was a full 
Division of British troops, comprised of 15,000 soldiers.  Military lorries, priority rail 
arrangements, and the Royal Air Force, all of which were already well represented in the 
region, were also deployed.  Major-General Wakely, putting the lie to statements made 
both by the Bengal Government and the later Famine Enquiry Commission report, was 
able to quickly hire 7,000 country boats on contract to facilitate the movement of relief 
into remote, riverine districts.198
Only three days after his return to Delhi, then, Wavell could inform London that 
troops were being located throughout the hardest hit districts and supplies were moving 
out of Calcutta and into the countryside at pace.  Additionally, arrangements were being 
made for large-scale medical relief, and materials for temporary shelters for the homeless 
were being sent. The alacrity with which Wavell organized these relief efforts was, at 
once, a testimony to his own initiative, as well as a very troubling contrast to the apathy 
and indifference with which at least a million people had already been left to starve.  
Linlithgow himself, in his discussions with Wavell before turning over authority, had 
predicted that as many as one and a half million were likely to die of famine in Bengal 
before the end of 1943, which, he admitted, "would be getting off better than [I] had 
thought was possible."
   
199
 The War Cabinet again met on November 10th, with "The Bengal Famine" now 
an international sensation.  Very little of that famous Iraqi barley had made its way to 
Bengal, and because hostilities in the Middle-East had taken a turn for the worse, the 
  In the end, there is no question that Wavell's prompt and 
comprehensive engagement saved an inestimable number of lives, but the situation in 
Bengal had been allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that the relief initiated in 
November of 1943, for many, was far too little and far too late.  And the cards were still 
stacked against Wavell's own initiative. 
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remainder of the shipment was doubtful.200 The Secretary of State asked for commitment 
of 50,000 tons of food grains per month for the forthcoming year, together with an 
additional 50,000 tons from Australia for immediate shipment.  When the War Cabinet 
met, however, with the Prime Minister, again "in the Chair," Churchill broke into "a 
preliminary flourish on Indians breeding like rabbits"201 and, in the end, the Minister of 
War Transport, Lord Leathers, found Amery's request for immediate shipments 
"impracticable."202
At the same meeting, a Canadian offer for the immediate shipment of 100,000 
tons of wheat to India was considered.  Canadian Prime Minister, McKenzie King, had 
informed Amery that the wheat was available and the ship was ready to be loaded and 
could depart on the 12th.
 It was furthermore "made clear" that there could be no promise to 
undertake "a long-term program" of food grain shipments to India.  
203  The trouble was, Amery wrote in his journal, "that Winston 
so dislikes India and all to do with it that he can see nothing but waste of shipping 
space."204  Leathers concurred with Churchill that Canadian shipping could be utilized to 
better effect, and the War Cabinet "invited" the Prime Minister to send King an 
immediate telegram "deprecating the proposed allocation of a Canadian ship."205
 Meanwhile, Amery was making the best of Wavell's decisive action. On 
November 11th he informed the House of Commons that the "military machinery for 
detailed distribution [was] already working," and surmised that "there [was] good reason 
to be satisfied with the progress made."
  Which 
he did - and the shipment was promptly cancelled.   
206  Military relief programs were operating 
efficiently and aid was getting into the far reaches of the Bengal countryside.  Even mules 
were being used to pack rice into remote villages.207 Just as importantly, the aman crop 
was fast ripening and it looked to be a healthy and abundant harvest. Amery reported to 
Wavell that his efforts had made an excellent impression in England.208
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own continuing dissatisfaction with how things were progressing, the Secretary of State 
responded sympathetically, "It is true that you draw a pretty disquieting picture of the 
Bengal food situation, of the epidemics that may follow, of Rutherford's fade-out, and of 
the hopeless corruption and inefficiency of the Bengal administration at large, but I do 
feel that you are really taking hold and that your initiative, both through the Army and 
through the Governors, will get things into ship-shape condition before it is too late."209
At what point the situation might have been understood as "too late" is anybody's guess.  
Disease was running rampant, quinine, for treating malaria was extremely scarce, cholera 
was epidemic, the public health system of Bengal was in shambles, the price of rice was 
still highly elevated, hundreds of thousand, if not millions had already died, millions 
more had been weakened by hunger to the point of collapse, the Bengal Ministry was still 
entangled in embittered debate, no rationing scheme had yet been established, starvation 
was still claiming thousands of lives, the "cloth famine" had practically denuded the 
entire suffering population of Bengal, and the cold season was on its way.   
  
But by the first week of December, Calcutta had been largely cleared of "sick 
destitutes," and the Secretary of State for India was assuring the House of Commons that 
progress was being made.  Major-General D. Stuart, who had been put in charge of 
famine relief, announced on December 4th that, due to Government's efforts, there was 
now "no shortage of food in the majority of the famine areas."210
But on December 5th 1943 war again took center stage.  
 In official imagination 
the Bengal Famine was all-but over.  On the ground in Bengal, however, imagination 
could only go so far.   
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Chapter Five: Japan Attacks 
 
 
The Forgotten Chapter 
 Analysis of the social, economic and political impact of World War II on India, as 
Indivar Kamtekar has rightly pointed out,1 has often been relegated to footnotes in the 
history of modern India.  With attention more frequently focused on the macro-politics of 
nationalism, the Pakistan movement, negotiations for self-rule, and the mass movements 
associated with the independence struggle, the extent to which war shaped priorities, 
national alliances, and imperial policy in India during the 1940s has been largely 
overlooked.  The impact of World War II, in this sense, has been a somewhat forgotten 
chapter in the annals of colonial India.  And yet, as argued above, whatever were the 
concerns, contentions or calamities that confronted the Indian population during the 
period; the functioning of the colonial state remained deeply enmeshed in a calculus of 
total war.  Defence, mobilization, security, and "morale" remained the primary mantras 
of authority in India - and particularly in Bengal - throughout the first half of the decade, 
and the exigencies of war allowed an authoritarian resolve that served to accentuate and, 
in fact, accelerate the entrenched racist dynamics of colonial rule - even as Empire itself 
was crumbling. In this sense, and as Kamtekar has argued, "the state's new burst of 
energy and activity [with the outbreak of war] provides a flare of light enabling us to see 
its features more clearly."2
 The spotlight of war was nowhere in India as bright as it was in Calcutta.  On the 
frontlines of the war, particularly after the fall of Burma, Calcutta, by 1943, was critical 
to the Allied fight against Japan - the primary staging ground for the push east against a 
formidable enemy.  Governmental priorities in Bengal, from the beginning of the war, 
  
                                                 
1 See the introduction to Kamtekar's "A Different War Dance: State and Class in India, 1939-1945" in Past 
and Present, No. 176 (August 2002)   pp. 187-221   
2  Kamtekar (August 2002), p. 189 
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were consistently established in direct relation to overarching concerns of "defense."  As 
many as 200,000 Bengalis were recruited into the A.R.P., Civic Guards and Home 
Guards to form an ad hoc provincial police force under the ambiguous banner of 
"security." Coastal regions had been "denied" transportation facilities, as well as stores of 
food grains.  Manipulation of provincial politics had destabilized the organs of self-rule, 
and commercial firms, reaping record profits in war-related industries, had scoured the 
countryside to appropriate supplies of rice for their mushrooming workforces.  
Government partnered with commercial interests in consecutive rice procurement 
schemes, that created panic and distrust throughout the province.  And, finally, famine, in 
its most acute form, had arisen out of the mix of wartime inflation, commercial and 
governmental myopia, and administrative chaos - devastating the province and creating 
social, political, and economic chaos that would haunt Bengal for many years to come. 
And yet, in most histories of the period, the impact of war on the socio-political 
configuration of pre-independence Bengal has been all but ignored.  That Calcutta itself 
was bombed is seldom mentioned, and at times is completely forgotten.  
 
This fact was extremely surprising to me when I began my research on this 
period.  From a young age I had been acutely aware of the Japanese bombings of Calcutta 
during World War II, having heard stories from my father about the air raids many times; 
the terrifying sound of the bombers overhead and the earth shaking concussions of heavy 
explosive shells that cracked foundations and shattered windows.  Listening to my 
father's stories, I had internalized the sudden impact of the bombs, the ear splitting report, 
and the dust spattered darkness between attacks, as universally understood facts.  The 
bombings, I also knew, continued to haunt my father.  They recurred in his dreams and 
continued to awake a whole family, 6,000 miles and several decades removed from 1943 
Calcutta.   
He was 11 when Calcutta was first bombed.  The house that he lived in at the 
time, my grandfather's house, was less than a mile from the Kidderpore docks.  The 
docks, as I later learned, had been the primary target of Japanese attacks. Having been in 
such close proximity to the bombings, they had made a lasting impression on my father.  
The house shook, the foundation cracked, and the sky burst into flames.  The sound of the 
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first bombs smashing into the docks, had deafened my father for several days. After the 
first round of bombings , each and every air raid warning, thereafter, sent him into 
paroxysms of fear. Sometimes he cried too much and had to be physically suppressed to 
maintain silence during black-outs. His sister-in-law, only a few years his senior - a child 
herself at the time - remembered many years later that he had been a "coward."3
My own inherited impressions of the bombings, learned from my father's 
recounting - and perhaps even more importantly gleaned from the fear that continued to 
haunt him - was, perhaps, out of proportion with events. I have found nothing in the 
historical record that mentions the Calcutta bombings as anything but incidental and 
unimportant. Though the first bombings had spurred a panicked exodus from Calcutta 
and had resulted, also, in the forceful - and fateful - requisitioning of rice in the city, the 
bombs themselves had caused "little damage."  The eighth and heaviest bombing, with 
which this chapter is concerned, did significantly more material damage, but, again, 
damage was reported (and has been re-reported) as "light."  Yet, the impact that these 
bombings had on one 12-year old boy, continues to impress me.  If the force of a few 
historically "incidental" bombs falling on a far away city, can imprint an impression on a 
small child strong enough to span generations and geographic specificity, then any 
judgment that dismisses that event as non-consequential is too narrow. 
   
On December 5th, 1943, in the midst of a devastating famine, with hunger-
stricken bodies still accumulating on Calcutta's streets,  the city was bombed in broad 
daylight by two consecutive waves of Japanese aircraft.  It was the heaviest bombing of 
the war.  Even by London standards of the time, it had been a sizeable strike.4
                                                 
3 Interview with Dolly Mukherjee 
  With 
America now well entrenched in the Asian theater and the overall tide turning in the 
Allies favor "damage control" was efficient and the bombings have been understood, 
since that time, as peripheral, at best.  The event does, however, shine a uniquely 
revealing "flare of light" on the nature of administration in Bengal at the time.  Much of 
the prejudice, indifference and dehumanization that lay at the foundation of colonial 
ideology was crystallized, in microcosm, during this particular "emergency," and much of 
the rhetoric of concern for Indian welfare and security was revealed shallow.  In this 
4 Ian Stephens suggests this in Monsoon Morning, p. 148 
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sense it is related, on a deep structural level, to both the famine that preceded it and to the 
continuing violence that followed. The air raid is thus a window into the barbarity of 
colonial rule at the twilight of empire. 
 
The Port of Calcutta 
 The Calcutta docks are situated on the west side of the Hooghly river about a mile 
and a half downstream from the city center and 100 nautical miles upstream from the 
mouth of the river at the Bay of Bengal.  In 1780, Colonel Henry Watson, Chief Engineer 
of the East India Company under Warren Hastings' Administration, received a 
Government grant of land to build the first deep water docks in Calcutta to supplement a 
series of jetties and moorings along the Hooghly that facilitated the East India Company's 
fast-growing trade in Bengal.  This original grant for the docks project at Kidderpore was 
"for the establishment of wet and dry docks and of a marine yard, in which every facility 
should be created for building, repairing and equipping vessels of war, and 
merchantmen."5
By the later half of the nineteenth century, with the opening of the Suez Canal and 
innovations in steamship travel, international trade continued to grow exponentially and 
further strained Calcutta's capacities. Extensive work on the Indian railway system had 
been undertaken, and far reaches of the Indian sub-continent were now linked up with 
  In the coming decades, and into the 19th century, trade continued to 
increase and the docks at Kidderpore were fast becoming obsolete.  In the early days of 
Company rule, trade with Bengal had consisted mostly of the export of finished textiles 
produced by highly skilled handloom artisans throughout the vast hinterland.  Trade at 
that time, as such, was a fairly limited and select venture.  Throughout the 19th century, 
however, as Bengal was increasingly de-industrialized, the extraction of large quantities 
of raw materials - particularly opium, cotton, coal, jute, indigo, oilseeds and tea - became 
the economic engine that fueled colonial profit.  At the same time, piece goods, finished 
products and luxury items, were now being increasingly imported into India through the 
port facilities at Calcutta.  With both exports and imports on the rise, the dock capacity at 
Kidderpore was proving insufficient.  
                                                 
5 Blechynden, p. 187 
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international markets. All three major railways lines, the East Indian Railway, the Eastern 
Bengal State Railway and the Bengal-Nagpur Railway converged on Calcutta, but the 
port still remained rudimentary, with just four jetties and an antiquated wharf system. In 
1870 a Board of Port Commissioners was appointed to oversee the development of the 
docks to meet current needs. By the time the new docks opened in 1892, locks at the 
mouth of a greatly expanded basin protected the inland dock area from tidal fluctuations, 
and other improvements included an extensive network of storage sheds, mechanical 
cranes, and 27 deepwater berths able to accommodate larger seagoing vessels. By the 
time these developments were complete, with over 8 miles of railway track also serving 
the port,6 the docks at Calcutta were the busiest in India.  The King George Docks at 
Garden Reach, with 10 more deep sea berths, 3 dry docks and heavy cranes serving 
another enhanced complex of warehousing structures, were added in 1929, and the Port 
of Calcutta was now on par with any other dock system in the world. Ten years later, on 
the cusp of World War II, shipping traffic through the Calcutta Port, now comprised of 
the Kidderpore and Garden Reach complexes, amounted to nearly ten million tons a 
year.7
As the docks grew, the area around them developed into a thriving 
commercial/industrial hub, with textile factories, jute and cotton mills, coal depots, iron 
works and tea warehouses lining the banks of the river around the port.  Calcutta's 
expanded "docklands"
   
8
                                                 
6 Madhubani Ghosh, p. 38 
 had developed into a sprawling industrial quarter of the city. The 
near-by, densely populated neighborhoods - Kidderpore, Watganj and Mommenpur to the 
east, and Garden Reach and Metiabruz to the west - became thriving, if poor, residential 
districts.  The Hooghly River, to the north of the docks, had extensive moorings and 
remained lined with ships waiting to enter the locks at Kidderpore all year round. To the 
south, a channel led out to "Tolly's Nullah," connecting the docks to an extensive canal 
system used by country-boats that connected the port to the rice and jute-rich regions of 
eastern Bengal along 1,127 miles of navigable waterways.  According to the Imperial 
Gazetteer of India, this network of water communications, by 1909, was "one of the most 
7 Ibid.  (Ghosh's figure is 9,965,911 tons.) 
8 The docks at Kidderpore and Garden Reach, together with the industrial and residential complexes that 
surrounded them, were referred to in Government and A.R.P. reports as "the Docklands." 
 221 
important systems of river canals in the world, judged by the volume of the traffic, which 
averages 1,000,000 tons per annum, valued at nearly four millions sterling."9
The demographics of "dockland," were accordingly, highly diverse.  By 1940 
several major jute mills, including the Hooghly Jute Mills, the Victoria Jute Mills and the 
Angus Jute Mills, operated in the immediate vicinity of the docks.  The Keshoram Cotton 
Mill, owned and operated by the Birla family, was close by in Metiabruz.  Bird and 
Company (Government of India's War Transport Member, Jeremy Benthall's, concern) 
ran several important collieries on the docks, as well as overseeing the supply of their 
own jute mills further up river from Kidderpore.  Tea plantations from North Bengal and 
Assam also had offices and warehouses in the dock area, as did several iron works 
factories and other engineering works. The Port Commission itself was a major operation 
with its own substantial payroll of employees and its own police force and fire brigade.  
The mills recruited labor from far and wide, with Biharis and Oriyans particularly well 
represented.  European firms, like the Victoria and Angus Mills, had white upper 
management and engineers. Bengalis often worked as clerks and mid-level supervisors, 
but by this time rarely as laborers.  Marwari businessmen, the Birlas primary amongst 
them, were highly active in the import/export trade and as such were also well 
represented in and around the docks. Additionally, the importance of international 
shipping meant that sailors, captains, and deck hands of many nationalities also moved 
through the area in numbers.  As such, the dock area was perhaps the most cosmopolitan 
quarter of Calcutta. 
   
 
Labor 
Laborers, at this time, comprised the vast majority of the population of the docks 
and - as of labor in Calcutta more generally - were officially understood to be "essential" 
and protected during the period.10
                                                 
9 The Imperial gazetteer of India, 1907-1909 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1909) 
  Rhetoric about the welfare of the industrial labor-force 
in Calcutta, moreover, was central to an ideology that justified various schemes of 
appropriation and differential distribution, which, in turn, contributed significantly to the 
10 Representatives of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce boasted at the Famine Enquiry 
Commission that "there was not one single case of death among industrial laborers from famine." (Nanavati 
Papers, p. 1089.)  This presumption, I am here arguing, is highly misleading as the relative "security" of 
industrial laborers in Calcutta was highly contingent.  
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acute impoverishment of the Bengal countryside, and ultimately famine.   An evaluation 
of the treatment of dock laborers during the December bombings will go some way 
towards testing this rhetoric.  As will become clear, the "priority" associated with labor in 
industrial Calcutta during the war was, in fact, highly contingent.  Just who was, in the 
last analysis, "essential," and who disposable, was often a matter of expediency rather 
than principle.    
The exact numbers of laborers associated with the docks is not easy to ascertain 
with any degree of certainty.  The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, in its report after the 
bombings, put the number of "dock laborers" at 11,000.11  Presumably this figure 
represented the number of permanent workers at the larger firms, such as Bird and 
Company, who worked on the docks as "regular" employees, and as such were 
represented by the Chamber of Commerce.  Port Commissioner, Sir Thomas Elderton 
(I.C.S.), in his separate report, put the number of dock workers at 18,000.12  This 
discrepancy is puzzling, but more puzzling is that Elderton himself subsequently 
informed the Governor of Bengal that "30,000 workers enter the dock area every day."13  
Many of these workers, it seems, were apparently not counted as "dock workers."  To 
make matters still more complicated, in his own analysis based on Intelligence Branch 
files eminent historian Suranjan Das notes that in December of 1942, at a time when 
traffic through the port was less than it was a year later,14 there were 60,000 dock 
laborers in Kidderpore.15  Of these 60,000 workers, Das explains, some 15,000 were on 
strike at the end of 1942, demanding higher wages, dearness allowances and War 
Bonuses.16
This last bit of information suggests that the numbers given by the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Port Commissioner reflect only permanent workers, laborers on 
company or Port payrolls whose conditions of employment did, in fact, grant them a 
certain "priority."  One such privilege of being regularly employed may, indeed, have 
  
                                                 
11 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-30/43 (III) 
12 Ibid 
13 Casey's Diary, p. 152 
14 In his analysis of shipping traffic through the Calcutta port during the war, Madhubani Ghosh, notes that 
the volume was particularly low in 1942 due to the war, but that "in the second half of 1943, the port once 
again was busier with brisk movement of army stores."  Ghosh, p. 38  
15 Suranjan Das (1995),  p. 62 
16 Ibid 
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been the possibility of collective action against employers for wartime concessions, 
which could explains the numbers given by Das.  A vast number of dock workers, 
however, were less than "regular," and as such appear not to have been "prioritised" by 
the same commercial and governmental bodies that exalted "labor welfare" to an 
ideological principle during wartime.  These were unskilled and transient laborers, who 
worked on a contract basis that afforded them none of the benefits of "essential" 
employment (such as food, shelter or clothing.) Labor security, in a more general sense 
then, was nothing more than a myth.  But if this is so, what were the real motives behind 
the forces that created famine in Bengal? 
Jeremy Benthall's Bird and Company, alone, employed as many as 16,000 
contract laborers in its collieries at the Kidderpore docks.17
This was all loaded by hand. Long planks of timber were placed from the quay to 
the deck of the ship and an endless belt of human misery ran up one plank with a 
basket of coal, threw the coal down the ships hold and ran down the other plank. 
Some people were filling the baskets and partners of two lifted the baskets on the 
shoulders of the endless belt of men. It was stifling hot on the ship as the port 
holes had to be closed to keep the coal dust out as much as possible. No one could 
sleep as the coal was being loaded 24 hours a day, non-stop, so after consultation 
we were taken to the Seamen’s Club where we could bathe and sleep in cool 
rooms.
  Given that Bird and 
Company was supplied by the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, it is interesting 
that the number of contract laborers employed by this one firm alone exceeds the number 
of workers that the Chamber identified in its reports following the air raid.  Most of these 
contract laborers were "coolies," lowly paid, unskilled, mostly immigrant workers who 
toiled long hours, sometimes in intense heat or driving monsoon rain, for poor wages; 
many without any provision for housing or messing - and none with any job security to 
mention.  Though mechanical cranes had been installed at the docks, much of the loading 
and unloading was still done by hand, particularly given the low cost of human labor.  
J.W. Stanworth, of the British Merchant Navy, passed through the Kidderpore Docks 
during the war and witnessed a typical operation.  His vessel was sent to load 10,000 tons 




                                                 
17 WBSA. Home Confidential,  file W-30/43 (III) 
18 BBC oral history project "WW2 People's War."  J. W. Stanworth at 
www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/36/a6021136.shtml (Last accessed June, 2010, 5:25 PM) 
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Given Benthall's position as War Transport Member of the Government of India, and his 
firm's dominance in the coal business at Kidderpore, it is entirely likely that the operation 
that Stanworth witnessed was run by Bird and Company. 
 But Bird and Company was not alone in its labor practices. The railways, tea 
plantations and textile companies also utilized contract labor to a large extent, as did Jute 
Mills - the cornerstone of industrial labor in Bengal.  Exact numbers, however, are not 
easy to compile.  Labor practices were anything but transparent, and as Dipesh 
Chakrabarty has pointed out, "individual workers [in the mills] remained largely 
undocumented."19  Workers frequently abandoned positions without notification, 
employment cards were typically not kept, and circular migration to native villages meant 
a highly unstable and indistinct core workforce, which obscures efforts to characterize the 
population with any degree of specificity.  "It is important to emphasize," Chakrabarty 
notes, "that the industry did little to help these migrant workers to settle down in the city, 
and thus develop a permanently stable work labor force."20
Labor conditions even for those who enjoyed company "benefits" as permanent 
employees, were, in any case, anything but luxurious.  Working hours were long, and in 
both the factories and colliers, environmental conditions were harsh and housing  
arrangements woefully insufficient.  Even the housing provide by employers to regular 
workers was woefully substandard. 
  Mill owners, both European 
and Marwari, above all sought to maximize profits, particularly during the war boom, and 
relative to profits, labor was cheap and ultimately replaceable. Consequently, laborers felt 
little loyalty, either, to the firms that employed them, and would switch mills frequently.   
21  Only an approximate 39% of reported workers 
were provided with housing at all.  The majority of workers lived in the "coolie lines," - 
privately constructed, congested, slum-like encampments, with rows of corrugated tin or 
bamboo-mat shacks built haphazardly in empty lots close to the factory doors.  They 
were notorious for their poor ventilation, lack of clean drinking water, insufficient 
sanitary arrangements and dangerously cramped quarters.  There were also no provisions 
for health care to speak of.22
                                                 
19 Chakrabarty (1983), p. 291 
  The "coolie lines" were also often run by unscrupulous 
20 Ibid, p. 301 
21 Arjan de Haan, p. 159  (The figure given for factory housed workers in 1946 is 39%) 
22 Ibid, p. 158-9 
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local strongmen, who demanded exorbitant rents, and lent money to the perennially 
indebted "coolies" at similarly extortionate rates. Further exploding the myth of the 
"priority" afforded to industrial workers in Calcutta during the war is the fact that - even 
while industries were logging record profits23 - due to wartime inflation the real wages of 
already severely impoverished24 industrial workers fell by as much as 30%.25
Obviously the hardships on contract laborers - who comprised a majority of the 
urban labor population - were the most difficult of all.  Along with unskilled factory and 
dock workers, several other groups of workers fell into the same category.  The doms, 
whose caste distinction included the handling of corpses, are noteworthy in relation to an 
analysis of the bombings,  as are the khalasis, a caste of itinerate Muslim seamen, hailing 
mostly from the Chittagong and Noakhali districts of eastern Bengal.  Khalasis were 
renowned throughout the region for their sailing skills, and were an essential element in 
the riverine commercial networks of Bengal and beyond.  They not only plied country-
boats through the inland passages of the province, consisting of a myriad of tidal inlets 
and dangerous and unpredictable rivers, but also manned small ocean-going vessels that 
worked the coast between Bengal and Burma.  Like itinerant boat people in many places 
in the world, they were known to be tough and resilient.  Though "denial" policy had 
amounted to a wholesale attack on their livelihood, some 20,000 country-boats had 
managed to evade the Government scheme. The majority of khalasis, however, were 
driven to Calcutta.  In and around Calcutta they worked the docks and jetties, transporting 
commodities, raw materials, and food supplies from import wharfs to markets, and from 
factories to the docks for export. They were, however, mostly employed on a contract 
basis that afforded them little security in perilous times. The Bengal Steamer Khalasis 
Bill of 1943, brought before the Legislative Assembly in January, called for the 
recognition of khalasis directly by companies, which would afford them the protection of 
"priority" status.  The bill was defeated, howver, by opposition from assembly members 
affiliated with the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.  As such, the khalasis remained 
unprotected throughout the vicissitudes of war and famine.
   
26
                                                 
23 Kamtekar (August 2002),  p. 203  
    
24 Mitter, p. 526 
25  Kamtekar (August 2002),  p. 210 
26  Dutta and Mridula, p. 82 
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Added to the eclectic mix that characterized the docklands, were now Allied 
soldiers of every stripe.  With major operations planned in Southeast Asia, the American 
presence, in particular, was mounting throughout the fall of 1943. The Calcutta docks 
were critical to all operations. On the southwest corner of Kidderpore Dock II, a large 
American Army depot was constructed, and heavy mechanical cranes were added to the 
King George's docks at Garden Reach by the American armed forces.  The British Army 
had a depot of its own on the docks, and barracks for soldiers of both nations, as well as 
those of many other Allied nations, were scattered throughout the area.  As a member of 
the Calcutta Police who was stationed in the area remembers: 
the docks boiled with activity (and crime) as vast amounts of military ordinance 
poured in, and the Burma front and Nationalist China (via the Ledo Road) were 
kept supplied by troop and ‘military special’ trains through the Herculean efforts 
of the East Bengal and Assam-Bengal Railways. Soldiers, sailors and airmen from 
all the Allied nations wandered the streets in search of “rest & recreation” which 
usually consisted of a feed, a fight and sex (in any order) inevitably necessitating 
much police intervention.27
 
      
 
Neighborhoods 
 The eastern boundary of the docks was defined - appropriately enough - by the 
Eastern Boundary Road, running approximately two miles from the Hooghly River in the 
north to the Boat Canal in the south. Over time, however, the "coolie lines" crossed over 
the Eastern Boundary Road  and expanded east, spilling over into the adjacent 
neighborhoods. Kidderpore, the locality which gave its name to the docks, was an old 
quarter of the city which grew in direct relation to the growth of the dock complex.  
Mominpore (to the south of Kidderpore) and Watganj (to the north) were essentially 
outgrowths of Kidderpore.  The amalgam of these three neighborhoods; bounded by the 
docks to the west, the Hooghly river to the north, the Boat Canal to the south and 
Diamond Harbor Road - the primary arterial highway running south to the mouth of the 
Hooghly - to the east, defined a distinct quarter of the city with a more or less composite 
character.  
                                                 
27 Peter Moore, "Policing War-time Calcutta," at http://www.oldmartiniansassociation.co.uk/memories.html 
(Last accessed May 4, 2002, 1:45 PM),  p. 2 
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 Though once a rather affluent "native" quarter of Calcutta, due to its proximity to 
the profitability of the port trade, the Kidderpore area, by the early twentieth century, had 
become one of the poorest and most desperate areas of the city.28  Not only had the 
"coolie lines" themselves quickly expanded outside the boundaries of the port, but around 
them sprawling bustees sprang up to accommodate the overflow.  As these slums on the 
western fringe of the quarter continued to grow, a progressive blighting of the entire area 
ensued, with congestion and poverty coming to define the landscape.  By the second 
decade of the twentieth century, the Kidderpore area had the worst living standards in the 
city and the highest death rate.29
 The impoverished khalasis who had long made the Kidderpore area their base of 
operations in Calcutta, took to sometimes violent labor actions against their putative 
employers,
  Furthermore, labor recruiters often affiliated with an 
underworld of strongmen and toughs, were the de facto town planners, lending an 
atmosphere of criminality and exploitation to an already desperate environment. 
30 which, in turn, contributed to the "rowdy" reputation of the area.  Frequent 
labor actions in the factories and warehouses in the port area also furthered the image of 
Kidderpore as a "disturbed" quarter.  Muslims comprised a full three-quarters of the labor 
population of the Calcutta Port, and, as such, the Kidderpore area reflected both the 
poverty and the communal composition of the port.  The precinct was, in fact, one of the 
largest Muslim neighborhoods in Calcutta, which, together with its reputation for 
volatility, resulted in an all too easy equation, for some, between Muslim habitation and 
violence.  By the middle of the century, Kidderpore was presumed to be in the heart of 
what Suranjan Das has called the "traditional riot zone of Calcutta."31
To what extent the desperation that sometimes erupted into violence in 
Kidderpore had to do with religious conflict, however, and to what extent it had to do 
with other factors is questionable.  During the first World War (as in the Second) a sharp 
rise in the prices of essential commodities had made life difficult in Bengal. Cloth, in 
particular, became exceedingly scarce and conditions approaching a "cloth famine" 
prevailed.  In Kidderpore a "cloth riot," begun by "the unemployed or semi-employed 
   
                                                 
28 Suchetana Chattopadhyay,  p. 229 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Suranjan Das (2000), p. 294 
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Urdu-speaking Muslim poor and directed against a section of non-Bengali Hindu rich 
[Marwaris - who were prominent in the cloth trade]" erupted.1 The violence of the 
"Muslim mob" was easily attributed to "communal" sentiment, but little reflection is 
required to conclude that there were rather more complex economic, ethno-linguistic, and 
class factors at play.  In 1925, on the occasion of the Muslim festival of Bakr-Id, there 
was another "riot" in Kidderpore with the Muslims of the quarter again targeting 
Marwaris and "up-country" Hindus.1  Though the communal nature of this "riot" seems 
more straightforward, to underestimate the underlying economic and class tensions that 
simmered below the surface, particularly in the context of a variety of unsettled 
immigrant populations, would be a mistake.  
As well as contributing significantly to the poverty and turmoil of the quarter, 
close proximity to the docks also provided incentive for capital development.  Along with 
the larger industrial warehouses and manufacturing plants on the western fringe of the 
Kidderpore area, a host of smaller, mostly Indian run, factories came up.  Metal 
workshops, smaller collieries, machine presses and  oil mills were prevalent along the 
alleys and by-lanes of Kidderpore.  The quarter was also known for its lively markets and 
bazaars, stocked with a wide array of cheap commodities, often "overflow" from the port 
itself.  In fact, the capital intensity in the vicinity resulted in a more diverse atmosphere 
than its reputation for prevailing poverty might suggest.  Middle-class garden houses and 
multi-story brick-and-mortar shop buildings lined the major thoroughfares, providing a 
stark contrast to the sprawling bustees that nestled in the shadows. The Muslim capital-
class, as well as the Muslim intelligencia, both Bengali and Urdu-speaking, were also 
well represented.32
However, limits on the prestige of the neighborhood kept real estate prices low, 
and the area's reputation for crime, poverty and communalism discouraged many non-
Muslims from associating with the quarter.  My grandfather, ex-Calcutta policeman, 
Ramakrishna Mukherjee, however, seems to have been an exception to the rule.  By the 
time of his retirement from the Calcutta police in 1937, he had amassed a relatively 
sizeable cash fortune - far in excess of his official income.  Much of this small fortune he 
sunk into real estate- with extremely poor returns. It was owing to his connections with 
  
                                                 
32 See Suchetana Chattopadhyay, p. 229-230 
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the Crime Unit of the Calcutta Police that Ramakrishna Mukherjee had links with the 
Kidderpore area.  It is also, perhaps, was owing to the fact that he hailed from the Satkira 
sub-division of Khulna,  a Muslim-majority district in modern-day Bangladesh, that he 
ventured where few middle-class Hindus in Calcutta dared to go.   Although he had 
remained in the city for many years, he was still a rustic man with "old world" ideas.  He 
was superstitious and stern, and maintained a distinct sense of noblesse oblige.   On his 
family's modest tract in Khulna, Muslim tenants worked the land and paid their rents, 
sometimes at the butt of a lathi.  In the city he had secured a position of authority and 
prestige, which reinforced the sense of privilege which he had carried with him to 
Calcutta.  It was perhaps this combination of traditional patrician rusticity and sanctioned 
urban entitlement that compelled him to invest his reserves in the Muslim "docklands."   
Those who knew him remember that Ramakrishna Mukherjee bought several 
tracts of land in the Kidderpore area during the 1930s with cash that he had accumulated 
during his service in the Calcutta Police.  The transactions themselves were something 
less than "regular," involving complicated court cases that captivated more and more of 
the ex-policeman's time and energy after retirement, as well as depleting more and more 
of his progressively dwindling financial resources. The properties that he had purchased, 
with full knowledge of how dubious were the deals, he had gotten cheap. But the 
expenses of extricating clean deeds from the nebulous bureaucratic labyrinth of Bengal's 
colonial property laws were formidable.  Along the Eastern Boundary Road he had 
purchased bustee tracts, inhabited by Muslim dock workers and "coolies."  Rents were 
minimal and difficult to extract.  The monthly rounds that he made, lathi in hand, to 
collect from his tenants by the docks, were, in some definite sense, more ceremonial then 
they were remunerative - particularly as the cost of living began to rise sharply with the 
advent of war.  Additional bustee tracts that he had purchased in the Muslim slums of 
Park Circus were similarly economically unproductive. 
The house that he had settled his large family in was less than a mile distant from 
the docks, on the main road in Mominpore.  It was not an extravagant house, but certainly 
impressive in relation to his official means, and much more lavish than he would have 
been able to manage elsewhere in Calcutta.  It was a two-story, cinder block and plaster 
home, approximately 3000 square feet, with an additional 1500 square feet of rooftop 
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overlooking bustling Mominpore Road.  On the ground level was a "parlor" for receiving 
friends and acquaintances, a few store rooms rented out to local merchants, a small 
kitchen, staffed by cooks brought from the village in Satkira, and a thakur ghor, or idol 
room, with an unusually large and fiercely depicted Kali goddess, in which Ramakrishna 
held regular pujas and animal sacrifices. The kitchen led out into a back alleyway where 
a few cows were tethered, providing milk for the family. The family's quarters were on 
the second floor; four bedrooms with simple, oversized cots that accommodated, in 1943, 
approximately 30 people, including my father ,the second youngest amongst 13 children, 
5 of whom still lived in the family house at Mominpore.  Ramakrishna's oldest son 
Narendrakrishna, at this time 24 years old, had graduated from college with a degree in 
Human Resources Management, and was gainfully employed with the Calcutta Shipping 
Corporation, as well as the A.R.P..  Narendrakrishna was, even at this early stage in his 
career, the primary earner and provider for the family - a status that had become 
increasingly demanding, and would become ever more so in the coming years. 
When Japan attacked Burma in 1941, Ramakrishna, like so many others, had sent 
his family to the village.  Only he and his oldest son remained behind in Calcutta.  When 
the predicted Japanese attack failed to materialize, the rest returned to the city.  When the 
docks were bombed in 1942, the impact shook the house and shattered the windows.  The 
plaster on the walls cracked and fell in dusty chunks to the floor.  My father was 11 years 
old at the time.  The bombings had terrified him inordinately.  During repeated air raid 
warnings and black-outs in the coming weeks he was dangerously inconsolable.  He was 
sent, again, to the village in Satkira, along with his younger brother and mother.  But in 
early 1943, famine was already devastating the countryside, and the increasing pressure 
of government appropriation schemes was breeding anxiety and violence in the districts.  
He was again brought back to Calcutta, as, it seemed, the threat of Japanese attack was 
(again) waning.  The streets of the city, by this time, were filling up famine refugees - and 
corpses.  Driven from the more affluent and reputable neighborhoods of the city, the 
starving congregated in less "European" (meaning poorer) neighborhoods of Calcutta 
such as Mominpore.  Their plaintive moans rent the air, as their broken bodies lined the 
streets.  The images of famine, my father told me so many times, were etched into his 
 231 
memory like acid on soft metal.  But the memories of the bombings, in this one case at 
least, were deeper still. 
 
Japan Attacks 
 On Sunday, December 5th, 1943 Calcutta awakened to its ongoing tribulation of 
famine.  Three of the six "corpse disposal" vans, originally commissioned to the 
Government of Bengal for air raid casualties, were making their rounds, manned by 
police officers and A.R.P. personnel, collecting "sick destitutes" in various stages of 
starvation and disease and removing them from the streets to "repatriation camps" outside 
the city.33
 Calcutta was still, however, very much critical to the pursuance of war, with 
troops moving through the city at an ever-increasing pace and the production and 
movement of war materials to the front heavily dependent on the port.  But the actual 
defense of Calcutta had failed to become a priority.  The Indian Command had been 
requesting better equipment to defend the city for some time, but despite the continuing 
rhetoric of "security" which dominated administrative policy-making and 
implementation, military preparations to defend India had evolved little since 1941.
  The irony of removing the dying from the streets of Calcutta in vehicles 
commissioned for the removal of the dead is telling. That tools allocated to deal with war 
were busy with famine "relief," is similarly instructive.  Two more of these vans, one 
each, were with the Hindu Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam for the removal 
of Hindu and Muslim corpses - respectively. The sixth van, in a state of disrepair, was 
with the Calcutta Corporation awaiting re-commissioning.  In the face of famine, disease 
and despair - as well as profit, political intrigue and indifference - the war with Japan had 
faded into the background, both in popular and official imagination.  Although the air 
raids of December 1942 had entailed profound socio-political impacts, those impacts 
were somewhat removed from the actual material damage inflicted.  Nearly a year had 
elapsed since Calcutta had been bombed, and the momentous events of that year had 
greatly attenuated popular concern about the war. 
34
                                                 
33 WBSA  Home Confidential, "8th Raid,"  file W-30/43 (Note by Secretary of the Government of Bengal, 
E. W. Holland on corpse disposal.) 
  
After the first bombings of Calcutta in 1942, elite "Beaufighters" had been rushed in from 
34Stephens, p. 217 
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the Middle-East to complement a few squadrons of dilapidated "Hurricanes," and as 
recently as November of 1943, three squadrons of highly effective "Spitfires" were also 
sent to the region.  Both the Spitfire and Beaufighter squadrons, however, were shifted to 
advanced positions along the Burmese border for offensive maneuvers by mid-1943, and 
Calcutta was left defended by nothing more than a handful of obsolescent Hurricanes and 
a few equally out-of-date batteries of anti-aircraft guns scattered at strategic locations 
around the city.35
When the air raid sirens began to wail at 11:15 A.M. on the morning of December 
5th, therefore, there was little excitement.  Interrupted from his morning work, Statesman 
Editor, Ian Stephens, remembers feeling "no more than a vague annoyance."
  Meanwhile, the Allied war in Europe was going well, and with 
increased American involvement in South-East Asia - despite the dismal failure of the 
Arakan campaign earlier in the year - optimism was running high.   
36  A.R.P. 
drills were still a regular part of life however insignificant the war seemed in relation to 
the monstrous difficulties of daily existence in Calcutta.  The air raids that had taken 
place the year before. moreover, had been night raids and the possibility of Japan 
mustering the audacity to launch a daylight raid on Calcutta seemed remote. It was also a 
Sunday morning, and the city was even more "at ease" than it might have been on a 
weekday.  At 11:27, however, the sirens began sounding the "red alert," which meant that 
an attack was imminent. Within 20 minutes of the red alert, the sky filled with the rumble 
of Japanese bombers, as many as 250 planes in all, stepped up at three levels and 
descending from a cruising height of 20,000 feet down unto the docks of Calcutta.37
Heavy explosive and anti-personnel bombs began pounding the docks only 18 
minutes after the red alert had sounded.
 The 
bombers had launched from central Burma and then had angled south across the Bay of 
Bengal,  completely avoiding Allied defenses, which were bunched along the Burmese 
front at Chittagong and Shillong.  By 11:45, out of a clear blue sky, a massive, broad-
daylight attack on Calcutta by the Japanese Air Force was underway.    
38
                                                 
35 Ibid, p. 224 
  The bombers, meeting no opposition, streaked 
36 Ibid, p. 215 
37 Ibid, p. 216 
38 The sequence of events described below is all taken from the A.R.P. reports contained in WBSA, Home 
Confidential, file  W-30/43. "8th Raid." A map is also included in the file, which pinpoints the locations of 
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in low and picked targets at will. Within a few short minutes the docks were in flames 
and continuing bombardment was rending the air, as Japanese planes continued their 
unopposed onslaught.  A series of heavy explosive bombs hit the coaling berths on the 
western edge of the south basin of the Kidderpore docks, igniting the coal and turning the 
wharf into a blazing inferno.  The impact from the heavy explosive bombs, which left 
impact craters 12 feet wide and 6 feet deep, blew out the overhead electric lines as well, 
and the heat from the coal berth fires spread to the adjacent goods' sheds rapidly.  A 
second primary target, the Bengal Nagpur Railway depot, a few hundred yards north of 
the coaling berths was also under heavy attack.  Anti-personnel bombs, which burst into 
high velocity fragments of steel and shrapnel immediately on impact with the ground, 
rained down on the depot, and pierced steel rail webs at ranges of up to 30 feet,  
destroying the railway's mainline.  Fifty railway wagons, one engine and the goods yard 
were also struck and partially or totally damaged - as was the quarters of the "lower paid 
staff" of the railway.  A heavy explosive bomb was also dropped on the offices of Bird 
and Company, sandwiched between the coal berths and the railway depot. The Hooghly 
Jute Mill, within the port compound itself, was hit with as many as seven bombs and 
suffered extensive damage.  Barges waiting to load or unload, anchored in the dock basin, 
were targeted as well, and the fires that resulted jumped from barge to barge quickly.   
By 11:57 - only twelve minutes after the bombing had began - at least 11 barges 
were "blazing furiously" on the water.  Anti-personnel bombs had also fallen on the 
"coolie lines," and fires from the coaling berths and goods sheds spread throughout the 
workers' quarters.  The sweepers quarters of the Bengal Nagpur Railway was demolished, 
and the river dock of the Government Timber Depot was also destroyed.  Either by 
default or by design the destruction was not contained within the boundaries of the dock 
area itself.  Damage from anti-personnel fragments spread out in a 300 yard radius from 
the site of the bomb blast.  Shops, private residences, and small factories outside the dock 
gates suffered collateral damage, or were struck directly by misguided bombs.  The Clive 
Jute Mill in Garden Reach was also hit and heavy explosive bombs fell in residential 
areas of Watganj and Kidderpore.  A petrol pump, the A.R.P. barracks, a "coolie market," 
                                                                                                                                                 
the bombs.  A chronology of events is given in the Calcutta Fire Brigade's report in the same file.  Where 
relevant,  reference will be given to the specific documents from this file. 
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the Tramway Depot Drivers' Quarters, and the ration shop were also hit.  Bombs also fell 
outside the general dock vicinity, with reports of heavy explosions in Bhawanipur and 
Alipore, more than a mile away, and in Bowbazar, central Calcutta, a heavy explosive 
bomb left a gaping creator in the middle of the main thoroughfare.   
On the docks, which remained the primary target, there was panic and total chaos 
as soon as the attack began.  Along the docks and in the attached Bengal-Nagpur Railway 
yard, "coolies" took cover wherever they could find it, many going "to ground in or under 
any form of structure which had the effect of hiding them from overhead.  Corrugated 
iron sheds, wagons and latrines were all used and were, of course, entirely useless."39 
Anti-personal bomb fragments ripped through the walls of these same structures killing 
many instantly, and wounding many more. In its A.R.P. report, the Railway noted that 
those who died without sufficient shelter were, in fact, "mainly non-B.N.R. employees."  
The B.N.R., its General Manager assured the government, had adequate shelter for 100% 
of its employees.  The difficulty in the dock area, the report continued "was that there 
was not always shelter for the outsiders who were present in the goods yard."40
The Port Commissioner, Sir Thomas Elderton, admitted that the port itself had 
adequate shelter for only 14,000 of its 18,000 "employees."  Some extent of the number 
of dock workers left out of this equation can be gleaned from the fact that when the 
bombs began falling the Port's shelters were quickly "crammed to suffocation," with 
"shelters meant for 50 generally containing upwards of 200."
 The 
manager of the railway, however, gave no indication of what percentage of the labor 
working in its own yard at the time of the bombings were "outsiders." Such disavowal of 
responsibility, however, clearly demonstrate the limits of the "priority" given to industrial 
labor in and around Calcutta during the entire period.  
41
                                                 
39Ibid,  B.N.P. Final Report 
 If the Port had, in fact, 
adequate shelter for more than 75% of its own employees, and shelters were crammed to 
four times their capacity, the number of workers in the immediate area who were 
understood as "outsiders" was something on the order of 3 to 1. But even "regular" 
employees did not fair well. At the Hooghly Jute Mill, immediately adjacent to the main 
dock, the shelters provided by the company were "extremely defective," lacking any 
40 Ibid, Note from B.N.R. General Manager to Government of Bengal, Home Department (emphasis mine) 
41 Ibid, Note on Labor Reaction  
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proper covering wall, and even inside these shelters, workers were killed by flying 
fragments.42 Whatever slit trenches were in the area remained unclean, and, without 
proper sanitation facilities in the dock area, were little better than open latrines, and as 
such these went unused. Slit trenches, in any case, would have provided no protection 
from overhead.  Given the lack of preparations made for workers safety in the event of an 
air raid - four years into the war, and after seven previous bombings of the docks - one is 
forced to wonder at the temerity of later statements, in several analogously worded 
reports, that lamented, "casualties would mostly have been avoided had people taken 
proper cover."43
The luckiest of the workers, perhaps, were those who successfully escaped the 
dock area once the shelling began.  These laborers, it seems, may have been following the 
lead of the American military personnel in the area, who made great haste for the dock 
gates when the bombs began to fall. The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta penned a 
complaining note to P. D. Martyn, Secretary of the Government of Bengal, a few days 
after the bombings.  In it the Commissioners testily requested that "orders be issued that 
soldiers working in the Dock area must take cover in the Dock area.  We want coolies to 
do this but they certainly will not as long as men in uniform rush for the gates 
immediately when they hear sirens."  The "behavior of the American Negro troops," the 
Commissioners noted in particular, "was disgraceful."
  
44
While reporting to control on the siren from the chummery, I happened to be near 
the above entrance.  There was in front of me a jeep and American truck [and here 
it is penciled into his typewritten report: "with white Americans"] proceeding 
towards the dock.  As soon as the dock siren was audible the truck immediately 
stopped and turned in the opposite direction, away from the dock, and in turning I 
went passed and saw a man lying in a precarious condition on the road, where the 
truck had backed and turned.
  It does seem that disparagement 
of American black soldiers may have been a recurrent theme in explaining the chaos on 
the docks.  The report of a Kidderpore Fire Brigade worker, stationed near the dock gates, 
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 British soldiers appear to have "stood to" with more fortitude, but contributed 
considerably to the panic.  A Military Police Security Control Officer on the spot 
describes the scene near the coaling docks as chaotic.  Military lorries, parked too close 
together relayed the coal berth fires across to the warehouse sheds.  Other lorries had flat 
tires and blocked emergency vehicles from entering the area.  Troops poured in from 
ships and adjacent areas and "using their own stretchers, gathered the casualties together, 
sending then off to Hospital in army lorries."46  This practice led to a later opacity 
concerning the numbers killed or injured. In other places British soldiers "seized  Port 
A.R.P. stretchers, vehicles, etc., blocked roads by parking vehicles haphazardly, and 
generally speaking made it impossible for the Port A.R.P. to function in an organized 
fashion."47
This subordination of the A.R.P to military personnel during the bombing - after 
four years of training, exercises and pay-rolling - is a telling demonstration of the true 
level confidence that had been invested in this organization of "local" loyalists. The 
A.R.P. had been widely utilized by Government as a vehicle of propaganda, co-opting 
influential Hindu citizens into the "war-effort."  Their "drills" had been planned (even 
before Japan entered the war) to  instill a sense of "emergency" in the population.  They 
had been used to police the urban populations of Bengal during disturbances that had 
nothing to do with Britain's war.  They had also been posted in front of control shops to 
"keep the peace" when citizens of the city were clamoring for food,  and, during the "food 
drive," they had been deputized to seize supplies of rice from private citizens. Once 
famine victims began to "pollute" the streets of Calcutta, they were sent out to round 
them up, by force if necessary, or to cart off their dead bodies to the nearest crematorium 
or burial ground.  Now that bombs were falling and decimating the docks, however, the 
Air Raid Precautions services were unceremoniously pushed aside and superceded. 
  Both the Port A.R.P. Controller and the 24 Pargana Controller (responsible 
for the immediately adjacent areas) complained that the military had grossly interfered 
with their operations.    
 Not that the A.R.P. wasn't having considerable difficulties of its own.  In what 
would become a highly controversial report a Military Police Control Officer stationed on 
                                                 
46 Ibid, M.P.S.C.O.'s  Memorandum 21/sco/80 to the Chief of the General Staff  
47 Ibid 
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the docks observed that "during the period between the first bomb and the 'all-clear,' Civil 
Defence Departments were conspicuous by their absence; the entire fire fighting, first aid, 
and rescue work being done by the fighting services."48  A general lack of coordination, 
coupled with public distrust, contributed significantly to the A.R.P.'s ineffectiveness.  
A.R.P. Controller for Bengal, A. S. Hands, for one, was in bed with malaria on the 5th of 
December when the bombs began to fall and so could not oversee the local operations in 
the port and its surrounding areas.49 Additionally, the Controllers for both the port and 
the 24 Parganas complained that they were unable to contact the Chief Civil Defence 
Commissioner at any time during the raid to request advice or reinforcement.  A call had 
been made in the very short interval between the red warning and the commencement of 
bombing, but after that "there was no response on the telephone."50
Outside of the dock area, the scenario was almost comically similar to the "drills" 
of 1939.
 The office of the Port 
A.R.P. was thus totally isolated in its efforts, even though it "badly needed assistance." 
The A.R.P. first aid stations in the port were similarly "swamped," and wholly unable to 
cope with the crisis at hand.  
51  Warning sirens were not distinctly heard in many places, and in Howrah the 
sirens failed to sound at all.  In most localities of the city, the Calcutta A.R.P. Controller 
noted, citizens were averse to following directions from A.R.P. officers, and disorder 
ruled the day.  Though several bombs did fall in Calcutta proper, causing at least 34 
casualties, the public remained skeptical of A.R.P. authority.  Slit trenches, left un-
cleaned for many months, were almost entirely ignored, and in many areas of he city 
inhabitants refused to take any shelter at all, preferring to watch the spectacle of the 
Japanese attack from their rooftops.  In Bhawanipur "people were out in the open and 
some groups were gazing towards the sky."52
                                                 
48 Ibid, Memo 21/SCO/80 
  In the Park Street area, "coolies" ignored 
the siren and continued to work.  In a telling redaction in the report on the same, the 
original: "a Warden collected 50 coolies who were not in shelter, formed them up into a 
line, and marched them in a military manner to a public shelter at 30 Park Street;" was 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 See Chapter One 
52 WBSA, Hone Confidential, file  W-30/43. 
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changed to "...marched them in an orderly manner... ." 53
At 1 P.M., after two waves of heavy bombings, the All-Clear signal was sounded.  
The docks lay in almost total ruins. The coal berths had been razed by fire, along with as 
many as 15 of the 29 storage sheds lining the perimeter.  The Bengal-Nagpur Railways 
yard had suffered extensive damage, with at least 50 wagons and one engine destroyed in 
the attacks.  The tracks leading out from the yard had also been heavily damaged by anti-
personal shrapnel and heavy explosive bombs. In the basin the burned out hulks of 11 
barges, 3 ships (the SS Matheson, SS Nauchung and the SS Irtria), 1 dredger, and 4 tug 
boats smoldered on the water.  Large sections of the "coolie lines" along the Eastern 
Boundary Road had been devastated by fire and the electrical supply to the dock area had 
been cut.  The area was also strewn with hundreds of corpses, both human and animal, 
untended and unclaimed,  that began to rot in the afternoon sun.  The gates of the docks 
remained unmanned and within a few hours hundreds of curious on-lookers were entering 
the area to survey the damage and collect "souvenirs." There was no security within the 
dock complex in the wake of the bombings, and "crowds were allowed to collect around 
the [dead] bodies, resulting in very exaggerated rumors."
  The slippage between the 
policing and the protecting function of the A.R.P. revealed by this rewrite is apt: the 
exercise of ad hoc "emergency" authority over a refractory population needs to be relayed 
not as a "military marching" - which would imply martial control -  but as an "orderly" 
shepherding in the name of "security" - which would imply patriarchal concern.  
54
At the same time, a steady flow of traffic away from the dock and industrial areas 
was picking up pace - even though the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance of 
1941 had made it a crime punishable by up to a year in jail for dock and factory laborers 
to "abandon" their place of employment.  Along Garden Reach Road, the main axial 
roadway running through dockland, a column of approximately 7,000 workers was 
reported moving towards points unknown.  Along the Grand Trunk Road, the main 
highway out and into the districts, another group of an estimated 2,000 "coolies," with 
 Confusion, chaos and 
disorganization, as well as an administratively expedient rewriting of events, continued 
for many days to come.   
                                                 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid, Port A.R.P. Report 
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bullock carts loaded down with personal belongings, was fleeing the city.  From Bird and 
Company's dock complex as many as 10,000 contract laborers "absconded immediately 
after the raid,"  leaving the firm with less than half of its workers, and workers employed 
by the Port Commission directly also fled in large numbers, only 1,800 of the enumerated 
11,000 laborers staying behind.  From the Hooghly Jute Mill, 80% of workers quickly 
decamped or otherwise "disappeared,"  and the surviving portion of the B.N.R.'s heavily 
bombed out sweepers' quarters also "ran away" in mass.  Reports from the Chamber of 
Commerce suggested that many, if not most, of the workers who had "absconded" were 
"lying up" in the adjoining neighborhoods of Kidderpore, Mominpore, Watganj and 
Garden Reach.  What percentage of these same workers had actually been killed in the 
bombing is a question that is extremely difficult to answer, and is one to which I will 
return. 
However ill-compensated, ill-protected and marginally affiliated much of the 
dock, railway and mill labor was, they still remained "essential" - at least in theory - to 
the prosecution of war and profit.  As such the "morale" of the dock and industrial labor 
was carefully monitored and engineered - by force - where possible.  The post-raid 
A.R.P. report from the Bengal-Nagpur Railway noted that "an attempted exodus on the 
part of outsiders by the Shalimar Ferry [which would have taken them across the river to 
relative safety] was checked."55
                                                 
55 Ibid, B.N.R.'s Post-Raid Report (emphasis mine) 
  Under what authority and by what means the B.N.R. was 
able to arrest the movement of laborers who were not in their direct employment is not 
specified.  Nor is it mentioned by what means and under what conditions these same 
workers were detained within the dock complex against their will.  Stevedores and other 
essential dock hands were, on the other hand, "housed in camps under military control," 
and, as such, could be more easily restrained from fleeing.  In this context a note from the 
Port Commission that several hundred of its own "essential labor" had been 
"accommodated in a warehouse shelter as a measure to instill confidence," also hints at a 
euphemistic usage of "accommodation."  If the living remained essential to labor 
management, however, the dead had become anything but a "priority."  As night fell on 
Calcutta, corpses still littered the docks, unclaimed, unidentified and untended.  At night 
the crowds of "sightseers" were replaced by crowds of looters who stepped over the 
 240 
bodies to ransack the docks for any unburned coal or other commodities left behind by 




In the morning many of the corpses remained where they had fallen, and front 
page headlines in The Statesman relayed the official report from the Government of India 
in New Delhi that " a number of bombs" had been dropped on "the Calcutta area," but 
that the damage had been "slight."57   The scenario may have been much more grim, the 
government communiqué went on, had the defence of the city not been so stalwart: "Our 
fighters intercepted the enemy aircraft and a heavy and effective a-a barrage was put 
up."58  No further information or specifics were given.  The report was, in fact, an 
exemplary model of succinct vaguery and misleading understatement - in close keeping 
with official orders.  In April of 1943, after the earlier air-raids on Calcutta, a Defense 
Circular was sent to all Provincial Governments and Chief Commissioners outlining the 
official protocol for reporting on raids.  The Joint Secretary of the Government of India 
directed that "the vital necessity for the most careful wording" of post-raid reports 
"should be impressed upon local military commanders."59  Instructions on the exact 
wording to be used were included.  No specific mention should be made of the specific 
target of the bombing: "this will be in general terms, i.e. 'Calcutta area,' not 'Docks 
Calcutta.'"60  The extent of the destruction should also be left indefinite: "where 
necessary to publish any mention of damage the general terms 'slight,' 'moderate,' and 
'heavy' or synonyms of these will be used.  These terms will have no relation to any 
specific numbers of casualties."61  As to the number of casualties, the instruction went on, 
"an underestimate is better."62
Such obfuscation, however, failed its first test.  The lack of information, and the 
discrepancy between the information officially and unofficially circulated, created 
resentment and only served to heighten anxieties. Rumors quickly began to spread about 
   
                                                 
56 Ibid 
57 The Statesman,  "Jap's First Daylight Raid on Calcutta,"  December 6, 1943 
58 Ibid 
59 WBSA, Home Political, file W-296/43 
60 Ibid, (emphasis in the original) 
61 Ibid (emphasis mine.) 
62 Ibid 
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extensive damage to the docks and heavy casualties, and that much of the labor force 
associated with the docks had "melted" into surrounding residential areas only 
accelerated the dissemination of unofficial information. Dock workers had witnessed the 
attack first hand, and the fear that they carried with them out of the docks was contagious. 
They, themselves, were in a state of "extreme nervousness as a result of the casualties 
which took place among them."63  It was well known, moreover, that damage to the dock 
area had been anything but "slight," with plumes of smoke and ash from the attack being 
seen as much as two miles away.64  Additionally, as the gates of the docks had been left 
unprotected, hundreds of "sightseers" had surveyed the wreckage and seen corpses still 
littering the docks and had carried these impressions back home with them.  That "very 
exaggerated" reports of damage quickly took hold amongst the population of Calcutta, 
then, is not all that surprising, particularly in relation to the obviously specious official 
declarations published in the press.  Even labor managers complained of an "almost 
complete lack of [accurate] authoritative information," which made it impossible to rally 
"morale."65
The claim, furthermore, that the attack had been effectively countered by the 
Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and anti-aircraft fire, also rang extremely hollow.  In none of 
the subsequent A.R.P. reports were either mentioned.  Rather, the report from the Bengal-
Nagpur Railway was typical in citing consternation at the fact that "so many planes were 
allowed to fly over targets in perfect formation and drop bombs with no apparent 
opposition."
   
66  The Statesman accused the armed forces of complacency and speculated 
that perhaps "the well known British disposition for relaxation over the week-end" might 
explain the manifest lack of opposition with which the Japanese attack was met.67
Indian opinion is strongly critical of the R.A.F,'s failure to protect Calcutta; the 
success of the raid has caused some to think that the stories of R.A.F. successes 
elsewhere are exaggerated; others think that the British cannot defend Calcutta 
from air-attack.  British opinion is even more strongly critical and is indignant 
 The 
Calcutta A.R.P. report outlined more general sentiments: 
                                                 
63 Ibid, "Bengal Chamber of Commerce Labor Conditions" 
64 Ian Stephens, in Monsoon Morning, remembers that clouds of smoke and ash could be seen emerging 
from the dock area shortly after the bombing began.  Stephens was at the Statesman building, 
approximately two miles distant from the docks. 
65 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-30/43 
66 Ibid, B.N.R. Report 
67 The Statesman, "Sunday Morning," December 6, 1943 
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 Efforts at damage control only further destabilized a precarious situation.  On the 
morning of December 6th, at 9:20 A.M., the air-raid sirens began to wail again, and again 
chaos ensued.  The remaining dock labor ran for the nearest exit gates and the military, 
again, also fled in fear.  The sky, however, remained empty.  Hooghly Jute Mills, which 
was trying to get up and running with only 20% of their staff reporting, gave up the effort 
for the day and waited.  In the adjoining neighborhoods there was anxiety and trepidation, 
but still no sign of Japanese bombers.  The morning passed in a state of dread. Then, at 1 
P.M., the All-Clear siren sounded.  It had been a false alarm.  Exactly how or why the 
sirens had sounded was a mystery.  That it was an "unauthorized" sounding was 
confirmed later, but no explanation was forthcoming.  The Port sirens had been the first 
to go and this warning had set off a chain reaction throughout the surrounding areas.  The 
Chamber of Commerce complained that their efforts to rally labor morale had been 
"frustrated" by the false alarm, and the Commissioner of Police began an investigation.   
The delay in the sounding of the "all-clear" had been purposeful, however.  Seeing the 
reaction to the initial alarm  - even when it had been confirmed that it had been a false 
one - the Port A.R.P. hesitated to sound the "all-clear," potentially adding to the chaos.  
"It is true that coolies cannot distinguish between the Warning and All Clear," the 
Additional Secretary wrote to the Port A.R.P. Controller, "but others can and the fact that 
the signal heard was the 'Raiders Passed' would soon be known to all.  The sounding of 
the 'Raiders Passed' would certainly cause temporary panic, but in the long run it would 
be better than keeping up indefinitely the state of uncertainty."69
                                                 
68  WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-30/43 
  The following morning 
there was another false alarm, which was followed by a more prompt "all-clear" 
sounding, but little could be done, at this point, to shore up confidence.  Later in the 
afternoon publicity vans made their rounds through the docks, broadcasting assurances 
that all was well and that it was perfectly safe to return to work.  However, less than 20% 
of the dock labor showed up for work on the third morning, and Bird and Company 
reported that its labor was still "lying up in and around Calcutta." Boosting morale was a 
69 Ibid 
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hard sell.  The attack itself had been devastating, very little warning had been given, no 
defense had been mounted, shelter had been inadequate, the official line on the attack had 
been patently specious, rumors were spreading unabated, and, to make matters worse, 
dead bodies, uncollected and unidentified, still littered the docks, even on the third day, 
and had begun to stink in the December sun.70
 
  Besides the inconvenience of the odor of 
rotting co-workers (and perhaps family members), the disregard shown these corpses 
stood as an all-too-obvious material example of the true "priority" that had been granted 
to their ranks. 
Bodies 
 In an ancient - but still popular - Indian folk tale, "The King and the Corpse," a 
famous and powerful king becomes indebted to a wandering beggar who has paid him 
unexpected tribute.  For the riches that the beggar has bestowed on the king, the 
Sovereign agrees to do the beggar a favor.  The favor that the beggar asks of the king is 
for him to bring a corpse to the burning ground, where the mendicant, who is also a 
sorcerer, will perform certain rites on the corpse to enrich his own power.  The king 
dutifully goes to a site in the forest where the corpse is hanging from a tree, cuts down 
the corpse, heaves it over his shoulder, and begins his long march to the funeral ground.  
The corpse, however, is possessed by a spirit that awakens when it is slung over the 
king's shoulder.  As the king proceeds, the spirit quizzes him with a series of morality 
tales, in the form of riddles, that test the king's enlightenment.  With each correct answer, 
the corpse slips from the king's grasp and returns to the tree from which it was originally 
found hanging.  Each time the king, again, cuts down the corpse, heaves it over his 
shoulder and heads off to the cremation ground to meet the beggar. But each time, again, 
the corpse tests the king and, again, ends up slipping from his grasp. The tale can be 
interpreted in a number of ways, but here I reference it only to point out the relationship 
between sovereign power and the corpse.  That the idea of the corpse as the king's 
recurrent burden and moral interrogator is well entrenched in Indian literature, is 
interesting - and is of special relevance to this analysis.   
                                                 
70 Ibid  
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 In many ways, 1943 could be considered the "year of the corpse" in Bengal.  In 
the latter half of the year, in particular, the corpse had become a ubiquitous and material 
"social fact."  That there were as many as 1.5 million lives lost to famine in 1943, also 
means that there were as many as 1.5 million corpses that remained behind and had to be 
dealt with - or not.  The tremendous weight  - in both material and socio-political terms - 
of these corpses put an enormous bio-political strain on Bengal society and 
administration.  The management of corpses represented a recurrent moral riddle that had 
to be solved.  In the preceding chapter I outlined the treatment of corpses during famine.  
Some were retained in "constructive possession" of the state, others were turned over to 
religious organizations for removal, and still others were thrown unceremoniously into 
rivers and canals.  Many remained untouched where they had fallen and became a feast 
for wild dogs and vultures.  Overall, the relationship of the corpse to "the king" during 
famine, it can be said, was dependent on its differential relation to power.  Corpses that 
proved compromising to colonial power - primarily those in Calcutta - where "unclean" 
and had to be removed promptly and through official channels.  Corpses that did not 
impinge on the functioning of the state were left to fate.  
The treatment of the corpse, moreover, also provides a clue to the value attributed, by the 
state, to the life that once resided in it.  Because the corpse consists of only the material 
aspect of being, without the contingency of agentive contradiction or contest, it is a kind 
of tabula rasa upon which the script of power is most clearly inscribed.  The corpse, in 
this regard, represents the limits of essentialism. The ways that corpses were labeled, 
enumerated, categorized, and disposed of, demonstrate what was officially imagined to 
be the unchanging essence of the existence that the corpse now represents - whether 
useless, dangerous, insignificant, or otherwise.  In this sense corpses represent an 
ideological map to the psychological terrain of power. The way that bodies were handled 
during and after the air raids, moreover, was both an example of all that had been learned 
during the famine - and was also a template for what was to come.  Most importantly the 
primary - and at times sole - distinction that was made by the state was whether the 
corpse was "Hindu" or "Muslim."  This simplistic binary distinction had become so 
ingrained in administrative thought that it was understood, by this time, as the only 
necessary categorization.  The colonial state was, in this sense, reifying a cultural 
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difference, by means of corpses, that would parallel the political distinction that was used 
to "divide and rule" India. The idea that Hindu-ness or Muslim-ness adhered to the very 
body of the population, moreover, was a subtle license to violence against the bodies of 
the "other." 
 
The A.R.P., it should be noted, had its own corpse disposal squads, which had been 
drilled and trained in accordance with the A.R.P. Services Ordinance of 1941, and  
further authority had been granted to the organization to constitute its own mortuary 
services early in 1943.71  The removal of corpses thus was understood to be a central 
responsibility of the Civil Defence Services.  The A.R.P., moreover, had gained extensive 
experience removing corpses from the streets of Calcutta during the famine.  Their 
lorries, in fact, were still removing starvation victims from the city's streets when the 
December 5th bombing took place. Those on the verge of death, however, though also 
handled by the A.R.P., could not be taken to A.R.P. hospitals, where hundreds of beds 
remained vacant, despite the acute lack of medical facilities.  These hospitals were 
reserved for air raid casualties only.72  When the bombing actually took place, however, 
it appears that both the A.R.P. corpse disposal squads, as well as the A.R.P. hospitals, 
served little purpose, which led to an obfuscation, also, of the number of lives lost during 
the bombings.  The earliest reports from the A.R.P. Controllers of the Port and the B.N.R. 
note that the R.A.F. interceded in casualty recovery efforts at every juncture, and began 
loading bodies onto military transport vehicles, almost immediately, and removing them 
to unknown destinations.73 Seth Drucquer, the Office-in-Charge of the Post Raid 
Information Services, responsible for gathering casualty statistics, noted on the 6th that 
the removal of "large numbers" of casualties by military personnel to military hospitals, 
severely hampered efforts to count the dead and the injured. Bodies were also shifted to 
several other non-A.R.P. hospitals, and even moved between unauthorized medical 
facilities without explanation or official documentation.74
                                                 
71 WBSA, Home Political, file W-112/43 "Constitution of Mortuary Services under the A.R.P. Services 
Ordinance, 1941." 
 Moreover, the vast majority of 
72 Casey's Diaries, p. 338 
73 Ibid, first reports from the Port A.R.P. and the B.N.R. A.R.P. 
74 Ibid, Civil Defence Information Office, Final Report 
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these casualties, both the dead and the injured, remained "unidentified," which led to 
further confusion. 
 Drucquer himself, when he received word through unofficial channels that bodies 
had been taken to the Indian Military Hospital, "by members of the armed forces without 
the knowledge of the Port Commission A.R.P. authorities," visited the hospital to collect 
statistics.  There Drucquer found considerable "irregularities in the situation."75  No list 
of persons admitted had been kept, no record of treatments administered was existent, 
and no attempt to identify the casualties had been made.  The Deputy Supervisor of the 
Port precinct also visited the Indian Military Hospital and reported that the Military 
Officer in charge could not even tell him of the exact number of casualties brought in, nor 
how many were dead or alive.  The treatment given to the injured was also far from 
adequate, "nothing but tincture iodine being applied in many cases."76  Nor were there 
beds available for these mostly poor and marginal "essential workers."  They were 
housed outside the hospital in army tents, and held throughout the cold December night 
"without adequate clothing or blankets."  Those interviewed by Drucquer complained that 
they had not been given food and no proper sanitation facilities had been arranged.  In 
effect, conditions starkly analogous to those prevailing throughout the famine-stricken 
province were recreated in microcosm at the Indian Military Hospital.  The evidence 
pertaining to casualties of the raids taken to the British Military Hospital is less 
documented.  When Drucquer paid a visit to this hospital he was simply "refused 
admittance," and no information at all could be collected.  At the private, Campbell 
Hospital, Civil Defence Information Office staff were similarly denied access and 
hospital administrators "refused to give any details regarding the dead bodies collected 
there."77
 Other bodies, not taken into military custody, where the subject of considerable 
uncertainty as well.  Concerning these copses confusion reigned between the police, the 
A.R.P., and the Calcutta Corporation as to their "respective responsibilities."
 
78
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  Despite 
the fact that the port had been the target of all previous attacks on Calcutta, and casualties 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid  
78 Ibid 
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had been inflicted in these bombings as well, the Bengal Nagpur Railways A.R.P. 
Controller complained that no clear instructions on removing dead bodies had been 
given.  The Port A.R.P., for its part, followed the famine model, making over bodies to 
the Hindu Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam, ensuring proper funeral rites to 
the dead in relation to religious community - though the majority of those killed were 
otherwise recorded as "unidentified."  The B.N.R. A.R.P. also recorded the religious 
community of the dead that were collected under its auspices, but little else. In his initial 
report, the A.R.P. Controller for the B.N.R. noted that A.R.P. "sanitation sweepers" had 
assisted R.A.F. personnel and "other European officers" in lifting bodies onto R.A.F. 
lorries, but admitted later that it had lost track of many casualties in the process.79
 Obviously, under such conditions, even a rough estimate of the number killed 
during the bombing of December 5th, 1943 becomes extremely difficult.  In his final 
report, Drucquer - on a line penciled in and rough with erasure marks - reported the total 
number of dead, "as revealed," at 335.  To put this in perspective, it might be noted that 
during the first air attack by the German Luftwaffe on England during the "blitz," 436 
Londoners were killed, and it was considered a catastrophic event.  The number killed on 
the docks, however, remains highly inconclusive.  The Secretary to the Home 
Department of the Government of Bengal, himself, remained skeptical, reporting to the 
General Secretary that the Port A.R.P numbers were "very doubtful." He warned that 
government would have to "explain that the removal of large numbers of casualties to a 
military hospital has made the compilation of accurate statistics virtually impossible."
  The 
police, for their part, removed an unspecified number of corpses to the nearby 
Mominpore morgue, where the bodies lay for several days in tight "files," again without 
identification or enumeration. And then there were also an unspecified number of corpses 
that somehow fell out of the jurisdiction of all the official parties involved and "had never 
been touched" - even three days after the raid.  
80
                                                 
79 Ibid.  For the assistance of sanitation workers see B.N.R. Initial Report, for losing track, see Final Report. 
  
The Secretary replied that he would issue the necessary caveat about the dead removed to 
military hospitals, and also noted that a "considerable number of casualties... occurred on 
80 bid, Kitchin to Martyn 
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board ships and on freighters and barges."81 He presumed that these would be recorded 
by the Port A.R.P., but the Port A.R.P.'s numbers in its final report failed to include those 
killed on the water - many of whom were most likely khalasis.  Nor was there any 
attempt to estimate those bodies that had been consumed by fire or otherwise destroyed, 
leaving no remains behind at all.  Fires in the congested "coolie lines," in particular, 
raged unabated for several hours and large portions of the encampments lay in complete 
ruins by late afternoon.  A Military Security Control Officer, stationed in the area, noted 
that during the bombings he had seen "nothing being done by Civil Defence Services.  It 
is understood," he continued, "that the firefighting services were busy elsewhere, but the 
coolies, who were a high percentage of the casualties, received no help from First Aid, 
Rescue, or Ambulance Squads until after the 'All Clear.'"82
 The pervasive disregard, disrespect and even disgust, with which the bodies of 
these (poor) laborers were treated reveals important aspects of the colonial mindset at the 
time - aspects which contributed significantly to the mentality of debasement, erasure and 
de-prioritization that led to famine. While these bodies served any economic or political 
purpose, they were touted "essential."  Once their utility had been negated - as corpses - 
they became a "security risk," endangering the war effort (by registering the success of 
Japan's attack), encumbering the administration (by the awkward materiality of their 
corpses), and generating rumors (that threatened efforts at damage control.)  Their bodies, 
for the most part, had to be whisked from public sight, denied, obscured and, ultimately, 
forgotten. Far from being protected or prioritized, they had been defiled, degraded, or 
entirely neglected once their utility had been - violently - revoked.  This fact exposes the 
myth of patriarchal concern for the industrial labor of Calcutta that consecutive programs 
of appropriation, "denial," and militarization all banked on, and reveals the emptiness of 
the rhetoric that justified much of the official policy that precipitated mass starvation in 
Bengal.  Ultimately, during the air-raid, these "essential workers" fared little better than 
poor villagers during famine. Their violent deaths, except for the risks to "security" that 
was entailed, meant next to nothing to the colonial state.  Despite claims to the contrary; 
they were expendable, insignificant and very easily dehumanized. 
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 But something perhaps even more troubling was revealed in terms of the 
"essence" assigned to these dead bodies by the colonial state.  Of the 335 corpses 
officially counted in the Post Raid Information Service's (P.R.I.S.) Final Report, 260 
were recorded as "unidentified." In other words, nothing at all was known of their names, 
ages, places of origin, marital status or employment affiliation.  The Officer-in-Charge of 
P.R.I.S. attributed this shortcoming to several different causes.  Non-A.R.P. hospital, he 
complained, had made no attempt to gather information on the bodies brought to them.  
In many cases, "they were allowed to die without identification even though there would 
have plenty of time to ask their names [at least] before they died."  A.R.P. wardens, 
moreover, had entirely failed to do so themselves at the time when the injured were 
collected.  Drucquer also pointed out that "identity discs," which were supposed to be 
issued by employers, were nowhere to be found.  The B.N.R. Railway, in particular had a 
large number of unidentified casualties that might have been positively identified had 
discs been issued.  In addition, denial of access to the bodies, quick disposal, and 
improper preservation had obviated identification by family members after the raid. 
Tarak Nath Halder, for one, was admitted to the Indian Military Hospital on the 5th.  The 
Deputy Supervisor had recorded his name and condition when Halder had been brought 
in, but when his father arrived the next day to locate his son, "no trace of Tarak Nath 
Halder could be found and the doctors were unable to state whether he had died in the 
meantime."83
The police, as well as the A.R.P. and hospital authorities had also failed to take 
necessary measures that might have facilitated identification of corpses, though according 
to official protocol it was ultimately the responsibility of the police to identify the dead.  
Of primary importance in this regard, was the task of photographing corpses so that 
subsequent identification could be made by relations of the deceased.  These photographs 
were to be forwarded to the Post Raid Information Service, which had been operating in 
the same capacity for several months in relation to the identification of famine victims. In 




                                                 
83 Ibid 
 Drucquer, in his report to the Chief of Civil Defense Services, 
84 Ibid 
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noted that the police had not gained access to many of the bodies until several days after 
the raids, and noted that though "there [was] a provision for the Police to photograph 
unidentified dead bodies after raids... by the time the Police arrived, they were too much 
decomposed for such photographs to be of any value."85  In a hand written and 
parenthetical addendum Drucquer added that "probably the Police, like the P.R.I.S., were 
not informed of the whereabouts of casualties until it was too late."86  The Police 
Commissioner himself also defended the record, denying delay on their part, while 
placing blame elsewhere.  Their primary concern, he reported, had been "to have the dead 
bodies removed from sight as early as possible."  They had attempted to take photographs 
at the Mominpore morgue, where many corpses had been stacked, but "there was 
difficulty in arranging the dead bodies for photography... [as] the doms refused to move 
them into proper position."87
Although the corpses accounted for were thus disposed of without name, physical 
description, or any personalized record that would facilitate future identification, there 
was, in the last analysis, one single mark of classification assigned to most of the bodies.  
Given that these same bodies had been left to rot, had been denied care, and had been all 
but systematically denied, the trace of "identification" that was recorded has to be 
understood as the state's most "essential" distinction of all - one that would adhere to 
even an anonymous body, deprived of all social connection, dignity or recognition. That 
last trace, interestingly enough, was religious affiliation. As in the case of famine deaths, 
however, the method of determining the distinction between a "Hindu" and a "Muslim" 
corpse is difficult to fathom.  Because the only physical characteristic (which is limited to 
male corpses) that might be of value in this regard is to check males for circumcision - 
Muslims are generally circumcised, whereas Hindus are not - a genital examination of the 
corpses seems to be the only means by which such determinations could possibly have 
 This rebellion on the part of the doms against carrying out 
their normal role is a telling indicator of the times.  The doms - the most marginal of all 
"employees" - were, at this time, suffering themselves from the ravages of famine and 
disease, but could not be persuaded, even by police authority, to do the dirty work of 
Empire.   





been made.  Apart from the very questionable ethics of such a means of "identification," 
one is forced to wonder how it is that, though the bodies of many of the dead had been 
allowed to decompose to a point that photographs were "useless," a genital examination 
would have provided positive "proof" of religious identity.  
In any case, an "essential" assessment along these lines was somehow made, and 
remained the sole identification that the majority of corpses were granted - much to the 
chagrin of the Officer-in-Charge of the Post Raid Information Service.  In his Final 
Report to Government, Drucquer explains: 
The labels which the Police tie on to unidentified dead bodies and of which a 
copy is given to P.R.I.S. contain a column for marks of identification on the body.  
A very large number of labels received did not have this column filled up, only 
one words being entered, such as; "Muslim," or "Hindu."  This is of no use at all 
in establishing identification subsequently. 
 
It is a chilling fact that in the dehumanizing darkness of war and famine, this one simple 
and explosive distinction was all that was required any longer in demarcating the 
disposable citizens of Calcutta. It is furthermore, a similarly telling and chilling 
foreshadowing of the darkness still to come.  It serves too as a reminder of the 
administrative dividing line, at once taken for granted and cynically deployed.   
       
Settling Accounts 
 The Essential Services [Maintenance] Ordinance of 1941 had made it a criminal 
offence for any worker engaged in "essential" war-related industries and enterprises from 
abandoning their station of employment without "reasonable excuse," under penalty of 
imprisonment.  "The fact that a person apprehends that by continuing in his employment 
he will be exposed to increased physical danger," it was noted, "does not constitute a 
reasonable excuse."88
                                                 
88 Bhattacharya, p. 41 
  The threat of imprisonment it was understood, however, would do 
little to assuage the fears of current workers and might actually discourage labor 
recruitment.   The War Injuries Insurance Ordinance, promulgated in the same year, was, 
in effect, a companion - and counterbalance - to the Essential Services Ordinance.  Under 
the War Injuries Ordinance any individual "gainfully occupied" in war-related industries 
was entitle to compensation in the case of injury "caused by the impact on any person or 
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property [by] any enemy aircraft."89
In the days following the December 5th air raid, both the central and sub-area 
offices of the Post Raid Information Service were swamped with relatives of dock 
workers who had gone "missing" during the attack.  The agency, however, was only able 
to satisfy a "very limited number of enquiries... owing to the large number of unidentified 
cases."
  Reparation was to be worked out in accordance with 
the Workers' Compensation Act of 1923, and as such, the risks of war were associated 
with the occupational risks of employment.  In the case of death, compensation would be 
made to the nearest of kin according to the same payment scheme.  The War Injuries 
(Compensation Insurance) Act of 1943 reinforced the provisions of the earlier ordinance, 
clarifying that the liability of compensation was to rest on employers, who were 
subsequently to be reimbursed under the provision of the (mandatory) War Risks 
Insurance Ordinance.  
90   Applicants missing relatives had come not only to locate the whereabouts of 
their kin for sentimental reasons, but also to file insurance claims against the deaths of 
their family members - in extremely hard times. It was the responsibility of the P.R.I.S., 
its Officer-in-Charge explained to the Bengal Secretariat, to assist "relatives of persons 
killed in filling up forms for claims under the War Injuries Scheme."91 However, 
Drucquer informed his superiors, the lack of identification of the majority of corpses had 
made it "impossible to enable claims to be filed."92
The exculpation of the Civil Defense Services, the R.A.F. and the Port 
Commissioners for their contributions to the extent of damage and loss of life, as well as 
the chaos and mishandling of "rescue" efforts, was a much more delicate bureaucratic 
  It is likely that this state of affairs 
saved the capital interests operating in the dock area from the inconvenience of having to 
formally declare that the enumerated dead found on their premises after the raids, were 
"outsiders."  It is also likely that the lack of "identity discs" that contributed to the 
number of unidentified dead, further exculpated these same interests from paying 
compensation for their more "regular" employees who had been killed in the raid, but 
who had been left "unidentified."   
                                                 
89 War Injuries Ordinance, 1941.  At: http://bdlaws.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=192 (Last accessed 
July 8, 2010; 12:32 P.M.) 




affair.  A memo by one particular Military Police Security Control Officer, forwarded to 
the Chief of the General Staff, stated in paragraph #7 that, "during the period between the 
first bomb and the all clear, Civil Defense Departments were conspicuous by their 
absence - the entire fire-fighting, first aid and rescue work being done by the fighting 
services."93  This memo created quite a stir. The Chairman of the Port Commissioners, 
Sir Thomas Elderton - a well connected man and also the A.R.P. Controller for the Port - 
took sharp issue with the charges made by the military officer.  He wrote an indignant 
memo to the Bengal Secretariat deploring the accusations, and ensuring the Secretary that 
Civil Defense forces in the Port had acted swiftly and courageously.  The Bengal 
Secretariat, in turn, issued a note to the central Civil Defense Department of the 
Government of India, "to record its most profound disapproval of the action of the 
Military Security Control Officer."94  The Additional Secretary to the Government of 
India assured the Bengal Secretariat that "suitable steps [would be] taken to impress on 
the officer concerned the unfortunate repercussions which may result from derogatory 
comments on the Civil Services."95 The officer concerned, however, put it on record that 
his report had been "based entirely on personal experience," and, as such, could not be 
retracted.  In the end, however, the now infamous paragraph #7 of his report was changed 
to read: "During the period between the first bomb and the all clear there was delay in 
getting the Civil Defence Services into operation in some areas.  When they started to 
function, however, they worked satisfactorily."  E. R. Kitchin of the Bengal Secretariat 
sent an apology to Sir Thomas for the "injustices of the M.P.S.C.O.'s comments," and 
Elderton sent him back an appreciation for his good work, noting that "anyhow the man 
who made the mis-statements is no longer here."96
The question of the removal of bodies by British military personnel - rather than 
the A.R.P. - was a bit more difficult to resolve.  The same Military Police Security 
Control Officer had alleged in his controversial memo that "not one Indian civilian gave 
help or dared to touch a casualty," and that the R.A.F. had done all the removal of bodies 
themselves.  Alone this allegation may have been dealt with similar to the first.  
  
                                                 





However, both the B.N.R. and Port A.R.P. reports had complained of military 
interference with the removal of bodies, suggesting that their stretchers and ambulances 
had been commandeered by the military. Of special concern was the B.N.R,'s response to 
question 15 (i) on the A.R.P.'s "First Report" form: "Who did the actual handling and 
removal of corpses?"  The  - perhaps at the time, seemingly innocuous - answer was 
given: "R.A.F. and other European Officers volunteered to lift and remove bodies to 
mortuary in lorry loaded by the R.A.F.."97
The R.A.F., on the other hand, had accounts to settle of its own.  Reports in The 
Statesman and other media outlets that Calcutta had been left wholly unprotected rankled 
the forces.  Leslie Chippett of the R.A.F. remembers the accusation and its aftermath 
colorfully.  Chippett's squadron had just returned to Calcutta from Chittagong, less than 
24 hours earlier, and "although far from prepared [had] struggled to get some [obsolete] 
Hurricanes into the air." To no effect. 
  In the subsequent days, with the number of 
"unidentified" bodies generating public and administrative unease, the record was 
summarily clarified.  More than two weeks after the bombing, the A.R.P. Controller for 
the Railways sent a memo asking the Home Department to "kindly correct" query 15 (i) 
to read, in answer to who had moved corpses: "Volunteers from among the B.N.R. 
officials, and Indians, including a Sikh, 2 Brahmins, and Indian Christians of the B.N.R. 
Sanitary Staff... with the help of a lorry provided by No. 978 Squadron R.A.F.."  Nothing 
remained of the R.A.F. but the lorry, and in the place of their personnel, now sat this 
somewhat comical "rainbow coalition" of colonial Indian cooperation.    
Imagine the anger of the squadron from CO to the lowest [rank]when on the 
following Monday the Calcutta newspaper was very scathing, "Where was the 
RAF, do they have the weekend off?" It was decided to show these critics [who] 
sat at home with their gins, that the RAF did exist. On the following weekend a 
particularly important race meeting was to be held at Calcutta racecourse.  
Imagine the members chagrin when as the race commenced Hurricanes appeared 
at nought feet "beating up" the racecourse. Horses went everywhere and I believe 
the race was concluded in the slowest time on record. I saw no further criticisms 
of 67 or any other squadrons. Further to this there is a story about a camera gun, 
film or lack of it, and discrepancies regarding a "kill" made in that raid, but I'll 
leave that for another time.98
                                                 
97 Ibid, B.N.R. A.R.P. "First Report." 
 
98 Archived at BBC "People's War,"  http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/06/a4040506.shtml 
(last accessed July 8, 2010; 2:29 P.M.) 
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One can only imagine, also, the panic and fear that was inflicted on civilian "morale" 
when these same bombers came screaming out of the sky and "appeared at nought feet," 
exactly one week after the Japanese attack, and less then a mile from the docks.  
 Morale in docklands, in any case, continued to be "very low" for several weeks, 
despite assurances from the Defence Minister of the Government of India that "no panic 
ha[d] been caused by the raid and the normal life of the city is unaffected."99  In fact, the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce just a few days earlier had informed Government that, 
"[morale] fluctuates with anticipations or rumors of further raids: e.g. Sunday [the day the 
race track was "beat up"], because the last raid occurred on a Sunday, was a poor day."100  
The following week Bird and Company were reporting that much of their labor force was 
still absent, and the Hooghly Jute Mills were reporting only 30% attendance.101  The 
sweepers "quarters" in the B.N.R. yard had been demolished, and the sweepers had 
"disappeared."  Forty replacement sweepers had to be "recruited," but they were proving 
shaky as well.102 The Civil Defense Services were fairing little better.  An air raid alert 
over the docks on the 16th of December left the Captain of the Port Area Fire Service in a 
state of consternation.  Out of 126 men at his command, 59 had deserted when the sirens 
sounded.  To make matters worse, he added, "the men who deserted in some instances 
went away as much as a quarter of a mile from their stations.  Although Air Raid Shelters 
are provided in the Dock Area, these were not used."103
 But apart from - patently specious - official assurances printed in the newspapers, 
little was actually done to boost the all-important "morale" of the Indian population. A 
concerned business owner in the area posted a letter of protest on January 10th of 1944: 
  
Over one month has elapsed since the air raid on December 5th, and in the 
vicinity of our factory on Hide Road [Kidderpore], the only repairs which have 
been carried out appear to be those undertaken by the Calcutta Electric Supply 
Co. to their substation... all the small shops and bustees still remain exactly as 
they were a few hours after the raid.  The ruins of a Key-man shelter which was 
destroyed in the Port Commissioners' Depot have not been cleared away and is 
not exactly a good advertisement for Air Raid Precautions.  It occurs to us that at 
                                                 
99 The Statesman, "Sir F. K. Noon's Visit," December 7, 1943 





very small cost, and bearing in mind that in the War Risks Insurance Fund there is 
a sum of about 9 crores (900 million) rupees at the moment, all the necessary 
repairs to shops, buildings and dwelling houses in the area can be fully restored.  
The effect on morale and the propaganda which would be possible as a result 
needs no further elaboration.104
 
 
The Bengal Minister of Commerce, Labor and Industry investigated the situation and 
found that the War Risks Insurance Fund did not apply.  "Repairs to shops, buildings and 
dwelling houses damaged by air raids cannot be helped from this fund," he wrote, "a 
scheme for insurance against war damage to immovable property not covered by the 
[War Risks Insurance Fund] has been considered and rejected."105 By the end of the war 
the War Risks Insurance scheme had collected 4.2 billion rupees through mandated 
enlistment and had paid out less than 5 million.106 The Secretary of the Home 
Department was disappointed.  "The wording of the Metal Box Company's letter may 
[have been] unsuitable," he responded, "but there is something in what they say, viz: that 
air-raid damage should not be left just as it is indefinitely for all to see... this is not very 
satisfactory; i.e. a general denial of responsibility all around."107
 
 
Air Raid Damage 
 The house that my father grew up in, on Mominpore Road, was one of those 
dwellings that had been damaged in the raid, and was never made whole again.  Apart 
from the cracks in the foundation that had resulted from close proximity to the bomb 
blasts on the docks, there was also unseen damage seemed to linger on indefinitely.  My 
father carried with him, for the rest of his life, a profound and deep seated terror and 
anxiety that had been imprinted on him by this attack.  Our family's connection to the 
docks and to the air raids themselves had been, to be sure, uncommonly extensive.  His 
father, the retired policeman with dwindling accounts, had property along the docks in 
the bustee settlements of migrant laborers, whom he shook down for rent on most 
weekends.  My father's older brother - who even at this time was more or less the head of 
the household at 24 years of age - was an A.R.P. warden in Mominpore. Under his 
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106 Bhattacharya, p.40 
107  WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-30/43 
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jurisdiction the morgue, less than a mile from the house, also fell.  The neighborhood 
itself was inhabited mostly be underemployed and impoverished laborers associated with 
the docks and its concomitant factories, warehouses and workshops, and had been 
swamped after the bombing with terrified dock laborers "lying up" in its by-lanes and 
bazaars.  Flocks of "sightseers" had also moved through the area to observe the damage - 
and had moved back out bearing witness.  Nowhere in Calcutta, in fact, could the 
"rumors," panic and trepidation have been more pronounced.   
Surely the complex of factors involved must have impacted my father's young 
mind profoundly.  But it was simply, in fact, the actual visceral, terrifying and 
apocalyptic sound and magnitude of the blasts that had shattered his nerves and continued 
to haunt him throughout his life.  He had already lived in midst of famine, with bodies, 
particularly in that area of the city, pilling up on the streets day by day.  And he would 
live through, after only a very short interval, events that one would imagine would be 
even more deeply traumatic.  But, perhaps because of his age at the time, or perhaps 
because of his temperament, the impression left on him from bombing of the docks was 
the deepest and most nagging of all. He never described (and possibly could not have 
even processed at such an age) the details of the event.  In fact, from listening to his 
stories, I was under the impression that Calcutta had been bombed almost every night - as 
perhaps he was.  He only referred to the bombings as the shattering of windows, the 
cracking of the foundation, and the repeated ear splitting reports that made him feel that 
the world itself was coming to an end. It was a story without beginning or end.  No time 
frame or outline of events seemed to punctuate his memories and make them 
chronological.  The bombings, in this sense, were memory without context.   
Several accounts that I have heard or read from people who were children in 1943 
are similar in this way.  Though the bombings of Calcutta have been an almost unnoticed 
chapter in the modern history of India, or even Bengal, they do seem to hold a 
particularly prominent place in the memories of the children who lived through them. To 
give one example, below is the memory of one child at the time: 
I remember as a little girl aged 8 years old living in Calcutta during WW2 in our  
extended family. The Japanese bombed the city every night at that time as it was  
an important city and capital of the British Raj. As it was getting dark the air raid  
siren used to start and we all had to go into our basement room for safety. We  
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often had to stay for two hours or more until the all clear was sounded. We  
used to have our dinner early to eat before the air raids. As a little girl I used to  
always get very frightened during the bombing.108
 
 
The idea that the bombings took place "every night," although Calcutta suffered nothing 
of the sort, may, indeed, have more to do with "always being frightened" by the 
bombings that did occur, than with the frequency of the actual bombings. Undoubtedly 
there is a whole body of scholarship on the progress of post-traumatic stress in children, 
but that is beyond the scope of this present analysis.  Suffice it to say that every time a 
city is bombed in recent times, and its citizens are "shocked and awed" by the impact of 
weapons far more powerful than those that were in use in 1943 - and I reflect that in that 
city (of perhaps millions) there are a large proportion of children - I think of my father - 
and also of my mother, who wore a pin in the 70's, that read: "war is not healthy for 
children and other living things."    
 
                                                 
108 "Childhood in Calcutta," (italics mine) archived at BBC's "People's War," at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/34/a2780534.shtml (last accessed July 8, 2010; 4:50 P.M.) 
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 Once the famine had become an international news story, reporters flocked to 
Bengal to bear witness.  T. G. Narayan, of the Madras-based Hindu, arrived in September 
of 1943 and toured the famine-stricken districts of the province for several months. He 
compiled his observations in a book, Famine Over Bengal, published in the early months 
of 1944.  His tour of Bengal's country-side ended in the delta district of Barisal, by which 
time Narayan had seen enough. "There was too much misery around," he wrote, "the air 
was thick, heavy and foul with unrelieved distress, disease and degradation.  The famine 
had been more or less driven out of urban areas, but it was still there in the countryside."1
The city had had a raid - its heaviest - while I was away, and the air was heavy 
with talk about it.  My heart and mind were elsewhere.  I remembered the sights I 
had seen of human misery... and with a heavy heart I set to work to write of what 
I had seen.  It was not easy.  It was not pleasant.  Ten days' effort on the 
typewriter brought me to the previous chapter.  Thoroughly flagged out, I pushed 
away the typewriter, switched off the lights and got out onto the Maidan for a 
long walk by myself to collect my thoughts. It was pitch dark, except for 
occasional flashes of light from the overhead power-lines as the tram-cars' guide 
pulleys rolled along their joints.  The stars looked down on a sleeping world and 
everything seemed still in sleep.  But far out in the remote villages of Bengal, I 
knew, men, women and children were not sleeping the sleep that came to those 
who had a full meal after the day's toil.  Many of them were fever-stricken, 
hunger-stricken, and would have no sleep.   
 
Narayan had retreated to Calcutta to recuperate and compile his findings.  In Calcutta, 
however, he found little respite from the anxiety that his investigations had fostered: 
I asked myself what chances they had of being relieved in the present and 
of being saved in the months to come... With the promise of a bountiful harvest, 
was Bengal to turn the corner, and did she see ahead of her the prospect of safety?  
Or was there danger lurking in the dark future, hatching in the womb of time, 
ready to descend on a hapless people and smite them again?  Would there be a 
                                                 
1 Narayan, p. 218  
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repetition in 1944 of the holocaust of 1943?  Would Bengal's countryside be once 
again laid waste and strewn with the wrecks of her children... Were the people 
again going to die like trapped rats... with plenty of food all around? I found no 
hopeful answer,  The night air was crisp, but it failed to refresh my weary spirit 
and I turned for home.  It was very still and even the traffic had gone off the 
roads.  The stars had disappeared behind banks of clouds and, as I stumbled in 
and out of the baffle walls, the night chowkidar flashed his torch, stirred himself 
and said goodnight.  As a sign of recognition, he added, "It is a very dark night, 
Huzzoor, the Japanese won't come."  Not wholly awake to what he said, I 
answered, "Yes, it is a very black night, but there are many hours to go before it 
will be dawn."2
 
   
 
"Second Famine" 
 By December of 1943 it was apparent that the all-important aman crop, harvested 
in late autumn, would be a bumper crop. With London's continued refusal of imports, this 
promising aman yield, above all else, was being counted on to relieve famine.  The new 
Viceroy, Field Marshall Archibald Wavell had also managed to implement an extensive 
and efficient military relief operation, almost overnight. Major-General Stuart (in over-all 
charge of military assistance) had, at his command, twelve to fifteen thousand British 
troops to aid relief operations, and Major-General Wakely (in charge of movements) was 
given considerable transportation priority to move rice out of Calcutta and into the 
districts. Although the official line was still that famine had been precipitated by the 
hoarding of cultivators, orders were passed that seemed to belie a less perfunctory 
understanding of the causes of famine.  The export of rice and paddy from Bengal was 
strictly prohibited early in December.3   Direct purchases from large industrial firms were 
banned,4  and a ban was also levied on the movement of rice and paddy out of 12 
principle rice-growing districts.  Perhaps most importantly of all, the Central Government 
in New Delhi committed itself to feed Calcutta through direct imports from outside of 
Bengal.5
 Wavell himself was in Bengal in December for a second tour of the province.  At 
his first public speech as Viceroy, he encouraged members of the combined Chambers of 
  These measures, combined, would take immense pressure off the countryside, 
which was suffering incalculable misery at the expense of Calcutta. 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p. 223-234 
3 The Statesman, "Exports of Rice and Paddy Banned," December 2, 1943 
4 The Statesman, "Rice Purchase By Firms," December 13, 1943 
5 The Statesman, "Plan for Calcutta,"  December 22, 1043 
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Commerce in Calcutta to begin thinking about the future: "I do not propose here to enter 
into long consideration of how we reached our present difficulties," he informed the 
gathering, "our business is not to look back but to look ahead."6  The implication was 
clear, the Bengal famine was to be put away to history and business would go on as 
usual. The Food Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, Sir Jwala Prasad 
Srivastava, was even more sanguine.  He was also in Bengal in December, meeting with 
prominent citizens in Dacca, and - despite the fact that "several members of the public," 
had harassed him with complaints "about the shortage of rice in the city and mofussil, the 
quantities supplied through ward committees, scarcity of milk and the non-supply of 
mustard oil, kerosene and coal"7 - he had waxed optimistic. "We are now faced with the 
problem of the future," he announced, "the food crisis is probably over and I wish and 
pray that it may never occur again."8
So much for 1943... for me personally it has been a dull, uphill year with no 
highlights and a growing volume of abuse from India and from the Left here.  
Gandhi's fast and the famine - or rather the general economic overstrain of which 
the famine is only a symptom - have been my chief pre-occupations and my chief 
reward for having, from the outset, pushed on India's war effort in every 
direction.
  Secretary of State, Leopold Amery, from his 
remove in London, was more reflective.  On the last day of a difficult year, he sat in his 
private chamber and turned to his diary:  
9
 
   
On the 12th of January, 1944, in an obvious effort to punctuate the political 
embarrassment of starvation in India, Wavell telegraphed Amery in regards to a "Bengal 
Famine Enquiry." The proceedings, he suggested, should take the form of a Royal 
Commission, which might be organized "almost immediately." He also again urged that 
the enquiry should "be concerned with the future rather than with the past."10
                                                 
6 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell's Assurance," December 21, 1943 
  The "terms 
of reference" that the Viceroy suggested were succinct: "to investigate and report to the 
Governor-General in Council upon the causes of widespread distress, starvation and 
7 The Statesman," Food Member Visits Dacca," December 18, 1943 
8 Ibid 
9 The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 959 
10 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 645 
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disease in Bengal in the year of 1943."11
(a) the possibility of improving the diet of the people and the variety and yield of 
food crops  
  The bullet points were, likewise, pragmatically 
delimited.  The commission would be tasked to offer recommendations on: 
 
(b) the possibility of increasing the administrative system, particularly in the 
districts, and 
 
(c) the need for better provision for medical relief and public health.12
 
  
 Such a program of enquiry, the Viceroy knew, would be an essential step towards 
putting an "end" to the Bengal Famine. Even The Statesman got into the mood of closure, 
publishing a "Famine Retrospect" on the very same day that the Viceroy telegraphed the 
Secretary of State about an enquiry.  The "Bengal Famine of 1943" - as it has been 
known ever since - was officially becoming a thing of the past. 
 But the view from Calcutta - or for that matter New Delhi, and certainly London - 
as T. G. Narayan rightly pointed out, was deceptive. Freda Bedi, a reporter for the Punjab 
Tribune, like Narayan, had been sent on assignment to cover the famine in Bengal.  She 
arrived in Calcutta in January of 1944 to begin her tour of the province.  The city, she 
reported, was "full of busy life... there are soldiers everywhere, and the restaurants are 
bursting with food and music and merry-makers. But look into the faces of the middle-
class and the poor.  Some of them have got a haunted look.  They are thinner.  'Tell me,' I 
said [to one resident], 'is the famine over - at least the worst of it?'  'Good God, no' was 
the reply.  'They have only made Calcutta more comfortable for the rich to live in: they 
have pushed the inconvenient sights back into the villages.'13
Her shoulders were heaving as she stirred it.  She covered her face, for strangers 
had come.  I went up to her and looked in her eyes: they were full of tears.  Tears 
were falling into the rice.  It was a bare half-seer floating in the water.  "For seven 
people," her husband said in a low voice.  In how many villages, I wondered, 
[were] the poor eating their bare handful of rice slop salted with a woman's 
tears?
  In these same villages, 
Bedi found "stark hunger... everywhere."  In one village near Dacca, Bedi found a 
hunger-bent woman cooking what rice her family could afford in the open-air: 
14
                                                 
11 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 646 
  
12 Ibid 
13 Bedi, p. 22 
14 Ibid, p. 70 
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 While it is true that relief efforts, coupled with the harvested rice, had eased the 
intensity and rapidity of starvation in Bengal, all retrospective analysis of the "Bengal 
Famine of 1943," was, as of yet, grossly premature. The price of rice had come down off 
1943 highs, but still remained four times pre-war levels.15 At Government "free kitchens" 
many of Bengal's poor, who had managed somehow to survive until now, fared little 
better.  The doles of "gruel" handed out at "relief centers" were radically insufficient - 
"rice and water with a little dal"  - in quantities amounting to 800 calories a day, less than 
a third of the ration mandated by the (neglected) Bengal Famine Code.  The Deputy 
Surgeon General of Bengal, himself, was confounded;  "it was incredible," he admitted, 
"that they could have lived on [such rations]... particularly considering that many people 
who attended the kitchens had to walk a mile or two to get it."16  Graft, he added, was 
wide-spread, and much of the "excess" food was going to "the man running the kitchen... 
local headmen of the villages, schoolmasters and other similar types of men."17
 But the problem in Bengal in the early months of 1944, as Freda Bedi reported, 
"was not just the problem of the availability of rice.  It [was] the problem of society in 
fragments."
 The 
quality of food given was also extremely poor, and caused many to become sick after 
consuming it.  
18
                                                 
15 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State, p. 597 
 The ongoing grind of hunger, homelessness and nakedness, continued to 
claim hundreds of thousands of lives. Malaria, cholera, and - with increasing virulence - 
smallpox, were sweeping through the hunger-stricken population unabated.  Weakened 
bodies succumbed within hours of the onset of disease, saving officialdom the 
inconvenience of reporting the continuing toll of "starvation deaths."  Official medical 
relief had begun only in December, and remained grossly inadequate.  Quinine, for 
treating malaria, was the new black-market craze.  Record numbers of land-transfers had 
left millions without shelter and a scarcity of cloth had left many more millions half or 
fully naked throughout the winter months. In December, Army relief headquarters were 
fielding cries of distress from several districts "saying that people were dying, not on 
account of lack of food, but on account of the weather because they had nothing to put 
16 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of K. S. Fitch, p. 680 
17 Ibid 
18  Bedi, p. 12 
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on, no blankets and no clothes." 19  Even in Calcutta, mortality in January of 1944 was 
again on the rise, with 1,280 deaths against and average of 661 for the preceding five 
years.20
 Regardless of the view from below - the continuing toll of hunger and 
deprivation, and the dire indications that many millions more were at risk of perishing of 
starvation and disease in short order - the official line that "famine" was over pervaded 
political and administrative thinking.  An early "end" to famine in Bengal, first and 
foremost, served certain instrumental purposes for the British. Relations with the United 
States, in particular, were at a critical juncture in the context of wartime cooperation, and 
sharp criticism of British colonial rule in India represented a sore spot in diplomatic 
relations. The conclusion of famine would be one less open wound. The end of famine 
would also forestall further criticism of the Government of India domestically, 
particularly after the failure of the Cripps Mission, little progress on the constitutional 
front, and the bulk of Congress leaders still in jail.  On the even more charged and 
divisive provincial level, famine had come to almost totally monopolize the political 
economy of Bengal.  For the Muslim League, an end to famine would avert 
condemnation of failure, and shore up the beleaguered authority of the League Ministry 
by lending it the credibility of having contained disaster.  The opposition, likewise, 
willingly adopted the rhetoric of the "end" of famine instrumentally.  With the Bengal 
Famine of 1943 already in the box, the specter of a "Second Famine" could be hoisted 
and left to hang over the current Ministry like the proverbial Sword of Damocles.  
  And still, rationing had not yet begun.  
 Famine, in this sense, lent a dark and elemental tone to an already acrimonious 
debate. Predictions, forebodings and indignation concerning a "second famine" in Bengal 
were, in fact, rife, and served to further entrench already divisive, and increasingly 
communalist antagonisms in the province - not least of all in relation to relief efforts.  
With Congress leaders jailed, and the organization in shambles, the Hindu Mahasabha in 
Bengal was able to gain a foothold that had eluded them electorally.  Famine 
 provided a particularly manifest opportunity to consolidate the Hindu Mahasabha's 
representative claims. According to the Bengal Congress Parliamentary Party, "Congress, 
                                                 
19 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Major-General Wakely, p. 1023 
20 The Statesman, "Calcutta's Mortality Raises Again," January 12, 1944 
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which had obvious difficulties in organizing country-wide relief owing to its entire 
machinery having been declared illegal, decided to accord Dr. [Shyama Prasad] 
Mookerjee [President of the Provincial Hindu Mahasabha] every possible support and co-
operation."21
 The Muslim League thus found itself in the untenable (and unenviable) position 
of having to defend an "end" of famine, which would substantiate its own claims to 
competence, while having to deflect attacks of misadministration and the coming of a 
"second famine." The ironies of its own position came to light in the testimony of the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce. "The [Muslim] Mercantile Community," their 
memorandum to the Famine Enquiry Commission read, "has noted with pain that 
political organizations unfriendly to the Government of Bengal - and also the 
Government of India - considered it right and proper to take advantage of the people to 
thwart every attempt made to ameliorate the situation... the Press and the Platform were 
used... [to] engender fear, and even when scarcity and disease had been brought under 
control these reprehensible activities were turned to preach about a second famine."
  Under this arrangement the ideologies that the Hindu Mahasabha stood for 
were also entangled in famine relief efforts.  Primary on the Mahasabha's ideological  
agenda was to promote an understanding of Muslims as inferior citizens of Hindu India, 
and primary on the political platform, at the time, was a deep seated antipathy for the 
Muslim League and a vituperative opposition to its primacy in the Bengal Ministry.  In 
this context, Mahasabha leader, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, made energetic use of the 
specter of a "second famine" to discredit the Muslim League, rally opposition, and lobby 




relief measures of the Muslim League, in the form of (however substandard) government 
kitchens, were thus valorized as having brought famine "under control" - even while, 
scarcity and disease continued to decimate the province, and the first famine might have 
been declared "second" at any given moment. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Bengal Parliamentary Party, p. 18 
22 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce, p. 264 
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Whose Famine? 
 The ascension of a Muslim League-controlled Ministry in early 1943 had served - 
as the Viceroy himself had predicted - to exacerbate already strained communal relations 
in Bengal, and - particularly with Congress outlawed - "opposition" or "allegiance" to the  
provincial government in Bengal during the Nazimuddin Ministry increasingly became 
synonymous with "Hindu" and "Muslim" interests.  The dire impact of famine served to 
galvanize animosities, congealing communalist rhetoric into material claims and counter-
claims concerning the means of bare existence.  Economic collapse, wide-spread 
destitution, despair, and ultimately death by starvation and accompanying disease, in this 
sense, provided a grim bio-political substrate upon which the most virulent strains of 
communal ideology flourished. As famine deaths mounted and the calamity of starvation 
in Bengal became increasingly central to political debate, communal resentments became 
leaden with the weight of hundreds of thousands of corpses - as well as the care of 
millions more who hovered on the verge of death.  As already seen, these bodies 
themselves, were commonly understood as "Hindu" or "Muslim," with few other points 
of reference attached to them. 
Such distinctions also became entangled in relief. With official relief operations 
extremely belated and inadequate, private organization had stepped in to fill the void, and 
these efforts too were quickly sucked into the current of communal bitterness and  
accusation. With Congress energies and funds channeled through the Hindu Mahasabha, 
its leader Shyama Prasad Mookherjee, became the de facto "Relief Commissioner" for 
large sections of Bengal.  Under his auspices the Bengal Relief Committee (BRC) was set 
up, becoming the umbrella organization for a large contingent of private relief efforts.  
The primary objective of the BRC, however, was for the relief "middle-class Bengalis"23 
- code-words, to many, for "Hindu" sufferers.  Lending credence to detractors who 
detected a biased approach to the efforts of the BRC, the organization set up most of its 
relief centers only in Hindu majority villages and wards.24
                                                 
23Greenough (1982), p. 190 
  A parallel organization, the 
Hindu Mahasabha Relief Committee, was also set up under the leadership of Mookherjee, 
because "many of the donors... expressed the desire that their money should be spent 
24 Ibid 
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through the Mahasabha [only.]"25  Central to the claims of both organizations, however, 
was that Government relief centers employed Muslim cooks, which made it "impossible" 
for Hindu sufferers to take food at Government gruel kitchens.26
 Counter-accusations of bias on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha were also rife.  
Shyama Prasad Mookherjee was an extremely divisive figure and his directorship of 
private relief measures, alone, was enough to alarm Muslim citizens.  The Revenue 
Department of the Government of Bengal, in charge of relief operations, fielded 
complaints that the Mahasabha was only giving relief to Hindus and issued a warning that 
Government would cut off their supplies if the practice continued.
 Such assertions, it is 
easy to conclude, were very thinly veiled accusations of communal bias in relation to 
governmental relief. 
27  Members of the 
Mahasabha admitted that they had given differential relief to Muslims - uncooked grains, 
rather than cooked food - but denied observing any "consideration of caste or creed" in 
relief operations.28 Other, less overt, measures that would have discouraged Muslims 
from seeking relief seem to have been current however.  When Journalist T. G. Narayan 
visited a Hindu Mahasabha hospital in Midnapore he found, much to his surprise, that 
fifteen out of forty beds were empty.  But apart from few  patients, he found that "every 
room in the hospital had a picture of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee [on the wall.]  I 
don't know what therapeutic effect that had... [but] it would have been much better to 
have filled up the hospital with dying patients."29
 The Muslim League also had its public image much in mind in regards to relief. 
Because the League was in control of the Ministry, government "gruel kitchens" served, 
in some sense, as an avowal of the Muslim League's concern.  Though the inadequacy of 
relief provided, the poor quality of food doled out, and the recurring issue of "Muslim 
cooks," drew sustained criticism; the scope and visibility of government relief kitchens 
did make a good impression upon the Muslim poor of Bengal, winning particular favor 
for Food Minister, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy.
  
30
                                                 
25 Nanavati Papers, Memorandum of the Hindu Mahasabha, p. 257 
  The Muslim League itself opted 
26 Ibid, p. 261 
27 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Tarak Nath Mukherjee, p. 910 
28 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Bengal Provincial Mahasabha, p. 155 
29 Narayan, p. 172-3 
30 Shila Sen, p. 175 
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against organizing any relief operations under its direct control, in  order not to "give 
those people [the Mahasabha] a chance of making accusations against us only to justify 
themselves."31
 The matter of Jinnah's check quickly became an all-India controversy. In 
response, Hindu nationalist and ardent Mahasabha activist, Vinayak Savarkar, called for 
"every Hindu organization and individual to follow the brave lead of the Bombay 
Provincial and some other Hindu Sabhas to send all help to rescue, clothe and shelter 
Hindu sufferers alone...Hindus should be determined to send whatever money, foodstuffs 
and cloths the destitutes want and earmark the rescue of Hindu sufferers."
  Instead the Muslim League channeled its resources and funds through the 
Muslim Chamber of Commerce.  This shelter of Muslim League social and financial 
capital, however, proved insufficient.  When word got out that Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
himself had sent a check through Ispahani with money stipulated specifically for 
"Muslim relief," controversy and condemnation ensued.  The Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce admitted that approximately 5% of the donations it received were for Muslim 
relief only, but argued that it had not earmarked these same funds, since more than 5% of 
the recipients of Chamber relief were Muslims in any case.  Such arguments had very 
short legs in the political climate of famine, however. 
32  Savarkar 
went further still and accused Muslim organizations in Bengal of withholding relief from 
Hindu "destitutes" unless they agreed to convert to Islam.33  Nazimuddin defended the 
record acerbically at the Muslim League's All-India conference in Karachi in the last 
week of December 1943, deploring Savarkar's accusations and categorically denying that 
"conversions of starving Hindus had taken place."34 The Muslim Chamber of Commerce 
also presented evidence to show that its own relief efforts had been ecumenical, 
publishing memorandums sent to District Magistrates which "imposed conditions...that 
money should be distributed without thinking of caste or creed."35
                                                 
31 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, p. 1373 
  But beneath the dark 
shadow of famine, accusation and counter-accusation were the order of the day and 
evidence did little to allay growing communal animosities. 
32 The Statesman, "Dar-el-Islam," December 12, 1943 
33 Ibid 
34 The Statesman, "Muslim League Session Concludes," December 28, 1943 
35 Nanavati Papers,  Testimony of the Bengal Muslim Chamber of Commerce, p. 1078-9 
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  The aman procurement campaign, of essential importance to the Government of 
Bengal in the winter of 43'-44' and the most comprehensive "relief" plan going, was also 
hampered by political division which broke along communal lines.  In the Bengal 
countryside the ghastly depredations of famine had depopulated whole villages and had 
left an entire society numbed and deeply traumatized. Scarcity, homelessness, hunger and 
disease were the order of the day, and bodies were still lying in various states of 
decomposition throughout Bengal.  Millions more teetered on the brink of extinction, 
struggling to survive by any means available.  Such conditions provided fertile ground for 
divisive politicking.  In this context, the Hindu Mahasabha began an energetic and 
aggressive campaign against the government scheme, warning Hindu citizens to offer 
"stubborn resistance" to all government efforts at rice procurement.36 Their campaign, it 
seems, was largely effective.  By March of 1943 the Government of Bengal had been 
able to acquire less than 15% of its target of 1.15 million tons, which put a great strain on 
efforts to control both prices and supplies.37
 The campaign against procurement, again, reverberated on a national scale.  The 
Food Member of the Government of India, Cawnpore industrialist J. P. Srivastava - 
himself, an active member of the Hindu Mahasabha - criticized the Bengal Ministry's rice 
procurement and rationing plans stridently at the central governmental level.  His 
criticism drew predictable ire from the Joint Secretaries of the Muslim League Ministry.  
The Joint Secretaries went public in denouncing the Viceroy's Food Member, "whose 
attitude to the Bengal Ministry's food administration has been so surprisingly similar to 
that of the Opposition elements in the province."
  
38  A statement issued by the Ministry 
itself condemned Srivastava's meddling as a campaign of propaganda, designed only to 
"give the Bengal Ministry a bad name."39
                                                 
36 Basu, p. 64  
  On this count they accused the Food Member 
of "import(ing) politics into food questions" and demanded his resignation from the 
Executive Council. The Bengal Famine, was dangerously hardening communal 
sentiments even in Delhi.  Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery, brushed off the 
controversy breezily:  "I am afraid this is typical of the way in which the communal 
37 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 808 
38 The Statesman, "Criticism of Food Member," January 7, 1944 
39 Ibid 
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question enters into everything," he wrote to the Viceroy, "I am not sure that you will not 
have to end up by composing your Executive entirely of Indian Christians or by inventing 
a new official religion to which all Government Servants and Ministers should be bound 
to subscribe!"40
 The implementation of rationing in Calcutta, which would also be a crucial step in 
controlling prices throughout Bengal, was similarly entangled in rancorous debate that 
broke along communal lines. The Ministry was pushing hard for the opening government 
shops that would be staffed according to legislated communal ratios, that mandated parity 
for Muslims, while  interested Hindu parties lobbied vigorously for a rationing system 
that would run through existing trade channels, which were heavily Hindu dominated.
   
41  
The Government of India had sent their Special Rationing Advisor, W.H. Kirby to 
Calcutta several times in the summer of 1943, but he had made no progress. He, himself, 
was in favor of using any channels available, but was met by obstruction from 
Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy. Towards the end of 1943, the Viceroy, frustrated by the 
communally-charged standoff, invoked Central authority under Section 126-A of the 
Government of India Act and ordered the Ministry to "establish a specific number of 
shops and to include a specified number of trade as well as Government shops."42 This, in 
some sense, was understood as a communal compromise. The ministry reported back that 
it would arrange for 1,000 ration shops to be opened by January 31, 1944, of which 55% 
would be private retail shops (run overwhelming by Hindus) and 45% would be 
government (read: "Muslim") shops. These percentages were perhaps a concession to the 
Hindu majority in Calcutta, though still weighted, according to strict communal 
proportions, in favor of "Muslim" (government) shops, as Hindus comprised almost 75% 
of the population of Calcutta.43
Srivastava, charged that the Bengal Ministry's concern was only to "admit more 
Muslims into the grain trade."
  The plan predictably drew fast criticism from several 
quarters.   
44
                                                 
40 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Amery to Wavell, p. 609 
 He also noted that a lack of grain reserves in Bengal 
41 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of W.H. Kirby, p. 364 
42 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 561 
43 The Census of 1941 recorded the population of Calcutta as 73% Hindu, 23% Muslim.  Census figures, 
however, were recognized at the time (and since) as highly unreliable.  See: Unsettled Settlers, p. 51 
44 The Statesman, "Criticism of Food Member," January 7, 1944 
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would, in any case, make the scheme impossible and, as such, it was doomed to fail.  The 
Joint Secretaries of Bengal responded that the proportion of Muslim shops was relatively 
small, but that "the inclusion of even a few Muslim shops [was] too much for the Hindu 
Mahasabha representatives at New Delhi."45  They also pointed out that given the fact 
that the central government had agreed to undertake the feeding of Calcutta itself, the 
accounting of grain reserves in Bengal had little bearing on the city's ration scheme.  In 
this context they reminded the Food Member that if there were insufficient grains to 
ration Calcutta, the Government of India itself would be to blame - a thinly veiled 
accusation against Food Member Srivastava himself.46  Srivastava was defended from the 
"Hindu perspective" a few days later in The Statesman.  Members of the Viceroy's 
Executive Council in New Delhi lacked the kind of authority that the Ministry were 
imputing on them, the author argued, and they were, as of yet, "more or less executive 
heads, without clear mandate from their various parties or constituents."47  It was only 
due to its own imminent failure, the observer noted, that the Ministry was impelled to 
"raise in advance the smoke-screen of communalism."48
N. C. Chatterji, Leader of the Hindu Mahasabha Party in the Calcutta Corporation 
kept up the attack.  Under the Muslim League plan, he predicted, "the rationing scheme 
would break down and Calcutta would be faced with a great danger."
 
49 The distribution 
of ration cards had been vastly incomplete, and more importantly, "the number of shops 
decided upon by the Government was hopelessly inadequate."50 The refusal of 
Government to allow more private (Hindu) retail shops into the scheme, he argued, 
would jeopardize the whole plan. The "Central Rationing Committee" of the Bengal 
Hindu Mahasabha weighed in on its own account, lamenting that its offer for constructive 
cooperation with the Ministry had been rejected.51 The Committee urged the Ministry to 
double the number of private shops to "ensure smooth working and efficient distribution 
of foodstuffs."52
                                                 
45 Ibid 
 The Government of Bengal responded to such attacks with veiled threats 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 The Statesman, "Political Comments by our Indian Observer," January 16, 1944 
49 The Statesman, "City Corporation and Rationing," January 20, 1944 
50 Ibid 
51 The Statesman, "Mahasabha Criticisms," January, 28, 1944 
52 Ibid 
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of its own.  They would "value co-operation and even healthy criticism" in regards to 
their food policy, a press release began, but would take swift and stern measures against 
"any attempt to sabotage it."53
Criticisms of the amount of the projected daily ration also stirred up communal 
sentiments.  The initial plan to allot three and a half seers
 
54 of grains per person per week 
was regarded as woefully insufficient.  The Bengal Famine Code determined a daily 
ration of at least 12 chattacks (1 chattack = 1/16 seer) per day for adults.  The proposed 
ration for Calcutta was thus little more than two-thirds of that outlined in the Famine 
Code.  Government agreed, after some debate, to increase the weekly ration to 4 seers per 
week and also gave assurances that  provisions for supplementary rations for "heavy 
workers" (the "priority" classes) would be arranged at cooked food canteens.55 Members 
of the Hindu community took immediate issue with this solution.  Hindu workers, it was 
suggested, could not be expected to take cooked food from government canteens, where 
ritual purity could not be ensured.  The Calcutta Corporation adopted a resolution on 
January 29th to this same effect.  "In view of the fact that it is impossible for Hindus to 
have cooked food in canteens," the resolution stated, "Government [is] requested to 
increase the quota of [uncooked] rice and/or atta to one seer per day to heavy workers, 
and that for 2nd class workers...[to] 5 seers per head per week."56  In the same resolution 
the Hindu-dominated Corporation demanded that an additional ration be allowed to 
Hindus for religious worship, particularly in regards to bhog, or the "feeding" of the 
deities.  Food Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy, rejected the claim, noting that in Bombay no 
such provisions had been made in the rationing scheme already underway, and the gods 
had survived.  Hindus, the Government concluded, would have to make arrangements for 
bhog by other means.57 The Hindu Mahasabha rejoined, "the curt refusal...to sanction 
ration for Hindu deities...has perturbed the public mind."58
                                                 
53 The Statesman, "Purchase and Distribution of Foodgrains," January 28, 1944 
 The issue simmered for many 
weeks to come. 
54 1 seer = 2.057 lbs. 
55 The Statesman, "Quota of Rice Increased," January 26, 1944 
56 Nanavati Papers, Resolution included in Testimony of Calcutta Corporation, p. 1264 
57 The Statesman, "Quota of Rice Increased," January 26, 1944 
58 The Statesman, "Mahasabha Criticisms," January, 28, 1944 
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Despite ongoing contentions, however, rationing did finally get underway in 
Calcutta on the 31st of January 1944. By most accounts, and contrary to grave predictions 
from the opposition, the logistical arrangements proved adequate.  There were other 
problems, however.  Complaints were received from many quarters that the quality of 
rice being distributed at ration shops was extremely poor, some of it entirely rotten, and 
some contaminated with dirt and other filler.  At an emergency meeting of the Calcutta 
Corporation, a moldering and stinking sample was presented to the Director of Public 
Health and held up to his nose as proof. "He reacted to it violently.  He was shocked at 
the sight it presented and turned up his nose against it."59 Rationing Controller, Mr. A. C. 
Hartley, admitted that the quality of rice being sold at ration shops was poor, but denied 
that it was quite unfit for human consumption.60  Food Minister, Suhrawardy, was also 
inundated with complaints and had to concede that the rice being used was not up to par, 
but noted that reports circulating that it was causing disease and even death "could not be 
confirmed."61
The quality of foodstuffs being fed to the starving masses in the countryside was 
still worse.  In Murshidabad a Sub-Divisional Officer at Lalbagh had found stocks of atta 
sold to his precinct entirely "unwholesome."  The District Magistrate suggested that it 
might at least be sold to local farmers as fodder for cattle.  The Veterinary Surgeon, 
however, found the grain unfit, even, for animal consumption.  Rejected as cattle feed 
this same rice was "reconditioned" and returned again to local markets for human 
  As pitiable as it might be to feed starving people rotten food, the likely 
explanation for such is darker still.  As milled rice can be stored for up to one year 
without significant deterioration, it is likely that the rice now being circulated had been in 
the possession of Government and/or its corporate clients' warehouses for more than one 
year.  Though findings on hoarding by Government and industry were inconclusive, that 
stores of now rotten rice were being unloaded on the ration market in the first months of 
1944 is damning evidence that any number of famine deaths may well have been averted 
by stocks already in hand, and that rice was, in fact, rotting in warehouses while people 
starved.   
                                                 
59 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Calcutta Corporation, p. 1265 
60 The Statesman, "First Week of Rationing in Calcutta," February 8, 1944 
61 The Statesman, "Quality of Rice at Ration Shops," February 19, 1944 
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consumption.62  In Faridpur the District Magistrate reported that "in the gruel kitchens 
just one kind of food was being served out irrespective of the condition of destitutes.  The 
result was that in one case the entrails of a destitute came out soon after his taking the 
gruel and he died."63 In many places a very coarse grain called bajra, more commonly 
eaten in upper India, was being fed to "destitutes" who had no previous experience eating 
such food.  As Major-General Stuart later reported, eating bajra "led to diarrhea for about 
three days; after that they apparently became accustomed to it... but cholera was present 
at the time [and] they were frightened that it might be cholera."64
 
  Yet for many, there 
was no other option. 
Governing Bengal 
 The Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, to his credit, understood the Bengal Famine to be 
the most pressing and grave responsibility of colonial governance in India.   His sense of 
urgency - and even compassion - as well as his military connections, resulted in a 
commendable, if still inadequate and woefully belated, relief effort.  His patience was 
thin, however, for the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Government of India 
Act of 1935, which had established "Provincial Autonomy."  Like his predecessor, 
Wavell had little, if any, faith that the elected government in Bengal had the wherewithal 
or sincerity to cope with the magnitude of the crisis in the province, and was alarmed by 
"the reckless way in which political capital [was being] made of the Bengal trouble."65  
He found the Chief Minister, Kwaja Nazimuddin "honest but weak,"66 and he estimated 
the much more formidable Food Minister, Shaheed Suhrawardy, "all big talk and small 
action."67
                                                 
62 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of the Official Congress Party, p. 806 
 What Bengal needed, Wavell thought, was "inspiring leadership" with a broad 
mandate.  The only way to realize this necessity, the Viceroy concluded, was - once again 
- to enact Section 93, in order to abolish the provincial government and grant the 
Governor, under direct authority of the Viceroy himself, emergency rule in Bengal. The 
procedure of superceding provincial autonomy and enforcing autocratic white-rule in 
63 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of F. A. Karim 
64 Nanavati Papers, Testimony of Major-General Stuart, p. 1167 
65 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 459 
66 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 616 
67 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 566 
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Bengal, however, would be difficult to accomplish.  The Ministry in Bengal, for one 
thing, commanded a substantial majority in the Legislature, and the abrogation of its 
authority would create considerable animosity with the Muslim League, and perhaps 
among Muslims more generally.68
The resignation of the Ministry, on the other hand, would dampen the impression 
of heavy-handedness on the part of the colonial state. A possible route to Section 93 by 
resignation had been laid out by Wavell's predecessor.  Under Section 52-(I) (a) of the 
Government of India Act, the Governor could claim extraordinary powers in any 
province if the "peace and tranquility" of that province was under threat.  These powers, 
in concert with those granted under Section 126A which allowed Central Government to 
"direct" the provincial legislature, might be used to create conditions that "no self-
respecting Government" could or would agree to, resulting in resignation.
  The move might additionally only encourage Hindu 
nationalists in the province, who had already been lobbying for the dissolution of the 
League Ministry.  From a legal angle, as well, Section 93 would technically only be 
applicable in the advent of an actual breakdown in the functioning of the provincial 
legislature, which was not the case in Bengal.   
69  Acting 
Governor, Thomas Rutherford, however, questioned the constitutionality of the scheme, 
unwilling as he was to take on such responsibility.  Wavell disappointed in the Acting 
Governor's refusal, wished for a permanent Governor "who [did] not worry too much 
about constitutional form and [was] determined to get things done."70  He also wished 
that Linlithgow had taken a firmer hand earlier in the famine, "when Ministers were 
thoroughly frightened and prepared to do anything that they were told."71 In that case, 
Section 93 may not even  have even been necessary.  But the Ministry was now too 
entrenched, and so Wavell continued to call for a "vigorous Section 93" in Bengal, 
despite the Governor's reservations.72
 It is worth mentioning that given the recent history of Governorship in Bengal, 
Wavell's call for Governor's rule in the province was, to say the least, ironic.  Sir John 
Herbert had caused Linlithgow considerable consternation and grief, and then just a few 
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days before The Statesman published its pictures of famine in Bengal, had been removed 
to the hospital for an "appendix operation," which turned out to be much more serious.  
Hearing the news, Linlithgow grew superstitious, "Government House, Calcutta, 
continues to add to its lamentable reputation," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "you 
will remember that not only did poor Brabourne collapse there after one of these internal 
operations, but his acting successor, Reid, then had a serious appendix, and now Jack 
Herbert."73 Sir Thomas Rutherford had reluctantly agreed to serve as Acting Governor 
until a permanent replacement could be found, but himself had made anything but a firm 
stand.  After his first meeting with the Acting Governor, Wavell confided to Amery that 
he found Sir Thomas "second-class" and without "fire in his belly."74  Major-General 
Mayne also expressed his "gravest doubts" to Wavell about Rutherford's competence. 
Rutherford, Wavell wrote, "expressed surprise at Mayne's anxiety about the general 
situation, and said he thought much too much was being made of [the famine.]  He then 
retired to Darjeeling for rest."75 A few weeks after his retreat to Darjeeling, Amery 
reported to Churchill, "Rutherford is not in good health and I have no confidence in his 
capacity to deal with the situation in Bengal."76  A salary of Rs. 10,000 each was now 
being paid to two ill and incompetent governor's of Bengal - in the darkest midst of 
famine - even while the Viceroy continued pressing for Section 93.77
 Herbert died on December 11, 1943 and a memorial was given at St. John's 
Cathedral in Calcutta on the 19th.  Wavell attended, and later that afternoon met with 
Mayne, Wakely and other senior civil servicemen, "none of them optimistic about the 
future of the food problem in Bengal."
 
78  Not only was Rutherford complaining of ill-
health and seemed to have "lost-heart," but "his senior officials such as Williams, Chief 
Secretary, and Stevens, the Food Commissioner, [were] lacking in energy, and there 
[were] signs that they [were] not cooperating with the Army."79
                                                 
73 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Amery to Linlithgow, p. 191 
  What was desperately 
needed, the Viceroy informed London, was a "first-class man who is ready to sacrifice 
his immediate prospects to do work of the highest importance to the prosecution of the 
74 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 434 
75 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 458 (emphasis mine) 
76 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Amery to Churchill, p. 488 
77 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Linlithgow to Amery, p. 296 
78 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 565 
79 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 490 
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war," and who had "the necessary fire...to restore morale among the officials."80 
Churchill approached Richard Casey, an Australian Parliamentarian who had been 
drafted into British Civil Service as Minister of State in the Middle East in 1942.  The 
Prime Minister promised Casey that if he accepted he would submit his name to the King 
for a "peerage of the United Kingdom."81  Casey declined the full offer, citing his 
intention to run for office in Australia in the elections of 1946, but agreed to serve a 
truncated term, without peerage or knighthood, which might damage his prospects at 
home.82
 Hearing that he was getting a "first-class" man for Bengal at last, Wavell 
redoubled his efforts to get a "vigorous Section 93," turning to the Secretary of State to 
have emergency rule authorized by the War Cabinet in London.  Amery sympathized 
with Wavell's desire to circumvent protocol.  "Acts," he assured the Viceroy, "were 
meant to be evaded or overridden if necessity is great enough."
   
83  The Secretary of State 
prepared an extensive brief for the War Cabinet.  In it he included the possibility of 
forcing a resignation by onerous "directions" issued under Sections 52-(I) (a) and 126A.  
In the event that this tactic failed, the only option was "to throw overboard regard for 
Provincial autonomy and get rid - by dismissal - of a Ministry with a working 
majority."84
The War Cabinet met on the 11th of January 1943, and rejected the Viceroy's bid.  
Members worried that if Section 93 was introduced under such circumstances "the 
Hindus would be delighted," and Muslims might become "actively hostile."
  Amery argued that the "food problem" was an "all-India problem," and as 
such justified such extreme measures.   
85 If the 
Government of India, moreover, became responsible for the momentous problems of 
Bengal, they themselves might be stranded on "very insecure ground."86
                                                 
80 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 434 
  The use of 52-
(I) (a) and 126A might be deployed and extra I.C.S. men lent to the province, but Section 
93 was out of the question.  The problem of food in Bengal, the War Cabinet concluded, 
would remain a provincial matter. Wavell was severely disappointed with the decision, 
81 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Churchill to Casey, p. 453 
82 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Casey to Churchill, p. 454 
83 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Amery to Wavell, p. 569 
84 T.O.P. Vol. IV, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (44) 18, p. 618 
85 T.O.P. Vol. IV, War Cabinet W. M. (44) 5th Conclusion, Minute 1, p. 629 
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and reminded Amery that in such matters it was really incumbent upon the Cabinet to 
trust his judgment.87 He only hoped, he added, that the War Cabinet would not be so 
imprudent as to reject his more important demand for substantial import of food grains.88 
Amery sought to hearten Wavell, noting that at least a "man of Casey's experience and 
personality had been appointed [Governor.]"89
The mood on the ground in Bengal was less celebratory.  When news of Casey's 
appointment reached long-suffering Midnapore, the reaction in the local journal, Biplabi, 
was caustic: 
   
Following the death of Sir John the big bosses (Churchill, Amery, Wavell and 
Co.) spent much effort searching the forests and jungles of Australia and suddenly 
chanced upon a comparatively civilized animal by the name of Mr. Casey; in an 
announcement they broadcast their intention of making him the ruler of Bengal.  
There must be some secret reason why Churchill, Amery and Co. awarded the 
honor...to the land of the kangaroos...a certain class of animals...that are famous 
for their ability to jump considerable distances with the help of their tails and hind 
legs... Is it to be tolerated that we will be ruled by an inhabitant of Australia, 
where Indians cannot exercise any right?90
 
  
Richard Casey was sworn-in as Governor of Bengal in the Throne Room of 
Government House, Calcutta on the 22nd of January 1944.  After the oaths had been 
read, a 17 gun salute was issued from the ramparts of Fort William, and Casey, 
accompanied by his wife, "left the Throne Room in procession."91
                                                 
87 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 690 
  Erstwhile Acting 
Governor, Sir Thomas Rutherford, was supposed to return to his post in Bihar, but was 
granted leave out of India, effective immediately, on health grounds. He had had enough.  
Casey, on the other hand, had his work cut-out for him, and set diligently to work, sorting 
through the tortured intricacies of administration in Bengal. The province was entirely 
new to him.  He worked hard for a few days, meeting with Ministers and Secretaries, 
Commissioners and Commanders, but did not make it to the end of one week before he 
was befittingly welcomed to the realities of Bengal.  On the 28th of January he ended his 
diary entry despondently: "I developed a fever and had to go to bed this afternoon.  
88 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 647 
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90 Biplabi, p. 309 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Denham White is looking after me."92
 
  He was incapacitated for 
many days to come.  
Imports 
 As Amartya Sen's study of famine mortality in Bengal has confirmed, "very 
substantially more than half the deaths attributable to the famine of 1943 took place after 
1943."93  In districts which had not been "severely effected" by starvation in 1943, 
according to the Famine Enquiry Commission's report, there was "a general rise in the 
death rate" in the first half of 1944, and in districts where starvation had been most 
prevalent, mortality "continued on a high level."94  In Birbhum, Dacca, Rangpur, 24 
Parganas, Murshidabad, Malda and Tippera, the death rate was 90% in excess of the 
quinnenial average prior to 1943, and remained 26-86% higher in all other districts, 
except the "hill station" of Darjeeling.95  Moreover, there was abject destitution on a scale 
that beggars description.  A study done by the Calcutta University Department of 
Anthropology early in 1944 estimated that two-thirds of the province - more than 20 
million people - had been "severely affected" by famine.96  25-30% of cultivators with 
small holdings had lost their land,97 and landless agricultural laborers, fisherman, skilled 
artisans, and transportation workers had also been rendered homeless and destitute in 
high numbers - their families fragmented by death and disease, their means of livelihoods 
bartered for survival, and their communities shattered. 98
 As the Famine Enquiry Commission's report also affirmed: "a famine-stricken 
population is a sick population. Famine means not only lack of food in the quantitative 
sense but also lack of essential food constituents which are needed for bodily health."
    
99
                                                 
92 Casey's Diary, p. 63 
  
From December of 1943, the Commission reported, there was a change in the "clinical 
93 Amartya Sen (1981), p. 215  




96 The Statesman, "Sample Survey of Famine Districts," February 28, 1944 
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98 Greenough (1982), p. 205 
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picture" of famine.100  Though people were still dying of hunger, by early 1944 famine 
entailed more death by disease than by starvation.  Malaria and other fevers, Cholera, 
dysentery, and small pox accounted for many hundreds of thousands of deaths in the first 
six months of the year alone. Mental illness, although much less talked about in relation 
to the Bengal Famine, was also epidemic.  Not only had the entire collective psyche of 
the population been scarified by death, misery and despair, but madness was, itself, a 
symptom of starvation.  Victims were obstinate, apathetic, irrational and at times 
maniacal.  "The mental state of many of starving destitutes," it was explained in the 
Report on Bengal, "sometimes disconcerted workers in famine hospitals, who were not 
aware that [madness] was a pathological condition induced by famine."101
The public health system in Bengal, insufficient in normal times, all but totally 
collapsed under the pressure. Doctors, nurses, and other medical workers were in acutely 
short supply and recruitment remained problematic.
 The cerebral 
effects of malaria, including hallucinations and delirium are better known.  Small pox can 
induce similar symptoms.   
102  T. G. Narayan records the story of 
one government doctor in Midnapore who threatened to commit suicide if he was not 
transferred from the front lines.103 In all of Bengal, as late as January 1944, there were a 
total of 13,000 hospital beds available for famine victims - while an average of at least 
2,300 people were dying each day of preventable disease and starvation.  The hospitals, 
moreover, where ill-equipped and undersupplied.  Large stocks of quinine to treat malaria 
had been allocated, but had entered swiftly into the black market in Calcutta and were 
selling at ten times controlled rates.104  Public health workers who ran vaccination 
programs for smallpox were paid less than unskilled dock laborers and were themselves 
incapacitated by hunger and disease.105
                                                 
100 Ibid, p. 118 
 Disinfectants, essential for the prevention of 
Cholera, were still being hoarded by the A.R.P. for decontamination in the event of a gas 
101 Ibid, p. 117 
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103 Narayan, p. 173 
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attacks.106
Wavell, himself, knew that the only remedy was to import large quantities of food 
grains, stabilize prices, and feed the population.  The Viceroy wrote a sharp telegram to 
London in the last week of December, warning them that the import of 1.5 million tons of 
foodgrains into India was imperative to ward off even greater catastrophe in the coming 
year.  Increased demand by Defence Services was further straining an already difficult 
situation to the breaking point. The Secretary of State responded that His Majesty's 
Government was still of the opinion, relayed in the earlier War Cabinet decision, that 
imports on the scale that Wavell was asking for were "out of the question."  It had been 
agreed, however, that shipping might be provided for the import of 50,000 tons of grain 
to India in January and February.
 And starvation, though slowed, remained chronic as the vitality of the 
population further plummeted, allowing disease and madness to continue gaining ground. 
107
Wavell responded to Amery's request for an elaborate brief testily, "it is of no use 
going on arguing from month to month on figures and details," he complained, "I think 
Cabinet must trust man on the spot.  You can warn them from me that it is my considered 
judgment that unless we can be assured now of receiving one million (repeat one million) 
tons of food grains during 1944 we are heading for disaster."
  Amery realized that this was absurdly insufficient 
and promised to renew the case for 1.5 million tons, but requested a detailed brief from 
New Delhi outlining their demand.  
108 The Viceroy did, 
however, put together a comprehensive brief, with whatever numbers were available to 
him, and sent it off to London with further cautionary reminders.  Pressing the 
government's only operative "famine code," he warned that "the present state of affairs in 
Bengal is a serious threat to the security of an operational base and to the health of 
troops."109  The Secretary of State relayed the Viceroy's warning to Lord Leathers, noting 
that imports were essential to "prevent the breakdown of the whole economic structure of 
the country and its ability to function as a base for military operations."110
The War Cabinet met on February 7, 1944 to consider the Viceroy's demand.  
Churchill questioned the statistical basis of the Government of India's request, and 
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showed himself "gravely concerned...that shipping...should be used on a major scale to 
import food into India."111  The Minister for War Transport, concurred, arguing "it would 
be out of the question to find shipping for the million tons asked for." Ships would be 
available, however, to export 10,000 tons of rice per month from India to Ceylon.  The 
Cabinet emphasized that if there was any shortage at all in Bengal, it was statistically 
insignificant.  It was also noted that in Bengal shortage was, in any case, "political in 
character," being caused by "Marwari supporters of Congress in an effort to embarrass 
the existing Muslim Government of Bengal, the Government of India and His Majesty's 
Government."112  Under such circumstances agreeing to imports would amount to 
concessions to the "enemy."  The Cabinet concluded that the "matter should be further 
examined."113 Towards this end, a separate committee on "Indian food grains 
requirements" was established.  The Committee consisted of the Secretary of State, the 
Minister for War Transport, the Food Minister, and Churchill's closest advisor, now 
Paymaster-General, Lord Cherwell - who, the Secretary of State had noted in his diary,  
"like Winston, hates India."114
When Wavell received news that his request had been denied, he was incensed. 
The Bengal Famine, he reminded London, "was one of the greatest disasters that [had] 
befallen any people under British rule and damage to our reputation...is incalculable."
  
115  
The statistics reported, he admitted, had been defective, but had been based on the best 
estimates available.  A "rigid statistical approach," he added, was, in any case, "futile."116
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He had personally discussed the supply situation with all provincial governors and had 
visited, in person, seven of the eleven provinces.  The reality of shortage and the threat of 
impending nation-wide economic failure, leading to an even more massive famine, was 
manifest.  He ended his telegram bluntly: "I warn His Majesty's Government with all 
seriousness that if they refuse our demands they are risking a catastrophe far greater than 
Bengal famine that will have irretrievable effect on their position both at home and 
abroad.  They must either trust the opinion of the man they have appointed to advise them 
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115 T.O.P. Vol. IV, Wavell to Amery, p. 706 
116 Ibid 
 283 
on Indian affairs or replace him."117  Churchill seemed softened by the Viceroy's threat of 
resignation.  He wrote to Wavell and assured him that he would give him all the help he 
could, but India should "not ask the impossible."118
The War Cabinet met again on the 14th of February to reconsider the Government 
of India's demands.  The Prime Minister presented the Viceroy's urgent telegrams and 
expressed his own concerns - about a lack of shipping to meet Wavell's request.  The 
Minister of War Transport, Lord Leathers, seconded Churchill's anxiety, reiterating his 
doubts about being able to even maintain current shipments of grain to India.  He 
suggested that when and if India could prove itself to be in "acute shortage" he would 
make the necessary arrangements for the shipment of up to 25,000 tons a month of Iraqi 
barley to the sub-continent.
   
119 The Cabinet agreed to send a telegram to the Viceroy 
informing him that they had very earnestly considered his request, but could not comply. 
The last sentence of the telegram, they suggested to the Secretary of State, "might be 
expressed...to make it clear that refusal of India's request was not due to our underrating 
India's needs, but because we could not take operational risks by cutting down the 
shipping required for vital operations."120
The Viceroy, far from resigning, renewed his efforts, reminding London, "this [is] 
a matter of life and death for hundreds of thousands of Indians and one by which our 
good name in the world for justice and kindliness may be irretrievably ruined."
  
121
                                                 
117 Ibid, 707 
  He 
tailored his original demand for 1.5 million tons down to 500,000 in the next six months, 
and requested that a deputation be sent to the United States immediately to ask for help 
with shipping. In the event that these efforts failed, he also requested permission for India 
to apply to the newly formed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) for aid.  In the meantime he recruited the assistance of the Commander-in-
Chief for India, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, and the Supreme Commander, South-
East Asia Command, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Both Commanders sent 
telegrams to the Chiefs of Staff conveying their conviction that it was "an urgent military 
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necessity for food to be imported into [India.]"122
The War Cabinet met to consider the Viceroy's "counter-offensive" on the 21st of 
February.
  The coding of food imports in terms of 
war requirements was the only hopeful approach.  That hundreds of thousands were 
continuing to die of starvation and concurrent disease was, apparently, a non-starter.   
123  They had before them his series of forceful telegrams, together with those 
of Mountbatten and Auchinleck, and also the Food Grain Committee's anemic report.  
After short deliberation it was agreed that little could be done for India.  The Minister of 
War Transport suggested that the 50,000 tons of Iraqi barley promised would be replaced 
by 50,000 tons of wheat - at some future date.  The shipment of another 50,000 tons 
already en route to India from Australia, however, would have to be cancelled and 
redirected to the Balkans. The net gain was, therefore, zero.  Instead a net loss of 100,000 
tons - represented by the lost Iraqi barley and Australian wheat - was incurred. A 
telegram to the Viceroy was sent conveying these conclusions and also noting that the 
Minister of War Transport was "fully satisfied that United States have no shipping," and, 
as such, an approach to the Americans would be pointless.  An appeal to U.N.R.R.A. 
Leathers added, was, likewise, pointless, as they had no shipping of their own.  Churchill, 
in a separate telegram to Wavell, expressed his regrets and wished the Viceroy "every 
good wish amid [his] anxieties."124
Wavell cabled to London in dismay.  "To expect me to hold the critical food 
situation here with empty hands," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "is stupid and 
shortsighted."
  
125 Once again, the hand of Churchill's confident and chief council, Lord 
Cherwell, was deplored.  "I see from your letter," Wavell added, "that that old menace 
and fraud the Professor was called in to advise against me. The fact is that the P.M. has 
calculated his war plans without any consideration at all of India's needs."126
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  The 
Viceroy sent telegrams to Auchinleck and Mountbatten with the request that they might 
arrange, on their own, for the replacement of military cargo with food grain imports for 
India.  In the meantime, Wavell pressed on, admitting to Amery that he understood 
himself to be something of a "nuisance" to His Majesty's Government, but reiterating that 
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he was "so certain that imports are vital to India that [he was] determined not to accept 
refusal."127
In London, however, the contention that India had enough, if not more than 
enough, was well entrenched.  In a rather cynical rejoinder to the Government of India's 
request for wheat imports, a proposal was floated by the War Cabinet suggesting that 
India might be supplied with 300,000 tons of Australian wheat in exchange for 300,000 
tons of rice from Bengal for Ceylon. The scheme involved the forward shipment of rice 
from India, backed by the promise of later imports of wheat.
   
128 The Viceroy predictably 
bridled at the suggestion: "[this] proposal has no real bearing whatever on India's main 
food problem.  It does not increase by one ton India's total food supply and in fact 
apparently proposes that India should lend Ceylon rice for period without return."129 
Actual procurement in Bengal, he noted, was less than 15% of that which had been 
targeted, and the resumption of exports under such conditions would only lead to further 
panic.  Moreover, he reminded Amery, "it is quite impossible for us to export rice at all: 
we have in fact publicly pledged not to do so."130  "It is clear," Wavell concluded, "that 
the War Cabinet have not begun to understand the nature of our problem, and apparently 
don't even care to try."131
The lobbying done by Auchinleck and Mountbatten, however, had gained some 
traction where the remonstrations of the Viceroy had failed.  The Chiefs of Staff met to 
consider their views on March 18th.  In conclusion they issued a report that advocated the 
import of at least 200,000 tons of wheat to India in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944, the 
allocation of 10% of cargo space on military vessels for further imports, and an approach 
to America for help with additional shipping.  They ended their recommendations 
predictably: "the shipping necessary to provide the cereals for the minimum maintenance 
requirements in India," they wrote, "should be tabulated in future as military 
requirement."  The War Cabinet met the following day and acceded to the 
recommendation for the release of 25 ships for the import of 200,000 tons of grain to 
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India in the coming six months.132
Wavell categorically rejected the exchange scheme, noting that the import of 
200,000 tons was a mere one-sixth of India's needs.
  At the insistence of the Minister of War Transport, 
however, it was stipulated that there would be "no prospect" of additional imports in 
1944.  Lord Leathers also expressed his aversion to any approach to the U.S. for 
assistance, as well as the unfeasibility of allocating 10% of military shipping to food.  It 
was also concluded that the Ceylon exchange scheme should be "strongly pressed" with 
the Viceroy in view of the "surplus" of rice in Bengal.   
133  Military requirements, alone, 
amounted to 724,000 tons per annum, and as such 524,000 tons were still being removed 
from civilian consumption even if the entire imported amount was allocated to Defense 
Services - which was, in fact, the plan.  In a resort to more extreme methods, the Viceroy 
informed the War Cabinet that with this 200,000 tons he would be able to supply the 
military a total of 550,000 tons, leaving a 224,000 ton shortfall.134 To the Secretary of 
State, Wavell drove the point home still further. "It is not a matter of sentiment," he 
wrote, "on the one hand, it is impossible to ignore the needs of starving people, and on 
the other hand, an acute shortage of food at once reduces the efficiency of the factories 
and the civilian services of all kinds, on which a Military Commander must rely."135
In the third week of April, however, Wavell returned to the charge. Procurement 
in Bengal had continued to be moribund and crop damages were being reported from 
several other provinces which threatened to destabilize the nation-wide food supply still 
further. Given these contingencies, Wavell informed Amery: "the promised import of 200 
[thousand tons] just balances civil position with nothing (repeat nothing) to meet defense 
requirements of 724 for 12 months from 1st May and whole amount must be imported if 
Army demands are to be met...I am informing Supreme Commander and Commander-in-
Chief of inability to meet service requirement."
 
Wavell's protestations had little effect.  With 200,000 tons promised, the issue languished 
for several weeks.   
136
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"great shock" to London.137  At a recent meeting of the Indian Food Grains Committee, 
Lord Cherwell, "The Professor," had suggested that "a certain number of wealthy Indians 
should be hanged," and that this might solve the crisis.138 But the Secretary of State was 
of the mind that the import of food grains might be a better measure.  The War Cabinet 
convened, yet again, on April 24th and concluded, however, that nothing could be done - 
neither hanging nor imports.  Churchill was "truculent" as ever, "and came very near 
saying that we could not let Indian starvation interfere with operations."139  All he was 
willing to concede, according to the Secretary of State was to telegram the Americans 
and to "intimate to them that the general economic situation was likely to be serious."140
A telegram, drafted with approval of the War Cabinet, was sent off to Washington 
on April 29, 1944.  In it mention was made of Wavell's "gravest warnings," and also of 
the "grievous famine" of 1943.  But mention was also made of the "good crop of rice" in 
Bengal, and no specific information of the extent of shortfall that the Viceroy anticipated 
was included.  His Majesty's Government had done its honest best, Churchill assured his 
counterpart. "I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to India 
from Australia during the first nine months of 1944. I cannot see how we could do 
more."
 
141  When Wavell received a draft of the telegram he responded wryly to the 
Secretary of State, "I see that the Prime Minster speaks of having made 350,00 tons of 
wheat available which apparently means a promise to us of another 150,000 tons over 
what has already been promised."142  Amery assured the Viceroy that that was not the 
case; "Leathers put it that way in order to make it clear to the President that we had done 
our best."143 President Roosevelt, apparently, felt that that was good enough.  On June 
3rd he cabled back to express his "utmost sympathy," but reported that he would be 
unable to provide any assistance, being "unable on military grounds to consent to the 
diversion of shipping."144
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Nearly six months had elapsed since Wavell had begun his campaign to contain 
famine in India by means of necessary imports, and nothing more than a promise of 
200,000 tons against the Viceroy's estimate of 1.5 million necessary had been 
accomplished.  Bengal, meanwhile, was entering into its lean months, which under even 
normal circumstances, meant acute hardship for the poor.  Smallpox had reached its peak 
during the months of April and May,145 and with one hospital bed for every 100,000 
residents of the province, had taken a very severe toll.  In Calcutta, alone, the mortality 
rate was three times what it had been in 1943.146  But, as Governor Casey reported to the 
Prime Minister, "food [was still] the constant and most important problem."147 Conditions 
in Bengal, moreover, were destabilizing the food supply of the country as a whole.  
Receiving the news of Roosevelt's refusal, Wavell was despondent.  "There has been 
dangerous, and as I think, deliberate procrastination," 148  he complained to Amery,  "I 
have never believed that the tonnage required to enable me to deal properly with our food 
problem would make any real difference to [military] operations in the West or here."149
Wavell sent a second telegram to Churchill directly. He assured the Prime 
Minister that in the event of imminent nation-wide famine, "His Majesty's Government's 
attitude if maintained, can, and will, be represented with reason as both short-sighted and 
callous."
   
150  No War Cabinet meeting was called.  Instead, the Prime Minister, in direct 
consultation with his War Transport Minister, used the authority within his mandate and 
issued an executive order for arrangements to be made for the delivery of an additional 
200,000 tons of food grains to India by September of 1944.151  On the 5th of July the 
Viceroy informed London that His Majesty's Government's decision had been "too little, 
too late."152
 
  After six months of frustration and failure, he returned to his charge for 
imports in the months to come. 
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Famine Enquiry 
 As detailed in the official Medical History of the Bengal Famine, on the morning 
of July 10, 1944, a 32 year-old, "male Hindu," identified only as “Netai,” was picked up 
on the streets of Calcutta and removed in an Air Raid Precaution lorry to the Campbell 
Medical Hospital Calcutta.153  Netai had been starving for at least six months and was 
weak and emaciated on admittance. He had a history of intermittent fever for 2 months, 
but tested negative for malaria.  His fever may have been the result of kal-azar infection, 
or may have resulted from pulmonary infection or kidney failure.  His left lung had 
impaired resonance, fine crepitus and his breathing was diminished.  It is possible that he, 
like millions of others, had spent the winter without shelter or sufficient clothing, which, 
combined with starvation, had left him with chronic pneumonia in his left lung. The 
hospital had no reagents to run a sputum test to confirm or contradict a diagnosis of 
tuberculosis, which was also a distinct possibility.  High levels of phosphate in Netai's 
urine suggested kidney dysfunction, which also could have explained his fever.  He had 
acute edema in his feet and hands, which was a common finding with famine victims, and 
like all patients in his sample group, he had severe anemia.  His blood sugar was also far 
below normal and he was suffering from diarrhea.  The diarrhea may have been the result 
of dysentery contracted from eating rotten food, it may have been from an infectious 
disease such as para-sprue, or it may have been a "specific type of diarrhea found in 
starving individuals which is not infective in origin and may be called 'famine 
diarrhea.'"154
 
 The blood and mucus detected in his stool would be consistent with any of 
the above.  He was spoon fed barley water, and was administered sub-coetaneous saline.  
On the 18th of July his condition was still deteriorating.  His pulse was feeble and his 
respiration was hurried.  Netai died on July 20, 1944 in bed 20A at Calcutta's Campbell 
hospital.  His body was claimed by relatives the same day.  No post mortem was done. 
 Less than two weeks later, on the 31st of July, 1944 the Royal Commission to 
Enquire into the Bengal Famine of 1943 convened in Delhi under the Chairmanship of 
I.C.S. Officer, Sir John Woodhead.  Woodhead, a white British citizen, had been 
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appointed by the India Office in London despite protests in India that an Indian should 
preside over the enquiry.155  In keeping with current colonial policy, one Hindu 
representative, S.V. Ramamurthy, and one Muslim representative, Afzal Hussain; were 
included as examiners.  The panel was rounded off by an expert on public health, Dr. 
W.R. Aykroyd, and a representative member of the Indian business community, Manilal 
Nanavati.  The terms of reference were to be, as already mentioned, future-oriented.  Care 
was to be taken so that "officials giving evidence [would be] assured of complete 
immunity of victimization."156 As an additional safeguard, the entire proceedings were to 
be held in camera, as "it would be most embarrassing if officials were examined in 
public."157
 The Famine Enquiry Commission was, in some definite sense, primarily an effort 
to punctuate the "Bengal Famine of 1943."  It was also a fairly thorough examination of 
the economic, political and social context of famine in Bengal.  As such, the transcripts of 
the proceedings provide an extensive record of the events, personalities, and forces that 
comprised the context of famine in 1943.  The Commission's Report on Bengal, 
published in 1945, was, on the other hand, a relatively brief narrative summary of the 
information gathered, edited to conform with the "terms of reference" which had been 
outlined beforehand.  The full transcript of the proceedings was never published, but 
remains in the public record at the India National Archives in New Delhi.  The wealth of 
information that is contained in the unexpurgated transcript of the proceedings has been 
used extensively throughout this study. Here, certain items of testimony given at the 
Famine Enquiry Commission will be examined in an effort to foreground the context in 
which the proceedings actually took place.  In short, as several witnessed testified, famine 
was still very much persisting even while the  Commission sat down to compile its 
retrospective. 
 Witnesses were called to testify from the Government of India, the 
Government of Bengal, military and private relief organizations, and commercial 
interests involved in the rice trade in one form or another. No testimony was given by any 
representative of the India Office or His Majesty's Government in London.  
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 On August 14th, 1944, Mr. Justice Braund, Regional Food Commissioner, 
Eastern India, testified before the Woodhead Commission.  As Food Commissioner since 
March of 1943, Braund had intimate knowledge of the food supply and distribution 
system in Bengal.  He was also intricately involved with the aman  procurement scheme 
of 1944.  In his testimony Braund gave a frank and unflattering picture of the state of 
affairs in the province.  Mill capacity was wholly inadequate, a lack of storage facilities 
was a very serious problem, transportation services were extremely deficient, and the 
staff of the Civil Supplies Department was still in a state of utter chaos.158   The high 
price of rice had been caused by a systemic breakdown involving all of these factors - 
none of which had yet been remedied. The current price of rice, he added, was still more 
than four times higher than in early 1942. After hearing the grim picture that Braund 
sketched, Nanavati asked him whether or not rice was yet within the reach of the poor in 
Bengal.  "No, it is not always," Braund replied.  Lieutenant-Colonel K.S. Fitch, Deputy 
Surgeon General of Bengal, in charge of Medical Relief Operation, including those at 
Campbell Hospital in Calcutta at which Netai had recently died of starvation, confirmed 
Braund's surmise, admitting that, "generally...there is still a lot of underfeeding."159
The Honorary Secretary of the British Indian Association drew the implicit 
conclusion that neither Braund nor Fitch had ventured: "the continuation of famine 
conditions," he testified, "may be said to be persisting." 
 
160  Mr. Barman, of the Calcutta 
Corporation, also explained to the Commission excitedly on September 13, 1944, "there 
are yet famine deaths. I can cite a famine case examined by Dr. Roy, just at the junction 
of Howrah.  He died only yesterday being famine-stricken."  Nanavati rejoined 
perplexed, "Is it happening here?"  Dr. Ahmed of the Corporation responded in Barman's 
stead, "Yes, there are quite a lot of people dying even now."161
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 Members of the 
Provincial Kisan Sabha, a peasant rights organization with the closest links of any to the 
rural poor in Bengal, described conditions as "a complete crack-up of rural life - rural 
economy, rural society and rural humanity - this is the reality of 1944.  The village 
artisans; weavers, fishermen, boatmen, black-smiths - all have been ruined.  Fishermen 
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have no fishing nets, boatmen have no boats, weavers get no yarn, black-smiths get no 
iron or steel."162  According to their estimates, ten million had been forced from their 
homes by hunger.  Three and a half million had died.  "The remaining six and a half 
million - homeless, landless, and denuded of all that is human, are moving about in the 
90,000 villages of Bengal."  But, the Kisan Sabha representatives warned, "let nobody 
think that famine has ended with this toll."163
The pervasive ruin of society, dislocation of economic life, and continuing 
hardships of scarcity, inflation, hunger and disease, that defined famine in Bengal, were 
endemic facts of life for the majority of the population of the province at the time. The 
mostly Hindu, "middle-class," though surviving better than the (mostly Muslim) rural 
poor, were not immune.   In conclusion to his testimony before the Famine Enquiry 
Commission, the District Magistrate of Faridpur noted, "it is now people with fixed 
incomes, middle-classes, lower middle-classes, who are gradually getting impoverished, 
both financially and in health."
  Famine was continuing. 
164 By April of 1944, the prices of a wide array of essential 
commodities in Bengal had risen by an average of more than 250% in just three year.165  
The price of lentils, a primary supplement to a rice diet for those who could afford them, 
had more than tripled.  Vegetables had more than doubled in price, and eggs were three 
and a half times more dear. Fish, which was the most important source of protein to the 
middle-classes of Bengal, had more than tripled in price, due to consumption by the 
armed forces, and a stubborn scarcity of ice for preservation.  Coal and Kerosene, were, 
likewise grossly inflated, and had to be acquired at control shops were long queues and 
short supply led to daily scenes of frustration and turmoil throughout the cities and towns 
of Bengal.  Even with fuel for cooking, matches were at times unavailable, and cooking 
oil prices had risen nearly 400%.  Government had commandeered a full 70% of the 
country's supply of paper at the beginning of the war, which created a paper shortage that 
crippled publishing, small business and educational enterprises central to the middle-class 
economy.166
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bullets taking priority, and the acute scarcity of cloth was causing indignity for the poor 
and middle-class alike.167
During famine claims of social difference based on class and religious 
community, long embedded in the socio-political structure of the province, were 
increasingly entangled in a bio-political struggle for sheer survival. The sufferings of the 
middle-class became easily equated with the claim of disproportionate suffering of 
"Hindus" in general, and government relief for the poor, as exampled above, was 
considered inappropriate for middle-class Hindus, and as such, was resented as biased. 
Because, moreover, most of the impoverished cultivators, particularly in eastern Bengal, 
were themselves Muslims, the Muslim League Ministry's relief efforts aimed at the rural 
poor, and aided by the Government of India and the British military, were understood by 
Hindu political interests as "Muslim relief." The Hindu Mahasabha, meanwhile, while 
distributing unquestionably necessary relief to the middle-classes, was able, through its 
relief networks, to gain a foothold throughout Bengal that had evaded all previous efforts 
at consolidating a popular "Hindu" political front.   If, as Sugata Bose has argued, class 
conflict in Bengal "did not, without external influence, flow easily into the communal 
mould,"
   
168
The rigidity with which class and communal identities continued to harden has to 
be understood from a psychological perspective as well. Survival, in the midst of death 
by deprivation, was a double-edged sword: it could only be exacted at the price of the 
death of others.  Callousness and self-interest thrived.  The "care of one's own" took 
precedence over finer sentiments of suffering humanity more generally.  Charity became 
extremely strained and society became mean and chary in the furnace of want.  The 
Director-General of Food for the Government of India, identified these psychological 
factors as part and parcel of famine: "Public confidence," he testified, "was so 
undermined and people felt so insecure that everyone tried to keep what he had in his 
own hands."
 the devastations of famine provided a unique and exceptional circumstance for 
just such an eventuality. 
169
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suffering of fellow-villagers and the civic spirit was entirely absent."170
 
 Corruption 
thrived, and  "honesty," representatives of the Provincial Kisan Sabha noted, had been 
"eliminated."  The famine of food, they asserted, had engendered a "moral famine" of 
equally disturbing proportions.  Religious, class and/or ethnic bigotry under such 
circumstances, it is no stretch to conclude, can be understood as yet another pernicious 
disease that thrived in the wake of famine - the increasingly virulent divide between 
"Muslim" and "Hindu" claims, most dangerously of all.  
Pakistan 
 The release of Gandhi on health grounds in mid-1944 had, meanwhile, shifted the 
spotlight back to national politics.  Although hopes in London were high that Gandhi 
would retire from politics after his detention, he re-engaged in the nationalist struggle 
immediately upon release.  By the autumn of 1944, the Muslim League's call for a 
separate state of Pakistan had become increasingly vociferous, and now represented the 
most pressing "national" dilemma of all - not least because of famine itself.  The question 
of Muslim freedom from Hindu economic dominance had long been a primary concern of 
the Muslim elite, who formed the backbone of the All-India Muslim League.171  
Catastrophic economic failure, leading to acute scarcity, despair, and mass death from 
starvation, only accentuated the urgency of the issue, providing a stark backdrop upon 
which the idyll of Pakistan was sketched.  Famine also offered a manifest platform to 
popularize the call.  At the All-India Muslim League's Council meeting in November of 
1943, Bengal's Chief Minister, Kwaja Nazimuddin argued that famine had clearly shown 
that Pakistan was a necessity for the poor Muslim masses.  The famine had demonstrated, 
he declared, "that situations like the present cannot be tackled by a Central Government 
and in the future no Central or Federal scheme for India can ever hope to meet a situation 
like this."172  At the same meeting "a uniform food policy for all Muslim majority 
provinces" was outlined by Jinnah. 173
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"Pakistan," an exercise organized to presage the benefits of Muslim political solidarity 
and economic independence. 
 Though, in 1942, Gandhi had been sharply opposed to the Muslim League's 
proposal for partitioning India into Hindu and Muslim states, after his release from 
detention he appeared to be in a somewhat more equivocal state of mind. By that time a 
new scheme for a "communal settlement" had been advanced by ex-Congress faithful, 
and close confident to Gandhi, C.R. Rajagopalachari.  The "Rajagopalachari  Formula," 
as it came to be known, represented, what Secretary of State Amery termed a 
"conditional and partial concession of 'Pakistan.'"174 The formula advanced a plan for the 
Muslim League and Congress to work together towards the independence of India, 
deferring the question of a separate Muslim state until after the war. At that time, district-
by-district plebiscites in Muslim-majority provinces would be taken to decide the terms 
of a possible division of India into Hindu and Muslim states. Such plebiscites, it was 
understood, would guarantee the partition of the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab 
along communal lines. The plan also included an ambiguous caveat for "mutual 
agreements" between Muslim and Hindu states in relation to defence, commerce and 
other "essential purposes, in the event of partition.175   The likely division of Bengal and 
the Punjab - two extremely important Muslim-majority provinces - and even the hint of a 
central administrative apparatus for any purposes at all, were deeply antithetical to the 
Muslim League's professed main-line, but the Rajagopalachari Formula did represent the 
first real concession to the Muslim League's demand for a separate state, and Gandhi's 
acceptance of the scheme lent it enticing relevance. 176
 Many Congress followers supported the overture, but acceptance was far from 
universal.  The Hindu Mahasabha, in particular, was vehemently opposed to any detente 
with the Muslim League, and was especially hostile to even the mention of "Pakistan" in 
national debate.  To Hindu Nationalists Gandhi's support of the plan amounted to a 
reckless betrayal of Hindu interests.  Within the Muslim League, particularly in Bengal, 
there were divisions as well.  The League in Bengal was, at this time, becoming 
 Jinnah responded equivocally, and 
negotiations with Gandhi were planned for September of 1944.   
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increasingly divided, with Chief Minister Nazimuddin seen to represent non-Bengali, 
elite Muslim interests, and Food Minister and Midnapore native, H.S. Suhrawardy, 
representing the Bengali rural and urban poor.177  Nazimuddin was, moreover, considered 
to be the All-India Muslim League's "man in Bengal," while Suhrawardy, a seasoned 
veteran in the tortured and always-shifting terrain of provincial politics, had not attended 
an All-India Muslim League session since 1941.178
 By the middle of 1944, disruptions and deadlock in the Bengal Assembly had all 
but halted the provincial administrative machinery.  Governor Casey visited the chamber 
during a debate on the Secondary Education Bill
 Suhrawardy's reputation as an 
advocate for the poor had, furthermore, been greatly enhanced during the famine, and his 
challenge to Nazimuddin's authority had crystallized accordingly.   
179 and found the proceedings "perfectly 
disgraceful."180  The "Hindus in the Opposition" he wrote, gave a "splendid example of 
intolerance," shutting down all debate and holding the floor by main force.  When the 
Governor argued for the immediate removal of the Speaker, whose duty it was to keep 
order, Nazimuddin warned him that he was unable to do so "for fear of riot in the house, 
which would be followed by communal disturbances in Bengal generally."181 Casey, 
found the state of affairs in the Assembly absurd, but himself was "saddled with boils 
under the arm and a poisoned toe," and so was unable to take a more active stance.182 
Meanwhile, "the opposition," approached Suhrawardy to suggest a coup against 
Nazimuddin.183 The detente between the Congress and the Muslim League at the center 
in relation to the Rajagopalachari  Formula had facilitated the possibility of an otherwise 
highly unlikely alliance between S.P. Mookerjee and H.S. Suhrawardy.  Suhrawardy 
approached the Governor in a quandary, wondering what to do.  Casey warned the Food 
Minister against a plot "clearly designed to split and confuse the Muslim League forces 
still further."184
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The "opposition" was having troubles of its own. Hindu Mahasabha President, 
S.P. Mookerjee, who had once declared that "the indivisibility of India was his God,"185 
was shouted down at a Mahasabha rally in Calcutta for his suggestion that the Sabha 
might support the "Rajagopalachari  Formula" along with Congress.186
Meanwhile, conditions on the ground in Bengal continued to be extremely grim. 
Malaria hit its peak in November 1944, with as many as 51.7% of blood samples 
examined at Calcutta hospitals testing positive for malaria parasites.
  In August he 
traveled to Delhi to discuss the particulars of the formula with Gandhi and it was reported 
to the Viceroy that he had left "much encouraged" by the plan. It is entirely likely that his 
Ministerial aspirations in Bengal were at least as influential as Gandhi's arguments at the 
Center. Although Mookerjee himself was not a member of Congress, his associations 
with Congress were extensive and essential to his own political career. When the Jinnah-
Gandhi negotiations proved abortive and sentiments between the Muslim League and 
Congress hardened, however, politics in Bengal returned to the communal fold, and S.P. 
Mookerjee venture to broker no further  compromise with the Muslim League, again 
retreating into bitter opposition. 
187  Cholera and 
smallpox were still decimating the countryside,188 and the price of rice still remained 
beyond the reach of millions.189  Rationing had been operating in Calcutta and Dacca, but 
the rest of the province was still without.  Even in Calcutta, where famine was officially a 
thing of the past, the urban poor lived on the absolute margins of life and death.  
Governor Casey toured the slums of the city in December of 1944 and was shocked: "I 
have seen something of the way that hundreds of thousands of the citizens of Calcutta are 
obliged to live," he reported, "[and] I have been horrified by what I have seen."190
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Bengal.  Field Marshall Wavell, however, remained upbeat.  He had maintained his 
crusade for food imports and by the end of 1944 had managed to wrangle one million 
tons out of London.  On New Year's Eve he sat at his desk and mused: "So ends 1944.  
On the whole not a bad year for India."191
 
 
The Lean Season 
 Richard Casey shared none of the Viceroy's optimism.  On the 1st of March 1945, 
after 13 months on the job as Governor, he drafted a frank and gloomy report to the 
Viceroy.  "The Empire has cause for shame," he wrote, "in fact... in Bengal, at least, after 
a century and a half of British rule, we can point to no achievement worth the name in 
any direction."192
What stands out principally in my mind is the pitiful inadequacy of the 
administration of the province. Judged by any standards which I am acquainted 
with or which I can imagine, the administration is of a very low order.  On these 
standards Bengal has, practically speaking, no irrigation or drainage, a medieval 
system of agriculture, no roads, no education, no cottage industries, completely 
inadequate hospitals, no effective health services, and no adequate machinery to 
cope with distress.  There are not even plans to make good these deficiencies - 
and even if there were, it would be quite impossible to pay for them, as things 
are.




The Imperial Services in Bengal, he also noted, had "for generations...been mainly 
concerned with law-and-order and revenue," and had little skill or interest in more 
"modern" functions of governance. The I.C.S. ranks, in particular were of extremely low 
caliber and their numbers "grossly inadequate to the barest needs of a modern 
administration on the most elementary schedule."194  Little help had been given him from 
the Government of India or His Majesty's Government in London and little light was on 
the horizon. "In short," he concluded, "I believe that unless I am given more active 
assistance, I will have to discuss with you whether or not it is worth while my remaining 
here."195
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 Wavell was able to convince Casey to remain, but only a few weeks later the 
Ministry in Bengal collapsed.  The virulence of attacks by the opposition, together with 
the forces of division inside the Muslim League, had weakened Nazimuddin's regime to 
the breaking point.  The end came on March 28, 1945, two years to the day after Fazlul 
Huq had been unceremoniously removed from power.  Behind the scenes Nazimuddin 
had been attempting an alliance with Kiran Sankar Roy of the "orthodox" Congress.  A 
partnership with Congress would have given Nazimuddin the leverage to remain in power 
despite routine defections by the Suhrawardy faction, who frequently crossed lines to 
vote with the opposition.196
 Meanwhile, allied forces in Europe and Asia were moving from victory to victory 
and the end of the war was now well within sight.  Japanese and Indian National Army 
troops had been successfully fought back from the boundary regions of British India by 
the fall of 1944.  They retreated to Mandalay in Burma, which in turn fell to Allied 
advance in March of 1945.  On May 2nd, Rangoon was recaptured by Allied troops, and 
the Japanese threat to India had been all but extinguished.  Less than a week later, on 
May 8th, Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allies, and the streets of 
London and New York were mobbed by victory celebrations.  On the very same day, the 
Famine Enquiry Commission's Report on Bengal was published.  Although the report 
detailed the pervasive failure of the colonial administrative apparatus in India, as 
publication had coincided with V-E Day, the Viceroy assured London, “the impact [was] 
considerably lessened!”
 Negotiations between the parties broke down, however, and 
on the 28th of March a trap was laid for the Nazimuddin by the opposition in concert 
with Suhrawardy loyalists.  An almost incidental Agricultural Grant Bill came to the floor 
and was defeated when 18 members of the ruling party crossed over to the opposition.  
Failure to pass the Agricultural Grant tied up the budget bill, and the failure to pass the 
budget amounted to a no-confidence vote in the Ministry.  The Bengal Ministry was 
disbanded on the 29th and Section 93 was declared in Bengal, with Governor Casey, a 
disillusioned and interim executive, gaining extensive emergency powers to govern the 
province without democratic interference.  
197
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on such a historic day.  Governor Casey, however, remained reflective.  “There does not 
seem to be much doubt,” he jotted in his diary that evening, “but that India represents an 
administrative and governmental failure on a scale that fortunately is not common in the 
world…It all makes one very ashamed.”198
 Wavell, himself, was also disillusioned with the merits of Empire, and had been 
pushing for a resumption of the "political process” since the beginning of his Viceregal 
tenure.  Churchill had been foremost in opposition to resuming the process, and no moves 
had been made since the failed Cripps Mission.  With the war in Europe now over and 
elections in Britain scheduled for July of 1945, however, the Prime Minister gave the 
Viceroy permission to revive negotiations.  The Congress Working Committee was 
released from detention on June 15, and a conference was scheduled at Simla towards the 
end of the month.  The proposal to be presented by the Viceroy differed little from that 
rejected by Congress at the time of the Cripps Mission, but Allied progress in the war 
now made the prospect of provisional “Indianization,” with the promise of more 
comprehensive independence after the war, much more enticing.  The other major player 
at Simla would be the Muslim League.  In the first few days of the conference there was 
considerable optimism, but negotiations broke down when Jinnah refused to allow any 
party but the Muslim League to appoint Muslim representatives to sit on the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council.  The Muslim League, according to Jinnah's contention, should be the 
sole representative body of Muslims in India, and Jinnah its “sole spokesman.”  This idea 
proved wholly unacceptable to both Congress, whose President, Maulana Azad, was 
himself a Muslim.  The Viceroy, who himself had facilitated Jinnah's role as a chief 
negotiator, was dismayed by Jinnah’s “arrogance and intransigence.”
 
199
 Meanwhile general elections had taken place in the United Kingdom, and much to 
the shock of the Conservatives, they and their heroic wartime leader, Winston Churchill, 
were swept from power by the Labour Party in a landslide victory.  Clement Attlee 
replaced Churchill as Prime Minister, and Lord Pethwick-Lawrence replaced Leopold 
Amery as Secretary of State for India. The Labour party was assumed to advocate Indian 
independence, and despite the failure of the Simla Conference, anticipation that the new 
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government in London would move in a “liberal” direction on India policy was 
widespread.  Wavell traveled to London towards the end of August, and though he found 
the leadership in the newly formulated India Office "obviously bent on handing over 
India to their Congress friends as soon as possible,"200 he also noted that "the rank and 
file of the Labour party and the country at large take little interest in India."201
 The end of summer in Bengal was breeding other anxieties however.  Once again 
the province was approaching its lean season, when local reserves from the previous 
harvest were perennially running low, prices were rising, and anticipation of the coming 
aman crop was all that kept many of the province's poor from absolute despair - even in a 
normal year.  The monsoon rains in 1945, however, had failed; drought conditions were 
prevailing in most districts, and by August fears were rising that Bengal was facing 
imminent starvation on a large scale once again.  It was predicted that the aman harvest 
in the province was likely to be just 65% of average.
 He 
returned to the sub-continent with little more to report than that elections to the General 
Assembly and provincial legislatures would be held - for the first time since 1937 - in the 
coming winter months. 
202  Wavell wrote to the new 
Secretary of State just a few days after he took office, to convey to him that the food 
situation was extremely worrying and a "serious scarcity of rice in Bengal" was 
anticipated.203
 Due to administrative inefficiency, political intrigue and colonial indifference the 
situation in Bengal had been allowed to drift. Military medical and food relief had been 
withdrawn in late 1944, and little had been done by the provincial government to replace 
the loss.  Casey had initiated an ambitious program to re-build country boats, in order to 
rehabilitate the dismantled transportation infrastructure, but the scheme was riddled with 
  Predictions of the poor rice harvest, he informed London, suggested that 
the province would soon be facing a shortage of as much as 3.5 million tons.  The 
Viceroy had received reports that there were considerable reserves in re-occupied Burma 
and Siam, which might be utilized if large scale famine was to be averted. 
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corruption and was flagging badly.204 An increasingly acute coal shortage was crippling 
rail movements throughout the country, and the transport of food remained a low 
priority.205 As a result, and despite the lessons learned from 1943, the food distribution 
system in Bengal continued to be poor.206 Land rehabilitation schemes were entangled in 
political maneuvering and acrimony, and millions in Bengal remained homeless. Calcutta 
itself, after permutations already detailed, was now fully rationed, but the rest of Bengal, 
with the exception of Dacca and Narayangunge, were without any rationing scheme at 
all. As such, supplies, as well as prices, were still subject to the vicissitudes of the "free 
market."207
 Victory over Japan, meanwhile, meant little in Bengal.  Repressive wartime 
controls remained in effect,
  And perhaps most alarming of all, the feeding of industrial Calcutta, which 
was widely understood to have been deeply implicated in the calamity of 1943, had been 
removed from Government of India responsibility and the city would, once again, be 
dependent on rice from the country-side. 
208 and Governor Casey hesitated to demobilize the Home or 
Civic Guards who had been instrumental in keeping "order" in Bengal for the last several 
years.  Rice was now theoretically available through traditional import routes from 
Southeast Asia, but the geo-political landscape remained unforgiving to Bengal.  A two 
million ton surplus of rice in Burma and Thailand had to go through the "tooth-comb of 
the Food Committee in Washington," Governor Casey worried, "and [the] U.S.A. 
[would] push for rice to China - their white-haired boy."209 Casey's apprehensions proved 
well founded.  Despite the Governor's appeals, backed by Wavell's increasingly harsh 
warnings, the Secretary of State reported back to India that, as regards the possibility of 
getting imports from Southeast Asia, "the Americans have been making themselves very 
difficult in opposition to India's claims."210 What might be made available to Bengal, 
Pethwick-Lawrence warned was "certain to be immensely short of total requirement."211
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Thus, scarcity, hunger, and martial law continued to be the order of the day - despite 
Allied victory. 
 Hunger continued to be the order of the day in provincial politics as well.  In 
August of 1945 Fazlul Huq was on the stump at Calcutta University, thrashing the 
Muslim League and warning that their policies imperiled Bengal with the threat of an 
even greater famine than the "last."  Casey called on Huq and scolded him for his 
"exploitation of the food situation for political ends."212  The speech, he chided the ex-
Chief Minister, had been a "naughty one" that the Governor could not tolerate.  Huq left 
Casey's office chastened, "with the promise of being good."213  Shortly thereafter the 
Governor summoned the editors of all the major newspapers in the province and 
implored them, as well, "to desist from crying 'famine.'"214  S.P. Mookerjee was, 
meanwhile, maintaining his attacks, warning of an impending "second famine" and 
reminding his audiences that an "Anglo-Muslim League conspiracy" had been 
responsible for the greatest catastrophe in living memory, which had provided "a bitter 
foretaste of Pakistan rule in Bengal kept in power by the British bayonets."215  He also 
reminded his gatherings of the singular relief work that the Mahasabha had done and 
assured them that they would continue the fight to make "famine's recurrence 
impossible."216 H.S. Suhrawardy was, at the same time, reinforcing his own public image, 
expanding the connections and influence that he had accrued as Food Minister under 
Nazimuddin, particularly with the increasingly active Muslim student community who 
had gained a certain political capital in voluntary service at government "gruel kitchens" 
during famine relief efforts.217
 For the poor of Bengal, however, the autumn of 1945 proved yet another act in 
the ongoing script of dislocation, hunger, disease and unmitigated despair. The 
continuing "cloth famine," in particular, was becoming increasingly acute.  Governor 
Casey, while on a visit to New Delhi, approached the Government of India's Department 
of Civil Supplies about "the nakedness of Bengal due to shortage of cloth," but was 
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unable to move "hardly a dhoti" out of the Central Government.218  As the cold weather 
approached, the situation become only more dire.  Relief agencies operating in the 
districts were compelled by law to accept shipments of cloth from warehouses in 
Calcutta, regardless of quality.  The District Magistrate in Jessore complained bitterly 
that "some of the cloth sent [was] reported...to be so moth-eaten or so rotten that it cannot 
stand the slightest strain.  This is grossly unfair on our local handling agents who have to 
pay the Calcutta agent irrespective of the quality delivered - an unheard of thing - and 
also on the public, especially the poor folk who have to pay hard-earned rupees for bad 
stuff."219  The dead, as of autumn 1945, faired only a little better.  Protests had been 
raised about the lack of cloth, even, to cover the deceased, and special provisions were 
made to ration whole cloth for corpses.  Following standard procedures related to the 
dead in general, however, rations for mortuary cloth were allocated according to religious 
community, with yardage figured according to respective Hindu, Muslim or Christian 
needs.220
Meanwhile, grim prospects for the rice harvest were unsettling prices and the 
black market was again holding sway.
 
221  By September the Chief Secretary was 
reporting "appreciable demand for rice from Government stocks for the districts."222 and 
arrangements were made to move rice from Calcutta to the mofussil.  But the direction of 
"relief" was reversed within a few short months, and by November, "steps [were being] 
taken to reinforce Calcutta's stocks by moving stocks from the districts."223  At the same 
time, rations in factories were being reduced and the quality of rice being dolled out was 
still extremely poor.224
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Electric's Garden Reach factory "there was a riot...on account of bad rice supplied to the 
workers and the Manager was assaulted."225 In the countryside, as winter approached, 
conditions deteriorated further.  In Bankura district there was "agitation over distress" and 
reports of death from starvation.226  In Midnapore "test relief works" were opened and 
drew large numbers of "destitutes" (the final measure of famine according to the Bengal 
Famine Code.)227  Test works were also opened in Khulna, Dacca and Bankura - all 
drawing tens of thousands of "volunteers."  Seed potatoes were in short supply 
throughout the province due to consumption by starving cultivators, and in districts 




 On the 21st of November 1945 - amidst such bad news from every quarter - 
Calcutta erupted into violence, the scale of which had not been witnessed in decades.  
The trouble began when a large crowd of students gathered to protest the trials of Indian 
National Army (INA) soldiers captured by British authorities upon the defeat of Japan in 
Burma.229  After a rally at Wellington Square in downtown Calcutta, a procession began 
towards Government headquarters at Dalhousie.  The meeting itself had been authorized, 
but when the crowd approached Dharmatala Street, they were met by a cordon of police 
constables and a tense stand-off ensued.  The confrontation grew more heated in the early 
evening, and by morning there were reports that shots had been fired and at least three 
student demonstrators had been killed and by the afternoon of the 22nd rioting was 
widespread, with outbreaks becoming "steadily more violent in character."230 Student 
demonstrators by this time had been joined by a diverse contingent of urban residents 
including taxi drivers, "up country" laborers, Bengali factory workers, and, according to 
the governor, "the hooligan element [more] generally."231
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days of violence at least 33 people had been killed, with another 400 seriously injured, 
including 200 police, fire brigade workers and military personnel. 
 The exact cause of the disturbances, Governor Casey admitted to the Viceroy, had 
been difficult to establish. The activities of the students on the 21st, he informed Wavell, 
could not explain the amplification and diversification of violence that rocked the city 
subsequently.  The disorder, in this sense, "was not the result of a widespread conspiracy 
to plunge Calcutta into anarchy."232 Rather the violence emerged spontaneously, and as 
such could only be understood to represent a diverse range of animosities, grievances and 
anxieties. It also exampled an unprecedented sense of desperation.  "Both in North and 
South Calcutta," Casey reported, "a feature of the disturbances comparatively new to 
Bengal was that crowds when fired on largely stood their ground or at most receded a 
little, to return again to attack." 233  The targets of the crowds included police 
installations, public transport facilities, symbols of governmental authority and military 
vehicles and personnel.  In a telling and highly significant sign of the times, attacks were 
also made on Government ration shops, and private retail outlets were forced to shuttered 
their establishments by angry mobs.234 Department of Civil Supply lorries were also 
targeted, some being attacked and burnt, and as many as six going completely "missing" 
during the disorder.235 The Calcutta Rationing Department issued a press release on the 
24th of November. "It is in the interest of the people themselves," the publication read, 
"to see that Food Rationing lorries are enabled to work so that people may be fed."236
 That the citizens of Calcutta were acting contrary to their own interests was a 
viewpoint also held by all the major political parties, who hastened to disassociate 
themselves with the disturbances.  On the 21st protestors had tied together Muslim 
League, Congress, and Communist Party flags in a rare gesture of political unity.
 
237
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parties themselves, however, quickly denied involvement, making claims and counter-
claims implicating rival organizations.  Muslim League representatives rushed to the 
Governor's office on the 22nd to assure Casey that the League "deplored the present 
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disturbances and disowned any responsibility for them."238  They, in turn, fingered Sarat 
Bose, leader of the Bengal Congress, as the primary instigator.  Sarat Bose - brother of 
Subhas Bose, who, himself, had commanded the INA - also unequivocally denied 
involvement.  Bose issued a "frantic appeal" to residents of Calcutta on the 22nd urging 
them to remain "disciplined" to Congress directives.239  He subsequently put blame for 
the disturbances on the communist party,240 with whom Congress was recently having 
very bitter differences.241 The Communist Party, though involved in the initial protest 
through their students' wing, was, by the 23rd, touring the affected areas in "propaganda 
cars...dissuading students from further participation."242  Lack of support from organized 
political parties and repressive Government measures thus precipitated a "sudden 
collapse of the trouble and the speedy return to normal conditions."243
 "Normal conditions" in the fall of 1945, however, and as detailed above, were a 
grind of poverty, ill-health and acute anxiety.  That this popular "disturbance" was short-
circuited by lack of institutional support is a sad and telling commentary on the 
disconnect between party and popular interests in Bengal at the time.  After several long 
years of colossal calamity, suffering and insecurity, and with the specter of acute food 
shortage again looming on the immediate horizon, the desperate measures that 
characterized the November disturbances in Calcutta can, and should, be understood as a 
revolution denied. "The most significant feature of the disturbances," writes historian 
Pranab Kumar Chatterjee, "was absence of communal strife.  The Hindus and Muslims 
stood as comrades in arms and no trace of mutual rancor between the communities was 
evident all through the November episode."
  
244
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political elite, who continued to channel the anxieties and frustrations of the masses into 
an entirely more sectarian mold.  
 In February of 1946, however, disturbances again broke out in Calcutta that 
mirrored the November model.  The flashpoint was again the trial of INA soldiers, but, 
again, the "disorder" that ensued belied the deep and pervasive anxieties of a population 
under siege.  Demonstrators fought pitched battles with police and military forces across 
the city, burned Government transport, looted shops and, again, stood their ground 
against police and military firings.  The violence took on a distinctly anti-colonial 
character, with numerous attacks on European people and property, and spread to the far 
outskirts of the city.245 "As in November," historian Sumit Sarkar notes, "there quickly 
developed a remarkable unity in the streets between students and workers, Muslims and 
Hindus."246 Governor Casey, whose bags were already packed for Australia, met with 
Muslim League stalwart Huseyn Suhrawardy concluding that the day's activities 
"show[ed] quite clearly that [he had] no recognized authority over his followers."247  
Sarat Bose again disassociated Congress from the disturbances and called for strict 
adherence to party "discipline."248  After two days of clashes, 84 people were dead and 
more than 300 injured.249  The incoming Governor, Sir Fredrick Burrows, was scheduled 
to arrive in Calcutta on February 13th to assume Emergency Rule in Bengal, but Casey, 
himself eager to get away, telephoned the Viceroy to advise delay.  Transporting Burrows 
from the airport would "take a great many police (who [were] being sorely tried) away 
from much more important tasks."250  "The Almost Revolution"251
 
 of February 1946 was 
the last of its kind in colonial Calcutta.  The conflagrations that Burrows would have to 
deal with in the coming months were of a much different, and darker, nature. 
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Second Famine 
The Viceroy informed London on the first of January 1946 that the food situation 
in India was deteriorating still further.  If Congress called for a mass movement, Wavell 
warned, food shortage would surely intensify the response. 252  "To have another 
disastrous famine within the space of three years," he cautioned further, "would afflict the 
conscience of the world."253  He lobbied for immediate and substantial imports, but, yet 
again, received less than satisfactory replies.  "India's need is unquestionable," the Labour 
Party's Secretary of State responded, "but...it would be foolish to raise false expectations 
of greatly increased imports."254  Perhaps, the Secretary of State added, a cut in rations 
could save the situation.255 Wavell found the suggestion that rations in India should be 
reduced to 12 oz. per day deplorable. He pointed out that a 12 oz. ration amounted to only 
1200 calories, "which any health expert [would] admit is a hopelessly inadequate diet."256  
He puzzled at the audacity of the India Office in London. "I cannot believe," he bristled, 
"that anyone will contemplate keeping such a large population on the edge of starvation 
for the whole of this critical year."257
 With few other options, however, Wavell contemplated this exact course.  He met 
with his Executive Council, and found them amenable to the idea of a ration cut.  A few 
weeks later, he met with Congress President, Maulana Azad, and even more surprisingly, 
found Azad agreeable to a reduction of rations as well.  In a press statement Azad 
explained that Congress was "essentially a political organization based on the will and 
aspirations of the people...fully alive to the urgency of the new spirit and to the 
impatience of the younger generation.  But we are equally conscious of our heavy 
responsibility at this critical time."
 
258  Part and parcel of that responsibility was to urge 
the public to co-operate with India's current colonial caretakers.  Co-operation, as far as 
the food crisis went, meant accepting Government expediencies.  In this context, he 
reasoned, the cut in rations was "a far-sighted measure for saving millions of lives."259
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The leadership of the Muslim League similarly complied with the necessity of reducing 
rations and pushing the masses of India further towards "the edge of starvation."260
 By this time the Congress and the Muslim League had been established as the 
overwhelmingly dominant players on the national scene.  In the winter elections, 
Congress had commandeered a majority in the Central Assembly, winning 57 out of a 
total of 102 seats, earning 91.3% of the non-Muslim vote.
 In this 
sense, the disconnect between the masses and the political elite, evident in the earlier 
disturbances, was reiterated in relation to food.  
261 The Muslim League scored 
a parallel victory, winning all 30 Assembly seats reserved for Muslims, after garnering 
86.6% of the Muslim vote.  The fact that franchise was extremely limited, less than 1% 
for the Central Assembly elections,262
 The May 16th Plan involved a three-tiered federation with a weak central 
authority that would remain in control of  defence, foreign affairs and communications.  
Provinces would be "grouped" according to majority religious communities, with Group 
A comprised of Hindu majority provinces in south and central India, and Groups B and C 
consisting of Muslim majority provinces in the west (Punjab and the North Western 
Frontier Province) and in the east (Bengal and Assam.)  Each grouping would be given 
wide-ranging governmental autonomy, and the minority community in any of the three 
groupings would be guaranteed a measure of equity by the balance of power in the 
groupings where they maintained majority status. This plan, it was thought, would give 
Jinnah and the Muslim League a very close approximation of the "Pakistan" that was 
central to their demands - particularly in establishing the entire provinces of Bengal and 
 did little to curtail the enthusiasm with which each 
party now claimed broad and sweeping representation.  The election results also served to 
reify the rivalry between the League and Congress, centralizing the over-determining 
issue of contention between them, namely: Pakistan.  A high level Cabinet Mission was 
organized by Wavell in conjunction with the India Office in London to bring the parties 
to the table in order to hammer out a final resolution that would determine the terms of a 
transfer of power.  The "Cabinet Mission" commenced its work in March of 1946, and by 
May 16th had come up with a plan that one tentative agreement from both parties.  
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Punjab under Muslim control - as well as placating Congress with the promise of a, 
however compromised, central authority. Though they had given provisional approval of 
the scheme in May, however, the Congress leadership began to back-pedal, most 
conspicuously on whether groupings were to be understood as compulsory or whether 
they would be based on plebiscites.  Further acrimony mounted in June as the Congress 
leadership became ever-more equivocal, with leading industrialists lobbying for a 
stronger central government that would guarantee their primacy.263
Further dispute surrounded the composition of an Interim Government, which 
would oversee the constitutional and administrative processes in the lead-up to 
independence.  The Muslim League demanded parity with Congress in any provisional 
government, and furthermore stipulated that only they should be allowed to appoint 
Muslim representatives to the Council.  A Cabinet Mission statement was issued on June 
16th granting both demands.  Congress, however, rejected the plan, most vehemently in 
relation to the monopoly on Muslim representation proposed by the Muslim League.  The 
Muslim League argued that if Congress was unwilling to participate in the Interim 
Government proposed by the Cabinet Mission on June 16th, it was incumbent upon the 
Viceroy to move ahead with the formation of a provisional government without them.  
Members of the Cabinet Mission, however, fearing a mass movement if Congress was 
excluded, rejected Jinnah's insistence.  On June 26th the Viceroy announced that while 
constitutional negotiations would continue, the formation of an Interim Government 
would not be presently possible.  On June 29th the Cabinet Mission left India. 
  The issue of a much 
stronger center finally became the issue around which Congress support for the 
negotiations collapsed. 
 The Viceroy, for his part, felt that, "however absorbed [Government] may [have 
been] in the constitutional problems, the food situation [was] even more urgent."264  
Promises of imports from the U.S. had proved hollow, and London had little more to 
suggest than that India might be able to work a deal for 60 large tractors which were for 
sale at the American Air Depot at Agra.265
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should not be a matter of party politics, but in the end they will not forgo party advantage 
even in the face of famine."266  Animosities were nowhere higher than in Bengal.  The 
Muslim League, campaigning on the "single issue of Pakistan."267 won a substantial 
victory in provincial elections, registering 93% of the Muslim vote, and in April 
consummate Bengali political strongman, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, formed "an 
almost purely Muslim Ministry...with an almost purely Hindu opposition" 268 Franchise 
had been no more than 10% of the population in provincial elections,269 however, and it 
is entirely unclear to what extent the majority of the population remained interested in the 
ongoing Ministerial morass. The insufficient aman crop was now in and the province was 
careening towards the lean months with few solutions to an impending disaster.  Reports 
from most districts in Bengal, meanwhile, indicated that acute distress was imminent.270
 London sent Herbert Morrison, leader of the House of Commons, to Washington 
to argue the case for imports to India, but the U.S. Government offered little help.  
Wavell discussed the possibility of cutting rations still further with his Executive 
Council, but it was concluded that any further cut might "create very serious labor trouble 
and by affecting confidence would probably doom the prospects of procurement so as to 
leave us even worse off than before."
 
271  Towards the end of June there were 
demonstrations in Calcutta, orchestrated by provincial Kisan Sabhas, demanding 
immediate arrangements for the movement of at least 200,000 tons of rice to distressed 
districts and the immediate constitution of a Food Advisory Council.272  Government 
gave in to the latter demand, organizing an all-parties Council to advise Government on 
procurement, storage and distribution on food grains, but no measures were taken for the 
movement of food relief to deficit areas.273
                                                 
266 T.O.P. Vol. VI, Wavell to King George, p. 1236 
  While reports of starvation were filling the 
newspapers and famine was again becoming headline news, the Viceroy called on 
267  Suranjan Das (1991),  p. 164 
268 Bose (1986), p. 223 
269 Sumit Sarkar (1983), p. 427 
270 Casey's Diary, p. 236-238 
271 T.O.P. Vol. VII, Wavell to Henderson, p. 645 
272 The Statesman,  "Demonstration in Calcutta," July 1, 1946 
273 The Statesman, "Food Advisory Committee," July 1, 1946 
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Maulana Azad to dissuade the Bengal press from fomenting "alarm about the food 
situation."274
At the same time a "U.S. Famine Mission" arrived in Calcutta to tour Bengal, in 
order to gauge levels of distress and make recommendations to the U.S. Government.
   
275 
The Mission visited deficit districts and studied distribution and rationing arrangements, 
but when asked to comment on their conclusions, admitted that Bengal's problems were 
"too big and too complex" to make any statement presently.276  On July 10 the Statesman 
reported that mortality rates in Calcutta had risen more than 15% over the previous 
week,277  and on the 16th of July the Government of India's Food Adviser warned that the 
rationing system in Bengal was highly "inefficient," and the province "might face 
famine," if markets were further destabilized by black-market forces and political 
intrigue.278  On July 25 Congress representatives tabled an adjournment in the Bengal 
Council that focused on the "acute distress prevailing in different parts of the province 
because of the government's failure to reduce prices and to maintain an adequate supply 
of rice."279  The Congress representatives expressed their dismay that no lesson had been 
learned from the cataclysm of 1943 and warned, "reports reaching Congress offices 
showed that starvation on a wide scale has already begun."280  The dreaded "second 
famine" had finally arrived, and Congress laid the blame squarely at the Muslim League's 
door.  Muslim League representatives retorted that the Ministry was "being attacked for 
an offence that was not committed by them.  It was the Section 93 Administration which 
should have been the subject matter for discussion as the food policy pursued by that 
regime was responsible for the present situation."281  The problem, moreover, might have 
been met but for the "malicious propaganda obviously carried on in the Press in the 
interests of Hindu merchants and aratdars."282
                                                 
274 T.O.P. Vol. VIII, Wavell to Maulana Azad, 1946, p.  
  A motion to censor the Ministry for 
allowing a "second famine" to arise was defeated along party lines.   
275 The Statesman, "U.S. Famine Mission Arrives in Calcutta," July 2, 1946 
276 The Statesman, "U.S. Food Mission Ends Bengal Tour," July 4, 1946 
277 The Statesman, "Rise in Calcutta Mortality," July 10, 1946 
278 The Statesman, "India's Food Import Needs," July 18, 1946 
279 The Statesman, "No Starvation in Bengal," July 26, 1946 
280 Ibid 
281 Ibid 
282 Ibid (aratdars are small traders who also store rice.) 
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On August 2nd a banner headline in The Statesman, the same paper that had 
broke the "first" famine read: "Millions to Die of Starvation."  The United States 
Department of Agriculture, the article read, "feared a serious famine was developing in 
Bengal."  Meanwhile, however, the Cabinet Mission had completely broken down and 
the impasse between the Muslim League and Congress at the center had become 
intractable.  On July 10th Nehru gave a speech unequivocally rejecting the May 16th 
plan, asserting that the Indian National Congress would not agree to mandatory 
groupings.  The Muslim League, bitterly disillusioned with both Congress and Britain, 
convened a three day meeting at the end of July.  At this meeting, the Council of the All-
India Muslim passed two resolutions; one rejecting the Cabinet delegations plan for 
Indian independence, and a second calling for "direct action" for the achievement of 
Pakistan.  August 16th was designated "Direct Action Day," and Muslims across India 
were called on to observe a hartal (general strike), and to conduct public meetings and 
rallies throughout the country in support of Pakistan.  On August 4th it was added that 
Direct Action would also include a no-tax campaign, "particularly in respect of taxes 
levied by the Central Government."283 The primary objective of the announced program 
seems to have been to show the collective strength of the "Muslim Nation," and to 
demonstrate that they, like Congress, could organize a program of mass disobedience to 
express their political will.  Furthermore, and rather importantly, the intended target of 
"direct action" appears to have been at least as much the British as it was Congress - or 
for that matter "Hindus," in general.284
 
   
In the mix of what was to come, famine in Bengal was forgotten. 
 
                                                 
283 The Statesman, "League Direct Action Programme Includes No-Tax Campaign," August 6, 1946 
284 Sir Arthur Waugh interviewed the Muslim League Secretary, Liaquat Ali Khan on the 7th of August and 
reported that Khan said that "shedding of British and Muslim blood would be deplorable, but that it was 
better than slow strangulation."  (T.O.P. Vol. VII, Waugh to Abell, August 7, 1946. p. 199)  That Liaquat 
Ali Khan foresaw possible Muslim/British violence is significant.   
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Chapter Seven: Riots 
 
 
The colonist keeps the colonized in a state of rage, which he prevents from boiling over.  
The colonized are caught in the tightly knit web of colonialism.  But we have seen how 
on the inside the colonist achieves only a pseudo-petrification.  The muscular tension of 
the colonized periodically erupts into bloody fighting - between tribes, clans, and 
individuals.1
     Franz Fanon - The Wretched of the Earth 
    
 
Direct Action   
On the 7th of August, Bengal Chief Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy, released a 
statement to the press calling on Muslims to ensure that Direct Action Day in Bengal 
would be observed peacefully.  "This is the first step we are taking in pursuance of our 
new policy," he reminded followers, "and we must be absolutely disciplined.  Let us 
show to the world that we can perform our task with complete discipline and that we have 
sufficient self-control and control over our people."2 Suhrawardy's Ministry declared the 
16th a public holiday, arguing that this was in the interest of public order and would 
"minimize chances of conflict."3   Minimizing conflict in the always contentious Bengal 
Legislative Assembly, however, would not be easy. Deploring the exercise of 
"Government in using their authority to give [official] effect to a communal party's 
decision," 4
                                                 
1 Fanon, p. 17 
 Congress representatives tabled a motion to overturn the public holiday 
ruling. This same motion was, in turn, promptly thrown out by the (Muslim League) 
Deputy Speaker.  After angry protests, heckling, and rancorous dispute, Congress Party 
representatives stormed off the floor and took the debate into the streets.   In south 
Calcutta, the Provincial Congress Committee held a public meeting, at which the Muslim 
League was accused of "utilizing their [governmental] powers for advancing party 
2The Statesman, "Suhrawardy's Message for Direct Action Day," August 7, 1946 
3 The Statesman, "Discussion on Holiday," August 16, 1942 
4 The Statesman, "Congress Party Walk-Out,"  August 13, 1946 
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interest," and the League's plan of Direct Action was denounced.5
 The central platform of "Direct Action" in Calcutta, aside from a city-wide hartal, 
was a mass rally on the Maidan planned for three-o'clock in the afternoon.  And so, 
starting early in the morning, Muslims from every corner of Calcutta and its industrial 
suburbs began to travel, mostly on foot, to the center of the city to join the demonstration. 
Reports of trouble began filtering into police headquarters by 7:30 AM.  Armed Muslim 
processionists on their way to the Maidan were attempting to force Hindu shops to close, 
and bricks and other projectiles were being thrown from Hindu rooftops onto passing 
Muslim processionists below.
 The leader of the 
Bengal Congress, Surendra Mohan Ghosh, urged "the public to perform their normal 
duties on August 16th," and a movement to thwart the League's hartal took hold.  
6  Looting and violent confrontations between large mobs 
were reported a short time later, and by 9:30 serious disturbances had erupted in north 
Calcutta.7  Also around 9:30, casualties began to pour into Medical College Hospitals.8  
By noon, thirty-seven arson fires had been reported from neighborhoods including; 
Maniktola, Machipara, Beliaghata, Jorasanka and Amherst street, and violent clashes had 
broken out all over central Calcutta.9  The police were fighting running battles with 
rioters in the streets and resorting to tear-gas and lathi-charges to deter looting mobs - 
who at times were attacking them directly.10  At 2:30, the Police Commissioner 
telephoned the Governor to inform him that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and 
that he and the Chief Minister were both of the opinion that the military should be called 
in immediately to quell the violence.11
 Despite the ongoing situation, however, the rally on the Maidan began at 4 P.M., 




                                                 
5 The Statesman, "Protest Resolution Adopted," August 15, 1946 
  At the gathering, rumors were rife that Muslims had been attacked and killed 
in many quarters of the city on their way to the Maidan. The crowd was already highly 
6 Calcutta Disturbances Commission of Enquiry (Hereafter CDCE), Vol. V, Test. of H.N. Sirkar, p. 58 
7 Ibid 
8 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B 1X) "Medical Arrangements During the Civil 
Diturbances.) 
9 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B IV) "The Work of the Fire Brigade." 
10 CDCE, Vol. V, Testimony of H.N. Sirkar, p. 59 
11 CDCE Vol. II, Testimony of D.R. Hardwick, Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, p. 69 
12 Estimate of the Commissioner of Police, D.R. Hardwick in CDCE, Vol. II, p. 82 
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excitable, and these rumors served to increase the collective anxiety precipitously.  The 
keynote speakers were the former and current Chief Ministers of Bengal, Kwaja 
Nazimuddin and H. S. Suhrawardy.  Nazimuddin, according to the Governor's report, "in 
a wooly speech, on the whole preached peacefulness and restraint, but rather spoilt the 
effect by asserting that till 11:00 that morning all the injured persons [in clashes] were 
Muslims."13 Suhrawardy, also gave a half-hearted and unremarkable speech, but is 
reported to have assured the crowd that the police in Calcutta had been "restrained" and, 
as such, would not suppress Muslim violence - though no transcript of his speech exists.14
   After five days of unrestrained murder, loot, arson, mutilation, torture and 
dislocation, much of the city lay in ruins. A British journalist present on the scene 
reported: 
  
Meanwhile, even while the speeches were going on, violence had spread throughout 
central and north Calcutta.  Clashes had also erupted in Tollygunge and Bhawanipur in 
south Calcutta, as well as in the industrial "docklands" of Kidderpore, Mommenpur and 
Garden Reach.  When the demonstration at the Maidan ended, there was massive looting 
along the central business corridor, and as the congregants fanned back out into the city, 
violence across Calcutta escalated further.  A curfew was imposed at six-o'clock, and 
military troops were dispatched from Sealdah sometime around midnight.  But the 
violence, by this point, had already spiraled out of control, and neither the police nor the 
military could do much to stem it. 
A sense of desolation hung over the native bazaars. In street after street rows of 
shops had been stripped to the walls. Tenements and business buildings were 
burnt out, and their unconsumed innards strewn over the pavements. Smashed 
furniture cluttered the roads, along with concrete blocks, brick, glass, iron rods, 
machine tools - anything that the mob had been able to tear loose but did not want 
to carry off.  Fountains gushed from broken water remains. Burnt-out automobiles 
stood across traffic lanes. A pall of smoke hung over many blocks, and buzzards 
sailed in great, leisurely circles. Most overwhelming, however, were the neglected 
human casualties: fresh bodies, bodies grotesquely bloated in the tropical heat, 
slashed bodies, bodies bludgeoned to death, bodies piled on push carts, bodies 
caught in drains, bodies stacked high in vacant lots, bodies, bodies.15
 
 
                                                 
13 T.O.P. Vol. VIII, Burrows to Wavell, p. 297 
14 Ibid 
15 Sengupta, p. 293 
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Nothing approaching the carnage that had taken place in Calcutta between the 
16th and 20th of August had ever before taken place in the history of modern India.  
Estimates of between 5,000 and 10,000 killed have been advanced, but the true number 
of dead is impossible to ascertain.  An unknown number of bodies were burnt to death in 
fires, stuffed into the sewers, dumped into rivers, or otherwise disposed of without 
account.  Close to 200,000 people were in need of immediate relief, with at least 100,000 
homeless.  The violence also left deep psychological scars, both individually and 
collectively.  The animosity between Hindu and Muslim religious communities suffered 
an irreparable shock that would concretize the push towards the partition of India - which 
took place exactly one year later. The violence in Calcutta precipitated communal 
outburst in Noakhali in east Bengal in October, and the violence in Noakhali (and 
Calcutta) reverberated in Bihar a month later.  These several riots, in turn, set the tempo 
and tone for the catastrophic violence across India that accompanied partition in 1947.  In 
this sense, it can be said, Calcutta provided the spark that ignited the conflagration of 
violence which would leave at least one million people dead, and more than ten million 
people dispossessed and dislocated. 
 
The Calcutta Riots in History 
 That the Calcutta riots of 1946 were a catalyst and point of departure for the 
catastrophic violence that accompanied the partition of India, is a fact that is widely 
acknowledged by many historians - and yet about the riots themselves very little has been 
written. Not a single full length monograph has been published, and minimal scholarship 
exists. Very little of anything that has been written on the topic, moreover, gives any 
plausible explanation of the extent and ferocity of the cataclysmic violence that 
devastated the city in August, 1946.  Participation was extremely widespread and seems 
to defy the logic of "instigation." What were the larger socio-political factors at work?  
What variables influenced the course of events?  And - why was the violence so 
pervasive?  Towards an answer to these questions historian Ayesha Jalal notes that the 
Calcutta riots were "just one symptom of a more generalized and diverse unrest... the 
endemic rivalry of scarce resources."16
                                                 
16 Jalal, p. 223 
 The received wisdoms on the riots, she contends, 
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has proven insufficient: "everyone who describes these killings, runs for the shelter of 
communalism to explain the inexplicable, or more accurately the unacceptable, face of 
violence.  But the killings still await their historian."17
The most commonly cited cause of the Calcutta riots is the acrimony caused by 
Britain's failed Cabinet Mission.  According to this line of thought, the Muslim League's 
call for "direct action" is cited, de facto, as sufficient explanation for the violence that laid 
ruin to Calcutta.
  
18  As can be discerned from even the perfunctory summary of events 
given above, however, the call to "direct action" was, in itself, merely an indefinite 
political posture taken by the central command of the All-India Muslim League, which 
included no explicit call for violence, and was, moreover, intended as a movement 
against the British, at least as much as against Congress supporters, no less Hindus more 
generally.  More puzzling still is that Direct Action Day was, in fact, observed peacefully 
all across India - while only in Calcutta was there catastrophe. That Muslims - mostly 
poor and immigrant - comprised only 25% of the population of Calcutta at the time, 
would also tend to make explanations of one-sided Muslim instigation implausible.  It is, 
furthermore, generally accepted - though no reliable statistics were ever compiled - that 
more Muslims were killed in the violence than Hindus,19
In other histories, particularly those with a Hindu or Nationalist bent, the role of 
Chief Minister, H.S. Suhrawardy, in particular, is given primary importance.  According 
to this line, Suhrawardy is accused of having instigated the violence, almost single-
handedly, through his connections with Calcutta's Muslim underworld and the Calcutta 
police. That Suhrawardy himself was in favor of calling in the military - even on the first 
day - to quell the disturbances, however, seems to indicate quite clearly that whatever 
machinations he may be guilty of, the violence that extremely rapidly engulfed Calcutta 
was far beyond the purvey of his governmental or popular authority.  In fact, once 
violence had engulfed the city as a whole, and the extent of brutality was evident; 
Suhrawardy and Kwaja Nazimuddin of the Muslim League, together with Congress 
 which again would tend to 
undermine explanations that place disproportionate blame for the riots on Muslims.   
                                                 
17 Ibid, p. 216 
18 See, for instance: Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, or  Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia 
19  On August 19th, Wavell wrote to Pethwick-Lawrence, "the present estimate is that appreciably more 
Muslims than Hindus were killed." (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 274.)  Vallabhbhai Patel, in a letter to Stanford 
Cripps in October also suggested that "in Calcutta the Hindus had the best of it. (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 750.) 
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leaders, Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray, issued a joint appeal for peace in the 
city. 20
 In the most often cited, and most thorough work to date on the topic, Kolkata 
University historian, Suranjan Das expands on the logic of political instigation in an 
effort to outline a more complex understanding of the 1946 riots.  In his 1991 book, 
Communal Riots in Bengal: 1905-1947, Das engages in a meticulous and extremely well-
researched survey of Hindu/Muslim conflict in Bengal during the 20th century, 
concluding with a chapter that is devoted primarily to the "Great Calcutta Killings."
  But the situation, very quickly, was well beyond control of political leadership as 
well.  
21  
Previous riots in Calcutta - most notably those in 1918 and 1926 - Das concludes, 
provided "a channel for an expression of the socio-economic grievances of the lower 
social order,"22 and as such, "the riotous crowd had their own perceptions [and] their 
participation in the violence was dictated as much by their own consciousness as by a 
response to mobilization attempts by communal leaders."23  The 1946 riots, however, Das 
argues, "were organized and overtly communal; religious and political, and not class or 
economic consideration, primarily determined the crowds' choice of targets."24 The 
murderous mobs in 1946, Das adds, "Hindu as well as Muslim - came to be motivated by 
a kind of political legitimization."25  Das goes even further to suggest that in 1946 "the 
rioting crowd appears to have been broadly aware of the objective of the violence in 
which it was participating.  It was inspired by the same sense of 'moral duty' as had 
motivated the French revolutionary crowd to perform tasks which the magistrates had 
shown themselves unwilling to do."26
In fact, the violence during the 1946 riots was highly variegated and the list of 
motivations, objectives, grievances and expressions, is hardly exhausted by an 
examination of the connections between organized and popular politics - however 
  As such, according to Das, it was not merely the 
extremity of these riots that set them apart from previous disturbances, but, more 
importantly, their communal, "sophisticated and organized" nature. 
                                                 
20 The Statesman, "Communal Riots in Calcutta," August 18, 1946 
21 ... as the Calcutta riots are also known 
22 Ibid. p. 74 
23 Ibid, p. 59 
24Das (1991), p. 6 
25 Ibid, p. 310 (emphasis added) 
26 Ibid, p. 170 
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important these may have been.  Most importantly, the socio-economic context in which 
the riots took place can not be so easily dismissed, and - as in the case of previous riots in 
Calcutta - must be understood as fundamental.  The context of the 1946 riots, it should be 
understood, was defined above all else by famine and war.  In Communal Riots in 
Bengal, Suranjan Das does recognize the impact of famine on the population of Bengal, 
noting: 
The 'man-made famine' of 1943 was [a] devastating experience for the Calcuttans, 
as thousands of hungry people from all parts of the province moved to Calcutta, 
begging even for gruel when they lost hope of being given rice.  Great numbers 
starved to death of open streets, precipitating some of Calcutta's worst ever 
epidemics of cholera, malaria and smallpox... in popular perception these 
developments reduced the value of human lives.  There was a brutalization of 
consciousness on a mass scale, as if the people were being prepared for the 
inhuman episode of August 1946.27
 
  
But Das's emphasis on the political aspects of the violence obscures the more pervasive 
structural relationship between famine and riots in Bengal. The Bengal Famine was not 
merely a psychological prelude to the riots, it was also a principal catalyst, and in 
concrete ways set the stage for the Calcutta Killings. 
 As I have argued in all that has come before, famine had, throughout the period, 
insinuated itself into every aspect of life - political, psychological, economic, socio-
political, communal, and otherwise.  By 1946 this was a society in which any idea of 
"moral duty," particularly in the political sphere, had been so attenuated by the ravages of 
famine and the uncertainties of war, that for many millions it can be said to have ceased 
to exist.  Famine had not merely "brutalized the consciousness" of the population, it had 
distorted and deformed certain fundamental structures that define daily existence.  
Meanings of concepts like "health," "territory," "hunger," "home," "community," and 
"priority" (to cite just a few) had gone through many complicated and rapid layers of 
transformation in the tumult of war, starvation, and death. Famine and war had also 
transformed the geo-political importance of Calcutta. Millions had died - and continued 
to die - of deprivation and disease, so that Calcutta, the colonial war effort, and Capital 
could thrive.   With the countryside increasingly understood as merely a buffer zone to 
the city, both in terms of defence and supply, establishing a legitimate foothold in 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p. 162 
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Calcutta had increasingly meant the difference between life and death.  "Belonging" to 
Calcutta meant "priority," which, in turn, meant survival.  Meanwhile, bodies themselves 
became tokens of social value,  with certain bodies - the bodies of the poor and 
disempowered - sacrificed for those deemed "essential."  In this way, the bio-politics of 
famine also congealed identities, hardening distinctions in the furnace of necessity and 
survival, transforming, but at the same time cementing, affiliations of community, class, 
and caste.   
 In the examination of the Calcutta riots to follow, I will continue my analysis 
from these perspectives.  A central, if implicit, argument that I am making is that an 
investigation of the "causes" of the Calcutta riots is a somewhat impracticable exercise 
that can only proceed from a generalization of the event that does not withstand scrutiny.  
What is called the "Calcutta riots," I want to suggest, can be more productively 
understood as a complex conglomeration of enactments which, taken as a whole, can not, 
and should not, be grouped under any single category, such as "communal," "political," 
"economic," or otherwise.   In the pervasive breakdown of order that characterized 
Calcutta between the 16th and 22nd of August, 1946, the violence was highly diverse, 
motivations were, likewise, varied, and even perceptions of the violence remained 
relative and contingent.  
The five sections that follow each illustrate specific issues at 
stake in the violence, starting with claims on territory at a time when gaining a secure 
toehold in the city seemed key to survival. But first, I include a short anecdote that serves 
as an apt introduction. 
 
In 2004 I spoke with a Muslim man, in his 70s, who had miraculously survived 
the 1940s in Calcutta.  He had immigrated from Bihar in 1938 at the age of eight or nine, 
after his father had died of disease and his family could not support him any longer.  In 
Calcutta he at first lived on the streets, and later, after securing work as a casual laborer, 
moved into a bustee in central Calcutta. I asked him about the early forties in Calcutta - 
the war and famine - and he responded anxiously, "bahut takliif - bahut!"28
                                                 
28 "Too much trouble - too much!" 
 When I then 
asked about the "Calcutta Riots," he seemed confused.  He knew nothing of August 16th 
 323 
and only repeated, "it was a time of trouble, too much trouble, no food and always 
trouble."  I asked him again specifically about the riots, the fighting that had taken place 
in the streets, the killing.  "Yes," he said, "people were fighting, many stabbings, all the 
time people were killing, it was terrifying, for so many years." I began to realize that he 
had little concept of the event-structured chronology that I was following in my 
interviews.  He understood the whole period as simply the time of trouble (bahut takliif!), 
without drawing much distinction between famine, war and riot.  He spoke nothing of the 
political situation at the time, as had almost all of the other (mostly middle-class) 
survivors that I had spoken with, and as such it was difficult to locate him in my own 
understanding of "events."  He had not talked about this period of time with anyone 
before and was highly agitated to recount his experience.  Finally I asked him why people 
were fighting all the time and why they were killing, and he exclaimed emotionally, 
"Khanna ke liye! Jagah ke liye!  (For food!  For space!)"29
 
 I think of him often as I write.    
Territory 
The demographic pressures on Calcutta, throughout the 1940s, were intense and 
unremitting.  According to the 1931 census the city of Calcutta had a population of 
approximately 1.2 million people.30  By 1941, due to economic flight from the 
impoverished countryside during the depression, and migration related to war-time 
industrial production after 1939, the population of Calcutta had increased to nearly 2.1 
million.31  By 1945, with the subsequent ramping-up of war-related industrial production, 
increased deprivation in the countryside, and other dislocations associated with war and 
famine, the population of the city had doubled again to more than four million.32
                                                 
29 Interview with Sattar Abdul Khan 
 This 
doesn't include "outsiders," who lived in the city without having confirmed regular 
residence according to A.R.P. enumeration practices - on the basis of which rationing 
privileges were also determined - nor does it include the large number of military troops 
stationed in Calcutta at the time.  Housing in the city, meanwhile, had long been 
30Ghosh, Dutta and Ray, p. 78 
31 Ibid (actual enumerated population in 1941: 2,070,619) 
32 Exact numbers of the actual population are lacking, but according to A.C. Hartley, Controller of 
Rationing, 4 million official residents of Calcutta were being fed by the end of 1944. In: Nanavati Papers, 
Testimony of A.C. Hartley, p. 894 
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insufficient, with more than 16 residents per household recorded in 193133
Meanwhile, under the Defence of India Rules, close to a thousand homes had 
been requisitioned for military purposes until 1945, which caused great indignation 
among Indian residents of Calcutta, and exacerbated existing antagonisms between 
military personnel and civilians.
  By 1941 that 
number had increased to 27.5 people per household, and was steadily rising throughout 
the decade. Immigration and scarcity of land conspired to squeeze the population of the 
city into a tighter and tighter mold.  The conditions in the slums of Calcutta were 
especially deplorable, with over-crowding to the point of suffocation in many of the 
bustees of the city. 
34  In a material sense, the requisitioning of civilian 
property in Calcutta during the war also gave official sanction to the idea that civilian 
property ownership was entirely contingent on the expediency of martial priority.35 Those 
understood to be less than "priority" could and would be removed by force.  Few 
additional houses had meanwhile been built, which also led to increased rents and further 
intensification of overcrowding in existing quarters.36  When put to question on the floor 
of the Bengal Assembly, just three days before the riots broke out, the Secretary to the 
Chief Minster admitted that there was an "acute shortage of residential accommodation in 
Calcutta," and blushed at the fact that only 200 of the 985 civilian residencies occupied 
by the American and British militaries had been de-requisitioned since the end of the 
war.37
                                                 
33 Ghosh, Dutta and Ray, p. 78 
  With an average occupancy of 27.5 (by the conservative 1941 number), this 
would have meant that of the nearly 30,000 people dislocated by the military, more than 
20,000 were still homeless even after the war.  To the south of Calcutta entire villages 
had been "evacuated" by the military as well, dislocating an additional 30,000 people 
34 Stephens, p. 151 
35 Minto Dutto's large family compound in south Calcutta, for one, was requisitioned in the winter of 1941.  
Without any prior notice, the requisitioning officers showed up at the house and told them that they had 24 
hours to vacate the premises.  The next morning, even before 24 hours had passed, 30-40 military personnel 
arrived with mules packed down with provisions for a long stay.  The family, given no other choice, hid 
their valuables in a cache beneath the stairwell and relocated to Dacca for the duration of the occupation of 
their home.  When they returned in 1945, the house was a shambles, strewn with cigarette butts, empty 
whiskey bottles and food wrappers.  The roof was pock-marked with divots made were anti-aircraft guns 
had been fastened, and the garden outside had withered from a lack of care.  No compensation was paid.  
(From an interview with Minto Dutto) 
36 The Statesman, "Bill to Control House Rents," August 1, 1946 
37 The Statesman, "Congress Party Walkout," August 13, 1946 
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who filtered into Calcutta in search of provisional accommodation and subsistence. These 
demographic realities need to be kept in mind in relation to the riots. 
During the height of famine the city came under increasing, and at times, 
extremely volatile, demographic pressure.  Starting in the early months of 1943, waves of 
"destitute" villagers began pouring into the city in various stages of starvation, and 
occupied the city's public spaces and back alleys, begging for rice-water, and dying on 
the open streets in large numbers.  With the city fast becoming "filthy" with starving 
destitutes by summer relief operations were undertaken.  One of the first measures of 
"famine relief," however, was to collect the tens of thousands of famine victims from the 
streets of Calcutta and forcibly remove them to "rehabilitation camps" outside the city 
(though these same famine victims were, in fact, Bengalis, who themselves had labored 
in various ways to keep the city prosperous.) The treatment of famine refugees also 
demonstrated that - if necessary - force was a legitimate means of clearing the city of 
those who did not "belong."  The ration system, when implemented, followed the same 
logic, with "outsiders" excluded from the guarantee of subsidized access to food - even 
while the country-side remained un-rationed and starving.  Meanwhile, the food situation 
was again rapidly deteriorating in the summer of 1946, with the streets of the city, again, 
filling up with starving destitutes, who were, again, being removed, by force in large 
numbers.38
But Calcutta had long been a city of immigrants, with few, if any, having an 
ancestral claim to the city.  As such, all claims of legitimacy were historically contingent 
and socio-politically constructed. For this reason the administrative rubric of "belonging" 
gained special relevance.  The white-collar class was mostly comprised of Hindu Bengali 
bhadralok who had immigrated to the city in increasing numbers in the 20th century from 
the impoverished countryside. The industrial workforce was mostly comprised of 
immigrant laborers, both Hindu and Muslim, from Bihar, Orissa and the United 
Provinces, whose poverty and lack of opportunity back home had also driven them to the 
city.  The dock area attracted Muslim boatmen, khalasis, from the eastern reaches of 
Bengal, and from the Punjab, many thousands of Sikhs had migrated to work in the urban 
 As might be expected, then, those who could claim authorized residency in 
Calcutta clung to their territorial claim jealously and tenaciously.   
                                                 
38 Das (1991), p. 162 
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transportation infrastructures.  Marwaris, though relatively small in numbers, held an 
inordinately prominent position in trade and industry. They were known for speculation 
in commodity markets, as well as for their involvement in the textile industry. The most 
prominent Marwari family in Calcutta was the Birla family, whose connections to the 
Nationalist leadership have already been discussed. The city, as such, was a patchwork of 
ethno-linguistic and religious diversity, with concurrent tensions and contestations of 
belonging and place, which tended to increase in uncertain economic times. 
Each of the many immigrant communities, due to filial or regional association, 
had settled into distinct paras, or tightly knit neighborhoods, that were often, but not 
always, relatively homogeneous in composition.  Attached to each para there was 
generally a local market, or bazaar, which was also recognized as a distinct commercial 
unit.  By 1946 Calcutta was essentially a vast urban patchwork of diverse paras that were 
popularly recognized as discrete and cohesive demographic entities.  In Calcutta one's 
para (even until today) is the most commonly cited reference of locality.  The para, in 
this sense, was as important a social reference point as was one's religion or place of 
origin, and could commonly be understood to signify both.  Because Calcutta was an 
almost entirely unplanned city - many areas being comprised of nothing but endlessly 
winding narrow lanes and alleyways that comprise a highly intricate and complicated 
maze of urban habitation - paras too were established haphazardly and without any 
necessary systematic logic. A larger territorial unit, such as Beliaghata in northern 
Calcutta, might be comprised of a number of adjacent Hindu paras with few Muslim 
residents, or a single Hindu para, such as Ananda Pali, north of Park Circus, might exist 
amidst a large area of mostly Muslim paras.  In north-central Calcutta, Hindu and 
Muslim paras were more equally scattered, sometimes bounded only by a single narrow 
lane.  Individual paras, however, remained only relatively homogenous - in a "Hindu" 
para such as in Bhawanipur, there would likely be some Muslim families residing, as in a 
"Muslim" para, such as in Mominpore, there would be a handful of Hindu families.  In 
central Calcutta paras were especially mixed, with some neighborhoods being evenly or 
almost evenly divided.  
The earliest violence reported on August 16, 1946 seems to have erupted, above 
all else, in relation to the territorial specificity of the para. From early in the morning, 
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Muslims from all parts of the city traveled in processions to the Maidan for the scheduled 
rally, and along the way had to move through many Hindu-majority neighborhoods of the 
city.  Early in the morning, as Muslims, waving flags and chanting slogans, passed 
through Hindu paras in north Calcutta, trouble arose.  In some Hindu neighborhoods, 
bricks and other projectiles where hurled from rooftops down onto the Muslim 
processionists below, and in other neighborhoods, Muslim processionists attempted to 
force Hindu shops and bazaars to close for the day, and were met with stiff resistance.  
That Muslims had to pass through Hindu neighborhoods on their way to the Maidan, and 
that they tried to enforce their political will in such localities, led to violence.  On the 
other hand, bricks and other heavy objects were hauled up to the rooftops of individual 
Hindu homes in preparation for the "invasion" of their territory by Muslim 
processionists.  The attacks on Muslim processionists below, can, likewise, be understood 
to have stemmed from a territorial vigilance.  Several of these skirmishes quickly 
developed into large scale clashes, which had to be broken up by tear-gas and lathi 
charges.  In this sense, the earliest conflicts during the Calcutta riots could be said to have 
erupted over territorial tension.  The extent to which famine and war had aggravated the 
significance of territorial rights in Calcutta, in this regard, should not be underestimated - 
territory in Calcutta, for several years running, had meant survival, and nothing less. 
Moreover, famine and war had also rendered the public spaces of Calcutta a 
matter of contention and contingency.  Claimed by neither Hindus nor Muslims, public 
spaces might be imagined to have represented something like neutral ground.  However, 
during wartime, access to public space in Calcutta was increasingly policed, most clearly 
during air-raid drills and "black-outs," at which times Calcuttans were ordered to remove 
themselves from streets and sidewalks immediately and efficiently, and remove 
themselves from public space.  During famine the right to occupy public space in the city 
at any given time of the day or night became only increasingly qualified, with those 
understood as "sick destitutes" being removed, by force when necessary, from public 
view. The jewel of all public space in Calcutta, was the Maidan - Calcutta's Central Park; 
a vast expanse of open fields, sometimes referred to as "the lungs of Calcutta."  The 
Maidan was also home to Fort William, the Victoria Memorial, the Royal Calcutta Turf 
Club, as well as the Ochterlony Monument, and was featured prominently in imperial 
 328 
publications to demonstrate the grandeur of the British Raj in India. The territory of the 
Maidan, was thus, of great symbolic importance, and was well understood as such. 
During the war, although a landing by Japanese airplanes was highly unlikely, buses were 
periodically parked all across the Maidan to prevent "invasion" - an exercise aimed much 
more at "morale" than defense.  
The occupation of Calcutta's most conspicuous public space by many tens of 
thousand of Muslims on August 16th was a similarly symbolic spectacle.  Reports of 
attendance at the rally varied from 30,000 to as many as 500,000.  The Governor of 
Bengal, in his report to the Viceroy, noted that the former number had been the estimate 
of Central Intelligence officer "a Hindu," while the latter was that provided by the Special 
Branch Inspector "a Muslim."39  This discrepancy is a telling indication of the highly 
charged nature of the event.  For the minority Muslims of Calcutta, many coming from 
the overcrowded and squalid slums of the city's industrial wards, to physically occupy the 
city's most sacred civic space, en masse, was a much bolder expression of corporate 
power than any of the rhetoric advanced by their leaders who spoke at the rally.  Golam 
Kibria, a Muslim coal seller from Park Circus, had made the journey to the Maidan with 
the local Muslims of his neighborhood as well.  He remembers thousands and thousands 
of people, waving flags and shouting slogans, and also remembers rumors swirling of 
Hindu attacks on Muslim processionists in Kalighat and Bhawanipur, but remembers 
nothing of the speeches.  "There were so many people," he explained, "and the sound was 
not good."40
When the rally broke up, there was widespread looting along the business corridor 
adjacent to the Maidan, and increasingly violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims as 
the processionists passed back through the city returning to their own neighborhoods.  By 
seven o'clock in the evening the violence had sharply escalated, with arson, looting, and 
  Whether or not the Chief Minister had, in fact, assured the gathering that the 
police had been "restrained," it is clear that the agitation of the crowd stemmed at least as 
much from rumors of attacks against Muslims in different parts of the city, and also from 
the symbolic significance of the mass occupation of the Maidan by many tens of 
thousand of Muslims, as it did from political instigation. 
                                                 
39 T.O.P. Vol. VIII, Burrows to Wavell, p. 297 
40 Interview with Golam Kibria 
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murder being reported in many areas of Calcutta.  Much of the violence continued to 
have a certain undeniable territorial logic about it that can be related back to socio-
economic and psychological circumstances that were years in the making. 
The Sen family, who I interviewed in 2003, lived in a two story house in a 
narrow, self-contained alley of Ananda Pali, a small Hindu neighborhood, sandwiched in 
the heart of Muslim Calcutta; with Park Circus to the south, Motijil to the north, and 
Taltala to the west.41  To the east there is a local railway line that runs goods from the 24 
Parganas south of Calcutta, to Sealdah Station, a mile or so north of Ananda Pali.  In the 
early afternoon of the 16th, from the rooftop of the family house, Soumesh Sen recalls 
seeing a gang of armed Muslim men, two to three hundred strong, making their way 
north from Park Circus along the elevated railway tracks. Shouts of "Allahu Akbar!" and 
"Larke lenge Pakistan!"42
That night, his recollection continues, a second crowd attacked the para from the 
north, crossing the small bridge that spans a transport canal separating Ananda Pali from 
Motijil.  Again chants of "Allahu Akbar!" rent the air - this time answered by a thin but 
defiant call of "Bande Matram!"
 could be heard as the crowd approached the Sens' para.  
Soumesh was fourteen at the time, and it was the sound of the excited mob, above all 
else, that frightened him.  Sensing trouble he recalls, a contingent of Hindu men was 
quickly organized from the neighboring houses, and they went out to confront the gang 
before they crossed into the para.  An argument ensued by the tracks and one of the 
Muslim interlopers was struck across the wrist by a large knife and the mob retreated,  
fleeing back down the tracks towards Park Circus. 
43
                                                 
41 The reconstruction of events in Ananda Pali is comprised from interviews with Soumesh and Souresh 
Sen.   
.  From the window of their house, the Sens could see 
that all the Hindu houses along the main road of Ananda Pali had been set on fire and 
were burning unchecked.  A resident of one of the houses under attack, one Mr. Roy, 
approached the arsonists and demanded to know what the purpose was behind this attack 
on Hindu property.  He was killed on the spot - and the mob retreated.  The next morning, 
again, the Muslims of Motijil crossed the bridge and entered Ananda Pali.  There was 
more arson, and some looting, but no fatalities.  In the night, a group of men from the 
42 "We will fight for Pakistan!" 
43 Bow to the Mother Goddess! 
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para had organized for battle, assembling phosphorous bombs and gathering knives and 
lathis to ward off attack. Together they were able to drive the Muslims back across the 
bridge by midday on the 17th.  Several more attacks were launched on that day, but each 
was repelled by Hindus of the para.  That night, again, the neighborhood was encircled 
and chants of "Allahu Akbar" could be heard from all four directions, but no attack was 
launched.  From the 18th, efforts to defend the neighborhood were further organized, 
guns were fashioned out of pipes, and other weapons were amassed from local resources.  
Stray attacks and counter-attacks continued for two weeks, during which time, the Sens 
were prisoners in their house, subsisting on figs from a tree in the courtyard.   
It had been a terrifying ordeal, but  "during the fighting," Soumesh Sen noted, 
"very few people were killed." This last fact is somewhat unique perhaps, but in other 
aspects, this recollected story of Ananda Pali is typical of many incidents that took place 
during the Calcutta riots. Attacks on minority enclaves within "opposing" community 
majority wards were an extremely common target.  In the case of Ananda Pali, the 
primary focus of attack was the actual physical dwelling space of the Hindus of the para.  
The objective was to drive them out of "Muslim Calcutta."  The battle was fought, in 
many respects, like an ordinary turf war.  Both the railroad tracks and the bridge served 
as putative boundary lines, and the conflict unfolded based on an identifiable logic of 
territorial incursion and defence.  Though there is an obvious "communal" aspect to these 
battles, the prevailing demographic and socio-economic pressures that had reached a 
critical point in Calcutta by this time, are relevant.  For a long time, territory in Calcutta 
meant security.  In this context, the effort to purge majority neighborhoods of minority 
communities - "outsiders" so to speak - has to be understood also from within the 
purview of the overcrowding, scarcity, and "prioritization" that war and famine had 
visited on the city. In the first instances attacks were motivated by a jurisdictional 
jealousy, in these instances something more akin to ethnic cleansing is taking place.  
Both, however, can be understood to stem from territorial anxieties.  
While it is true that many of the Muslim combatants rallied to the cry, "Larke 
Lenge Pakistan," the call for a Muslim "homeland" can not be understood as sufficient 
cause for the eruption of violence. Hindus formed a significant majority of the population 
of Calcutta and few Muslims could have imagined that open warfare in the streets would 
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alter the city's composition in any way profound enough to transform the demographic 
equation.  Furthermore, if the leadership of the Muslim League, themselves, were 
uncertain about the geographic specificity of an eventual Pakistan, how much more so the 
poor and disenfranchised Muslim masses of Calcutta who participated and suffered in the 
riots?  The promise of "Pakistan" was, indeed, used to instigate attacks on Hindu 
neighborhoods, but in many instances it seems to have been denuded of any practical 
political content. Souresh Sen notes that "leaders of the Muslims... told them that this 
area will be yours - so go on rioting.  Because this is a small area, if they take this area 
into their Pakistan then they will be very happy." The idea that any small parcel of land, 
in Hindu majority Calcutta, that might be forcefully occupied by Muslim rioters would 
become "Pakistan," would seem to be only a rather pedestrian  ploy used by interested 
parties to advance their own much less grandiose material and territorial aspirations. 
Even if believed, this would not, in any case, limit the motivations of those who actually 
participated in the attack.  In this example, "Pakistan" was only a somewhat provisional 
casus belli emerging from the highly contentious socio-economic context specific to 
Calcutta at the time.  Above all else, this context was dependent on differential access to 
scarce resources based on claims of rootedness to the city. The riots, in this light, are 
understood not as a nationalist battle for the promised land of Pakistan, which would be 
home to India's 100 million Muslims, but as a much more specific, localized battle for the 
control of city blocks, alleyways and neighborhoods in Calcutta, the city of survival.  
The prevailing territorial dynamic of local dominance was, in fact, so deeply 
entrenched in the unfolding of the riots that it could not be obscured.  In an effort to ease 
communal tensions, many newspapers quickly stopped printing the religious affiliation of 
victims in their reports, fearing that the news of the killings of members of one 
community would lead to reprisal attacks on the other.  Little specification of victims 
was, however, necessary.  As Soumesh Sen notes, "in Hindu areas Muslims were being 
attacked, and in Muslim areas Hindus were being attacked...if you knew so many people 
were killed in Entally, you must know that they were Hindus, if you knew so many 
people were killed in Beliaghata, you knew that they must be Muslims."44
                                                 
44 Interview with Soumesh Sen 
 In this sense, 
much of the violence amounted to purges of "enemy" communities from specific 
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localities, not wholesale and gratuitous killings of Muslims by Hindus, and visa-versa.  
Paras were quickly militarized to protect against incursions from neighboring 
communities, as in Ananda Pali, where pickets of civilians were posted to "keep guard." 
Road barriers were also constructed to inhibit infiltration in many places, such as in Park 
Circus, were the main roads of entry were barricaded with barbed wire.45 The most fierce 
and protracted battles that took place, in this regard, were predictably in central Calcutta, 
where Hindus and Muslims lived in closer proximity and neighborhoods themselves were 
highly mixed.46
The infiltration of neighborhoods by rival communities was persistent and 
complex.  In the many interviews that I have conducted, it is at least as much the sound of 
the riots that has remained lodged in survivors' memories as it is any visual traces.  As in 
the case of Ananda Pali, actual infiltration of neighborhoods by riotous crowds was 
routinely preceded by acoustic penetration. Enervating choruses of "Allahu Akbar!"
   
47 by 
Muslim combatants, and "Bande Matram!"48 by Hindus, are remembered as a terrifying 
intrusions of domestic space that represented imminent peril to persons and property.  
Though, in and of themselves, neither invocation carries an explicit threat, both served as 
ominous and alarming indication of being surrounded by a hostile enemy.  In this way 
neighborhoods could be besieged and their residents' sense of territorial security 
undermined even without physical incursion.  Soumesh Sen remarks that even after the 
Hindu para of Ananda Pali had been secured by local armed guard, and Muslims no 
longer "dared" to attack, "every night there was still the sound: 'Allahu Akbar!  Allahu 
Akbar!  Allahu Akbar!' - and with those sounds only, we were getting frightened."  That 
sound is able to cross boundaries that have been secured from physical attack, seems to 
have been a constant reminder of the fragility of any sense of territorial sovereignty - and 
was used as such extensively during the riots.  It is also, and again, a distinctive echo of 
famine, during which it was the sound of "sick destitutes" that so many Calcuttans 
remember.49
                                                 
45 CDCE, Testimony of Deputy Commissioner, Calcutta Police, H.N. Sircar, Vol. V, p. 63 
 
46 Ibid, p. 88-90 
47 "God is great!" 
48 "I bow to the goddess!" 
49 As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was the recurrent and plaintive moan, "Ma, phan dao" (Mother give us 
your rice starch) that so many Calcuttans remembered above all else. 
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The physical destruction of homes of the "opposite" community represents a far 
less abstract territorial intervention.  Arson was extremely widespread during the 
disturbances, and cannot be understood as merely further evidence of political or cultural 
animosity, but can and should also be understood as a systemic effort to "de-house"50 an 
"enemy" sector of the population.  Given the arcane, and in many places, ad-hoc nature of 
property laws in Calcutta, the destruction of homes by means of arson amounted to a 
revocation of the territorial claim of many residents of the city - which depended more on 
perpetual habitation than official sanction.  Though no reliable tally of the destruction of 
homes can be ventured,51 the toll on residential properties was immense.  "Calcutta," it 
was noted in the Statesman on August 20th, "is like a town that has just known a heavy 
air-raid."52  In the first three days of rioting, the Calcutta Fire Brigade reported more than 
1200 calls, with each call representing an average of four fires burning in that locality.53 
Given the average occupancy of houses utilized above, this number (alone) represents the 
dispossession and dislocation of at least 130,000 residents of Calcutta - and this only 
derived from calls to fires that could be (and were) reported.  The number of Calcutta's 
poor who lost their homes in overcrowded bustees, which were also the target of arson,54
In as far as there was a concerted effort to deracinate members of the rival 
community from areas of the city, claimed by either Muslims or Hindus, it was an effort 
that was quickly showing results.  The Commissioner of Civil Supplies reported that "by 
Sunday, the 18th of August, large streams of refugees from affected areas were collecting 
at various centers, mostly operated under the auspices of non-official relief organization 
or ad-hoc non-official bodies set up for the occasion. Large exchanges of population took 
place within 48 hours as a result of persons of one community leaving their homes where 
 
is even less well documented.  
                                                 
50 Winston Churchill's friend and advisor, Lord Cherwell, pioneered the idea of "de-housing," which 
amounted to heavy bombing of German civilian area in order to "de-house", and thus de-moralize the 
population. 
51 The Statesman noted in an staff editorial on the 20h of August, "no one will risk saying how many 
dwellings and business premises [were] burnt...many thousands."  The lack of reliable statistics can be 
attributed to at east two factors; first, that there were more fires than could even be reported, or certainly 
fought, and second, that fire brigade workers were prevented from entering some areas by riotous mobs. 
52 The Statesman, "The Calcutta Scene," August 20, 1946 
53 The Statesman, "Death Roll Now Between 2,000 and 3,000," August 19, 1946 
54 See CDCE, Testimony of H.N. Sircar, Donald Hardwick, and others. 
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there was a preponderance of the other community."55  (It is worth noting that this may 
be the first  use of "exchange of population" used in the Indian context. It is a term, 
however, that became highly operative in the coming months in relation to the partition 
of India and the massive violence that accompanied the same.)  On the same day the 
Governor, with assistance of the military and police, initiated "Operation St. Bernard" to 
move minority communities from areas where they were under threat to rescue camps set 
up on the Maidan and elsewhere.56
The work done by the rioters, however, was on a far greater scale.  By the 28th of 
August, the Relief Department reported that there were 189,015 riot refugees being cared 
for in 307 quazi-official camps supplied by the Civil Supplies Department.
  By the next day as many as 10,000 people had been 
removed from their homes under police and military escort, and Operation St Bernard 
continued, under the directorship of "denial" mastermind L.G. Pinnell, for the next ten 
days.  Such an operation, it might be suggested, while undoubtedly beneficial for families 
under armed attack, ironically (or not) gave official sanction to the inclination of the 
rioting mobs. 
57  This 
number, approaching 5% of the city's population, does not include those who had fled 
one area of the city and were sheltering with friends or family members in another part of 
the city, nor does it include those who had fled the city altogether.  As to the former rank, 
some approximation of their numbers can be had in relation to the fact that by the 23rd of 
August, 110,000 people were reported to have fled the city by train since the 16th.58
In the weeks following the most extreme violence, the purges continued.  Outside 
of Ananda Pali, a killing grounds was set up in a vacant lot, and stray Muslims found in 
the area were removed to this spot where, "particular persons were there who were very 
  This 
number does not take into account those who fled on foot, or by other means of 
transportation. If account is taken of these refugees as well, it is easy to draw the 
conclusion that as much as ten percent of the city's population was dislocated by the riots 
- which would represent the largest displacement of an urban population in the history of 
colonial India until that time.   
                                                 
55 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, VIII)  "Activities of the Civil Supplies Department." 
56 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-391/46 "Report on Salvage Services."  See also, The Statesman, 
"Calcutta's Ordeal," August 19, 1946 
57 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, V), "Action Taken by the Relief Department"  
58 The Statesman, "Troops Work in Clearing City," August 24, 1946 
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much expert at killing."59  Muslims found in this small Hindu area were executed in 
deliberate and methodical fashion, more in the mode of calculated ethnic cleansing than 
communal frenzy.  Meanwhile, the few Muslim families living in the locality were 
permanently driven from their homes, which were subsequently occupied by Hindu 
residents.  In other neighborhoods, house exchanges occurred, where Hindu families in 
Muslim neighborhoods "traded" homes with Muslim families living in Hindu 
neighborhoods.60
While "de-housing" on this scale could not have possibly been foreseen, and 
would have been impossible to plan, it is, nevertheless, a fact that the riots resulted in a 
massive dislocation of people, the reduction of Calcutta's population by many tens - if nt 
hundreds - of thousands, and the "purification" of entire wards of the city by brute force.  
That such an outcome was not a matter of premeditation or overt planning, only lends 
weight to the argument that the underlying tensions related to territory, belonging, and 
residency in Calcutta had at least as considerable an impact on the course of the riots as 
did political manipulation, or, for that matter, "communalism," in a more abstract sense. 
   
 
Loot 
 In a similar sense, the extent to which rampant looting characterized the Calcutta 
riots cannot be simply viewed through the narrow lens of political instigation or 
communal animosity.  By the summer of 1946, the steady rise in prices, coupled with 
cuts in rations, had already precipitated considerable labor unrest, with as many as 242 
strikes occurring in Bengal in the first six months of the year.61 Many of these strikes 
were at smaller industrial concerns where preferential access to food grains was less 
secure than at the larger factories.62
                                                 
59 Interview with Soumesh Sen 
  The postal workers union had resorted to a strike 
over dearness allowances and job security on July 11th, effectively cutting off Calcutta 
from the rest of India in the weeks preceding the riot.  Rice, however, was not the only 
commodity which was, again, in increasingly short supply; the "position" of mustard oil, 
60 An account of this practice was relayed to me by Golam Kutubuddin (a Muslim) whose family lived in 
the Gol Park area (a Hindu locale) and after the riots traded houses with a Hindu family living on Park 
Circus.   
61P.K. Chatterjee, p. 170 
62 Ibid 
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kerosene, and seed potatoes had also become "chronic" by the beginning of 1946.63  In 
the winter months the shortage of cloth, in particular, had reached a critical stage and was 
breeding deep anxieties and resentment.  Even wealthier residents of Calcutta were 
having difficulty finding sufficient yardage to maintain their sense of dignity and 
station.64 For the poor things were considerably more desperate.  Hand loom weavers 
throughout the province complained of an acute shortage of yarn, and a thriving black 
market in piece goods was keeping prices artificially high and supplies short.65  
Moreover, the fact that the war had ended, and residents of Bengal were still suffering the 
same shortages that they had suffered during war, was extremely galling. That prices 
were again rising in 1946, and that there were, again, front page headlines announcing 
famine in Bengal,66 did not bode well.  Levels of theft in Calcutta and Bengal as a whole, 
had soared since the beginnings of famine,67 and with reports of difficult times ahead, 
crime statistics were again on the rise in late 1945.68
In this context, it is not entirely surprising that looting - from the earliest reports 
of trouble on the 16th - was a widespread and endemic feature of the riots.  No estimate 
of the total value of commodities looted from private residences, businesses, and 
government warehouses has been ventured in any quarter, but the scale of looting was 
immense.  Tellingly, when asked which community, Hindu or Muslim, most of the looted 
articles recovered by the police belonged, the Deputy Commissioner of Police responded 
to the Enquiry Commission, "It is very difficult.  The quantities are very huge.  
Practically the whole of the Indian museum was used for display of the articles 
recovered."
   
69  Some historians have argued that looting during the riots too can be neatly 
folded into a "communal" explanation - that looting was motivated by a will to inflict 
economic damage, rather than committed for economic gain70
                                                 
63 WBSA, Home Political," Fortnightly Report first half of December 1945" 
 - but this argument is 
based more on supposition than example. In the highly fluid and explosive situation on 
64 Interview with Dolly Mukherjee 
65 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report second half of December, 1945" 
66 See Chapter 6 
67 See Chapter Two 
68 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report first half of December 1945" 
69 CDCE, Vol. V., Testimony of H.N. Sircar, p. 83 
70 Das (1991), p. 172  "the only discriminatory element in lootings lay in Muslims exclusively pillaging 
Hindu shops and vice-versa." 
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the streets of Calcutta, specific enactments of "loot" were complex, participation was 
variously motivated, and, very often, an instrumental opportunism governed the 
transgression of loot more than any other single factor. 
In the early afternoon of the 16th, Muslims from Howrah, the industrial suburb 
just across the river from central Calcutta, were crossing the Hooghly Bridge on their 
way to the scheduled meeting at the Maidan. Like Muslim processionists from other areas 
of greater Calcutta, they carried flags and shouted slogans, stopped traffic and broke into 
scuffles with shopkeepers who had not closed to business for the day.  The situation, 
however, remained relatively under control.  Sometime in the early afternoon, however, 
according to the Police Inspector's report, "a large number of processionists who had 
already crossed the bridge were suddenly found rushing back to Howrah, shouting "Luto 
Howrah!"71  From that point on, the situation in Howrah deteriorated, with 28 incidents 
reported by nightfall.  Of these 28 incidents, 19 involved looting, with the most common 
articles looted being; cash, cloth, and gold jewelry.  Many of the reports listed the 
community of the owner of the shop looted, but not that of the looters.  Thus a typical 
entry reads, "24.) A cloth shop belonging to a Muslim at 62 Grand Trunk Road was 
looted," or, "27.) Cash and gold were looted from a Hindu shop at 5/B Maidan Road."72
This police blotter of August 16th in Howrah raises some interesting questions as 
to the motivations of the crowds and the nature of the looting that transpired.  That 
Muslim processionists from Howrah, on their way to the meeting at the Maidan, turned 
back from their intended destination in order to loot Howrah is telling.  To skip the main 
event at the Maidan - an assembly organized to demonstrate for Pakistan - in order to 
ransack the commercial district of Howrah, would suggest a rather tepid dedication to the 
cause of the day. Moreover, it was not to loot Hindus that the crowd turned back, but, 
demonstrably, to loot Howrah.  What seems to have gripped the crowd was not a 
politically motivated will to reek "communal" havoc in the streets, but rather a more 
mundane and spontaneous inspiration to take part in a free-for-all for personal economic 
gain. That, in a majority of cases reported on the 16th, the religious affiliation of the 
looted party is given, but not that of the looters, throws communal explanations into 
  
                                                 




further doubt.  The report that a "country liquor shop at 542 Grand Trunk Road belonging 
to a Hindu,"73 for instance, was looted, remains inconclusive in regards to the affiliation 
of the looters, except that they were likely drinkers.  By the 17th, the police blotter was a 
bit more suppositional, the typical report reading, "a stationary shop of a Muslim at 70 
Circular Road was looted by some unknown men - probably Hindu."74
If we take, even, the most famous case of loot during the Calcutta riots, where the 
perpetrators where identifiably Muslim and the shop was undoubtedly owned by Hindus, 
we find that there may yet have been discriminatory factors apart from the communal 
affiliation of the parties involved.  At approximately 4:30 in the afternoon on the 16th, 
while the meeting on the Maidan across the street was underway, a gun shop on the 
corner of Chowringhee and Dharamtolla, Mssrs. Biswas and Co., was broken into and 
looted by a Muslim mob.  To understand this one event, which is the most often 
referenced incident of loot during the riots, as primarily a "Muslim" attack on 
(specifically) "Hindu" commercial property, would be rather simplistic.   To think that 
this gun shop was looted not because it had guns, but because the owner of the gun shop 
happened to be a Hindu, would be extremely naive.  Calcutta, at this time, already, was 
exploding, and it is much more likely that it was the content of the shop that attracted 
looters, rather than the community of its owner.  People looted specific items, not always 
specific shops related to an enemy community.  
  Given the 
endemic poverty and prevailing hardships of life in Bengal at the time, however, any 
statement about perpetrators of such property crimes, without further evidence, doesn't 
amount to much.  
About less renowned incidents of loot it can also be also said that there were 
discriminatory aspects at work other than communalist calculation.  Scarcity of cloth had 
been a factor in several prior riots in Bengal,75
                                                 
73 Ibid 
 and in 1946, with cloth scarcer than ever, 
tailor shops, cloth warehouses and textile piece goods stores were, again, singled out for 
attack.  Golam Kutubuddin's family had been in the cloth business for several generations 
by 1946.  They had four clothing retail shops in Howrah, and a cloth wholesale 
warehouse in Burabazar. Their house in a Hindu neighborhood in south Calcutta, was 
74 Ibid 
75 Ibid, p. 67 
 339 
besieged by Hindus during the riots, and so the family took shelter in the American 
military barracks by the lake.  The family survived, but were economically ruined.  All 
four shops in Howrah, and the warehouse in Burabazar were looted and burned to the 
ground, and to put it in Mr. Kutubuddin's own words, "at that time we became beggars, 
you might say."  It was not discovered who had looted their businesses, and no arrests 
were made. Golam Kutubuddin's father, after surviving the killings, died a short time 
later of a heart attack brought on by economic ruin.76
The Deputy Commissioner of Police, H.N. Sircar, on patrol, came across several 
scenes of cloth looting in the first two days of the riot as well. On Chitpur Road in central 
Calcutta, he witnessed a "big crowd" breaking into a cloth shop. The officers with him 
lathi-charged the crowd and they quickly dispersed.  No mention is made of the religious 
affiliation of the looters or the owner of the shop, which doesn't seem to have been of any 
significance to the Commissioner.  In the dock area, at Kidderpore, a few hours later, he 
again came across a large crowd looting a cloth shop.  Eight rounds were fired by the 
police and three men were wounded.  The men were arrested and "a handcart which had 
been loaded up with looted cloth was deposited at the police station."  Again no specifics 
were given about the  communal affiliation of the victims or perpetrators. Shortly 
thereafter, also in Kidderpore, Sircar again came across a lorry full of cloth moving down 
the road.  About this incident there is a better indication of the participants.  The lorry 
was stopped and it was found that the occupants were police constables.  They told the 
Deputy Commissioner that they were on official business, but when Sircar began to ask 
for names and badge numbers, they fled away.
 Whether or not the perpetrators of 
each attack were Hindu, there were surely other factors involved.  That all five shops, in 
different locations, were all severally looted and destroyed, examples a particular focus of 
the looting crowds that was seen in many areas of the city.  
77
Calcutta was an anarchic and permissive city, and there were tremendous 
anxieties and socio-economic uncertainties just below the surface. Police constables were 
also poorly paid, struggling to get by, and morale in the force was extremely low.
 
78
                                                 
76 Interview with Golam Kutubuddin 
  In 
the College Street area several more lorries of cloth were looted from the Dalia Tailoring 
77 CDCE, Testimony of H.N. Sircar, Vol. V,  p. 63 
78 CDCE, Testimony of Norton-Jones,  Vol. IV, p. 257 
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Shop, a large retailer dealing in fine Benarasi silks.  The shop was completely emptied 
out and gutted, and, again, police constables were implicated.79  The Commissioner of 
Police, Donald Hardwick was not, himself, aware of the case, but testified that he had 
investigated several other very similar cases involving constables.80  The Sen Law and 
Co. liquor store in north Calcutta was also looted, this time by a "large number" of 
Anglo-Indians and police sergeants.81  Also in north Calcutta, two police Inspectors and a 
Sergeant showed up at a "European" locksmith shop with a large iron safe.  They 
explained to the proprietor that the safe belonged to one officer's wife.  It was later 
discovered, however, that the safe had been looted from a civilian's house earlier in the 
day.82 Three other constables on patrol in central Calcutta were arrested for participating 
in the loot of another gun shop in Dharamtolla, and one of them was found to be the 
orderly of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Philip Norton-Jones.83
Even children, as it would seem, were taking part in the free-for-all on the streets 
of Calcutta. While passing the Kamalaya stores in central Calcutta on the 16th, Deputy 
Inspector, H. N. Sircar found "some chokras were bringing out articles through the glass 
panes which had been smashed."
   
84
                                                 
79 CDCE, Testimony of D.R. Hardwick, Vol. II, p. 94 
  Chokras, the Deputy Inspector explained to the 
Enquiry Commission, are servant boys, usually between the age of 10 and 14.  Their 
designation as chokras, moreover, seems to have been more relevant to the report of the 
incident than the religious affiliation of the boys. What Sircar would appear to be 
attempting to convey is that all order had been lost, and even chokras were looting 
upscale shops in broad daylight.  Minto Dutta was, at the time, only nine years old, but 
hardly a chokra.  He came from a wealthy, landed family in a southern suburb of 
Calcutta.  On the morning of the 16th he went to the market in Kasba early to go to the 
ration shop.  When he arrived he found that the whole market was in a state of anarchy, 
with all shops being looted indiscriminately. Many year later he told me, with a 
mischievous smile on his face, that he had felt that he just couldn't leave there empty 
handed, and so he snatched three or four hurricane lamp chimneys from a glass shop that 
80 Ibid, p. 95 
81 Ibid, p. 94 
82 CDCE, Testimony of H.N. Sircar, Vol. V,  p. 83 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid, p. 60 
 341 
was being looted and began to run.  In the tumult he stumbled and the chimneys broke, 
cutting him in several places.  When he returned home, he was scolded for getting blood 
on his t-shirt and half pants.85
The choice of targets, too, did not always follow strictly communal logic.  When 
the meeting on the Maidan let out and looting quickly spread down the upscale 
Chowringhee commercial district, several European shops and business were looted, 
including the Enfield motorcycle showroom on Park Street.
      
86 The Statesman House (the 
large complex of buildings where the newspaper's offices are housed) was also 
surrounded by rioters who attempted to enter, breaking windows and setting fire to the 
doors, before being chased off by the police.87 The Grand Hotel also came under attack 
on the 16th, before being taken under police protection.88
The Civil Supplies Department, which handled the movement of foodstuffs to 
ration shops and industrial clients, well understood that it too needed protection - 
particularly in the context of famine, past and present.  The depots of Civil Supplies were 
kept locked and heavily guarded due to the very real likelihood "of depots being subject 
to mob attack."
 Across the river at Howrah, on 
the 17th, a large mob attempted to loot the Bengal Central Bank, but were, likewise, 
repelled by swift police intervention.  The police similarly broke up a mob looting the 
Bata Shoe shop (a Czechoslovakian concern) in Dharamtolla on the same day.    That 
each of these locations was protected by prompt police action - even while in the alleys 
and bazaars of Calcutta looting was going on relatively unabated and on a fantastic scale 
- is extremely telling, and is something that I will discuss more later.  
89 No Civil Supplies lorries moved until the 19th, and began then only on 
a limited scale and under close military escort.  The Relief Department similarly moved 
rice around the city only under armed police guard.90 Official reports released by the 
Civil Supply Department confirmed, however, that 15 government shops and 17 
approved shops had been attacked and looted.91
                                                 
85 Interview with Minto Dutta 
 This number may not indicate the real 
86 Interview with Golam Kibria, who himself was present when the showroom was looted. 
87 The Statesman, "Communal Riots in Calcutta," August 18, 1946 
88 Interview with Gyani Singh, who witnessed the attack on the Grand Hotel.  It is also written about in 
CDCE (need reference - Norton-Jones?) 
89 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, VIII), "Activities of the Civil Supplies Department." 
90 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, V), "Action Taken by the Relief Department" 
91 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, VIII), "Activities of the Civil Supplies Department. 
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extent of damage to the system however, and may, instead, represent an effort on the part 
of the Civil Supplies department to minimalize the panic over the city's (already 
extremely tenuous92) food supply. When rationing was resumed on the 20th of August 
only 430 out of 1288 shops opened for business.93  In addition to the food shops looted, 
the Civil Supplies Department reported "a number of cloth, kerosene, and mustard oil 
rationing shops were also looted, but details are not yet to hand."94 The Burabazar 
rationing offices were also attacked and looted, and a warehouse in Kidderpore was 
looted and burned to the ground.95
Also confirming the socio-economic nature of looting during the riots was that 
much of the loot recovered by the police in the days following the riots, was found in the 
bustees of the city.
  
96  In the bustees lived Calcutta poorest and most marginal residents, 
and the bustees were places of squalor and misery.97  Most bustee dwellers were 
immigrants from outside Bengal.  They worked either as contract employees or as casual 
laborers, eking out livings as porters, carters (coolies), doormen (durwans), sweepers, 
rickshaw pullers, cow-tenders (goalas), butchers (kasais), blacksmiths, masons, and dock 
workers (khalasis.)  They had suffered the brunt of famine and disease in Calcutta 
without the benefits given to "priority" workers. They also composed the bulk of the 
victims during the riots.  Many bustees were the scenes of large massacres, and many 
were burned to the ground.98  Bustee dwellers were also highly active as participants in 
both murder and looting.99
 
  To write off the participation of Calcutta's working poor, 
particularly in regards to looting, as a cultural or political phenomenon, without reference 
to the specifics of their socio-economic situation, would be a mistake.   
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96 CDCE, Testimony of H.N. Sircar, Vol. V,  p. 82 
97 See Chapter 5 for a comprehensive description of conditions in bustees 
98 See the Testimonies of H.N. Sircar and P. Norton-Jones in CDCE, both recount many stories of 
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Labor 
 The Muslim khalasis of eastern Bengal, as has been noted earlier,100 were 
itinerate and expert seafarers, renowned for their knowledge of the complex and 
dangerous inland waterways of Bengal.  From the early days of the colonial enterprise, 
khalasis had been drafted in large number into British mercantile firms as "lascars," or 
ship hands. The terms of their employment were highly exploitative and degrading.  They 
were often contracted into service as children, forced to work long hours, poorly 
compensated, insufficiently housed and fed, and had no job security to mention. As Ravi 
Ahuja has found, khalasi  "employment relations were structurally more akin to those of 
plantation laborers whose 'indenture' contracts subordinated them under their employer as 
persons for the whole duration of their contract."101  Unemployment among khalasis was 
often high, and, if idle, they remained under contract without pay. In 1930 there were at 
least 130,000 khalasis "belonging" to shipping and industrial firms of Calcutta, but not 
necessarily earning anything at any given time.102 Provisions made for compensation in 
the case of disability were tenuous, and during World War I their "special" legal status as 
contract laborers made it difficult for families to draw from the War Risks Compensation 
scheme in the case of injury or death.103
 Even still, the 1940s were a difficult decade for khalasis.  Their official 
designation as an "unruly" caste,
  
104
                                                 
100 See Chapter 5 
 accorded them little sympathy, and the "denial" 
scheme had deprived them of their main, non-corporate, bread and butter - driving them 
further into the hands of the trading firms and shipping concerns of European and Indian 
capitalists alike. Though owners of country boats received full compensation for the loss 
of their vessels after "denial," the workers of those boats (i.e. khalasis) received only 
three months' wages.  This arrangement left them especially vulnerable to the predations 
of famine and disease.  A bill - the Bengal Steamer Khalasis Bill of 1943 - to establish 
khalasis as recognized employees of industrial firms, would have given them preferential 
access to subsidized food stuffs, and other benefits granted to "essential" laborers during 
the war.  The bill was defeated, however, by the big-business lobby - amongst whom the 
101 Ahuja, p. 16 
102 Ibid, p. 21 
103 Ibid, p. 15 
104 See Das (1991), p. 86, note 208 
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leading lights were, Jeremy Benthall; War Transport Member of the Viceroy's Executive 
Council and Managing Director of Bird and Co., and G.D. Birla; Marwari industrial 
magnate -with direct ties to Gandhi - whose textile and jute interests in Calcutta were 
unrivalled in India.  Having failed to establish any legal normalization of their labor 
status, it is entirely likely that khalasis also comprised a fair number of the "outsiders" - 
whose corpses were left to rot in the sun for several days, unclaimed - killed in the 
Japanese bombing of the Kidderpore docks in December of 1943. Given the various 
circumstances compounding their already long standing economic hardships, khalasis 
often found themselves in the crosshairs of the structural and direct violence of war-time 
Bengal.  The Calcutta riots proved no different.  
On the morning of the 17th of August, while Calcutta was still reeling from its 
first long night of arson, looting and murder, approximately 500 khalasis left their 
quarters in a "coolie" bustee of Benthall's Bird and Company in Howrah, commandeered 
a number of the company's boats and steamers, and headed down river, towards the 
docks. They landed at Bichali Ghat in Metiabruz, which serves the surrounding factories 
- most notably G.D. Birla's Kesoram Cotton Mills and Kesoram Tent Factory - and 
proceeded to loot and set fire to the warehouses along the river.  They then turned on 
several goods' boats anchored near the ghat and set them on fire as well.  Fifteen boats, 
each manned by four boatmen, were destroyed.  "The attack was sudden," the official 
report noted, "and it was apprehended that most of the boatmen lost their lives being 
unable to escape." A "vigorous search" was made for the men who were on the boats, but 
no bodies were retrieved from the scorched hulks.  Some bodies were later found floating 
in the shallow water near the bank.  The bodies - "Hindu" bodies - were collected and 
"disposed of" by the Hindu Satkar Samiti.105
 What stands out in this case is certainly not the fact that the boatmen killed on the 
water were Hindu - although, that they were not khalasis may have been more material.  
That the khalasis first attacked the warehouses is also of significance.  Although it is not 
certain from the record, it can be fairly well assumed that the warehouses and the boats 
were related, and not just random targets. What seems just as likely, is that the khalasis 
  
                                                 
105 Entire Incident taken from WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-393/46 "I.G.P.'s Report, Howrah and 24 
Parganas" 
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who embarked on this raid, had some plan beforehand, as it would not be easy to 
coordinate an attack by 500 men on a single location without such, and, moreover, they 
traveled some distance to strike at this specific location.  These facts make it likely that 
the khalasis chose their target in relation to a specific grievance, and this grievance was 
most likely against the owners of the warehouse and boats (which is not given in the 
existent record.) That the khalasis first looted the warehouse, and then burned the boats, 
would indicate that their primary motive was the loot and destruction of the targeted 
party's property. The boatmen were apparently not the primary target of attack, but, 
instead, represented, in some sense, the "collateral damage" of the khalasis' attack.  It 
also seems likely that the destruction of the boats had something to do with the fact that 
no khalasis, who formed the bulk of dock and boat labor pool in Calcutta, were on the 
boats.  In this incident, in other words, there are very clear undertones of an attack on a 
specific industrial/trade interest on the docks that likely involved discriminatory labor 
practices or other economic grievances harbored by the khalasis against a known 
"enemy."   
 I began this section on labor with the khalasis because their involvement in the 
riots has been noted in several accounts,106 but little background information or analysis 
has been forthcoming.  The khalasis, themselves, came under attack by both "up-country 
Hindus" and Sikhs in the B.N.R. railways yard. Attacks and counter-attacks proliferated 
on the 18th and 19th, resulting in many deaths and much bitterness.107  How many 
khalasis were killed during the riots, as during the bombings, is not clear. What is clearer 
is that the khalasis' experience of violence (both as perpetrators and victims) had 
consequences far beyond what might be imagined from their social status. Having fled 
Calcutta in mass after the riots, many khalasis returned to Noakhali with stories of 
atrocities and outrages from the city and, as such, the khalasis of Calcutta have been 
implicated in the Noakhali riots as well, where the Hindu minority were the primary 
target of attack.108
                                                 
106 See Das, Communal Riots in Bengal,  Batabyal, Communalism in Bengal,   
  These riots, in October of 1946, were the first reverberation of the 
Calcutta riots, and the next step on the road to the even greater communal violence that 
wracked India for the next year in the lead-up to partition.      
107 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-398/46 "Report of the District Magistrate, Howrah. 
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 What is missing in the river incident, in terms of the target of the khalasis' attack, 
is open to speculation.  Given that there was a high concentration of Marwari capital in 
the area, particularly with the Birla mills close by, it is not unreasonable to surmise that 
the warehouses and boats that were destroyed, were related to such interests.  The 
Marwaris of Calcutta had made fortunes in the jute, textile and coal industries, and by the 
mid-twentieth century were the scions of Indian capitalism. But relations between the 
Marwari community and Muslim laborers in Calcutta were historically tense, and had 
erupted into violence several times over the years. Many families of the rich Marwari 
trading community had built their palatial homes, in fact, on land from which poor 
Muslim tenants had been "cleared."109 Tensions between Marwaris and Muslims in the 
early 20th century had also resulted in Marwaris refusing to rent houses to Muslim 
tenants, and discriminatory labor practice that disadvantaged Muslim laborers.110 In 
addition, Marwaris had long been popularly understood to engage in unfair trade 
practices such as commodity speculation and hoarding, which caused inflation and 
ultimately scarcity.111  In the mid-twentieth century price manipulations in the raw jute 
market - of which Marwari traders comprised 75-80% of dealers112 - had disastrous 
consequence for the Muslims of eastern Bengal, in particular, who then suffered 
disproportionately of famine in the 1940s.113  Marwari speculation in and hoarding of rice 
during the war was also widely suspected to have been a direct contributing factor in 
bringing about famine.114 Marwari monopolistic control of the cloth industry, coupled 
with a reputation for hoarding and price manipulation, moreover, was deeply resented 
and was a phenomenon that had been indexed in popular culture by rhyme: “Eh Marwari, 
khola kewari, tohre ghar mein lugga sari”115  In 1946, as in preceding riots in Calcutta, 
Marwaris were again singled out by Muslims for attack.116
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 But more importantly for the analysis to follow, perhaps, were Marwari industrial 
labor practices in war-time Bengal.  Calcutta was supplying the war effort and there was 
huge money to be made.  The mills and factories of Calcutta were, in fact, turning record 
profits throughout the war, and needed to guarantee "priority" for their regular workers.  
While millions across the region were starving, essential employees at Calcutta's bigger 
mills and factories were granted preferential access to subsidized food grains, that very 
easily could mean the difference between life and death - particularly for the otherwise 
rural and poor immigrant laborers who comprised the labor ranks. Meanwhile, many 
industrial laborers, remained "outsiders," and were left to fend for themselves. That mills 
and factories hired so many laborers -particularly Muslims - on a contract basis, without 
"priority" benefits, caused tremendous bitterness, and it is in this context that one of the 
most notorious massacres that took place during the Calcutta riots has to be viewed.   
Due to the eclectic mix of poor immigrant workers coming from many parts of 
India to work in the textile mills, shipping firms, collieries and railways in and around the 
Calcutta docks, the "docklands" were understood to be a volatile area.  Most of the 
bustees, however, were under the jurisdiction of the ill-equipped police force of the 24 
Parganas, while the mills themselves fell under the jurisdiction of the better organized 
Calcutta Police.117
At 10:30 in the morning on the 17th Muslim laborers of the locality began a brutal 
and relentless attack on the Oriya laborers living in Lichi Bagan, which adjoins the 
Kesoram Mill. In the first assault, 50 Oriyas were killed, 250 injured and as least 60 
 For this reason, violence in the "docklands" was also less easily 
suppressed. Looting began in Kidderpore on the morning of the 17th and spread to 
Metiabruz on the eastern flank of the docks quickly.  Metiabruz, a heavily Muslim-
majority area, was also home to the Kesoram Cotton Mills and the Kesoram Tent 
Factories.  Close around the factories were the workers bustees, inhabited by many 
Muslims who worked mostly as coolies and contract laborers, as well as the core of 
Birla's workforce who were comprised of Hindus from one particular locality of Orissa, 
from where they were recruited specifically to work at the Kesoram mills.   
                                                 
117 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-392/46 "Report of the District Magistrate of 24 Parganas." (All 
information on this incident, unless otherwise noted is from this same file.) 
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women living in the bustee were raped and brutalized.118
By nightfall on the 18th several thousand Hindu workers were sheltering in the 
Kesoram Cotton Mills.  They were protected by armed police guard and "special 
arrangements" with Civil Supplies were made to feed them. There were as many as a 
thousand who were injured, some mutilated to the extent that "the mill doctor at Kesoram 
fainted when the injured were brought in." The violence, however, had not yet come to a 
close.  On the afternoon of the 19th an armed mob of Muslims broke into the mill itself, 
and were turned back by police firing.
  In the adjoining bustee at least 
50 more Oriya laborers were slaughtered at around the same time. Houses were looted 
and set on fire, and several local temples were desecrated.  Almost simultaneously there 
was an attack by "Muslim hooligans" on the Kesoram Tent factory, which was set on fire, 
and 15 of its workers killed. Also on the 17th, at 12:30, the factory barracks themselves 
were attacked by Muslims and another "50 Oriyas were done to death and about 100 
more were injured, of whom several died subsequently."  Even in the midst of the 
onslaught, Kesoram Cotton Mill authorities began rescue missions in Lichi Bagan and the 
surrounding bustees, ferrying their workers into the factory buildings.  Nevertheless, at 
11:00 the next morning, there was yet another attack on the Oriya workers near the mill 
and about 40 laborers were killed.    
119  In all, 129 arrests were made in connection 
with the incident, and the mill remained shut for many days to come. Shortly after the 
massacres, the Chief Minister of Orissa visited the mills personally to inquire into the 
condition of the Oriyan laborers, lending national scope to this particular incident.  The 
Hindu nationalist media, meanwhile, made hay of the event, running highly exaggerated 
stories of the already spectacularly ghastly event to demonstrate Muslim barbarity.120
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From the Muslim perspective, things obviously looked different.  On the 22nd, relief 
authorities held a meeting to assess the situation.  At the gathering, according to the 
District Magistrate, "most inflammatory speeches were made," and representatives of the 
119 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-393/46 "I.G.P.'s Report, Howrah and 24 Parganas" 
120 The Ananda Bazar Patrika, for instance, ran reports that more than 600 "Hindus" had been killed, when, 
in fact, the number was demonstrably less.   
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Muslim community, "appeared to blame Marwari cotton mill authorities for causing the 
riots by not employing a sufficient number of Muslims."121
Undoubtedly there are many factors beneath the surface that go unexplained by 
the existing record of this incident, but it can somewhat safely be ventured that this 
incident cannot be explained by "direct action."  The tenacity and single mindedness with 
which the Oriya factory workers were attacked speaks of a more material motivation than 
political rhetoric can account for. In this context, the representation of Muslim labor 
grievance as a causal factor, particularly given the long history of Marwari-Muslim 
relations, cannot be easily dismissed.  It is significant, in this regard, that facilities of the 
mills were themselves entered, and in the case of the Kesoram Tent factory, attacked. It is 
also significant that the Muslim mobs did not go on a killing spree of "Hindus" in 
general, but that their choice of targets was entirely specific, and was inexorably linked to 
the Birla mills.  In some definite sense, I would argue, this attack of Oriya (Hindu) 
workers at a Marwari (Hindu) industrial plant, by Muslim laborers would be wrongly 
categorize under the broad (and all-too-simplistic) heading of "Hindu-Muslim violence."  
The particularity in this case - as well as in many others - is far too important to be 
dismissed in favor of a resort to an argument of "communal hatred."   
 
The extent to which famine paradigms can be traced through the entire course of 
events that comprise the Metiabruz incident is also very interesting.  That the territory of 
the mill itself, in several instances, became a battleground, is significant.  Competition to 
be in the mill had become especially fierce during famine, and during the riots the mill 
was, again, a protected space from the misfortunes reigning "outside."  The mill, even in 
the heat of this unprecedented breakdown of order, was still granted "priority" status; 
protected by armed police guard and able to make "special arrangements" with Civil 
Supplies for food -  even while many in Calcutta lived on whatever bare stocks they had 
at home for several weeks to come.  Those sheltered in the mill during the riots were 
effectively protected from the ongoing mayhem and horror in the streets of Calcutta - 
they were granted a secure space.  But, in truth, the fate of workers - even those given 
"priority" status - was always secondary at best.  Writing to Stanford Cripps after the 
riots, G.D, Birla spoke nothing of the massacre of his workers, instead he noted that the 
                                                 
121 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-392/46 "Report of the District Magistrate of 24 Parganas." 
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riots had been a "mixed evil," in that, even if many thousands had been killed, the 
Muslim League had been chastened by the fury that they (in Birla's estimation) had 
released.122
For laborers in Calcutta who were outside such structures of protection during the 
Killings, realities were especially fierce. As has been mentioned, the bulk of the victims 
of the Calcutta riots were poor - they were also Muslim. Both of the cases that I have 
looked at above involve Muslims attacking Hindus,  but the number of Muslim bustees 
across the city in which massacres took place is far larger.  In Shampukur, northern 
Calcutta, there was an "extensive massacre" of Muslims on the night of August 16th.
  
123  
No report of the incident was received, however, until the Governor himself, on tour of 
Calcutta on the 17th, came across a "number of corpses on the road," outside the bustee. 
The Karamtolli bustee near Chitpur Road was also the scene of a massacre, as was the 
Shahib Bagan bustee in Kalighat.124  In the Nakasipara, on the eastern side of Upper 
Circular Road, "most of the Muslims in that bustee were absolutely wiped out."125 And in  
Bhowanipur, "Muslims were murdered and killed in hundreds."126
 
 Perhaps because of the 
very same structural mechanisms that led to the exclusion of the victims of these 
massacres from any security at the time, very few specifics are to be found in the existent 
record of any of these incidents - whereas the two incidents that I have detailed more 
thoroughly above involved commercial interests and, as such, some record was 
maintained.  Given the lack of information on these other incidents, it would not be wise 
to speculate on the causes, motivations or variables, that defined violence in the bustees, 
but undoubtedly there were complexities to these attacks, as well, that betray simplistic 
explanation. It is enough to say, without further information, however, that these victims 
in Muslim bustees were poor laborers who, as in the case of famine and war, were, again, 
rendered most vulnerable to violence in the permissiveness and abject breakdown of 
order that defined the Calcutta riots. 
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Anti-Colonialism and Administrative Collapse 
 In both November of 1945 and February of 1946, as detailed in Chapter 6, there 
were massive and spontaneous anti-colonial uprisings in Calcutta which were put down 
with swift and comprehensive martial force.  The extent of the repression which was 
necessary to quell the 1945 disturbances greatly troubled then Governor of Bengal, 
Richard Casey. Speaking with General Auchinlek after the rebellion, he expressed his 
conscience on the matter, noting that he "had [General] Dyer and Amritsar constantly on 
[his] mind in the last few days."127 In his own diary he worried, "I do not want to kill 
these poor misguided creatures - I only want to frighten them and stop them doing the 
stupidities that the rabble-rousing politicians have driven them to."128 Although Governor 
Casey's sentiments might be imagined admirable, there is also something disingenuous 
about his logic.  As the Governor well knew, both the Congress and the Muslim League 
had expressed themselves unequivocally against this popular, and remarkably non-
partisan, expression of anti-colonial anger.129 Tellingly, although in Calcutta there was a 
wide-spread feeling that unnecessary and excessive force had been used on 
demonstrators, even Gandhi, when he met with Casey shortly after the outbreak, told the 
Governor that "no good purpose could be served in having a public enquiry into the 
recent disturbances."130
 Thus, the popular and decidedly anti-communal frustrations which were directed 
against the power structure, where met, on the one hand by the prohibitive violence of the 
colonial state, and on the other, by disapproval and disavowal by the national Indian 
leadership, both Hindu and Muslim alike.  In both cases, no call to action had been given 
by either major political party, and the audacity of the demonstrators - even in the face of 
armed assault by the police and military - had shocked the government.  The magnitude 
of these spontaneous eruptions served as a barometer of the pent up frustrations and 
anxieties of a society that had been pushed to the wall by war, famine and administrative 
 The disturbances of February 1946 followed an extremely similar 
pattern, both in terms of the outbreak of popular unrest, and the responses that it elicited. 
                                                 
127 Casey's Diary, November 25, 1945.  At Jallianwala Bagh, in Amritsar on April 13, 1919, Brigadier-
General, Reginald Dyer, had given orders to his troops to fire on demonstrators protesting against the 
Rowlatt Act, resulting in the massacre of 379 men, women and children, earning him the nickname "the 
butcher of Amritsar."  
128 Casey's Diary, November 24, 1945. 
129 See Chapter 6 
130 Casey's Diary, December 4, 1945. 
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failure. Heeding this troubling indicator of popular discontent, Government established 
its "Emergency Action Scheme" to deal with future disturbances against the state.  The 
Emergency Action Scheme revolved around protecting government and corporate 
interests from attack in the event of further disturbances in Calcutta.  Leaders of the 
national political factions, meanwhile, engaged in self-aggrandizing political 
showmanship aimed at diverting attention away from the colonial state and towards the 
domestic, political enemy, in order to "discipline" their unruly constituencies.  What 
these measures, together, managed to achieve, was to flatten the violence of the masses, 
which had been recently expressed upwards, onto a horizontal plane.  That is: the anger, 
frustration and violence of the people, which had just recently come to a head in united 
violence against the state, twice repressed and twice disavowed, exploded laterally - in 
civil war. 
 From his earliest report to the Viceroy on the 16th, Governor Burrows warned 
that events in Calcutta were serious, but reassured Delhi that the "disturbances have so far 
been markedly communal and not - repeat not - in any way anti-British or Anti-
Government."131  In his final report of the 22nd, he again celebrated the fact that "though 
'Direct Action Day' was intended to be a gesture against the British,"  he wrote, the 
violence had remained entirely "communal."132
Attacks on the police - particularly on the first day - were also widespread. At 
11:00 AM on the 16th the Deputy Inspector of Police, H.N. Sircar, received word that the 
Burtolla police station near Hatibagan in north Calcutta was under attack. The Second 
 This same contention has been echoed in 
all subsequent scholarship on the Calcutta riots in rather uncomplicated fashion.  It is, 
however, a contention that does not live up to historical scrutiny.  As has already been 
mentioned, Calcutta during the riots was an extremely permissive space and enactments 
of violence were highly diverse, multifaceted, and complex. As has also already been 
noted, there were attacks on European, governmental and quazi-governmental targets 
such as ration shops, Civil Supplies warehouses, the Bengal Central Bank, the Statesman 
House, the Grand Hotel and the property of large industrial firms - who since the 
beginning of the war had been granted de facto "governmental" status.    
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132 T.O.P. Vol. VIII, Burrows to Wavell, August 22, 1946, p. 302 (italics mine) 
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Officer in charge of the station explained that he was unable to hold the situation without 
armed reinforcement. A Riot Squad was quickly dispatched and the offending mob was 
dispersed.133 At 11:30, on Chitpur Road the police were having similar difficulties - the 
crowd there "was truculent...and attacked the police with brickbats." A call was made and 
"reinforcements from Lal Bazar soon arrived."134  In central Calcutta, on Chittaranjan 
Avenue, police were fighting a hit and run battle with an angry mob that fell back when 
tear-gassed, but advanced again when the gas had dissipated.  "The crowd was then 
dispersed by force."135 Shortly thereafter the headquarters of the North District Police 
was itself attacked by a mob, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, North District, 
was called in from field operations to address the situation.136
 By 3 PM on the 16th, in fact, attacks on the police were so widespread that the 
Commissioner of Police had made the decision to ask for military assistance 
immediately. "We could not hold out indefinitely," he testified later, "we were being 
attacked."
   
137  But there was disagreement about whether to call in the troops.  Brigadier 
E.K.G. Sixsmith, for one, feared that the "premature use of military might have turned 
these crowds...we knew the situation on the 16th might have developed into anti-
Government riots."138
The most significant aspect of the colonial state in relation to the riots, however, 
was its abject dysfunction.  The famine, more than anything else, had already revealed 
 The Brigadier's delicacy here is extremely significant.  Whenever a 
European or governmental target was attacked, there was a swift dispatch of auxiliary 
force from Police Central Command that was able to defuse the situation before any 
serious damage had been done.  Civil Supplies depots and vehicles, as well as important 
factories and commercial interests, were also under armed guard. The damage to high 
profile targets was thus being contained - the "Emergency Action Scheme" was working 
as planned. That the native bazaars, bustees and by-lanes were seething with arson, loot 
and murder did not alter that success.  The military was not deployed until after midnight 
on the 16th - but by that time things had spun far out of control. 
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the depth of administrative, ethical and political bankruptcy that prevailed in Bengal.  
The Famine Enquiry Commission, though conservative in many of its findings, was 
unequivocal in its condemnation of civil society in the province, noting: 
Enormous profits were made out of the calamity, and in the circumstances, profits 
for some meant death for others.  A large part of the community lived in plenty 
while others starved, and there was much indifference in the face of suffering.  
Corruption was widespread throughout the province and in many classes of 




The Rowlands Committee Report, commissioned by Governor Casey to further 
investigate the "hopeless corruption and inefficiency of the Bengal administration," 
clarified to the highest circles of colonial governance that Bengal was in a state of 
complete administrative collapse. But the colonial state was already in its death throws by 
the time the Rowlands Report was published in May of 1945, and no initiatives would be 
taken.  By the time of the riots things had only further deteriorated.   
During the riots Chief Minister,  H. S. Suhrawardy, was, throughout, in the police 
"Control Room," frantically scribbling notes to the Commissioner of Police, advising him 
on how and where to allocate police "pickets."  Since that time, and for this reason, he 
has been imagined by many historians to have been directing the riots from this remove 
by clever deployment of available forces to strategic locations that would protect the 
Muslim community.140
In fact, even in the Control Room itself, chaos reigned.  By early afternoon on the 
16th, the "Incident Board," which had been developed in relation to Emergency Action 
  But, in fact, it was the sheer ineffectiveness of the entire 
administrative and political apparatus to demonstrate any control over the situation that is 
most pronounced throughout the riots.  Suhrawardy was no exception. The kind of 
"order" that is conferred on the Calcutta riots by explanations of instigation or political 
mischief was simply in very scarce supply during the riots.  There may have been 
disproportionate agencies that influenced specific and limited events, but it is very 
difficult to argue that there were significant mechanisms of "control."  Police pickets did 
not materially effect the course of violence. 
                                                 
139 Report on Bengal, p. 107 
140 See: Sumit Sarkar (1983), p. 432 
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Scheme, had broken down completely and had to be abandoned.141  Calls were pouring in 
from every corner of Calcutta and no response could be mounted.142  Police resources 
could not meet the circumstances which confronted them already in the open streets. 
Undermanned and under attack, their presence quickly became increasingly futile. A 
thriving black-market, endemic poverty, high crime, and the duty of "removing" starving 
destitutes, had strained police morale to the breaking point, and corruption in the ranks 
was "rife."143 Even while Suhrawardy was in the Control Room advising the 
Commissioner, ordinary policemen were out on the streets of Calcutta looting lorries full 
of cloth and handcarts full liquor.  In the volatile neighborhood Kidderpore police had 
insufficient ammunition to mount any kind of effective intervention,144 and in the 
Jorabagan police station there was panic and fear.145  The Police headquarters at Lal 
Bazar was itself choked with thousands of refugees, which only added to the prevailing 
confusion.  A substantial massacre of several hundred bustee dwellers took place only 
200 yards from the gates of Lal Bazar, and the officers inside were none the wiser.146  
Fire Brigade workers also came under attack, and were prevented from answering many 
calls.147 The city's water supply also broke down, which threatened a cholera outbreak in 
relief compounds and further hampered fire-fighting efforts.148 Telephone exchanges 
went out of order,149 and hospitals could not cope with admissions and so began to shut 
their doors.150  "By Sunday," a British nurse working with one ambulance crew reported, 
"every city hospital was hanging signs of refusal outside its gates."151 The Calcutta 
Corporation's sanitation services also ceased to function, and garbage and corpses, both 
human and animal, rotted on the streets.152
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city's rationing system collapsed , even with a "second famine" looming. 
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Without the necessary wherewithal to deal with the deteriorating situation in 
Calcutta, the city's administration fell back, again, on its tired implements developed in 
relation to war and famine.  Refugees were removed from Lal Bazar and other police 
compounds where they had collected, and carried in police lorries to famine relief camps 
operated by the Relief Department.153 These relief camps, however, soon filled up with 
panicked and desperate refugees, and additional provisions needed to be made.  The 
horse stables at the Calcutta Turf Club were selected as a suitable place to warehouse 
those who had been driven from their homes by mob violence and could not be 
accommodated in existing famine camps. The stables were fitted out with supplies 
gathered from A.R.P. air-raid shelters, and opened to additional refugees. The Civil 
Supplies Department, also established during famine, meanwhile cut off all its deliveries 
except to "priority" sites, namely: hospitals, relief camps, and facilities for "essential" 
personnel such as the Kesoram mills.154  "Regular rationing to the public," it was decided 
at a closed-door meeting at Civil Supplies headquarters on August 18th, "would be a 
sheer impossibility until confidence was restored."155 In the meantime, as in the case of 
famine, private relief organizations did the bulk of the heavy lifting, sheltering and 
feeding the vast majority of the nearly 200,000 people dislocated.156
The Publicity Department, established in the earliest days of the war, was also 
pressed into service.  "But," as the Director of Publicity - one P.S. Mathur - complained 
in his report, "the Publicity Department was never asked to keep itself ready for 
communal disturbances."
  
157 All the Department had it its disposal were a sheaf of "health 
leaflets" to be distributed in times of "emergency," and eight "propaganda vans" which 
made the rounds during A.R.P. drills, and also during famine, to educate the public in 
civic responsibility. The vehicles were in dilapidated condition, "very worn out...and far 
from being 'trouble free.'"  Of the loudspeakers with which they had been fitted-out, "one 
was condemned outright, four were in working condition but could not bear much strain, 
and three others needed major repairs and were in the workshop."158
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Director of Publicity was requested by the Deputy Commissioner of police to get his 
vehicles up and running and out into the fray.  "But propaganda vans," the Director noted 
petulantly in his report, "though quite suitable for fighting panic and guiding law abiding 
citizens, are of no avail when mobs and organized groups of hooligans are concerned."  
Yet, dutiful to a fault, the Director of Publicity went off to work in the governmental 
office complex on the 16th, only to find "there was no other officer in the Writer's 
Buildings as far as he could see."  He went home that same afternoon after a few lonely 
hours in the office, only to find that "a pitched battle was going on just in front of his own 
house...and it was only with great difficulty that he could enter."  After another futile day 
at the office on the 17th, the Director of Publicity was summoned to Lal Bazar on the 
18th and told in no uncertain terms to get his propaganda vans in working order and out 
on the roads. After much inconvenience and jerry-rigging he was able to get three of the 
eight vans running and fitted out with load speakers, found some drivers, and headed out 
on the roads at 9 PM.  But with the Publicity Director's thoughts on this matter, it is easy 
to agree: "when there is fighting on every street and every road, when the trouble is so 
wide-spread, when clashes take place between armed groups of hooligans and angry 
mobs, publicity vans can be of little avail."159
 
     
Bodies   
 Throughout the chapters on war and famine, I have argued that how a society and 
government deal with their dead is of great importance in understanding the value that is 
accorded to the living of that society as well.  During famine, from early 1943 until the 
riots broke out, Bengal was confronted with many millions of excess corpses in every 
corner of the province. These corpses represented an overwhelming material 
predicament. Throughout the period, cremation facilities and burial grounds worked 
overtime, but corpses only continued to pile up.  Finally, whatever systems that had 
existed previously for the last rites of the dead were largely abandoned . Faced with the 
sheer enormity of the weight of these bodies, indifference to the fate of the dead began to 
reign. The majority of those killed by famine across Bengal's countryside were left to rot 
out in the open sun on roadsides or in fallow fields. Tens of thousands more were tossed 
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thoughtlessly into rivers and canals.  Bodies in all states of decay and putrification - and 
even in the last stages of life - were torn apart by vultures where they had fallen or 
dragged through the lanes of abandoned villages by hungry jackals. The province had 
become a vast charnel house, and the land, itself, did most of the work of digesting the 
millions of discarded bodies. 
The cumulative effect of this violence, I would argue, constitutes a very profound 
material "argument" that revolves in a pernicious dynamic which reinforces the logic of 
its own repetition.  When the most marginal of society, in their millions, are deprived of 
bare existence by economic violence, and when, moreover, society is witness to the 
ultimate debasement of their human worth, there results a "brutalization of conscious" 
that is deep and abiding.  The corpse becomes an acceptable social fact.  This 
desensitization towards death and normalization of the dead, entails a kind of collective 
permission that allows for further violence that guarantees the generation of still more 
corpses. The violent materialization of more corpses, again, is only that much less 
shocking, which, in turn, allows for more corpse-producing violence to ensue.  In this 
way, violence begets violence.   
 In Calcutta the scenario was different than in the countryside.  The stacks of 
corpse that accumulated on its streets and by-lanes by the summer of 1943 represented an 
acute embarrassment to empire, and had to be more proactively dealt with.  The dead 
who had breathed their last on the streets of Britain's "Second City," were thus put under 
the "protective custody" of the state.  Though many corpses did remain in the open air for 
days at a time, they were eventually loaded, in mass, onto military and police lorries, 
enumerated, labeled and disposed of in relatively orderly fashion. To achieve this end, 
two private organizations, the Hindu Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam were 
utilized to dispose of the corpses according to "community."  That bodies, deprived of 
any sense of decency or human value, were yet assigned this one last measure of 
classification, can be understood as the height of essentialism.  That it was the state, 
moreover, that sanctioned this final distinction on corpses is both striking and 
disconcerting. Because any and all social value of these individuals had been effectively 
revoked, the labeling of corpses, "Hindu" or "Muslim," amounts to  biological distinction 
that was imagined to have adhered in the fallen bodies themselves.  When one final and 
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single label is attached to these otherwise "meaningless" bodies, moreover, that single 
label takes on enormous significance.  In the total absence of any other social value, that 
label still matters. The violence in the streets of Calcutta in August of 1946 was, in some 
definite sense, a reiteration of this officially constructed truism: bodies themselves are 
understood as either "Hindu" or "Muslim," and, as such, the mass annihilation of bodies 
becomes a "communal" phenomenon.  
During the Calcutta riots, corpses, yet again, became a prevailing and ubiquitous 
social fact.  The streets and alleys of the city were, in fact, littered with corpses in all 
sorts of "grotesque attitudes."160  Mutilated bodies, bodies defiled, hacked to pieces, half-
burned, bludgeoned, stabbed, crushed, disfigured, discarded and decaying, defied all 
previous imagination.  Bodies floated in the river and choked the city's sewers. Bodies 
lay about in unmanned hand-carts and were heaped with other mountains of trash in the 
ruined streets.  Bodies lay beneath the rubble of burnt out buildings and hung from 
ceilings by their hair in looted houses.161  A Statesman reporter, on the 21st of August, 
reported that in an open plot in Shampukur he had come across a pile of about 50 bodies 
"that had been thrown haphazardly in two heaps and were being devoured by 
vultures."162 In Park Circus "beside the burnt and looted remains of a two storied house 
lay the bodies of two men and a dog. Vultures had attacked the former, leaving the dog 
alone."163 In Howrah, "a Muslim was found sitting on the dead body of a Hindu who had 
been stabbed to death." As police approached, there he remained, until he was arrested.164
Government, on the other hand, had no choice but to administer.  It was a 
mammoth task for an administration in collapse. The cast of characters involved was, 
accordingly, immense.  At least seven I.C.S. officers oversaw a process that involved, 
also, several ranking members of the Department of Public Health as well as the 
  
Kim Christen, working for Friends' Ambulance Service, came across a wheelbarrow full 
of bodies on Chittaranjan Avenue.  Among the corpses she found a boy with a pulse.  
Before she could revive him, however, he expired, and was left in the barrow, as it was 
not her mission to administer to the dead.   
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Geographical Institute.  The fire brigade lent assistance, as did the Deputy Secretary of 
the Development Board, the Assistant Secretary to the Governor, three judges from the 
Calcutta High Court, an official of the Bengal-Assam Railroad, and, of course, the Hindu 
Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam.165
On the afternoon of the 18th, authorities contacted the Secretary of the 
Mohammedan Burial Board to ask for his assistance with burial space.  He informed the 
Public Health Department that they had room at the Bagmari Burial Ground in 
Manicktola for the internment of several hundred corpses.  A few military "pioneers" and 
a bull-dozer were sent to the grounds to dig open pits to receive bodies, and the military 
lent lorries with armed escort for the work of collecting corpses from the streets. All was 
ready, except for the doms, who were proving exceedingly reluctant to be, again, pressed 
into government's grisly business of ridding the streets of Calcutta of its rotting and 
mangled corpses. Two days had elapsed since the riots had begun, and the work was 
"unimaginably foul." At length, the Deputy Commissioner of Police was enlisted, and he 
managed to wrangle up a contingent of 16 doms.  Four corpse removal parties, under 
I.C.S. leadership, with four doms each, went out onto the streets in military lorries to 
collect the dead at 9 PM on the 18th. When the 3-ton lorries, loaded down with bodies, 
began to arrive at Bagmari, however, it was found that they could not fit through the 
cemetery gates. Doms were thus engaged, with handcarts, to off-load the corpses from the 
lorries and wheel them a quarter-mile through the mud and up to the pits were the bodies 
were haphazardly dumped.  After several hours of such work, the doms refused to labor 
any longer, and operations were called off for the day.  In the meantime, the gates of the 
 But these actors only represented the 
organizational apparatus.  The dirty work, the actual lifting, shifting and handling of 
bodies was done by several hundred doms and Anglo-Indians - doms because this was 
understood to be within their caste distinction, and Anglo-Indians, because, as Christians, 
they were thought to be outside the parameters of the "communal" fray. The military also 
lent its services, providing lorries and light engineering troops, or "pioneers," who dug 
trenches to receive the dead.  Burial operations, however did not go as smoothly as the 
extensive and varied personnel expended on the job might imply.   
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cemetery had been removed and lorries of dead - which had been arriving all the while - 
were parked up "hard by the graves" for the night - yet to be unloaded. 
Again, the next morning, doms could not be found, as those who had worked all 
night on the 18th failed to show up for service.  By the time a new party of doms had 
been arranged, the scene at Bagmari was chaotic.  More than ten lorries filled with 
hundreds of corpses removed by the military early in the morning, had joined those of the 
Public Health Department and were in queue to deposit their payloads into the open pits.  
The bull-dozer, which was still in use digging more pits, however, was bogged down in 
mud, and the "pioneers" had dug trenches which made the grounds impassible to the 
lorries.  "Despite continued showers and a marked reluctance on the part of the doms to 
get to work," five of the lorries were somehow unloaded.  The military pioneers, 
however, for unspecified reasons, refused to "earth the graves," departing in mass and 
leaving behind only a few hand spades.  This created further difficulties, as "Doms are 
not grave diggers, and were not familiar with the spades, and the attempt to employ a 
section of them to shovel earth over the graves was abandoned when (only) half a trench 
had been filled."  By that time it was after 9 PM and the doms again struck work, "being 
tired wet, thirsty and apprehensive of the curfew."  The remaining lorries, stacked with 
corpses, were left behind and operations were suspended for the day.  In the night, 22 
other doms were rounded up "following the clues furnished by an Executive Engineer of 
the (Calcutta) Corporation."  
On the following day, again, an additional nine lorries had been brought in by the 
military by the time government workers arrived.  The lorries left over night, however, 
had blocked access to the graves, and as such, the military lorries could not approach.  
The doms were pressed into hard service to clear the queue quickly, but by 8 AM refused 
to work any further.  The military, who had brought their own doms, thus dumped the 
bodies that they had brought at the gates of the cemetery and headed back out into the 
streets to collect more.  A small contingent of doms were left behind.  They unloaded two 
more trucks "and left the bodies lying on the grass."  In the meantime, 15 additional doms 
were squeezed out of the Calcutta Corporation, and the corpses that had been left lying 
immediately outside the graves were interned.  These doms, however, having had no 
food, demanded breakfast, but then were not willing to be fed the "famine gruel" supplied 
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by the Relief Department.  They also demanded a steady supply of "pagalpani" (literally 
"crazy water") - "the only stimulant that will make doms work" - but, in the midst of the 
riots, none could be found.  Only "with difficulty," therefore, "were they induced to inter 
the bodies near the graves."  Those that had been dumped at the gates by the military, 
were loaded back onto lorries by the remaining doms and dumped again nearer the 
graves. At this time, however, these doms, too, refused to work any further and walked 
off the job.  The Bagmari Burial Ground was thus left with bodies scattered everywhere, 
open graves full of bodies un-earthed, and little space left for more bodies to be brought 
in.  A deal was struck with the Secretary of the Mohammedan Burial Board that "on 
supply of transport and escort," the remaining bodies would be buried and the pits filled 
in by Burial Board workers.  This work was reported to have been completed only a week 
later, on August 26th. 
Having thus closed operation at Bagmari, it was decided to "open" the A.R.P. 
burial pits at Gobra, which had been dug in anticipation of air-raid casualties during the 
war. Open pits were available to receive approximately 1,000 bodies, but other pits were 
filled up with water, which had to be pumped out by the Fire Brigade to clear them for 
more.  A whole "colony" of doms was "fortunately" located near Hazra Road and a 
"steady supply" of lorries began bringing corpses to the A.R.P. pits at Gobra.  But the 
Hazra doms too proved unreliable and obstinate, and continued to strike work.  
Frustrated, the organizers of the burials contacted the Anglo-Indian Civic Union, who 
agreed to send a battalion of Anglo-Indian workers to handle the corpses, on payment.  
"These proved, from the 22nd onwards, a valuable supplement."   
The work a Gobra went slow and haltingly at first, and so the Head Officer of the 
Corporation "agreed to instruct all burning ghats to dispose of all bodies brought to them, 
irrespective of community,"  and arrangements were made to keep the crematoriums 
"open day and night continuously." In the meantime bodies kept arriving at Gobra and 
after a few days the work there proceeded at an increasingly chaotic pace.  "Bodies were 
frequently unloaded at Gobra hurriedly, by night, and the tendency was to tip them, 
without arrangement, round about the pits."  This created extra work during the day, at 
which time corpses needed to be assembled in a more orderly fashion inside the pits. 
"This work was nauseating and picked men were necessary to take charge of it. "  How 
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men were "picked" is not mentioned.  The work at Gobra continued for the next six days, 
at which time the Anjuman Mofidul Islam, together with the Mohammedan Burial Board, 
were employed to "tidy up and fill the pits."  The operation had been extremely trying for 
all those involved.  It had only been held together, in fact, by the begrudging co-operation 
of the always difficult doms and sheer dumb perseverance.  It had also been "dependent 
on military transport and escort," as well as on "gunny (for carrying bodies hammock-
wise),  pagalpani (for doms),  beer (for Anglo-Indians),  stench-masks, kodalis 
[something like a garden hoe], and quicklime."   By official count, and in such a fashion, 
3,468 copses were disposed of in the mass graves at Bagmari and Gobra. 
What stands out most starkly in this account, however, is not just the reckless, ad-
hoc and debasing manner in which these bodies were managed - though it does provide 
an illuminating insight into the workings of the colonial state at this time - it is perhaps 
more interesting that, even after taking such care during famine and war to categorize 
bodies by religious affiliation, in the context of the riots this practice was totally 
abandoned and the neat system of demarcation and disposal broke down. Unclassified 
bodies were dumped into mass graves without distinction and bulldozed over in monsoon 
mud.  The Calcutta Corporation gave orders to burning ghats to burn all corpses 
irrespective of community, and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam, likewise, labored under 
directions to "keep no separate count." In short: the riots had done the work of final 
identification, no further assignment was needed. The administrative task of 
distinguishing Muslim bodies from Hindus bodies, had been accomplished, instead, by a 
violence that, beforehand, had marked these bodies as "communal."  The Calcutta riots 
had, in this sense, concretized a bureaucratic distinction that now could be left 
unreported.  
In addition to those bodies collected and disposed of by the state, there were 
countless other bodies that went completely unrecorded.  The exact toll of the Calcutta 
riots, therefore cannot be known. It is likely, however, many times the official figure. 
How many bodies were burnt in the thousands of fires that gutted the city, how many 
were dispatched into rivers and canals, and how many were disposed of by family 
members in private ceremonies at burning ghats and burial grounds, is completely 
unknown.  Even the official numbers are extremely unlikely to represent the total number 
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of bodies disposed of through state auspices alone.  Given the chaos of the official 
operations at Bagmari and Gobra, it is difficult to imagine that any accurate accounting 
could have been made.  In addition, it is unclear what other corpse disposal operations 
were undertaken by the military and/or government.   
Ashoke Mukherjee was, at the time, 18 years of age.  He had spent the worst of 
the riots sheltered in a friend's house in north Calcutta, the scene of the most extreme 
violence.  On the fifth day, when the riots had subsided to some extent, "clean-up" 
operation were undertaken.  Ashoke and three of his friends ventured out into the street 
for the first time since the 16th.  A group of armed military personnel approached them 
and demanded, in no uncertain terms, that they required the assistance.   Ashoke and his 
friends were commandeered by the cuff, told to take hold of some pushcarts, and pointed 
to a stack of dead bodies.  "Here, this is the mess that you have created," the soldiers 
barked, "and it is you who have to clear this mess."  They were told to load the carts with 
corpses, and "were made to drop the bodies of the slaughtered Muslims into the Ganges."  
The boys made three trips, moving about 25 bodies each time, before being released from 
their impromptu civic duty.166
A great number of bodies were also stuffed into the city's manholes and sewers.  
In Ballygunge, Mintu Dutto witnessed corpses arriving by train from many other parts of 
the city.  The bodies were unloaded from the train by Sikhs, who had sided with Hindus 
during the riots, and heaped indiscriminately onto pushcarts, by which means they were 
transported to the main sewer opening and crammed inside.  This procedure went on 
most of the day, disappearing an untold number of bodies into the sewage system.
  
167  On 
the night of the 20th a report was received by the Public Health Department that "3 or 4 
bodies" were stuck in the sewers at Ballygunge and it was feared that they might float 
over the grating at the pumping station and jam the pumps.168
                                                 
166 Interview with Ashoke Mukherjee 
  A party of doms was 
assembled and an operation was undertaken to clear the lines.  The doms were paid the 
special rate of 12 Rupees per body to dangle by ropes into the open sewer and fish out 
bodies from a depth of 14 to 20 feet. In this fashion, 110 bodies were retrieved from the 
167 Interview with Mintu Dutto 
168 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, IX) "Action Taken by the Department of Health and 
Labor."   
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sewers of Ballygunge, though it is unclear how many more were simply flushed through 
the system and out into the river.  Miraculously a Muslim boy who had been "killed" in 
Park Circus on the 16th was rescued alive during this operation on the 25th - nine days 
later.169  That he had been beaten and left for dead in Park Circus, more than a mile away, 
would confirm that bodies were transported to different parts of the city for secret - if 
production-line - disposal.  A similar retrieval operation was undertaken at the 
Mommenpur pumping station, which was also choked with corpses.  By official account, 
20 bodies were retrieved . But this number, too, is perhaps arbitrary.  Narendra Krishna 
Mukherjee attended the operations at the Mommenpur pumping station in hopes of 
identifying his brother in-law who had been killed on the 17th, but whose body had not 
been found.  No identification was possible, however, as the sewer was congested not 
with bodies, but with body parts.  The corpses had been hacked to pieces in order to fit 
into the tight opening of the sewer. N. K. Mukherjee found a hand that he believed to be 
his brother-in-law's, but was never sure.170
In north Calcutta there were also widespread reports of bodies having been stuffed 
into manholes and sewer openings.  No retrieval operations were undertaken, but a 
Statesman reporter toured many parts of north Calcutta, and while there were no bodies 
left in the open streets, he "was greeted with an overpowering stench in many localities 
(that) seemed to confirm (his) information that numberless bodies (had) been pushed into 
the city's sewers through manholes."
 
171  In fact, there had been a noticeable and nagging 
drop in the water pressure in many parts of the city, which frustrated Corporation 
officials and hampered firefighting efforts.  At first it was thought that open hydrants had 
caused the drop, but it was later discovered that at the pumping stations pressure was 
maximal.  This indicated to Corporation engineers that there were blockages in the main 
lines and a "choking" of pipes in the entire system.  The water mains were accordingly 
"regularly and systematically flushed" for the next several days, and the problem was 
resolved.172
 
  Calcutta had digested its dead. 
                                                 
169 The Statesman, "Ghastly Experience of August 16th Victim," August 26, 1946 
170 Interview with N.K. Mukherjee 
171 The Statesman, "Only Stray Cases of Assault," August 21, 1946 
172 WBSA, Home Confidential, file W-351/46 (Part B, IX) "Action Taken by the Department of Health and 
Labor." 
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These are not the signs of a society driven to madness by political rhetoric - these 
are the signs of a society de-humanized by abounding violence, death and impunity. 
These are the signs of an already tortured society.    
 
Conclusion (Communalism) 
 What may appear absent to some readers from the foregoing analysis is the 
omission of any sustained analysis of the communal nature of the riots.  My intention has 
not been to deny the prevalence of this particular aspect of the Calcutta riots, but to 
demonstrate, by concrete example, that the riots were not merely communal.  By 1946, 
Bengal had long been a society under siege.  Fear, uncertainty, oppression, and ultimately 
death on a monumental scale, had frayed the psychological, administrative and moral 
fiber of society; until, in August of 1946, Calcutta became completely unraveled.  The 
riots were, in many respects, a free-for-all in which any number of grievances, anxieties 
and animosities could find uninhibited expression.  All of these expressions - the sum 
total of the highly variegated violence that took place - are what comprise the event 
called the Calcutta riots. Underlying much of the violence, and many of the trends that 
characterized the riots, were anxieties that were many years in the making.  There was 
also a tremendous amount of communal enmity that was unleashed - which, itself had 
been cultured in the petri-dish of war and famine. 
 In most cases the looting, arson, and murder that took place was, indeed, directed 
violence, with Hindus targeting Muslims, and Muslims targeting Hindus. As I have 
argued, however, in many cases, there were often variables and particulars that confound 
the conclusion that communalism alone can explain the violence. In other cases, a very 
base and uncomplicated hatred of the "enemy" community does appear to have been 
primary.  Many victims of both communities were randomly stabbed to death in the 
streets with no other motivation than the murder of the "other."  Temples and mosques 
were desecrated and the property of the rival community destroyed without any logic 
other than to cause economic damage to a hated adversary.  In north Calcutta a group of 
Hindu women were raped, slaughtered and hung from the ceiling by their hair.173
                                                 
173 CDCE, Vol. V, Testimony of S.N. Mukherji, p. 152 
  In 
Beliaghata, the severed heads of Muslims impaled on spikes were paraded through the 
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streets.174 In Sovabazar, a group of terrified Muslim men, women and children ran to a 
five-story roof top to escape a Hindu mob.  The assailants, rather than chasing their prey, 
set fire to the building and the heat from below caused the roof to collapse.  All sixty-odd 
of the victims fell to their death and their bodies were consumed in the fire.175  In 
Mommenpur, a Hindu family was attacked by a local mob of Muslims and all the male 
members of the household were executed, one by one, while the women and the children 
were made to watch.176
 The list could go on, but there is no need.  About naked hatred and senseless 
murder there is very little that is interesting.  What is more interesting is that this descent 
into carnage and communal blood-lust did not occur in a vacuum.  It emerged in the 
context of a collective madness that had seized Calcutta, erupting on the day of a political 
demonstration.  This demonstration, and the politics behind it, have already been detailed 
in some depth.  Neither the demonstration itself, nor the politics behind it, can account for 
the carnage that ensued.  The over-determining factor, even in politics, and more 
specifically in communalists politics, leading up to this event was famine.  Politics had 
become deeply enmeshed in society's grief, and its attempt to come to grips with the 
avoidable death of at least three million of its citizens.  It is one thing when an opposing 
party is accused of kick-backs or catering to its own constituency; it is another when they 
are accused of being responsible for the death of millions.  Famine hardened the political 
discourse to a dangerous extent.  It also hardened society at large.  Scarcity, uncertainty, 
and fear of destitution, were for many years the prevailing social realities for a large 
sector of the population.  That it was this same sector of the population that were the 
primary aggressors, as well as victims, during the Calcutta riots is not coincidence.  
Issues of belonging, of claiming space, of commandeering resources, of eliminating 
economic competition, and of defending entitlements, were at least as important to the 
course of the riots, as were issues of politics or religion.  The historical record very much 
confirms this argument. 
  
 In some sense, the Calcutta riots became a far more nakedly "communal" conflict 
only after they had been declared "over."  By August 22nd, there were 45,000 troops in 
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175 Interview with Ashoke Mukherjee 
176 Interview with Gopal Banerjee 
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the streets of Calcutta, which, like during famine, meant that the riots were officially 
"over."  But killings, evictions, and generalized uncertainty still prevailed.  Many of the 
people I have interviewed have said that the riots continued for many weeks or months to 
come, and do not adhere to the official "five day" line. Once the din of unbridled violence 
had receded, however, the shallow rhetoric could start again.  The enormous complexity 
of the riots could be elided in favor of political explanations that privileged, again, the 
powerful as representatives of the weak. This, in some sense, was only a further de-
humanization of the (mostly poor) victims.  The tensions, anxieties, and apprehensions 
that underpinned the violence would not be addressed, and the idea that the riots also 
represented an expression of material grievance, could simply be ignored. Moreover, any 
admission of the participants acting in relation to their own consciousness could be 
denied.  They had merely been automatons of "communalism."   
The only official investigation into the riots, the Calcutta Disturbances Enquiry 
Commission, followed this same logic.  The proceedings took the form of a court trial, 
rather than a hearing.  The majority of witnesses called were police officers and military 
personnel.  They were confronted by a Hindu advocate who often questioned them in 
hostile and leading terms, and by a Muslim advocate, who tried to demonstrate that the 
atrocities of Hindus were that much more fierce.  The proceedings began in November of 
1946, and muddled along in this blame game for the next several months.  Finally, in July 
of 1947, with independence - and partition - pending, and without ever reaching 
conclusion, the commission was convened.  A presiding member explained: 
Your Lordships might remember that during the last session we had 
communicated with our Lordships that it would serve no useful purpose by 
continuing this Enquiry.  We sincerely feel that the sooner we forget about the 
Great Calcutta Killing the better it is for all of us.  The bitter memory of those 
days, 16th to 20th August 1946 might jeopardize the smooth working of a plan 
which has been accepted by the major political parties, and we think it should not 
be adjourned, but the whole proceeding should be dropped.177
 
  
The President of the Commission and all presiding Members concurred.  Since that time 
few have taken up the case. 
 By the time the Commissions convened, India was a sea of dislocation, massacre 
and despair.  The greatest "exchange of populations" in recorded history was underway. 
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Independence from colonial rule was within arm's reach, but the partition of India was 
excoriating the human landscape. In 1946, following close on the heels - and in direct 
relation to - the Calcutta riots, there had been riots in Noakhali, Bihar and the United 
Provinces.  Communal hatred only gelled further in the oven of these outbreaks, feeding a 
pernicious dynamic that made hatred and revenge ever-more central in each echo of 
violence.  The Punjab, in the west of India, erupted into pandemonium in 1947, and 
communal carnage there scarred the population for generations to come. When all was 
said and done, as many as a million people had been violently killed and at least ten 
million had been permanently "de-territorialized."   
Though the Calcutta riots were the spark that ignited the conflagration, they have 
received little scholarly attention. They deserve attention and they deserve explanation. 
That explanation rests in the truly devastating, unremitting and calamitous violence that 
preceded the riots.  The profound and pervasive links between war, famine and riot are 
tortured and complex, but they are also manifest.  They are, moreover, far from 
uncommon.  Whenever there is civil war, ethnic violence, communal riots, or any other 
type of horizontal violence - particularly in the Global South - look for the hunger that 
preceded it, and it is more often than not all-too-easily found.  
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